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12. The local Defence Committee are unanimously of opinion that the movement of all craft into and out of the harbour at night should be forbidden, and that the examination service should be suspended during the hours of darkness.

This decision has been brought about by the experience of the last mobilization, when the greatest difficulty was experienced at the batteries, and also on the examination vessels, in discerning friend from foe, particularly over the wide areas of water at the western entrance, and in bad weather.

After notifying to mariners that the harbour is closed to traffic between certain hours, the method which it is recommended should be adopted to enforce it is by means of patrol boats stationed sufficiently far outside to command the entrances.

This suspension of traffic will not interfere materially with the trade of the port, as the acting Harbour Master has informed the Committee that, on an average, only five of the smaller ocean- going steamers attempt to come in at night, and that otherwise they mostly, owing to the difficulties of navigation, fix their speed so as to arrive at daylight.

With this change in view, and the fact that the subject of the examination service is under the consideration of the Admiralty and War Office, the Committee consider that it is unnecessary to elaborate the present Regulations beyond the fact of determining special anchorages on the examination ground and under the guns of the defence, where all ships desirous of entering the harbour are to be brought-to for examination. These areas, called the "Cheung Hue" anchorage and the "Junk Island" anchorage, have been described and included in Chapter VI (ii), paragraph 6.

These anchorages would be for use by day only and in connection with the examination services.

I have, &c.

His Excellency the Governor.

(Signed)

C. H. DARLING, Colonel,

Commanding Troops, South China.

APPENDIX II.

General Officer Commanding the Troops in South China to War Office.

Sir,

Hong Kong, June 17, 1907. THE changes in the political situation that have taken place within the last few years render advisable a revision of the data on which the Hong Kong Defence Scheme is based.

l'aragraph 9 says: "For purposes of calculating the scale of raiding attack which it is the object of these defences to render impracticable may be conveniently assumed as one delivered by not more than six or eight armoured vessels accompanied by two or three armed transports, conveying in all a maximum landing force of 4,000 men.'

If raids of this nature are still considered within the bounds of probability, then the existing garrison of 2 battalions of infantry is, having regard to the extent and intricacy of the ground to be defended, inadequate.

It would appear, however, that, in the present state of affairs in the Far East, the rôle of the infantry garrison of Hong Kong would be

1. To deal with a Chinese attack from Canton as well as with the internal troubles that might accompany such an attack.

2. To protect the rear of the batteries from the enterprises of small parties landed to assist, by attacks on the defending guns, the long range bombardment referred to in Memorandum by Colonial Defence Committee, Secret, No. 388 M, dated the 7th March, 1907.

I have, &c. (Signed)

R. G. BROADWOOD,

Major-General,

Commanding Troops, South China.

PRINTED AT THE FOREIGN OFFICE BY J. W. HARRISON,-

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