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22. Chapter V has been redrafted for "precautionary" and " war stages, the form of draft regimental orders being retained (vide paragraph 23, Memorandum 330 M), although the title of 173 the chapter hardly admits of this interpretation.
23. Chapter VI (i), “Action by Civil Departments," has been drafted by your Excellency, and has been the subject of correspondence between us. As now put forward, the matter seems to harmonize in details with the military action.
24. Chapter VI (ii), "Harbour Traffic Regulations" has also been jointly revised, and I have added a few additional details given in the latest instructions received from the War Office.
As regards paragraph 4 (as amended), a certain amount of confusion has arisen by the use of the expression "signalmen." The "signallers" now shown are found by the R.G.A., and will be found provided for in Table B (ii); they are not seamen. The Harbour Master states that seamen signalmen cannot be provided. War Office instructions lay down three as the minimum for each examining vessel, and War Office letter lays down the number as two in three reliefs (W.O. letter No. 266/768 (M.T. 2) of 20/6/1904, as amended by W.O. letter No. 266/768 (M.T. 2) of 22/11/1904). If the Examination Officer on cach launch be considered as the third signaller, the service is complete.
The launches for junk traffic do not carry signallers.
A register of names of examination officers cannot be maintained by the Harbour Master, as that officer reports that British pilots are leaving the port, and that he would be largely dependent in time of war for the personnel of examination officers on officers of mercantile marine which might happen to be lying idle in the harbour.
A paragraph showing the arrangements for the entry of torpedo craft has been added. The exact code in which this initial letter should be shown depends on the flags in possession of the commanders of torpedo boats. An instruction from the Admiralty would assist in this
matter.
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25. General. On the broad principles of the division of the Defence Scheme into “ "precau- tionary" and ". war stages, as formulated in the Memorandum No. 330 M, I would point out to your Excellency that their successful application would appear to depend largely on the very earliest intimation of strained relations being given to the (General) Officer who is charged with the military responsibility. He is entitled to be trusted with this confidence. The channel of instruc- tions from home, as detailed in the last sub-paragraph of paragraph 6 in the above-quoted Memorandum, presents a roundabout method of apprising me, in my capacity as General Officer Commanding, with the military situation. It would seem as if the course adopted transfers from the War Office to the Colonial Office the initiative in directing military operations. I submit, for the consideration of the Colonial Defence Committee, that it would be more in accordance with the fitness of things, and more expeditious, if the Secretary of State for War, who is in possession of all information, and who, clearly, disposes of all military personnel and material, should be the authority to advise the (General) Officer Commanding (Imperial) Troops. For the successful conduct of the defence of Hong Kong, as I understand, I am responsible to my military superiors, and in no part of the Memorandum referred to can I discover any communication from them to me or from me to them. As is stated by the Colonial Defence Committee, "strictly speaking, no executive action should be required before the precautionary period," and the resulting tendency is to make undue preparations on that stage being notified, a tendency which I have endeavoured carefully to guard against, and to preclude measures which, were I placed in the early confidence of the Secretary of State for War, could be taken to facilitate the rapid mobilization of the garrison, by a gradual transference of men and stores which would be less likely to precipitate hostilities than a simultaneous movement of all arms no matter how disguised. In the event of an act of war being committed by a Power with whom we are in strained relations while as yet the "precautionary" stage only is notified, I should not be absolved from the possible results of the garrison not being mobilized. I submit, therefore, that the mobilization of the garrison is largely determined by local circumstances, and that I should be wanting in my duty if, having formed the opinion that mobilization be necessary, I should fail to order it, with, or without notification of the "war" stage by the Secretary of State for the Colonies.
In compliance with the recommendations of the Colonial Defence Committee, the measures to be taken and the precise distribution of the troops in the "precautionary" and "war" stages have been embodied in this revise. Such precision of detail is, in my opinion, destructive of initiative and numbs the sense of responsibility.
I have, &c. (Signed) V. HATTON, Major-General,
His Excellency Sir Matthew Nathan, K.C.M.G.,
Governor, &c., Hong Kong.
Commanding the Troops in South China.
PRINTED AT THE FOREIGN OFFICE BY J. W. HARRISON.-12/6/1906.
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