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complete his education ( the desire expressed by many of the youth ) and then
he began to cry. When I asked him why the tears he said that he had missed
so much schooling he realized that if he went back to school the boys in his
class would make fun of him because he was so much bigger than they. I
assured him that he was now among friends. I asked this boy why he had left
home. He said that recently his auntie had passed away and because of famine
conditions a man had retrieved her body the day after it had been buried , had
taken it to a pig slaughter house, had it cut up and peddled the human flesh
as pork. The thief was arrested and during his trial pled for a long jail sen
tence so he " would at least have something to eat."
From the interviews with some 50 people I learned the following facts.
Starvation is prevalent in Red China. It is common practice in west China to sell
new-born babies for human consumption. The grain that is being imported into
China from foreign countries is being stockpiled in west China in preparation
for the needs of the Communist leaders when they find it necessary to establish
a second line of defense there. This, coupled with the fact that industries are
being moved from the coast and the south China border, indicates the fea of
a possible invasion launched by the Nationalists. Whenever the authorities hold
trials of military personnelon charges of being counterrevolutionary many truck
loads of Army officers are brought to the long -drawn -out trialsas a warning to
beware. These trials are frequently held in an area where the residents are
restless. High ranking Communist military officers are dissatisfied and wish
to rebel.
It is the unrest and rebellion that led to some subordinate commanders in
south China relaxing the border restrictions. When the thing got out of hand
and unfavorable international reaction set in, Mao made a trip south and the
border was closed. Refugees are still illegally drifting into Macao at the rate
of about 50 a day and into Hong Kong at the rate of about 200 a day. A con
servative estimate is that 85 percent of the mainland people would openly
welcome a return of President Chiang as their leader.
The question has been raised . How were these 62 refugees selected. They
were not selected, they themselves elected to join the Nationalist cause. I met
with First Lieutenant Liu at the Chinese Air Force headquarters. He is the
young man who flew the MIG from Red China to Taiwan because he wanted to
defect to free China . These refugees manifested their choice in the same manner
only on a less dramatic scale .
I saw these people provided with fresh clean clothes, bedding, and funds, at
a clean comfortable reception center. I saw them stretch out on the fresh green
 REFUGEE PROBLEM IN HONG KONG AND MACAO 175

grass and relax in the beautiful garden of that center. They were being proc
essed when I left Taiwan a few days ago and will be helped by case workers
to find gainful employment or to continue their education or given an opportunity
to serve China as a member of her armed forces .
Following this delightful experience I went to Hong Kong. Here the at
mosphere is entirely different. Here the propogandists have done their dirty
work.
I feel that the British have done a splendid job in handling the refugee
problem in past years. I feel that they are justified in asking why the free
world is only now becoming interested in this problem . I feel that they sin
cerely believe they have reached the saturation point economically. My guess
is that their fear of Peiping if they openly aid and abet the Nationalist cause
in their desire to receive the refugees is what accounts for the horrible pictures
of brutality on the border which I have in my possession. These inhuman
brutal pictures clearly show their activities as they forcibly drove the refugees
back over the border. Perhaps I am wrong. hope so and I also hope that
before God the British can live with a clear conscience and justify their ac
tions. However, the real brutality and inhumanity may be charged up to
the immigration restrictions which our own United States has imposed upon the
Chinese.
In Hong Kong it was said , and no serious effort has been made to deny *
these allegations, that the Nationalists would only take 35,000 refugees *
that they would insist on screening them in Hong Kong and would dump se
curity risks on the crown colony and that there was a June 30 deadline on
accepting the 35,000. Nothing could be farther from the truth. I endeavored
in the short time I was in Hong Kong to make the true facts as widely known
as possible . What isn't generally known in Hong Kong or any other part of
the free world for that matter is that the Nationalists now have nine ships at
the southern tip of Taiwan ready to sail to Hong Kong on a moment's notice to
receive on board any and all refugees who want free passage to Taiwan. Nor
is it known that when the Nationalist relief officials wanted to visit Hong Kong
to view the problem close up, the British would not issue them visas. What
isn't known to the public is that the Chinese have made what appears to be a
very practical suggestion for a partial solution to the problem and theauthor
ities in Hong Kong, up to the date of my departure, had not extended to the
Nationalists the common courtesy of an acknowledgment of their communi
cations. This is hard, in fact impossible for anyone to justify. No matter
what line of reasoning they may take to justify the brutalities they cannot suc
cessfully justify this before the free world . The British are not in a very good
position to complain about the Berlin wall which the Communists erected
as long as they maintain the barbed wire fence which they erected in Hong
Kong.
I have dedicated myself to the task of helping these refugees who make their
way to Taiwan . My efforts will be only a drop in the bucket, but if we get
enough drops we will eventually have a full bucket. The refugees are like human
tennis balls being batted back and forth across the border. In a tennis game it
is only the ball that gets hit, and in this bit of international intrigue it is the
refugees who suffer . The free world unintentionally or otherwise has put to
death thousands of Chinese who were willing to come to our side and escape to
freedom . This is partly due to the fact that we were not prepared for such an
event. What is heartbreaking is the fact that 3 months have gone by, and we
are still not prepared if there should be a repeat performance. The British
would be left with no alternative but to repeat their acts of brutality.
I shall endeavor to help free China help the refugees by ( 1 ) making the truth
known. I began doing this before I left Asia by making the trip to Hong Kong
* * * visiting Chinese, relief agency heads, and American missionaries and also
by broadcasting to the mainland three times from Taipei. In Russia the people
are living behind the Iron Curtain . In Cuba behind the sugar curtain , on main
land China behind the bamboo curtain , and in the United States behind the
newspaper curtain. I am endeavoring to penetrate this curtain by writing,
speaking on the radio, making TV appearances and speaking to visible audiences.
( 2 ) By collecting and sending relief supplies and funds to Taiwan . ( 3 ) By
using every lawful means to put pressure on our Government to assist the Na
tionalists in their desire to help the poor enslaved mainland people. This can
be done in a number of ways : ( a ) Remove all the " ifs" from President Ken
nedy's statement about the offshore islands. ( b ) Remove the restraints from
176 REFUGEE PROBLEM IN HONG KONG AND MACAO

President Chiang Kai-shek * * * make a material investment in his efforts to
regain the mainland now while the Reds are thinking and acting defensively.
( c) Remove the ceiling on Chinese immigration quotas. ( d ) Falling short of
these measures prevail with the Hong Kong authorities to allow the establish
ment of an international organization that would provide a reception center
near the Red border in the free territories to which these refugees could flee.
* * * and from there be guaranteed safe conduct passage from the center to the
Nationalist ships in the Hong Kong harbor. At the same time guaranteeing the
British Government that the operation would be of no expense to them and
that no refugees would be rejected by the Nationalists and left on their door
step. I am confident that nearly every relief agency and every American mis
sionary in Hong Kong and Taiwan would wholeheartedly support such a move.
The importation of half a million refugees to Taiwan would certainly increase
the possibilities of a quick invasion victory on the mainland.
When leaving Quemoy I told the soldiers of the Kinmen Defense Command
that if they would continue to fight for those islands there I would continue to
fight for them here. This is in a sense a recruiting campaign for just that pur
pose. I would like to see this migration result in half a million young menI
being added to the excellent fighting force of free China. * * * Why ? Because
want war ? No. Because I don't want war.


LETTER TO CURTIS JOHNSON FROM RHOADS MURPHEY , EDITOR, THE JOURNAL
OF ASIAN STUDIES
JUNE 6 , 1962.
Mr. CURTIS JOHNSON ,
Subcommittee on Refugees and Escapees,
Senate Office Building, Washington , D.C.
DEAR MR. JOHNSON : In connection with hearings being held on the refugee
situation in Hong Kong, I would like to offer the following remarks :
The recent explosion of destitute refugees into Hong Kong is by no means
an isolated instance. Their plight is merely a sample of the very widespread
suffering of the people of China as a whole as the result of a series of difficulties
which have been experienced over the past 2 or 3 years andwhich are likely to
continue to leavetotal food supplies seriously inadequate. Without wishing to
speculate on the Chinese Government's reasons for permitting this recent outflow
of refugees into Hong Kong, it is clear that this flow can be and is being con .
trolled by the mainland government and that its appearance and/or disappear.
ance do not necessarily indicate either a worsening or improvement in the total
food situation in China proper. The problem should indeed be regarded as
chronic, at least in terms of the next few years, and it is difficult for any con
cerned person to ignore its existence or to ignor whatever opportunities present
themselves for outside assistance. The arrival of refugees in Hong Kong is
one such opportunity, and I would hope that the U.S. Government will use every
means take advantage of it. Only part of the reason for such action is
humanitarian concern . Certainly the example of the United States providing
assistance for refugees from any totalitarian system carries with it political
and moral implications which are obvious. It is also conceivable that a signifi
cant gesture of this sort from the U.S. Government might provide a useful pre
liminary experience for a further larger scale effort to help to relieve human
suffering in China proper , hopefully under conditions which would be welcome
to the United States as providing a means of influence development in China in
a desirable direction.
China's total isolation from the United States has certainly been one of the
most regrettableaspects of the last 12 years. It is obviously a serious loss and
source of misunderstanding on the part of the Chinese people, and we have also
suffered from it. The present accute situation of the refugees may provide a
means for beginning to break down that isolation in a way entirely in keeping
with U.S. objectives.
Yours sincerely ,
RHOADS MURPHEY.
 REFUGEE PROBLEM IN HONG KONG AND MACAO 177
THE CHINESE COMMUNIST REFUGEE PROBLEM : AN ANALYSIS
( By Peter S. H. Tang, executive director, Research Institute on the Sino -Soviet
bloc, Boston and Washington, D.C. , professor of government, Boston College )
Natural calamities and erroneous policy decisions, particularly throughout the
period 1958–62, constitute the essential background for analyzing the nature
and consequences of the recent mass exodus of refugees from the Chinese Com
munist mainland. Flood and drought, shortages of seeds and fertilizers, and
the inadequate and ineffectual irrigation network have resulted in insufficient
agricultural production. But, superimposed upon these unfavorable natural
conditions, and of equal if not paramount effect, has been the manmade calamity
traceable to decisions of the Communist Party in China ( CPC ) dating from
1958. The great leap forward, launched in 1958, called for the intensification
of industrialization at the expense of agriculture. In the party's efforts to
speedily catch up with or surpass Great Britain in production of certain essential
commodities, faulty policies occasioned economic dislocation. Perhaps the most
notable instance was that of the so-called backyard furnace campaign, which
the CPC itself was later to acknowledge as impractical and wasteful. Com
munalization, as originally conceived, proved disastrous. As unrest persisted
and mounted, and agricultural production quotas were unmet, the CPC again
indicated a reversal of original policies by making greater concessions to the
individual, through the abandonment of such radical measures as the forced
separation of families, and the transfer of the commune's greater authority to
its brigades and team units.
The calamitous effect on the mainland's agricultural production has had a
chain reaction. As agricultural production failed to meet needs, industrial
enterprises lacked essential raw materials. Thus, the regime was forced to
order the personnel of idle factories back to the countryside. Although this re
shuffling was conducted in the name of strengthening the agricultural front,
in reality, it probably caused more problems than it solved . Resettlement
involves retraining, places an enormous burden on the transportation network,
and threatens increased demands on the already strained supply and distribution
system. To the members of the individual commune, this relocation appeared
as a further drain on already inadequate rations. In the spring of 1962, as
grain supplies from the previous harvest were fast being exhausted and the new
crop had just been sown, peasant unrest reached a new peak .
It would be erroneous, however, to judge the recent refugee influx chiefly as
the product of mounting mass unrest. Rather, the sudden and dramatic in
crease in the number of refugees reaching Hong Kong and Macao must be
regarded as emanating from a policy decision on the part of the Chinese Com
munist regime. Certain fundamental CPC policies are involved. The Peking
regime has consistently and conscientiously endeavored to promote a favorable
image abroad and, linked to this, it has prohibited leakage of lower level
information concerning the actual conditions of daily life on the mainland .
More importantly, the regime has based it programs for the develop ent of
Communist China upon their cherished principle of the complete mobilization
and full exploitation of manpower. The complete utilization of all vital hu
man resources may be regarded as the motivating force behind the communes,
the “ every man a soldier ” movement, and, in fact, every basic policy decision.
Consequently, the challenge to the regime's authority and prestige reflected
in the mass exodus must stem fundamentally from the leadership's decision
to permit temporarily the departure of significant numbers of Chinese from
their domain. This supposition is apparently verified by the very suddenness
of the commencement and conclusion of the mass influx, which itself indicates
planned action and orderly movement on the part of the government. It is
also additional evidence that, although famine is serious, the regime continues
to exercise firm political control-isolated reports of mob action against local
government granaries notwithstanding.
What were the factors probably most responsible for the regime's decision ?
The Chinese Communists may have permitted this temporary mass flight in order
to test the world reaction to the Chinese famine. Despite any sharp increase in
178 REFUGEE PROBLEM IN HONG KONG AND MACAO

agricultural production 1962, food shortages must remain critical for a con
siderable period of time to come. With great shortages of capital, Peiping can
not hope to purchase sufficient food supplies on the free market and previous
purchases have had a negligible effect in terms of immediate needs. The Chinese
Communist government cannot ask for food without risking serious conse
quences to both the image it has created concerning its own progress and harmful
effects to the prestige of the entire international Communist movement. Strong
evidence indicates that the Soviet Union is unable to provide sufficient relief.
Hence, the regime is confronted with the apparently paradoxical task of, on the
one hand, denouncing all overtures from the West concerning the supply of food,
while, on the other hand, seeking such massive aid .
Faced with the pressing task of handling this sudden influx of Chinese refugees
in Hong Kong, it is understandable but nonetheless regrettable that there was a
lack of general coordination between the British authorities, the United States
and the Republic of China on Taiwan. Although it appeared expedient to offer
these refugees a meal and then return them to Communist China, it should be
acknowledged that this practice acted to destroy the unprecedented golden op
portunity of learning more of the actual situation in China and engaging the
enemy at his weakest point. Of primary concern is the fact that these policies of
expediency indicate a conceptual vacuum with respect to understanding correctly
the Chinese Communist opponents. To them , the front for contest is every
where. If, indeed , the regime permitted this exodus to sound out international
reactions, it must have assured itself that the free world is not psychologically
prepared or politically coordinated in meeting the Communist challenge on a
relatively obscure front. In turn, this knowledge may act as a powerful stimulus
to the regime in pushing ahead its programs even at the expense of its millions
of suffering citizens, whose fate is now predetermined.
The responsibility of the United States in developing some general policy for
handling this and possible future mass flights from Communist China derives
from its general responsibility as the leader of the free world. It requires an
acknowledgement that the struggle against Communist menace demands co
ordinated policies among all free countries to deal with issues arising along the
unseen as well as the visible fields of encounter. The outstanding strategist of
ancient China, Sun Tze, observed that the psychological offensive is of far more
importance than any direct attack on cities. Hence, the United States should
sponsor the initiative in urging the free world to capitalize on the refugee prob
lem, rather than allowing it to become the subject of interallied burden and
issue.
The President's special refugee program is encouraging, but insignificant in
terms of the whole problem . If the free world is to exploit the current situation,
it must seek the initiative in challenging the Chinese Communists via a co
ordinated policy and organization . One essential and immediate step should
be to provide aid to the some 10,000 recent refugees in Hong Kong who report
edly have so far evaded the roundup conducted by the local authorities. This
step would do much to recover our loss in the psychological offensive and serve
as an example that the free world intends to aid any individual who risks oppo
sition to or flight from communism . It must be emphasized that refugee prob
lems affecting a Communist country should be viewed carefully and tirelessly,
not in conventional terms, but in terms of the omnipresent and militant struggle
which must be waged against Communist threat.
The question of American supplies of food to the Chinese mainland must be
viewed in this context of vigilant struggle along every front. If a food relief
program is to be organized , it should follow the general pattern of the Hoover
Relief Commission in Soviet Russia in the early 1920's, and should be coordi
nated with similar allied efforts if possible. Food can be used as a weapon in a
far - reaching psychological offensive. In addition to possible benefits of in
fluencing the Chinese people, a relief program may do much to contradict
the Communist -inspired propaganda depicting the United States as a blood
thirsty archimperialist nation. The so -called uncommitted nations may be
deterred from accepting the Communist line by well popularized evidence of
massive people- to -people relief.
An American reliefprogram could follow a variety of forms. There are advan
tages in encouraging the Chinese to flee the mainland in order to receive proper
care — this would foster the triple goal of showing sympathy for the plight of
the people, shaking the Communsts' psychological front and promoting internal
unrest in confrontation with the possible drain of China's greatest long -range
asset — its people. At the same time, it would be well to send limited aid to the
 REFUGEE PROBLEM IN HONG KONG AND MACAO 179

mainland, if necessary through the offices of an ally, in order to promote our
psychological attack . In any case, food is far cheaper than ammunition in an
all-out engagement with the Communist challenge ; its distribution can elicit a
contagious reaction ; and its potential uses as a weapon should be considered
with the utmost care .

NEW YORK , N.Y. , June 8, 1962 .
Senator PHILLIP A. HART,
Senate Office Building, Washington , D.C.:
The Woman's Division of Christian Service of the Methodist Church, the
administrative body for organized Methodist women , expresses its appreciation
for your subcommittee's attention to the urgent need for thorough revision of
present immigration laws of the UnitedStates in order to provide flexibility
for dealing with problems of refugees. The current situation of refugees from
mainland China points up this very urgent need . From the time of the adoption
of the present immigration law, the woman's division has consistently urged
that the national origins quota system be replaced by categories which carry
no implication of racial or nationality bias. Desirable categories include those
whose admission would reunite families, those whose special skills would make
important contributions to U.S. economy or cultural activities and a realistic
proportion of those who were made refugees by political changes, war, or
natural disaster. We respectfully request the inclusion of this statement in
the report of the hearings of your subcommittee and that the convictions here
stated be considered when policies for change in the law are recommended .
Mrs. J. FOUNT TILLMAN ,
President, Woman's Division of Christian Service, Board of Missions, the
Methodist Church.

STATEMENT BY HERMAN WILL, JR. , ASSOCIATE GENERAL SECRETARY, THE DIVISION
OF PEACE AND WORLD ORDER OF THE GENERAL BOARD OF CHRISTIAN SOCIAL
CONCERNS OF THE METHODIST CHURCH
Distinguished gentlemen of the committee, moved by recent events in Hong
Kong, and by the expressed position of the Methodist Church, we submit this
statement to you on behalf of the Division of Peace and World Order of the
Methodist Board of Christian Social Concerns. We wish particularly to sup
port S. 3043, sponsored by Senator Hart and cosponsored by his several col
leagues, which would ease the restrictions on Chinese immigrants from Hong
Kong and permit the United States to assist that British colony in its remark
able efforts to receive and care for refugees from mainland China . We com
mend the initiation of such legislation, and urge its support and passage, along
with any additional emergency measures which may be included for dealing with
situations such as the deluge of refugees in May. Such measures, had they been
available to our Government at that time, would have enabled our Nation to
make a clearer witness to our humanitarian concern for the oppressed and
hungry of the world.
The general mandate for this testmony is a policy statement of the 1960 Gen
eral Conference of the Methodist Church. That official body of Methodism
addressed itself to the problems of immigration and urged Methodists “ to seek
through proper channels of Congress the thorough revision of the McCarran
Walter Act.” . Special attention was directed by the general conference to certain
principles, among which two are of particular concern to our present subject.
One of them urges that “ The ratios of admission to this country should ( also )
be reexamined and revised in near harmony with our current population trends,
our current economy, and without any bias related to race or national origin ,"
This section suggests that criteria for admission also be based on “ special needs
to relieve refugee and population pressures ." The other principle here relevant
is one pointing out that “ More generous provision should be made for the admis
sion of refugees displaced because of war or persecution."
In a later section the conference went on to say that :
“ In these times of political upheaval when the migrations of peoples often
have ther roots in religious or political persecution , we reaffirm the principle of
article 14 of the universal declaration of human rights : 'Everyone has the right
to seek and enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution. We further urge
Christians to work in their respective countries for the acceptance and imple.
mentation of this principle .”
180 REFUGEE PROBLEM IN HONG KONG AND MACAO

Our specific desire to testify at this time grows, of course , more directly from
the situation itself. We are aware that the political realities of the predicament
render impossible any sweeping effort to come to the assistance of the huge
numbers of Chinese refugees who might wish to come to this country. Never
theless, we believe that our prosperity, our bulging surpluses, and indeed , our
religious ideals should lead us to open our doors wider. S. 3043, and President
Kennedy's utilization of emergency measures to permit several thousand refugees
to come to the United States, are helpful steps in this direction.
We are particularly concerned that the sense of urgency imparted by the
recent mass exodus from China into Hong Kong not be lost with the reclosing
of the border. The problem which that exodus represented is not likely to be
solved by the closing of a border from either side, nor by token offers of assist
ance and asylum . Our country will need to look ahead to similar situations in
the future, possibly the near future, and be prepared to offer its resources and
refuge .
Finally, we join the others who have called to the attention of this committee
the interrelated nature of the flights from China and the food shortages there.
As churchmen , we urge our Government to consider seriously the possibility of
making available our food surpluses by sale or gift at the same time that it
relaxes its immigration restrictions.
We offer this testimony not as experts or authorities, but because we believe
the principles it embodies are sound and right. We wish to encourage the com
mittee in its endeavor to find answers to the problems of refugees and escapees
which will be commensurate with our national tradition and our religious con
cern for the welfare of all peoples.

LUTHERAN IMMIGRATION SERVICE,
New York, N.Y., July 24, 1962.
Hon. PHILIP A. HART,
U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.
DEAR SENATOR HART : You will recall that on June 28, when I appeared before
the Subcommittee on Refugees and Escapees, I was asked by Mr. De Haan
whether or not it was my impression that universal primary education had been
achieved in Hong Kong. I replied that we had received requests for additional
projects relating to primary schools and therefore in view of these requests I
would be hesitant to comment on his question without having some additional
information.
I have now been informed that the Hong Kong government did make a state
ment indicating that when all primary school projects listed in their current
school estimates are completed, the number of places available for primary
school students will equal the number of children of primary school age. In
other words, the Hong Kong government did indicate that universal primary
education in the colony is now possible.
However, when this statement was made by the Hong Kong government it
was based on the assumption that all available places in primary schools would
be in use. This, I understand , has not been possible as many of the facilities
must be rebuilt. Also, when this statement was issued, no allowance was made
for older children assigned to primary schools and for those listed as “ illegal
immigrants .” Also, the primary school problem has been complicated by the
Hong Kong government resettlement programs and the development of new
townships.
In other words, the Hong Kong government's statement, according to my
information, should not be interpreted to mean that additional primary school
facilities are not needed . In fact, we have been told by the director of educa
tion in Hong Kong, that " it is likely that outside help from reliable bodies for
the building of new primary schools will be needed for some time to come.”
I apologize for not having this information at the hearings. At that time,
I was not aware of the Hong Kong government's statement and therefore I
was taken by surprise as our requests for assistance in this area of concern
were received earlier this year.
Again , let me thank you for this opportunity to clarify my remarks.
Sincerely yours,
DONALD E. ANDERSON .
UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA



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