CAB11-57-10 — Page 28

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CHAPTER II (D).

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Saikung, which is shortly to be put into telephonic communication with Hong Kong by the Colonial Government. An enemy advancing from Three Fathom Cove would come under the cognizance of this police post, and the telephone would give timely warning of his advance; it would, in fact, be advisable to detach a small infantry outpost to this point to support the police and carry out scouting and patrol duties.

With regard to (2). The probable tactics of an enemy would be to quickly seize Buffalo Pass as an artillery position and the Hebe and Razor Hills with a view to forcing the passage of the Customs Pass and threatening the Devil's Peak Position. To meet these, guns would have to be massed on the ridge running from Tate's Cairn to Kowloon Peak, and Kowloon Peak and Chin Lan Chun Hill held by infantry; an outpost on Razor Hill would give early intimation of an advance in this direction.

(3.) The best way of dealing with an advance from the direction of Tai-po-hu would be to detach a movable column to Pine Apple Pass. There is at this point an admirable position on the western slopes of Needle Hill, and the eastern slopes of the opposite range which go to make the Pass. Below it the road is so encircled with spurs jutting out from all directions that an enemy would find himself in a veritable trap. A small infantry detachment on Needle Hill itself would be sufficient, owing to the steepness of the peak, to provide against the risk of the position being turned from this side, while guns on the spur would prevent the position being turned from the left. There is a police post of importance at Tai-po-hu in telephonic communication with Hong Kong, which would give always ample warning of an enemy's intentions in this direction, in time to forestall him at this Pine Apple Pass.

An advance from Tsin Wan Bay could be met by advancing the left flank on to the hills to west of Lai-chi-kok Pass, which dominate this line of approach; the left flank, resting as it does on the sea, becomes secure, and to effect an entrance on to the Pass an enemy would be obliged to diverge on to the Tai-po-hu route. Even were he fortunate enough to effect a lodgment at this point, his further progress on to Kowloon would be prevented by the Stonecutters Batteries.

10. A landing in Tide Cove and a frontal attack against the passes over the hills, is, in face of the rugged steep country to be traversed and the heavy fire that can be brought to bear upon it, so fraught with risk that it may be dismissed as impracticable. If, however, such an attempt were ever to be made, the one disposition, worthy of record, that would have to be made would be to establish a gun position on the northern spurs of Beacon Hill, which are easy of access from the Pass whence the shores of the Cove and the whole of the Frontier Road can be searched with artillery fire.

11. With regard to (b), the chances of a Chinese force invading the Colony are very remote, and of their attempting it in any other way than by an overland march from Canton are infinitesimal. It is perhaps just possible that they might mobilize an army there. Acting on the principle that a vigorous offensive is the best Iway to meet an attack by Chinese, a force, strength to be determined according to the numbers opposed to it, of which early information would always be available, would be pushed out, moving by sea transport to the mouth of Deep Bay, and seize a cluster of hills close to the shore, which afford an impregnable position, whence the flank of an invading army would be so seriously threatened as to render its advance impossible. Before it could continue its march this position would have to be taken or masked. Shallow draught gun-boats or armed river boats should form part of this force, and would be of the utmost service, for not only would they be able to co-operate but would cover the retirement of the force, if obliged to withdraw in face of over- whelming numbers. Another force would be moved out to the vicinity of Tai-po-hu, and from this base would be able to take up positions on the hills either at 365 or 391, which would bar the two lines of advance open to it. The invading Chinese army would thus have to first free its threatened flank by a long circuitous march, only to be met in front by the Tai-po-hu force. The Deep Bay force would then be available either to maintain its rôle of hanging on to the flank of the enemy or, what always instils Asiatics with the greatest fear, create such a panic in their rear and so threaten their lines of retreat as to throw them into utter demoralization. Although the contingency of a Chinese invasion is remote, the dispatch of two forces as above, working in combination, would be the best way of meeting it.

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