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APPENDIX.

1

(Secret.) Sir,

Covering Despatch of Governor.

Government House, Hong Kong, July 25, 1905. I HAVE the honour to forward herewith the Defence Scheme for Hong Hong revised to the 30th June, 1905, in accordance with the Colonial Defence Committee's Memorandum No. 330 M, dated the 10th February, 1905, and Remarks No. 373 R, dated the 4th April, 1905. I also enclose, to assist in the correct reproduction of the revision, a complete copy of the amendments that have been made to the Scheme submitted in September of last year.

2. The Scheme is covered by a letter from the General Officer Commanding in South China, explanatory of these amendments. The following paragraphs refer to the subjects treated in those correspondingly numbered in that letter.

3. In your Secret despatch dated the 23rd February, 1905, you informed me that the reduc- tion of the infantry garrison of Hong Kong from half a British battalion and three Indian regiments to half a British battalion and two Indian regiments was due to a decision arrived at by the Committee of Imperial Defence, that owing to the change that had recently taken place "in the balance of naval power in the Far East," a battalion could safely be withdrawn for the present. Within twenty days of the receipt of that despatch there was concentrated within 750 miles of this station a fleet which, as regards the number and theoretical power of the ships comprising it, and the strength of the force manning it was superior to any that had before been seen in the Far East. At the same time, i.e., on or about the 21st April, there were grounds for suspecting hostile action from this fleet, while political reasons made undesirable a concentration of the British Eastern Squadrons. This combination of unanticipated circumstances has strengthened my opinion that the defence of the naval base against raiding attack should not rest on His Majesty's Navy, i.e., should not be based on the balance of naval power at any particular moment, but that it should always be such that effective opposition could be offered to raiding attack on the scale which the Colonial Defence Committee have assumed convenient for purposes of calcu- lation,

viz., "

one delivered by . armoured vessels, accompanied by two or three armoured transports, conveying in all a maximum landing force of 4,000 men.' Taking into consideration the distance between the various points in the defensive line at which an attack would be delivered, and the difficulty of concentrating the defence troops rapidly at any of these points which must exist owing to the character of the country, whatever improvements are made in communications, I am of opinion that a garrison comprising little over 2,000 regular infantry, of which less than a quarter is British, is insufficient to meet an attack on the scale indicated. I accordingly ask that if the deduction that has been made in the number of Indian regiments is to be permanent, a whole instead of a half battalion of British infantry should be allotted to the place.

With the small garrison now approved, the difference, pointed out by Major-General Hatton, between the establishment of an Indian regiment as entered in the last revision of the Scheme, viz., 924 of all ranks, and the strength at which it proceeds here under orders from India, viz., 812 of all ranks, is of considerable moment.

4. The present combination on one sheet of the information hitherto contained in the two detailed maps illustrating the defence arrangements is an improvement. A further improvement would be the substitution for the indifferent key-map which now appears at the commencement of the Scheme of the map recently prepared in the Colony for the Colonial Office List. I have no doubt that the Editors of that List will be willing to supply the necessary number of copies for binding with the present and future revisions of the Scheme.

The only objection to the proposal of Major-General Hatton that in future the maps illustrating the Scheme should be placed in a pocket at the end of it, is the chance of their becoming separated from it and thus mislaid. As, however, the arrangement recommended is that adopted in secret documents issued by the Admiralty to Naval Officers, I do not think that this objection is of much weight.

5. The most striking feature of the port of Hong Kong is the accumulation of shipping at all times to be found in it, an accumulation not likely to be lessened in time of war when vessels would take shelter behind the defences. More damage could be done at the port in a short time by sinking this shipping than in any other way. The Defence Scheme assumes that seagoing torpedo boats will not be available to effect this damage, and that carried torpedo boats will not be used for this purpose. This was the view taken in my letter to the Commander-in-Chief, China Station, dated the 3rd September, 1904, printed in the Appendix to the Colonial Defence Committee's Remarks No. 373 R, and concurred in in paragraphs 8 and 12 of those Remarks. The examples that have been furnished during the current year of the free use as naval bases of convenient harbours in neutral territory, of the facility with which seagoing torpedo boats can be taken long distances under convoy, and of the recklessness with which a weaker belligerent will destroy even neutral shipping, have somewhat weakened this view, though I am not yet prepared to advocate that special measures should be taken at this port to avert the danger of merchant

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