CAB11-57-1 — Page 85

Page 85

Page 85

Great Britain should, for purposes of naval and military defence, have control over all the land which surrounds Mirs Bay and Deep Bay, and from which these bays could be commanded by any Power who might be at enmity with Great Britain. The military object in view in acquiring the new territory was solely to improve the defence of the waters between the Island of Hong Kong and the mainland. It is not proposed to make Mirs Bay a defended harbour for the British fleet, and it is only one of various inlets in the neighbourhood of Hong Kong where an enemy's ships could lie if not interfered with by our vessels.

3. Undoubtedly troops might be landed in Mirs Bay for a raiding attack on the shipping in the harbour and on the existing Kowloon and proposed Lymun works, but the danger of such an attack is slight. The distance to Kowloon Peninsula is 15 miles, and to Lymun 20 miles, and the ground is very difficult, even for infantry, so that the garrison would have considerable advantages in an infantry defence of the high ground to the north of Kowloon and Lymun, and this, it is thought, would be a more effectual defence than the provision of a fixed armament to prevent a vessel lying in Mirs Bay to disembark troops. Such a defence, as regards the Kowloon Peninsula, is already provided in the Hong Kong Defence Scheme (pages 29 and 30), and when the Scheme is revised, it will be necessary to arrange also for defending the Lymun Peninsula in a similar way.

This is a matter for the consideration of the General Officer Commanding, who should bear in mind that, with the strength of attack that may reasonably be anticipated, it is unlikely that an enemy would make serious attempts simultaneously on the mainland from Mirs Bay and on the Island of Hong Kong from its southern undefended shore, but that it is possible that a feint on one place may be made at the same time as a real attack is pushed home on the other, and the arrangements for transporting the infantry reserve from the island to the mainland, or vice versa, should be perfected.

The construction of roads by which the infantry can rapidly reach the positions they might have to occupy from the place or places where they would be landed on the mainland should be considered by the General Officer Commanding, in consultation. with the Colonial authorities, in order that the roads to be made should, as far as possible, answer military and civil requirements.

The positions of look-out posts, from which the waters of Mirs Bay, Tolo Harbour, and Deep Bay can be overlooked should also be reported on by the General Officer Commanding, as well as the telephone lines required to connect them with the head- quarters at Hong Kong.

4. It is for the consideration of the Governor whether some position should not be selected on the mainland to serve as a place of refuge to which the Europeans could retire in the event of a Chinese rising.

5. The Officer Administering the Government considers that, with the exception possibly of a fort on the Devil's Hill, on the north of the Lymun Strait, the increase of territory demands no extension of our line of defence on the Kowloon Peninsula.

The Colonial Defence Committee understand that the War Office have now under consideration the additional permanent defences required for the strengthening of the Lymun Pass, rendered necessary by the acquisition of the new territory.

6. The Colonial Defence Committee do not foresee any necessity to increase the artillery garrison of IIong Kong. The numbers they recommended in 1896, which have been accepted by the War Office, will, when the large number of R.M.L. guns in the fortress have given place to modern B.L. and Q.-F. weapons, give a sufficient margin for manning a powerful armament at Devil's Peak.

The infantry garrison now consists of a British battalion and the Hong Kong regiment of Sikhs. The Colonial Defence Committee do not at present propose any increase.

They do not think that the transformation of the village constables into an efficient body of Military Police, as suggested by Mr. Stewart Lockhart, and also by Mr. Long, is a very practical idea. It is difficult, even with Europeans, to train police to perform military duties, or to train soldiers to perform police duty, without losing efficiency in both. Further, it would be a risky experiment to arm 1,000 of the inhabitants of the leased territory, bred and trained under Chinese systems, and at the

Page 85

Page 85

Page 85Page 86