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CHAPTER II (D).

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10. A landing in Tide Cove and a frontal attack against the passes over the hills, is, in face of the rugged steep country to be traversed and the heavy fire that can be brought to bear upon it, so fraught with risk that it may be dismissed as impracticable. If, however, such an attempt were ever to be made, the one disposition worthy of record that would have to be made would be to establish a gun position on the northern spurs of Eagle's Nest, which are easy of access from the pass, whence the shores of the Cove and the whole of the frontier road can be searched with artillery fire.

11. With regard to (b), the chances of a Chinese force invading the Colony are very remote, and of their attempting it in any other way than by an overland march from Canton are infinitesimal. It is perhaps just possible that they might mobilize an army there. Acting on the principle that a vigorous offensive is the best way to meet an attack by Chinese, a force, strength to be determined according to the numbers opposed to it, of which early information would always be available, would be pushed out, moving by sea transport to the mouth of Deep Bay, and seize a cluster of hills close to the shore, which afford an impregnable position, whence the flank of an invading army would be so seriously threatened as to render its advance impossible. Before it could continue its march this position would have to be taken or masked. Shallow draught gun-boats or armed river boats should form part of this force, and would be of the utmost service, for not only would they be able to co-operate but would cover the retirement of the force, if obliged to withdraw in face of overwhelming numbers. Another force would be moved out to the vicinity of Tai-po-hu, and from this base would be able to take up positions on the hills either at 365 or 391, which would bar the two lines of advance open to it. The invading Chinese army would thus have to first free its threatened flank by a long circuitous march, only to be met in front by the Tai-po-hu force. The Deep Bay force would then be available either to maintain its role of hanging on to the flank of the enemy, or, what always instils Asiatics with the greatest fear, create such a panic in their rear, and so threaten their lines of retreat, as to throw them into utter demoralization. Although the contingency of a Chinese invasion is remote, the dispatch of two forces as above, working in combination, would be the best way of meeting it.

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