CAB11-57-1 — Page 250

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7. Paragraph 7. entirely concur in the ocean-going vessels in

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Closing of western entrance.--The Colonial Defence Committee decision of the Governor not to close the western entrance to time of war.

8. Paragraph 8. Torpedo boat attack.-The Committee concur in the Governor's expression of opinion in paragraph 4 of his letter printed as Appendix I, Enclosure 5. The General Officer Commanding was informed in War Office letter No. Hong Kong 5/945, dated the 28th October, 1904, that the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty see no reason for modifying their views with regard to the radius of action of torpedo boat destroyers, which is at present considered to be 300 miles.

9. Paragraph 12. Hospital accommodation in war.-This formed the subject of the Colonial Defence Committee's Memorandum No. 326 M, dated the 9th August, 1904.

10. Paragraph 13.-The Colonial Defence Committee have carefully considered the suggestion that the subject-matter of Chapter II (C) (i), "Communications by road and water," should be transferred to Chapter I in this and other Colonial Defence Schemes, and they recognize the force of the argument used. As, however, the arrangement recommended in their Memorandum No. 46 M, dated the 3rd May, 1893, has been adopted in about seventy home, Colonial, and Indian Defence Schemes, and has become familiar to many officers, they do not think the point of sufficient importance to justify a change.

Moreover, on reference to Memorandum No. 46 M it will be seen that the object of Chapter I is to give general rather than detailed information, and to give an insight into the principle upon which the scheme of defence is based. Chapter II describes in detail the dispositions of the defence, and the detailed particulars of the communications for the movement of troops; and the trans- mission of messages between, and in, the sections, could not very conveniently precede the description of the territorial organization into sections and the detailed distribution of the troops. As the communications described in Chapter II (C) are those of military importance only, they may conveniently be regarded as a factor in the defence organization, and as a necessary connection between the static disposi- tions of the troops in Chapter II (A) and (B) and their dynamic utilization in Chapter II (D).

In order to carry out this idea, a slight revision of Chapter I, Chapter II (D), and Chapter III (C) would be advantageous. From Chapter I, paragraph 20 (which begins somewhat abruptly), and paragraph 24, the actual names of the gaps and passes might be transferred to Chapter II (C) (i), "By road and water." The title of Chapter II (C) (ii), “Communication of orders and intelligence," might be altered to "By telephone and signalling" in order to bring out the point indicated in paragraph 11 of the Committee's Remarks No. 340 R, viz., that what is required is a record of the actual means of communication and not instructions as to their utilization for intelligence purposes by the D.A.Q.M.G., and other military and civil officers mentioned in Chapters III and VI, in which chapters such instructions should be recorded. Chapter II (C) (ii) with its well-arranged diagram of command lines is the part of the scheme to which any staff officer wishing to transmit orders or intelligence would turn, and in it should be found particulars of the military com- mand and administrative telephone systems, the Government telephone system, the ship signalling system, and the military signalling communications, if any, that would be continuously open in war.

Defence Scheme.

Chapter I.-Introductory Remarks and Strategic Considerations.

11. Page, 1 paragraphs 3 to 7.-The substitution of the following amended wording is recommended :-

3. The peace strength of the garrison of French Indo-China is now 34,000 men, of whom 14,000 are Europeans. In the event of war, an additional force of at least 12,000 reservists and 11,000 "gardes indigènes" would be available, besides 8,000 or 9,000 able-bodied Europeans in emergency. The native troops are composed of indifferent personnel, and the military position

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