CAB11-57-15 — Page 31

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CHAPTER II (D),

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possible time to threatened points. The guns of the movable armament on the island have been placed in the position where it is considered they could best assist the infantry to prevent an enemy landing.

10. Attack from direction of the Mainland.—An attack from the direction of the mainland is the most probable that an enemy would attempt, because almost the whole country north of the Kowloon Hills is defiladed from the fire from the heavy guns in the forts.

An attack from the north overland may be looked at from two points of view—

(1.) By an army of one of the Powers.

(2.) By a Chinese army, or Chinese army and rabble combined.

In either case their first objective would be to get possession of the Kowloon Hills, which dominate Kowloon and Hong Hong. It is therefore of the first importance to the safety of Hong Kong that the position of these hills should be denied to an enemy.

11. The line of defence on the mainland therefore follows the line of these hills in an arc of a circle nine miles in extent from Devil's Peak on the east to Wong Uk on the west.

For this, only one battalion of infantry is available, which has to furnish posts holding the approaches over the whole nine miles of the range while retaining a reserve and ready to reinforce threatened points.

12. The length and difficulty of the communication renders it necessary that these posts should have considerable powers of resistance, and this necessity is further empha- sized at night by the presence of heavy guns on the line. To meet these requirements, blockhouses have been provided, divided into groups, each group supported by a local

reserve.

13. The possession by Great Britain of the country between the Kowloon Hills and the Sham Chun River is, in one respect a source of weakness, because it makes it possible for one of the Great Powers to land an army within striking distance of Hong Kong, without violating the neutrality of Chinese territory.

It would, of course, be desirable to watch and guard the various possible landing places on the mainland, and to establish strong advanced posts in the difficult country north of the Kowloon Hills, but with the garrison available neither can be done without dangerously weakening the main lines of defence.

14. There are four practicable lines of approach to the Kowloon Hills from the mainland :---

(1.) A landing in Three Fathoms Cove and an advance in the direction of Buffalo Pass against the right centre and the right flank of the position.

(2.) A landing in Hebe Haven and an advance via the Customs Pass against the right flank of the position, combined with a turning movement of the Devil's Peak position.

(3.) A landing in Tolo Harbour in the direction of Tai-po-hu, and an advance by the Lead Mine Pass against the left flank of the position.

(4.) Landing in either Tsun Wan or Gindrinkers' Bay, under cover of Lantau and Chung Huo, and a turning movement round the left flank of the position.

15. The disposition of the troops to meet an attack from the mainland are laid down in Table B (ii).

The line of the Kowloon Hills forms an admirable natural line of defence. The hills slope very sheer to the north.

Tate's Cairn is a tactical position of great importance, as it dominates most of the country to the north.

The advance of an enemy from any one of the landing places mentioned above would be an operation of great difficulty.

With the exception of the Frontier Road, there are no roads worthy of name outside the arc of the Kowloon Hills, such paths as exist are merely tracks where troops could move only in single file.

The movement of guns other than mountain guns carried by mules or by hand is out of the question.

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