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INDIA'S FUTURE RELATIONS WITH THE COMMONWEALTH

Implications for Commonwealth Countries

I

THIS paper discusses the implications for the Commonwealth-political, economic, financial and military-of possible constitutional developments in India. It assesses those implications on three hypotheses-

(i) that India remains a member of the Commonwealth, though owing no

allegiance to the Crown;

(ii) that India becomes a foreign State in a specially close treaty relationship

with the United Kingdom and other Commonwealth countries; (iii) that India becomes a foreign State with no such close treaty relationship. 2. Under the first of these hypotheses it is assumed that, despite the severing of the allegiance, India would continue to maintain the same close relations in all practical affairs as now subsist between her and the other Commonwealth countries.

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Under the second hypothesis it is assumed that, although India had ceased to be a member of the Commonwealth, she would wish her practical association with the United Kingdom and other Commonwealth countries to be as close and friendly as possible. It is assumed that she would have understood and appre- ciated the reasons why she could not remain formally a member of the Common- wealth, and would have left it in a friendly spirit; and that it would therefore be possible for Commonwealth countries to conclude with her treaties favourable to their interests as well as to her own and that other relations not governed by treaty provisions would be at least as close as those with any other foreign State.

For the purposes of the third hypothesis it is assumed that India would treat as a rebuff the inability of the other Commonwealth countries to find means of giving effect to her desire to remain within the Commonwealth, and would leave it in a spirit of resentment and hostility. This part of the paper therefore assumes that India's future policy towards the Commonwealth would be at least unco-operative, and possibly hostile.

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3. The assessment of the implications under any of these hypotheses must be influenced largely by the judgment made of India's own interests and of the probable trends of Indian thought and policy towards the West in general and towards the Commonwealth.

In paragraphs 6 to 9 below two different estimates are made of the future development of Indian thought and policy. This paper does not attempt to make a final judgment between them. That judgment will, however, greatly influence the weight which is attached to the considerations discussed in the later Sections dealing with the three hypotheses about India's future constitutional development.

4. Indiasterdsofa is dependent on sea communions? 4af148 Bo land communications with other countries which are adequate for her trade and commerce. The annual volume of her overseas trade (imports plus exports) is

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atlagsert95b0ft48800 millions. Although, in thebrgheightsupply her own needs for most of the essential commodities, she is in practice unlikely to achieve self-sufficiency for a long period of time, if, indeed, she ever achieves it. At present, and for the foreseeable future, she depends on sea-borne imports for- (i) the marginal amount of food required to avert famine (2-3 million tons a year) drawn mainly from Australia, Burma and Siam, Argentina, the United States and Canada;

(ii) oil and lubricants;

(iii) capital goods and machinery of all kinds;

(iv) certain essential raw materials.

She depends largely on the Western Powers for the shipping required to carry these imports. She also relies on Western countries for the trained technicians who are essential to her industrial development, and for replacements and spare parts for her existing industrial plant, most of which has been supplied by the United Kingdom. Of India's total trade, 45 per cent. is with Commonwealth countries within this; 28 per cent. is with the United Kingdom.

5. Indians also have substantial interests in British Colonial territories. There are large Indian communities in East Africa, in the West Indies, in Mauritius, Malaya and Fiji. In all these territories except the West Indies large trading interests are also carried on by Indian citizens who are not domiciled there.

6. India's Foreign Policy.-Up to August 1947 India's foreign policy was controlled by the United Kingdom Government. Since then various general statements have been made on behalf of the Indian Government, from which the following principles of Indian policy emerge :-

(i) India will hold herself detached from Power blocs in international

affairs.

(ii) She will give full support to the United Nations.

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(iii) She will oppose Colonialism" in South-East Asia and in Africa,

especially in South-East Asia.

(iv) She has a particular interest in the countries of South-East Asia. (v) She will keep herself strong for her own defence, and if there is an inter- national conflict will decide her attitude in the light of her own interests. (In one of the statements it is specifically said that India will not necessarily be neutral in such a conflict.)

(vi) In a resolution on foreign policy passed by the All-India Congress in December 1948, it was stated that when her republican constitution is adopted India's present association with the United Kingdom and the Commonwealth will necessarily have to change; but India" desires to maintain all such links with other countries as do not come in the way of her freedom of action and independence, and the Congress would welcome her free association with independent nations of the Common- wealth for their common weal and the promotion of world peace.'

7. It thus appears that India's interests and her present policy are to some extent in accord with those of other countries of the Commonwealth. There are, however, other factors tending in the contrary direction to which due weight should be given. India has already shown some consciousness of her extreme economic dependence on the western world and is already directing her economic policy towards the achievement of greater self-sufficiency. Thus, she aims at developing a mercantile marine which will carry at least 50 per cent. of her trade. She is anxious to increase her industrial development, and with this object in view is aiming at an expansion of her food production. She has shown no reluctance to accept help in the provision of technicians and capital equipment from countries, such as Czechoslovakia, which are under Soviet influence. Her general economic position is, however, such that there are limits to the extent to which she can pursue a policy of economic self-sufficiency.

8. Indian Thought—About the future trends of Indian thought there can be no certainty.

On the one hand it can be asserted that India has many bonds of sympathy with the British way of life. Many educated Indians have been greatly influenced by British educational principles in schools and collegegin odiof 480 of them are

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profoundly influenced by British thought and by the democratic tradition. British Parliamentary instigations have taken root in India and food in their full form in the draft of the new Indian Constitution. More Indian students still choose to pursue their studies in the United Kingdom than in any other country. It is certain that Indian opinion was outraged by German aggression in 1939, and it is probable that a large part of the Congress Party would have favoured moral support of the Allied cause and might have favoured military support if India's constitutional issue had previously been settled.__ It is remark- able that, even though the political leaders of the Congress Party opposed co-operation in the war, over 2 million Indians volunteered for military service (though about half of these came from areas now in Pakistan) and war production in India was on a very large scale. It is also remarkable that, in spite of twenty- five years of acute political controversy between Indian political leaders and the United Kingdom Government, India should still wish to remain associated with the Commonwealth.

9. On the other hand it may be argued that these factors are ephemeral, and that the trend in India is towards the development of national forms of education and culture. India's present political leaders, who are moderate men with many links with Western thought and culture, may ultimately give place to extremists from the Right or the Left who have not the same appreciation of world affairs or the same admiration for Western thought. India's natural desire to assume the political leadership in Asia is likely to emphasise this trend. Her declared foreign policy contains one element-possibly, in Indian eyes, the most important-which may be out of harmony with the policy of the United Kingdom Government and other Commonwealth Governments. This is the demand for the ending of "Colonialism." Although it is the aim of British Colonial policy that Colonial territories shall be gradually developed towards self- government, there may be much room for discord about the speed at which this development should proceed. India has already taken a markedly independent line on certain aspects of foreign policy and her objective of securing the leadership in Asia may take precedence in the Indian mind over the struggle against Communism or any conception of Commonwealth solidarity. It may be that India's desire to remain within the Commonwealth derives mainly from a wish to profit by past Commonwealth prestige and experience in the pursuit of peculiarly Indian aims, and that any contribution which she is prepared to make to the general potential strength of the Commonwealth will be so limited by her divergent interests that it will be more of an embarrassment than a source of strength.

10. India's Financial Policy.A preliminary reference should be made here to the question of financial relations with India since these depend, not on her membership of the Commonwealth, but on her membership of the Sterling Area. The considerations under this head tend to some extent to cut across the three alternative hypotheses discussed below; for India could readily remain a member of the Sterling Area even if she left the Commonwealth-as, indeed, Burma has done.

India's trade is conducted in sterling, and it does not seem likely that she would wish to leave the Sterling Area unless she were impelled to do so by such a degree of political hostility to the Commonwealth as would induce her to ignore the possible financial consequences. She has considered leaving the Sterling Area during earlier financial negotiations with the United Kingdom Government, but seems to have concluded that it would not be in her own interests to do so. Since the last of these negotiations were held (in July 1948) it seems likely that any change in her attitude has been in the direction of favouring continued membership of the Sterling Area. In the first place, she has a substantial hard-currency deficit, which is being met in part from the central reserves of the Sterling Area, and she doubtless realises that this will probably continue. And because of her present shortage of food, her development plans and her need to import consumer goods to counter inflation, she is at present running a substantial deficit on current account which is also likely to continue, though perhaps on a smaller scale. If this deficit does continue, it can only be met by further releases from India's blocked sterling balances. These amount at present to £750 millions, and India is likely to conclude that she will have a better chance of getting generous releases if she remains within the Sterling Area. Secondly, India is likely to conglude that her demands on Commonwealth countries for

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scarce commodities, especially capital goods, will receive more sympathetic cpasiderationfiske remains within the Sterling Arege Tardy48here are signs of a greater readiness on her part to ask for the advice of the United Kingdom Government in financial and commercial negotiations. She has, in fact, a major interest in maintaining the value of sterling and in preserving her access to sterling markets, since it is in the form of goods purchased for sterling that she will ultimately spend her sterling balances.

11. Thus, India's own interests seem to lie on the side of remaining within the Sterling Area, even though she left the Commonwealth. The United Kingdom Government for their part would not wish, in present circumstances at any rate, to compel India to leave the Sterling Area. Even if she were excluded from it, it is doubtful whether she could be prevented altogether from drawing on the central reserves of gold and dollars-limited rights of convertibility have had to be conceded to Egypt, even though she has left the Sterling Area and, unless India's drain on the central reserves became much larger (which is by no means impossible, in view of her doubtful economic prospects) or her attitude were to become so unco-operative as to represent a danger to the Sterling Area, it would be to the advantage of the Commonwealth to retain her within it.

12. Military. The military implications of the three hypotheses are discussed in a separate appreciation by the Chiefs of Staff, which is reproduced in the Appendix to this paper.

III

First hypothesis: that India remains a Member of the Commonwealth, though owing no allegiance to the Crown

13. Political. The main political advantages to the Commonwealth of retaining India within it, even though she severs her connection with the Crown, may be summarised as follows:-

(a) In the eyes of the world, and particularly of potential aggressors, the size and power of the Commonwealth would remain ostensibly unaltered. The change in its constitution which enabled a republican India to remain a member might be regarded as a further example of the Anglo-Saxon genius for compromise; and the cohesiveness of the Commonwealth would appear to remain substantially unaltered. The satisfaction of India's express desire to retain membership while repudiating allegiance to the Crown would provide the best possible conditions for establishing confidence and friendship between India and the other Commonwealth countries. Continuing consultation and collaboration would enable other Commonwealth countries to influence the young Indian State during its adolescence, and would provide opportunities for influencing Indian policy. Finally, India hopes to exercise great influence in South-East Asia; and the interests of other Commonwealth countries in that part of the world would be more likely to be safeguarded if she exercised that influence as a member of the Commonwealth.

(b) Confidence in the future of the Commonwealth might be seriously shaken if India followed the path chosen by Burma and Eire. Conversely, the strength and prestige of the Commonwealth would be greatly enhanced if the whole of the India sub-continent, after being freed from "British rule," elected by the free decision of its peoples to throw in its lot with the Commonwealth. It would be specially unfortunate if the Commonwealth countries had to appear to be thrusting out of the Commonwealth an India which openly professed her desire to remain a member, particularly as it could be said that the sole basis for her exclusion was the insistence of the member Governments on constitutional forms connected with the Crown. Moreover, this would be a most unfavourable moment for such a change when a large part of South-East Asia is troubled with internal unrest and political instability, and gravely threatened by Communist encroachment from the north and fast. of 488 Page 197 of 488

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On the other hand, this course may have the following political disadvantagesage 198 of 488

Page 198 (a) With the passage of time, the Indian outlook may increasingly diverge from that of the rest of the Commonwealth, and this may be con- spicuously reflected in her foreign policy. While she may continue to co-operate with the Commonwealth to the extent required by her interests, her main concern may be with Asian affairs and with estab- lishing her leadership over the nationalist movements in South-East Asia. The continued membership of so powerful a State possessing interests, and pursuing policies different from those of the other countries of the Commonwealth might be regarded by the rest of the world as evidence of the unreality of the Commonwealth as an effective and united force at a time of crisis.

(b) The effect on India of having successfully compelled the other members of the Commonwealth to accept a fundamental change in their mutual relationship might be wholly detrimental to Commonwealth interests. It would be assumed, and not only in India, that the United Kingdom and the other Commonwealth countries were so anxious to gain India's goodwill that they were prepared to do so at the cost of undermining the traditional basis on which the Commonwealth has hitherto rested. Foreign countries might read this as a sign of material weakness, not of political wisdom. If, after securing these far-reaching concessions, India wished to pursue policies inimical to other Commonwealth interests, more particularly in the field of international affairs, she might use the threat of secession to put pressure on the other Common- wealth Governments not to oppose those policies.

(c) Indians might value the Commonwealth relationship more highly if it were made clear to them that Commonwealth membership is a privilege which must be paid for.

(d) One of the arguments for allowing India to remain within the Common- wealth, though owing no allegiance to the Crown, is that insistence on the allegiance as the essential qualification for Commonwealth membership might eventually have the result that the Commonwealth would contract to a point at which its international influence and standing would be gravely weakened. On the other hand, it is arguable that the retention of the allegiance is necessary to the cohesion of the Commonwealth, and that a Commonwealth united by that link, though smaller, would by virtue of its greater cohesion exercise a greater influence in world affairs.

The

15. Colonial.-In a number of British Colonies there are large communities of Indian (and Pakistan) origin which play an active part in the commercial and political life of the territory. Many of these Indians are Colonial-born. policy has been to encourage Colonial-born Indians and all Indians who desire to make their permanent residence in the Colonies to become "British Colonial " citizens rather than "British Indian " citizens. All Indians in the Colonies, however, retain a sentimental affection for India as their homeland. They also tend to incur local unpopularity as a result of their commercial and political ambitions. For both reasons they tend to become segregated from the other communities among whom they live. In addition, there are (particularly in Malaya and Fiji) many Indian nationals who cannot be regarded as permanent residents and whose interests may be considered to be a matter of legitimate concern to the Indian Government. That Government has, however, tended in the past, particularly in East Africa, to claim a right of interference on behalf of the Indian community generally and not only on behalf of Indians who are not permanent residents.

From the point of view of Colonial administration it would clearly be much more convenient if Indians resident in British Colonial territories continued to owe allegiance to the Crown as do the communities among which they live. Under any of the three hypotheses discussed in this paper the problems created by these Indian residents will become substantially more difficult. It is clear, however, that the first hypothesis is the least inconvenient, though it will give rise to various practical problems, especially if Indians in the Colonies opt in large numbers for Indian citizenship.