CAB11-57-9 — Page 31

CHAPTER II (D).

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(2.) A landing in Hebe Haven and an advance via the Customs Pass against the right flank of the position, combined with a turning movement of the Devil's Peak Batteries.

(3.) A landing in Tolo Harbour in the direction of Tai-po-hu and an advance by the Lead Mine Pass against the left flank of the position.

There is yet one more line of approach, which, although not so feasible as the three above mentioned, must not be lost sight of. It is a landing of troops, under cover of the Lantau and Chung Hue Islands, from the Stonecutters Batteries in Tsin Wan and Gindrinkers Bays and a turning movement round the left flank of the position.

9. Considering each of these probable lines of advance in detail and the tactical dispositions that would have to be made to meet them:

With regard to (1). Buffalo Pass provides a very good artillery position for an enemy's

's guns, and one that he would doubtless endeavour to secure, as it would enable him to manoeuvre his infantry under cover of artillery fire up to the passes over the hills; Tate's Cairn, however, dominates it, and becomes, in conjunction with (2), a tactical point of vast importance, and, having good space on its summit, makes a most excellent gun position, covering a very wide field of fire. There is a police post at Saikung, which is shortly to be put into telephonic communication with Hong Kong by the Colonial Government. An enemy advancing from Three Fathom Cove would come under the cognizance of this police post, and the telephone would give timely warning of his advance; it would, in fact, be advisable to detach a small infantry outpost to this point to support the police and carry out scouting and patrol duties.

With regard to (2). The probable tactics of an enemy would be to quickly seize Buffalo Pass as an artillery position and the Hebe and Leo Shui Wan Hills with a view to forcing the passage of the Customs Pass and threatening the Devil's Peak Batteries. To meet these, guns would have to be massed on the ridge running from Tate's Cairn to Nog Tau Tok, and the Nog Tau Kok and Chin Lan Chun Hills held by infantry; an outpost on Leo Shui Wan Hill would give early intimation of an advance in this direction and deny this tactical point to the enemy.

(3.) The best way of dealing with an advance from the direction of Tai-po-hu would be to detach a movable column strong in artillery to Pine Apple Pass. There is at this point an admirable position on the western slopes of Needle Point, and the eastern slopes of the opposite range which go to make the Pass. Below it the road is so encircled with spurs jutting out from all directions that an enemy would find himself in a veritable trap. A small infantry detachment on Needle Point itself would be sufficient, owing to the steepness of the peak, to provide against the risk of the position being turned from this side, while guns on the spur would prevent the position being turned from the left. There is a police post of importance at Tai-po-hu in telephonic communication with Hong Kong, which would give always ample warning of an enemy's intentions in this direction, in time to forestall him at this Pine Apple Pass.

An advance from Tsin Wan Bay could be met by advancing the left flank on to the hills to west of Lai-chi-kok Pass, which dominate this line of approach; the left flank, resting as it does on the sea, becomes secure, and to effect an entrance on to the Pass an enemy would be obliged to diverge on to the Tai-po-hu route. Even were he fortunate enough to effect a lodgment at this point, his further progress on to Kowloon would be prevented by the Stonecutters Batteries.

10. A landing in Tide Cove and a frontal attack against the passes over the hills, is, in face of the rugged steep country to be traversed and the heavy fire that can be brought to bear upon it, so fraught with risk that it may be dismissed as impracticable. If, however, such an attempt were ever to be made, the one disposition, worthy of record, that would have to be made would be to establish a gun position on the northern spurs of Dragon Hill, which are easy of access from the Pass whence the shores of the Cove and the whole of the Frontier Road can be searched with artillery fire.

11. With regard to (b), the chances of a Chinese force invading the Colony are very remote, and of their attempting it in any other way than by an overland march from Canton are infinitesimal. It is perhaps just possible that they might mobilize an army there. Acting on the principle that a vigorous offensive is the best way to meet an attack by Asiatics, especially Mongolians, a force, strength to be determined according to the numbers opposed to it, of which early information would always be available, would be pushed out, moving by sea transport to the mouth of Deep Bay, and seize a cluster of hills close to the shore, which afford an impregnable position, whence

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