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2 and 3 give steep bits of climbing, and it would hardly be possible to advance on the narrow paths under artillery fire.

The two 6-6-inch howitzers on Mount Kellet Spur would make it unpleasant for boats effecting a landing at Aberdeen.

(b.) From Deep Water Bay there are two lines of advance:

1. By Wong-nei-Cheong Gap.

2. By Little Hong Kong and Middle Gap.

These would be met by the garrison of the Wong-nei-Cheong Section, including four 7-prs., supplemented by the Reserves from Victoria, and the boats would be under fire from the two 8-inch howitzers above Wong-nei-Cheong Gap. Repulse Bay need not be specially considered, as if ever a landing took place on its steep shores, the advance would be the same as that from Deep Water Bay.

(c.) As regards Stanley, the village might be destroyed, but an advance from here would only be a very much more toilsome way of attacking the points that are more easily attained from Deep Water and Tytam Bays; if an enemy landing at Stanley advanced northward over the rugged broken ground, it would only lead him to the spheres of defence of Wong-nei-Cheong Gap and Tytam Reservoir.

(d.) From Tytam Bay the objective of the attack would be:-

1. To destroy the dam of the Tytam Reservoir and to seize the Wong-nei-Cheong Section; the two 7-prs. allotted to its defence, supplemented by the fire of the two 2.5-inch guns from Quarry Bay Gap, would hold an advance over this most difficult ground in check until the arrival of support from Wong-nei-Cheong Gap and of the Reserves from Victoria.

2. The deflection of this attack from the Reservoir viâ Quarry Bay Gap need hardly be considered, as it could not take place if the defence at the Reservoir held its

If not, this circuitous route would hardly be adopted.

own.

3. Advance by Tytam Gap and Sai-ki-Wan Road need hardly be considered, for after a lengthened march over steep slopes, it leads to ground defended by Sywan Redoubt and the garrison of No. V Section.

Reserves from Victoria would reach the Sai-ki-Wan Gap long before the advance from Tytam Bay, on which a flank or rear attack could be made from the Reservoir.

(ii.) Attack from the Mainland.

If an attack be made from the mainland, the Kowloon Hills used as natural forts give a strong line of defence. The right, on a ridge a little north-east of hill No. 12, well tested in our tactical exercises, commands the low ground between the hills and the eastern seaboard, and, in conjunction with hill No. 12, commands all the approaches to Hung Ham and its docks.

The ground in front is very difficult, and the hill-tops Nos. 10 and 11 are so narrow that there is not space for more than twenty or thirty men to lie down on them, and parties of men on these narrow hill-tops would be easily cleared by a round or two of shrapnel from East Battery and from field-guns on No. 12 hill.

On the left is Mount Cochrane, a scarped promontory of rotten granite; this with gun epaulment on top and shelter trench for infantry becomes a redoubt difficult of access, commanding the streets of Yaumati and the country to Gun Club Hill on the east.

The centre and reserves in a shelter trench near the Observatory have a clear field of fire to the front, which is also swept by a cross fire from the right and left. On No. 12 hill a blockhouse and a shelter-trench following the contour of the hills will be constructed.

If there are no seaward complications, a much stronger force would be available, and the bills to the north of the Rifle Ranges would be held as a first position.

In either of these cases the guns from Kowloon West and East, although not bearing on the ground between the hills, are effective against formed masses of troops on their summits.

The guns at Stonecutters, although somewhat distant, command the whole coast from the boundary-line southward, and would be effective against formed bodies of

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