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[This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty's Government.]

Printed for the use of the Colonial Office.

SECRET.

No. 441 R.

HONG KONG.

C.O No. 46446/06.

W.O. No. 79/Hong Kong/2.

Defence Scheme revised to November 1906.

Remarks by the Colonial Defence Committee.

THE Colonial Office have referred to the Colonial Defence Committee a despatch dated the 16th November, 1906, from the Governor of Hong Kong, forwarding the Defence Scheme revised to November 1906.

2. The despatch is printed with a letter, dated the 16th November, 1906, from the Officer Commanding the Troops in South China, as Appendix I to these Remarks.

The Committee have also received a letter, dated the 17th June, 1907, from the General Officer Commanding the Troops, South China, in which he draws attention to the inadequacy of the present infantry garrison of Hong Kong. The letter is printed as Appendix II to these Remarks.

3. When the Defence Scheme was under discussion the Committee had the advantage of the presence of Sir Matthew Nathan, late Governor of Hong Kong, who had been unable to comment on the Scheme when transmitting it to the Colonial Office in November 1906.

Sir Frederick Lugard, Governor of Hong Kong, was also present.

Observations by the late Governor of Hong Kong.

4. Sir Matthew Nathan expressed a desire again to draw attention to the weakness of the infantry garrison of Hong Kong. He was of opinion that the present infantry garrison, consisting of half of a British infantry battalion and two native infantry battalions, with an establishment of 2,322 of all ranks, of whom 1,826 were natives of India, was inadequate to meet the scale of attack to which Hong Kong has been assumed by the Colonial Defence Committee, for purposes of calculation, to be liable. He pointed out that although, with a view to economy of personnel, defensive positions of as limited extent as was possible had been selected, when the troops were distributed at their war stations under the Defence Scheme, there remained at the disposal of the General Officer Commanding, for the reinforcement of any point that might be threatened, a general infantry reserve of only 364 men. Taking into consideration the distance between the various points in the defensive lines at which an attack could be delivered, and the difficulties of concentrating the reserve rapidly at any of these points, owing to the nature of the country, and of transferring troops rapidly from one side of the harbour to the other, this reserve was dangerously small. He therefore again strongly urged that a whole battalion of British infantry instead of half a battalion. should be allotted to the defence of Hong Kong.

He also urged the desirability of reconsidering the assumption, laid down in Chapter I of the Hong Kong Defence Scheme, that Hong Kong should be regarded as immune from attack by sea-going torpedo craft. He suggested that the examples furnished during the Russo-Japanese war of the free use as naval bases of convenient harbours in neutral territory, of the facility with which sea-going

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