CAB11-57-17 — Page 31

CHAPTER II (D).

Page 31

24

14. These arrangements should make it impossible for an enemy to land anywhere on the west, south, or east coasts of the island without being discovered. If a landing in force is attempted the piquets may be forced to retire on their supports, and it may further be necessary that the supports should retire on their reserves, the line occupied by the latter will be held.

15. The Commander of every detachment is responsible for the protection of his detachment against surprise. It is therefore unnecessary to complicate this Scheme by laying down the exact measures for the protection of each post and piquet.

16. The guns in each sub-section form part of the local reserve of that sub-section.

17. Paragraphs 48 and 51, Chapter V, show the disposition of the infantry at the war stage.

(c.) Attack from direction of the Mainlund.

Mainland Section.

18. An attack from the direction of the mainland is the most probable that an enemy would attempt, because almost the whole country north of the Kowloon Hills is defiladed from the fire from the heavy guns in the forts.

19. An attack from the north overland may be looked at from two points of view-

(1.) By a raiding force of one of the Powers, of a strength of about 4,000 men. (2.) By a Chinese army, or Chinese army and rabble combined.

10. In either case their first objective would be to get possession of the Kowloon Hills, which dominate Kowloon and Hong Kong. It is therefore of the first importance to the safety of Hong Kong that the possession of these hills should be denied to an enemy.

21. The line of defence on the mainland therefore follows the line of these hills in an arc of a circle nine miles in extent from Devil's Peak on the east to Wong Uk on the west.

For this, only one battalion of infantry is available, which has to furnish posts holding the approaches over the whole nine miles of the range while retaining a reserve in readiness to reinforce threatened points.

22. The length and difficulty of the communications renders it necessary that these posts should have considerable powers of resistance, and this necessity is further empha- sized at night by the presence of heavy guns on the line. To meet these requirements, blockhouses have been provided, divided into groups, each group supported by a local

reserve.

23. The possession by Great Britain of the country between the Kowloon Hills and the Sham Chun River is, in one respect a source of weakness, because it makes it possible for one of the Great Powers to land an army within striking distance of Hong Kong, without violating the neutrality of Chinese territory.

it would, of course, be desirable to watch and guard the various possible landing places on the mainland, and to establish strong advanced posts in the difficult country north of the Kowloon Hills, but with the garrison available neither can be done without dangerously weakening the main lines of defence.

24. There are four practicable lines of approach to the Kowloon Hills available to a force landed in the neighbourhood, viz. :-

(1.) From a landing in Three Fathoms Cove and an advance in the direction of Buffalo Pass against the right centre and the right flank of the position.

(2.) From a landing in Hebe Haven and an advance via the Customs Pass against the right flank of the position, combined with a turning movement of the Devil's Peak position.

Page 31

Page 31

Page 31