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HONG KONG.
CHAPTER I.
INTRODUCTORY REMARKS AND GENERAL STRATEGICAL CONSIDERATIONS.
Strategical Conditions.
THE Committee consider it unnecessary to dwell upon the importance of Hong Kong as a naval base, and upon the fact that with its loss all British power in the Chinese seas and Western Pacific is at an end; and that not only would our trade be destroyed, but the independence of our rising Colonies in Australia would be seriously threatened.
The probable bases of operations against Hong Kong are Vladivostock, Saigon, and Hanoi, which are respectively 1,760, 900, and 500 miles distant. The Chinese Empire, as a possible enemy, must be taken into account, and it might even be found arrayed on the side of France and Russia against England. It is more probable, however, that, in the event of England being engaged in a war with France and Russia combined, China would be allied with England, and ready to give very material aid in the defence of Hong Kong.
No powerful attack could ever be made so long as England retains the command of the China seas, but if this command is lost, even if only for a short time, an attack in force will certainly be made upon this very valuable possession. It would probably be carried out by a few cruizers of moderate power, accompanied by smaller vessels, and by transports carrying a con- siderable body of troops.
In the event of a war against France and Russia combined, and even in the case of war with either, there are a number of small vessels of Her Majesty's navy which would be of little use, and they would consequently be concentrated at Hong Kong.
These vessels would greatly increase the power of the defence, and although the Committee cannot, of course, take them into account, it considers that this probability should not be lost sight of.
In a war with either France or Russia alone it is probable that only a raid by two or three ships, which had evaded our fleet, would be attempted, and this could be met by the artillery and submarine mining defences, but against both Powers combined the possibility of the attack being accompanied by a land expedition must be taken into account.
In view of the existence of a torpedo-boat station at Whampoa, Hong Kong is considered liable to attacks from 1st class torpedo-boats.
It must also be considered liable to attacks from 2nd class torpedo- boats.
General Character of Hong Kong.
The Island of Hong Kong is about 8 miles in length, running east and west, and from 3 miles at the western end, to 8 miles at the eastern end, in breadth.
The harbour lies between this and the mainland. The entrance at the east is only 500 yards wide; that on the west is separated by Stonecutter s Island into two channels, respectively 4,000 and 1,000 yards wide.
The north side of the harbour is Chinese territory, with the exception of
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