CAB11-57-5 — Page 6

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This plan entailed, among other disadvantages :-

(a.) The occupation of hills more or less covered by residential houses, and difficult to be defended satisfactorily.

(b.) The posting of infantry on heights which for a large portion of the year are enveloped in fog, and are in most cases, even in clear weather, beyond effective musketry range of the valleys and paths which they were intended to command.

(c.) The placing of howitzers and other movable armament at similar elevations, against which, in addition to the objections already recited as regards infantry, is the further objection that the guns are rendered almost useless owing to the excessive depression of fire and very long range from and imperfect view of the bays of possible landing.

(d.) The retention of the signallers on heights from which view is fre- quently obscured by fog, rendering the frequent breakdown of the signalling system unavoidable.

(e.) The comparative immunity from fire of the waters off Mount Davis and Sandy Bay, where hostile ships would easily rendezvous under shelter of Mount Davis before attacking the western entrance, or for bombardment, or for landing a force in that bay.

(f.) The rendering unavailable for communication between sections on the West and South Fronts, the only existing good road which generally follows the coast-line.

(g.) Failure to protect the reservoirs on which the water supply of the population depends, and also the shore ends of the submarine telegraph cables to Europe and elsewhere.

(2.) The great dispersion of howitzers-in many cases placed singly- which renders impossible their supervision by artillery officers, who are already too few for proper command in the forts.

(3.) The want of provision for timely preparation of platforms for the howitzers on the Southern Front, and for placing the howitzers permanently in position--a work which, owing to the hilly nature of the country and limited means of transport, it would take a long time to complete.

(4.) The divisional commands-each composed of three sections situated widely apart, in some cases as much as 3 miles-have been found to be too extensive for proper supervision by one commander.

Moreover, the number of separate local commands was thus increased in a way which the paucity of officers can ill afford, and the undivided attention of the senior officers-especially of artillery and engineers-to their own special duties was unduly impeded, while the extra delay caused by sending orders to sections through their often distant divisional commanders is undesirable.

(5.) The vesting in the divisional or sectional commanders the responsi- bility for equipping, arming, clothing, feeding, and making generally efficient the men of their divisions or sections-a responsibility which must necessarily in practice rest with commanders of corps-has been found to be impracticable.

(6.) The distribution of troops to defence sections by numbers instead of by units has proved to be not conducive to ready dispersion to fronts on emergency or to complete identification of defenders with their special fronts of defence, and has practically resulted in no reserve being left.

(7.) The absence of instructions to officers commanding corps as to the special preparations required from them beforehand, and to the distribution of their men on mobilization.

(8.) The absence of sufficient reserves.

(9.) Incompleteness of system of communications by telegraph, telephone, and visual signalling.

(10.) Absence of provision for manning the movable armament, i.e., howitzers, quick-firing guns, machine-guns, 9-pr. field battery, and the Asiatic artillery mountain guns, recently increased from four to eight.

(11.) Absence of any provision for defence of Kowloon on the land side. (12.) The confusion existing as to the responsibility of the Western or Southern Division for the defence of Sandy Bay and neighbourhood.

4. Accordingly the Scheme now proposed embraces the following altered features:-

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