39. This gem of scholarship is exemplified by the pioneering works of K. C. Wong, Beat patrol deployment in Hong Kong, International Journal of Comparative & Applied Criminal Justice, 25(2): 111�V138, 2001.
40. A review of comparative CJS text old and new does not reveal any sophisticated comparative methodology. See G. F. Cole, S. J. Frankowski, and M. G. Gertz. Major Criminal Justice Systems: A Comparative Survey (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, Sage Focus Editions, No 32, 1981); E. Fairchild, Comparative Criminal Justice Systems (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1993).
41. Numerous discussions with Andrew Willis, Deputy Director of Scarman Center, major provider of criminal justice distance learning instruction in Hong Kong, 1998�V1999; Rod Broadhurst, Associate Professor, Center for Criminology, Hong Kong University, 1999�V2002; Dr. Garland Liu, Program Coordinator, Police Studies Program, Open University of Hong Kong, 1999�V2000. Professor Raymond Lau, Police Studies Program, Open University of Hong Kong, 2002. More recently, discussion with Deputy Commandant, HKP College, 2012. This is supported by my extensive experience in reviewing HKP manuscripts as Managing Editor of Police Practice and Research: An International Journal and other scholarly outlets.
42. K. C. Wong, Policing in Hong Kong (Farmham, UK: Ashgate, 2012), Chapter Seven: One Country Two Systems of Policing; A. Jiao, Y. Allan and E. B. Silverman, Police practice in Hong Kong and New York: A comparative analysis, The International Journal of Police Science & Management, 8 (2): 104�V118, 2006. CRJU4010/7010: Comparative Justice Systems Criminal Justice Study in Taiwan and Hong Kong, 5 June�V19 June 2012. Department of Sociology, Anthropology, and Criminal Justice, College of Arts and Sciences Valdosta State University.
43. See details in Section IV Literature Review, infra.
44. C. Y. Cheuk, Community Policing in Hong Kong: An Institutional Analysis. DBA Thesis. Hong Kong Polytechnic University, 1999; A. Kerrigan, Policing a Colony: The Case of Hong Kong 1844�V1899. Ph.D. Dissertation. University of Wales, 2001; G. Mitchelmore, How Do Extrinsic Performance Incentives Affect the Alignment Between Frontline Police Performance and Police Strategy? DBA Thesis. Heriot-Watt University, August 2010.
45. See HKU Scholarly Hub �V HKU Theses Online (HKUTO). Search date 1941 to 2014. Search term: ��policing�� and ��Hong Kong��. There are 90 plus HKP thesis, a majority by HKP.
46. A review of HKU HKP-related theses and dissertations shows that little refer-ences were made to Chinese literature, except perhaps Chinese guanxi manage-ment in corruption and integrative function of Guan Di worship in policing.
47. W. C. Lo Yam (�c���f��), A Balanced Approach to Training: Another Step Forward in Improving Retention of Junior Police Constables, Master Thesis, Master of Public Administration, Department of Public Administration, 1994.
48. The dissertation consisted of seven chapters. Chapter 1 states the context, focus, contribution, method, and findings of the dissertation in brief. Chapter 2 begins with a brief review of public administration literature on the importance of training to human resource development. It then discusses the HKP�XCivil Service Branch��s policy towards human resource development, particularly as provided for in the 1989 Public Service Reform Report. The chapter concludes with a discussion of retention and training and development with the HKP. Chapter 3 addresses two HKP human resource development issues. First, it reports on human resource�Xcareer development in the HKP, with reference to changing roles and relations of police in Hong Kong society. Second, it reports on the changing role and responsibilities of police constables and PTS train-ing. Chapter 4 is a historical account of development of PTS and PC training. Chapter 5 documents the introduction of social studies at PTS, its rational, process and impact. Chapter 6 is the heart of the research. It reports on the research: methods, data, analysis and findings. Chapter 7 is a conclusion sum-marising the research findings, with recommendation rendered on how best to conduct social studies at PTS.
49. D. W. Pope and J. Hui, The Royal Hong Kong Police, preventive policing and young people, Police Journal, 57: 26�V31, 1984; J. C. Alderson, Hong Kong, Tokyo, Peking: Three police systems observed, Police Studies, 3 (4): 3�V12, 1981; M. S. Gaylord and J. F. Galliher, Riding the underground dragon: Crime control and public order on Hong Kong��s mass transit railway, British Journal of Criminology, 31 (1): 15�V26, 1991; J. Vagg, The borders of crime: Hong Kong�VChina cross border criminal activ-ity, British Journal of Criminology, 32 (3): 310�V329, 1992; Chapter 6: Hong Kong: Colonial Capitalism, In: R. I. Mawby (ed.), Comparative Police Issues (London: Unwin Hyman Ltd., 1990), pp. 86�V101; G. Benton, The Hong Kong Crisis (London: Pluto, 1983); J. Vagg, The legitimations of policing in Hong Kong: A non-demo-cratic perspective, In: O. Marenin (ed.), Police Change, Changing Police (New York and London: Garlan, 1996); J. Vagg, Policing in Hong Kong, Policing and Society, 1: 235�V247, 1991; H. Traver and M. S. Gaylord, The Royal Hong Kong Police, In: H. Traver and J. Vagg (eds.), Crime and Justice in Hong Kong (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1991); R. Mushkat, Freedom of Association and Assembly (pp. 153�V186); P. Morrow, Police powers and individual liberty, In: R. Wacks (ed.), Civil Liberties in Hong Kong (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1988), pp. 243�V278; G. Edwards and A. C. Byrnes, David Hodson, Criminal Investigation, In: Hong Kong��s Bill of Rights: The First Year (Hong Kong: Faculty of Law, University of Hong Kong, 1993), pp. 9�V17; M. Ng-Quinn, Bureaucratic Response to Political Change: Theoretical Use of Atypical Case of the Hong Kong Police (Hong Kong: Occasional Paper No. 2, Hong Kong Institute of Asia Pacific Studies, Chinese University of Hong Kong); there is no serious empirical research into Hong Kong policing, not to mention any original indigenous police theory building effort.
50. Book review by J. Barbyn: M. S. Gaylord and H. Traver, Introduction to the Hong Kong Criminal Justice System (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1994), xvi.+.200 pp, paperback, HK110. Hong Kong L.J. 25, 429�V430, 1995.
51. Ibid., 432.
52. W H Chiu and T. W. Lo, Understanding Criminal Justice in Hong Kong (UK: Willan Publishing, 2008). Reviewed by L. A. Jacobs. Canadian Criminal Justice Association. http://www.ccja-acjp.ca/en/cjcr300/cjcr335.html
53. M. Lee, Criminal justice in Hong Kong, Asian Journal of Criminology, 4 (2): 187�V188, 2009; D. Bindzus, Criminal justice in Hong Kong, Hong Kong L.J. 21, 181, 1991.
54. http://lib.hku.hk/general/research/guides/Hong%20Kong%20Police_bib.pdf
55. Not to be ignored are popular media stories or investigative reporting on HKPF, such as the acclaimed 1978 BBC series on ��Hong Kong Beat��. ��Hong Kong Beat�� 1978 BBC TV Theme by Richard Denton & Martin Cook. 1. Detective, 2. Chasing The Dragon, 3. The Bamboo Curtain, 4. The Streets of Hong Kong, 5. The Great Payroll Robbery, 6. The Big Swoop, 7. Country Coppers, 8. Buns, Boats and Bombs, 9. The Uneasy Summer. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YNiR0LHXa30
56. In the Shadow of the Noonday Gun (Hong Kong: Time Out, 2 January 2013). http://www.timeout.com.hk/books/features/55130/in-the-shadow-.of-the-
noonday-gun.html. See also K. C. Wong, Policing in Hong Kong: Voices, 2016, Manuscript under preparation.
57. OffBeat. http://www.police.gov.hk/offbeat/996/eng/index.html
58. Ling Sir��s website. http://lingsir.org. See also K. C. Wong, Policing in Hong Kong: Voices, 2016, Manuscript under preparation.
59. http://www.pcchk.com/forum-28-1.html
60. http://gwulo.com/royal-hong-kong-police-force-history
61. ���A�A�X��ĵ���ܡ� Water (pen name) 2009-8-21. 08:38. http://www.discuss.com.hk/viewthread.php?tid=104211751240
62. K. C. Wong, Policing in Hong Kong: Voices, 2016, Manuscript under preparation.
63. Laws are made to be upheld by all, The Standard, Tuesday, 24 April 2012. http://pda.cellinnet.com/free/hk_standard/stdarticle.php?we_cat=5&art_id=121770&sid=36148161&con_type=1&d_str=20120424&fc=8
64. PC Wong Chi-hon (Ah Ho) joined the HKP in 1988. Wong made a name for himself. He worked with Marco Tam Siu-ming and Chief Inspector Tse Yiu-tak, then the Western District Training and Staff Relations Officer, District Bulletin and training materials with real-life police officers in mind. They were fondly called ��Filming Trio�� (�����T�H��). The Force is with you�K.on the silver screen, Police Beat, 712: 26 September�V9 October 2001. http://www.police.gov.hk/offbeat/712/022_c.htm
65. Former police officer involved with indecent assault of female students, Sun News, 19 July 2006. http://the-sun.on.cc/channels/news/20060719/20060719030232_0000.html
66. Former police officer loitering in female toilet preliminary proven, Sun News, 6 July 2005. http://the-sun.on.cc/channels/news/20050607/20050607021707_0001.html
67. http://www.police.gov.hk/ppp_en/01_about_us/ph_02.html
68. L. Ho, and Y. K. Chu, Policing Hong Kong, 1842�V1969: Insiders�� Stories (Hong Kong: City University of Hong Kong Press, 2011). For example, Chapter 2, notes 1, 2, 5, 6.
69. Ibid., Big head in green coat whistle, p. 17.
70. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Patrick_Yu
71. P. S. Yu (Chinese: �E����), Tales from No. 9 Ice House Street (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2002), pp. 42�V46.
72. Ibid., p. 44.
73. E. Tu, a self-styled social activist, tirelessly championed for Hong Kong people against police corruption and government wrongdoing. ��A tribute to centenar-ian E. Tu��, Lau Nai-keung, China Daily, 6 June 2013. (��During the 1960s and 1970s, Elsie was a fierce opponent of the corruption, then endemic in many areas of Hong Kong life, and the influence of the Triads. She also campaigned for better working and housing conditions for the poor. Though many in ruling circles disliked Elsie ��rocking the boat��, her efforts led to the establishment of the Independent Commission against Corruption in 1974��.) http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/hkedition/2013-06/04/content_16562675.htm (Elsie Tu, GBM, CBE (nee Hume; Chinese: born 2 June 1913) is a social activist, former elected mem-ber of the Urban Council of Hong Kong, and former member of the Legislative Council of Hong Kong. She moved to Hong Kong in 1951 following a period as a missionary in China.) http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Elsie_Tu
74. E. Elliot, Colonial Hong Kong in the Eyes of Elsie Tu (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2013), p. 86.
75. G. Mathews, Ghetto at the Center of the World: Chungking Mansions, Hong Kong (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2012).
76. A. Ajukwu, Hell in Hong Kong: 134 Days of Torture (Denver, Colorado: Outskirts Press, 2012).
77. P. Craggs, When Harry Met Vicky�XA Fatal Attraction: Growing Up with My Parents (Bloomington, Indiana: Xlibris Corporation, 2012), 2012, 95, 97.
78. Wife cries for joy as she is cleared of murder, The Standard, Hong Kong, 28 March 1972.
79. K. C. Wong, The Study of Policing in Hong Kong, 2016, Manuscript under review.
80. Ibid., 218�V224. ��On Patrol��.
81. T. L. Tsim and B. H. Y. Chen (eds.), The Other Hong Kong Report (Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, Hong Kong Series, 1989), Chapter 3: People and Chapter 4: Laws�XRole of Police (p. 157).
82. Hong Kong Human Rights Monitor. http://www.hkhrm.org.hk/
83. Human Rights Watch, Human Rights Watch World Report 1997�XHong Kong, 1 January 1997. http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6a8b10.html
84. Hong Kong Bar Association�XPress Releases. http://www.hkba.org/whatsnew/press-release/
85. ��Statement of Hong Kong Bar Association on the Security Arrangements of the Hong Kong Police Force during the Visit of Vice Premier Li Keqiang��, Hong Kong Bar Association (24 August 2011). P. Siu, Human rights head blasts police action at protest, SCMP 14 August 2012; Hong Kong: Investigate Police Actions at July 1 Rally, Human Rights Watch, 11 July 2011. http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/07/11/hong-kong-investigate-police-actions-july-1-rally
86. Hong Kong Human Rights Monitor. http://www.hkhrm.org.hk/
87. ��Police Power and Civil Liberties�� (p. 11) Magaret Ng. Final Submission, LegCo Report 2011�X12. http://www.margaretng.com/download/Annual%20Report/MNG_REPORT_2012.pdf
88. A. Broom, The Closing of the American Mind (New York: Simon and Schuster, 30 June 2008, original 1987).
89. J. H. Scholnick, A sketch of the policeman��s working personality, In: Justice with-out Trial, 3rd edition (New York: Wiley, 1994), pp. 41�V68.
90. G. L. Kirkham, From professor to patrolman: A fresh perspective on the police, Journal of Police Science and Administration, 2: 127�V137, June 1974.
91. Police�Vinformant, CIP. BA, MA, 42, SIP Marine HQ./CID/Adm., prior assign-ment CID HKI, 18 years of service, married, two children.
92. P. Manning, Researcher: An alien in the police world, In: A. Niederhoffer and A. S. Blumberg (eds.), The Ambivalent Force (Hinsdale, IL: The Dryden Press, 1976), pp. 103�V121.
93. The officer might not be completely incorrect in his way and style of reasoning, objectionable though it might first appear. The lack of total information and full understanding of what, how and why HKP police works make for errone-ous judgment and distorted views about HKP��s relative effectiveness and degree of accountability. Since the people can never be totally informed (police have legitimate reasons not to share all information, e.g., cost, privacy, secrecy) and do not have the motivation, time or expertise to fully understand how police work, this is one of the evils of popular government, Sir Henry Sumner Maine, Popular Government (Indianapolis: Liberty Class, 1976) (First published 1885), they are likely to form a distorted view about the police or on issues relating to the police. If this should be the case (just as with imperfect market condi-tion calling for state intervention to prevent the market from being abused, e.g., monopoly), the HKP might be tempted to control and manipulate what information should be made available to the public in order to ��protect�� or ��cor-rect�� the people from structural ignorance of an unintended kind. This mindset towards information control, though appearing reasonable, is fraught with dan-ger. Chief among which is the inclination on the part of the police to withhold information not favourable to the police, and further manipulate, if not even manufacture information putting the police in a more favourable light. It is the opinion of the author that, proceeding this way, the situation could reach a 1984 Ministry of Truth scenario.
94. ��Although data, figures and previous analysis in relation to the concerned recruit-ment system are rather adequate and readily available, there is information being withheld by Personnel Wing of the Police Force that the author considers as relevant to this research. Personnel Wing has clearly indicated those informa-tion is within the ambit of confidentiality and relates to the Police Force��s inter-nal policy, which should not be disclosed to assist an academic research. Thus, the author concentrates on open materials only�� (p. 6). H. Chan, An Analysis of the Dual Police Inspector Recruitment System of the Hong Kong Police Force. A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment for the degree of MPA, Hong Kong University, 2006.
95. A. Y. Jiao, The Police in Hong Kong: A Contemporary View (Maryland: University Press of America, 2007).
96. H. Chan (����), An Analysis of the Dual Police Inspector Recruitment System of the Hong Kong Police Force. Dissertation, MPA, Hong Kong University, Department of Politics and Public Administration, 2006.
97. K. C. Wong, One Country Two Systems Cross Border Crime between Hong Kong and China (New Brunswick, NJ; London: Transaction Publishers, 2012).
98. K. C. Wong, Policing in Hong Kong (Farnham, Surrey, UK: Ashgate, 2012); A. Jiao, Police In Hong Kong: A Contemporary View (Lanham, Maryland: University Press of America, 2007); and I. Ward, Sui Geng: The Hong Kong Marine Police 1841�V1950 (Hong Kong University Press, 1991).
99. S. E. Hamilton, Watching Over Hong Kong: Private Policing 1841�V1941 (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University, 2008).
100. See SIP Ling case study.
101. See corruption and its control with HKP. S. Jing, Corruption by Design? A Comparative Study of Singapore, Hong Kong and Mainland China, Crawford School of Economics and Government, 2007. https://crawford.anu.edu.au/degrees/pogo/discussion_papers/PDP07-01.pdf
102. See CIP Andrews case study, Chapter Three, supra. See also M. Hampton, British legal culture and colonial governance: The attack on corruption in Hong Kong, 1968�V1974, Britain and the World, 5: 223�V239, DOI 10.3366/brw.2012.0055, ISSN 2043-8567. Available online September 2012.
103. Beyond public opinion survey.
104. Such as oral history.
105. K. K. Ho and Y. K. Chu, Policing Hong Kong, 1842�V1969: Insiders�� Stories (Hong Kong: City University of Hong Kong Press, 2012).
106. S. F. Gu, A Study of Ethical Policing in Public Order Events, MPA, Department of Government and Public Administration, University of Hong Kong, 2012.
36
Policing in Hong Kong
37
Debating Colonial Policing
35
2
Debating Colonial Policing
The Study of colonial policing was, for many years, the neglected stepchild of colonial and imperial history, preserving and perpetuating untested generali-sations and myths as undifferentiated assumptions were reiterated and reified. In an academic process that resembled nothing so much as the colonialism it described, the multiple roles of colonial police forces went unexplored, their positions in colonial power structures for the most part went unexamined, and their status as key apparatuses of the state was underplayed.1
Melvin Eugene Page and Penny M. Sonnenburg (2003)
Legally there was no such thing as a British Empire. Physically, too, it was a kind of fiction, or bluff, in that it implied a far stronger power at the centre than really exist. (p. 197)
Jan Morris (2010)2
Hong Kong did not posses the conventional attributes of a colony and that late twentieth century Hong Kong showed little sign of a colonial presence, and even less of a past.3
Tak-Wing Ngo (2002)
Introduction
Colonisation resulted from the globalisation of trade, in tandem with ��humanising�� and ��civilising�� the world. Western nations lacked cheap labour to make their goods and open market to ply their wares. They looked for slave hands and free markets overseas. Progressive imperialists and spiritual leaders, in order to salvage the world, looked overseas in search of backward race and lost souls.
Colonial conquests started with European settlements in Latin America in the fifteenth century (Spain and Portugal in Central and South America), followed by British domination of the rest of the world in the twentieth century (British and French settlements in North America, New Zealand, Australia and China). At its height, 50% of the world��s population were labouring under colonial rule of one form or another. In terms of reception, colonialism has been more maligned than understood, so said Frederick Madden:
Journalists and min-historians dismiss careful analysis and repeat their ready-make conclusions; and public opinion always prefers the folklore of sensational Sound Bits to historical truth. The obsession, politically correct of course is to denigrate empire, to pillory the conspiratorial machinations of empire build-ers, and to blackwash the whole British experience of overseas rule.4
Until very recently (1990), colonial policing was an understudied field (Mawby, 1990). Since then, Anderson (1992) and others have tried to catch up. The reason for the lapse is not clear. The impact of the neglect is evident: people��s understanding of colonial policing is simplistic and impressionistic; driven more by ideology than reality, conviction than evidence, and emotion than rationality.
To date, what little is known about colonial policing requires drawing a distinction between colonial policing in settlements versus pacification in protectorates. Additionally, there is much more known about ��colonial�� policing5 in settlements over white people than ��pacification�� policing in pro-tectorates over coloured subjects.6 The image of high-handed, militaristic, suppressive colonial policing, for example, Royal Irish Constabulary (RIC),7 is associated with the second, not the first. Still there are many variations in form and much difference in functions to pacification policing in vari-ous parts of the colonial empires that resist uniform treatment and tidy summation:
Generally, policing in these areas developed in an ad hoc fashion, in reac-tion to particular needs but more importantly in reaction to the nature of the local acceptance or resistance to colonial rule. Pacifying the ��natives��, pro-tecting colonial economic interests, uphold the legitimacy of colonial political authorities and maintaining basic essentials of law and order in order to open up trading routs, were some of the factors that promoted the establishment of police forces in the protectorates.8
Finally, evidence shows that colonial policing in Hong Kong is not unique. There is much cross-over of personnel, experience and practices throughout the British Empire:
Colonial policing in Hong Kong is not entirely unique. Ideas and practices from one colony were borrowed and applied in another; this was especially true both for administrative practice and of legislation. Police administration in Hong Kong is also not far from Metropolitan policing, to the extent British police are seconded for a short time to be in Hong Kong, with an expecta-tion of returning to London. The pool of experience that senior officers in the colonial police were able to draw upon was likely to have been a significant element in defining the character and development of policing. By examining these imperial linkages and by comparing experience of the colonies we may yet learn a great deal more about policing the empire.9
The intellectual challenge is set: What is the best way to describe colonial policing? To what extent is colonial policing different in Hong Kong and in what way is it the same with other colonies? Ultimately, what are the defining characteristics of the HKP, as a colonial force? The thesis of this book is that the HKP is neither British nor colonial. It is unique unto itself, more appro-priately called ��colonial policing with Hong Kong characteristics��.
This chapter has one purpose. It tries to debunk the myths of ��colonial�� policing in Hong Kong. It allows people�Xresearchers and the public alike�Xto see the HKP in its naked light, unencumbered by historical baggage and tinted by ideological blinders. It observes that long before its demise in 1997, colonial policing in Hong Kong is not what it has been made out to be. It has its own existential properties and associated defining characteristics. This observation should give pause to ideological zealots, political junkies and cultural warriors, who, for self-serving reasons or due to cultural ignorance, insist that ��colonial policing�� inherits a certain immutable form and essential functions, such as that of RIC�Xmilitaristic and suppressive, thereby making it ipso facto illegitimate and dysfunctional in serving the Hong Kong people��s best interests and basic needs.
As an intellectual project, the ultimate challenge with this chapter is to ascertain what colonial policing is all about, conceptually and in practice, as applied to Hong Kong, over the course of 170 years.
This chapter has four sections. Section I defines as it discusses the ��Concept of Colonial Policing�� before raising the issue, stating the premises and defend-ing the thesis that conventional idea of colonial policing ill fits grounded observation of policing in colonial Hong Kong. Section II ��Deconstructing Colonial Policing�� problematises colonial policing as applied to Hong Kong. It adopts four premises in unpacking colonial policing in Hong Kong, that is, colonial policing takes many forms; colonial policing is a pluralistic enter-prise; colonial policing is a collaborative effort; and finally, colonial policing is an existentially relative, not essentially absolute, phenomenon. It offers the idea of ��people��s policing��, ��collaborative policing�� and ��discretionary policing�� to debunk the myth that colonial policing is a one-sided (British) and unidi-rectional (top down) affair. This framework of understanding colonial polic-ing as people-collaborative-discretionary policing is nothing new. Personal experience informs and empirical research instructs; all policing is about people working together in a give-and-take manner. The contention here is ��it takes two to tango��. Section III ��The True Nature of Colonial Policing�� summarises as it discusses the implications of the findings while Section IV ��Conclusion�� takes stock of the lessons learned.
I: Concept of Colonial Policing
Defining Colonialism
Colonial policing escapes definition when one cannot agree on what consti-tutes colonial policing, in form, style and conduct. Colonial policing defies assessment when people cannot agree on its basic purpose, functions and util-ities. Nevertheless, definition and assessment of colonial policing is necessary to study HKP reform during the course of colonisation and decolonisation.
To define colonial policing, one must first define colonialism, since colonial policing exists to secure colonialism. Commonly understood, colo-nisation is the subjugation or domination of one people over another, eco-nomically, socially, culturally, legally and militarily.10 Colonisation can be achieved without force, for example, with cultural imperialism, or secured by economics, for example, multi-national corporatisations, but force is always implied and reserved as the ultimate sanction.11 This makes the colonial police handmaiden of economic masters.
There are many kinds of colonial rules, with different characteristics (Table 2.1). The typologies and characteristics of colonial rule necessarily affect government policy and policing strategy. Hong Kong belongs to the indirect rule group, in political, economic and social policy. From the very beginning, the British colonial office wanted to spend as little as possible in Hong Kong in developing its infrastructure or improving social conditions, thus the notion of laissez-faire economics and indirect rule in governance. As a result, much of the colonial policing was left to private funding and stewardship.
As to the justification, the formation and characteristics of colonial police Charles Jeffries describes as follows:
The fact is that the really effective influence upon the development of colonial police forces during the nineteenth century was not that of the police of Great Britain, but that of the Royal Irish Constabulary�KInto the merits or demerits of this system, as applied to Ireland, it is not for me to enter, but it is clear enough that from the point of view of the colonies there was much attraction in an arrangement which provided what we now call a ��paramilitary�� orga-nization or gendarmerie armed and trained to operate as an agent of the�K government in a country where the population was predominately rural, com-munications poor, social conditions were largely primitive, and the recourse to violence by members of the public who were ��against the government�� was not infrequent. It was natural that such a force, rather than one organized on the lines of purely civilian or localized forces of Great Britain, should have been taken as a suitable model for adaption to colonial conditions.12
The colonial policing model of policing, as exemplified by the RIC, is distinguished from the civilian model, made famous by Sir Robert Peel and spread around the world in the form of community policing, by the following structural, functional and stylistic characteristics:
First, structurally, the colonial police establishment is organised in such a way so that it is not part of the people, but part of the colonial government. As such the police officers do not mix with the people. This works in two directions. The police are insulated from the public, that is, it is not account-able to the public. The people are isolated from the police, that is, they have little to no relationship with the police. To this end, police live physically apart from the public.
Second, functionally, the colonial police officers, by mandate, are there to serve the imperial government��s interests, not that of the people, that is, they are there to secure the empire and control the people, not to serve and protect. To this end, the police rarely perform any civilian policing duties.
Third, stylistically, the colonial police are militaristically disposed. Force of arms is used to resolve political disputes and suppress social dissents. To this end, the police are organised in paramilitary ways.
Colonial HKP: Context Matters
A colonial police force was established in Hong Kong with the passage of ��an ordinance for the Establishment and Regulation of a Police Force in the Colony of Hong Kong�� (Ordinance No. 12 of 1844) on 1 May 1844, otherwise known as the Police Force Regulations (PFR).13
The PFR laid down the legal framework,14 specifying the necessary con-ditions of service15 and associated powers of an officer for the formation of the first-ever police agency in Hong Kong, under British rule.
The preamble of the ordinance reads, in a pertinent part:
[I]t is considered expedient that provision should be made for the establish-ment of an effective System of Police within the Colony of Hong Kong�K. His Excellency the Governor of Hongkong, to nominate, and appoint a proper per-son to be Chief Magistrate of Police, throughout the Colony of Hongkong, who shall reside in the town of Victoria, and shall be charged, and invested, with the general direction, and superintendence of the Force to be established under this Ordinance, and to appoint from time to time, fit and proper persons to be respectively marine, and assistant Magistrates, and Superintendents of Police, under the said Chief Magistrate.
The preamble is telling of a colony under siege. After 3 years of British occupation, Hong Kong was still infested with vice (opium,16 prostitu-tion,17 gambling18) and afflicted with crimes of all sorts19 perpetrated by evil Chinese,20 listless sojourns,21 ill-disciplined soldiers, drunken sailors,22 marauding criminals,23 organised gangsters24 and roaming pirates, which defies treatment and requires an ��effective System of Police�� to control and a harsh punishment regime to deter.25
Since the HKP��s inception, there has been a continuous debate about whether or not the HKP is a colonial police force. As an analytical frame-work, scholars have used Charles Jeffries�� RIC model to explain HKP��s origin and development. In his classical treatment of ��The Colonial Police��,26 Jeffries observed that colonial policing required the adoption of an RIC type of para-military force to maintain control, suppress dissent, impose governance and ultimately achieve dominance.
However, Jeffries also made clear that ��colonial police�� is not a static con-cept, still less a one-size-fits-all practice. It is capable of adjustment, muta-tion and change, in context, and most certainly over time. In time, when law and order in the colony is achieved and a habit of obedience of the people is obtained, the colonial police revert or advance to27 a more civil kind of polic-ing, with paramilitary policing held in reserve. Since then, Jeffries�� classical model of ��colonial police�� has been questioned and revised in some quarters.28 In the case of Hong Kong, the constant question being asked is whether and to what extent the HKP was a ��colonial police�� force, in mission, organisation and means.
In 199929 and 2001,30 two Ph.D. dissertations disputed Charles Jeffries�� crude treatment of HKP colonial policing. Ng, a historian, argued that the HKP adopted paramilitary policing, less to suppress the indigenous Chinese, but to bring law and order to Hong Kong, and as a defence against nation-alist rebels from China. Kerrigan, an (ex) HKP commissioner, argued that the HKP, while organised in a paramilitary fashion, in actuality functioned much like London Metropolitan Police, in using coercive force to tame out-laws and secure order in Hong Kong. In essence, coercive policing, a defining feature of sovereignty, is everywhere to be had, with consensual policing in London as in colonial policing of Hong Kong.
Both authors saw the need to revisit the issue of what counts as colonial police and what stands for colonial policing. Their work invites more analysis of the true nature and defining characteristics of colonial ��policing�� in Hong Kong more so than just describing ��colonial police�� in military terms and documenting ��colonial policing�� practice with an oppressive overtone. As a research project and field of discourse, the former analytical approach seeks to understand what ��colonial policing�� is like in Hong Kong and the latter tries to understand how policing works in colonial Hong Kong. The differ-ence between the two approaches is more than academic. It holds the key to the proper grounding of an emerging discipline of Hong Kong policing studies.
This chapter takes another stab at the colonial policing debate in Hong Kong. It argues that the HKP did not copy the RIC paramilitary tradition, but adopted military organisation (discipline) and measures (punishment)31 entirely due to the influence of one person, William Caine, the putative father of the HKP who tried to bring law and order to a place and people he hardly knew. Since then and until the 1890s, there was no influence of the RIC to be found.32 In so doing, the author subscribes to the idea that a strong per-sonality, limiting conditions and prevailing circumstances make historical theses.33
First, Hong Kong was acquired through conquest. The administrators of Hong Kong were nearly all military officers at the time. Second, Hong Kong was very much at war with China, until well into the 1900s. Although British troops landed in Possession Point in 1841, the treaty of Nanking was not signed until 1842. From that point onwards, disaffected Hong Kong residents, nationalistic Chinese people, anti-foreign Triads and disgruntled economic migrants never stopped causing problems for the Hong Kong Government, from invading Victoria from Kowloon, to poisoning foreign-ers, to rioting in the streets to mass blockading of Hong Kong. Third, Hong Kong was a dangerous place, with a restless, mostly male population. Stern control and draconian punishment were necessary; military discipline thus came to the rescue.34 To Major Cain, under the Command of Major General Pottinger, waging a war on crime was a type of military campaign35 and did not represent a clash of civilisations36 (though for the Chinese who bore the brunt of the crime campaign, and suffered disparate impact,37 the difference hardly mattered). Fourth, there was no plan for governing Hong Kong. For example, Pottinger was asked to
[E]stablish the Colony without being supplied with the usual model guide in the shape of printed instructions from the Colonial Office containing orders clearly defined as to almost every particular matter which would be required of him, and his establishment was at a disadvantage in many other respects, and his establishment was formed with such rough material as first came to hand.38
The British had never commanded a Chinese colony. As a spear for the British Empire, the military had a tradition in bringing order to untested land and alien people, with force of arms if need be. Fifth, Caine was a com-petent and zealous military officer. He had earned the trust of the British Government, in Hong Kong or at the Colonial Offices, with a can-do spirit and take-no-prisoners approach to fighting crime and disorder. But Major Caine who dispensed justice as Magistrate of Police was no lawyer, and had few inclinations to follow the law.39 Seventh, the colonial administration in general and Caine in particular were given a lot of (unbound) authority to pacify Hong Kong, the way Caine deemed fit and proper.
Until 1844, Caine was the personification of the HKP and embodiment of justice in Hong Kong.40 Hong Kong then looked like a penal colony more so than a civil society; one big military depot, in an epic war against British civilised rule.
Study of Colonial Police
The study of colonial police is the study of how the HKP functioned and was structured, in theory and practice. More specifically, the study of colo-nial policing is the study of how the HKP, as a colonial political institu-tion, conducted its business of colonial rule, by law (legal ordering) and with coercion (militant control). Additionally, it is the study of the negotiations over power (norms and process), substance (values and interest) and style (coercive vs. persuasive) as they existed between British law enforcement and Chinese customary social control, at the sufferance of the sovereign state (here the British colonial government). In ��more and less government�� theoretical terms, this conflict was a negotiation over the relative delegation of public control authority and relative sponsorship of private social control measures.
The ultimate question to be discussed in colonial policing is to what extent the two radically different control systems�Xcolonial versus indige-nous�Xwere in conflict and in what way they were complementary. More sig-nificantly, how did such observed conflicting and complementary elements of control manifest themselves in daily life as routines, and how were they resolved when in conflict, such as in crisis?
A cursory review of extant literature shows that with rare exceptions,41 the investigation into policing in Hong Kong has been exclusively focussed on the HKP, its origin, development, role and functions, organisation, pow-ers and mode of operations. Specifically, the coverage is mainly on HKP��s ��imperialistic�� role and ��colonial�� legacy,42 and less on its ��localised�� func-tions and ��indigenous�� makeover.43 There are few investigations into polic-ing in Hong Kong, its philosophy, functions, style and impact.44 Worse, scholars and students have confounded the two, creating unnecessary con-fusion, causing inevitable distortion and precipitating perennial conten-tious debates.
In the study of colonial policing in Hong Kong, the question that is most often asked is how was Hong Kong policed, before and after 1997,45 that is pre- and post-colonisation, as an internal46 and international47 com-parative project. By this line of questioning, what people really want to know is whether or not the HKP changed.48 An even more practical ques-tion on everyone��s mind is that which most coincides with post-colonial study49: how might Hong Kong��s colonial past affect post-1997 policing in Hong Kong?50
Such kinds of inquiry require investigation into the nature and charac-teristics of the HKP and the conduct and performance of colonial policing51 in Hong Kong as distinctive colonial policing practices,52 including charter and mission, ideology and philosophy, role and functions, organisation and operations, strategy and tactics,53 and problems and issues.54 Subsequently, three inter-related questions present themselves:
First was the HKP a colonial police force in philosophy, organisation and function? What did the HKP as a ��colonial police�� look like? This focus on seeking answers to how the HKP, as a colonial force, originated, developed and operated in Hong Kong, top down. The assumption here is that if the HKP is determined to be a colonial police force in the form of organisation and style of operations�Xparamilitarily organised and trained, isolated from the public in barracks, heavily armed during operations, devoted to public order policing and routinised secret political surveillance�Xone is entitled to assume that the HKP was conducting colonial policing. More colloquially, if it smells and looks like a rat, it must be a rat.
Second, what did colonial policing in Hong Kong look like in the street and with the people? The issues raised here include (1) How did the HKP act when conducting social policing, for example, maintaining public order or providing social services? More generally, how did the HKP conduct ��high�� versus ��low�� policing? (2) How did local and indigenised expatriate officers behave in doing colonial policing? If the HKP did not act in colonial ways all the time and colonial officers did not behave in colonial manner uniformly, what then was the nature of colonial policing in Hong Kong?
Finally, how can two divergent policing patterns�Xcolonial HKP (top down) policing versus people policing in Hong Kong (bottom up)�Xbe reconciled?
In pursing these queries into colonial policing, this investigation takes up Ngo��s invitation:
In the words of Bloch, when the passions of the past blend with the prejudices of the present, human reality is reduced to a picture of black and white. It is the danger of gross simplification of the nature of colonialism in Hong Kong that the present volume needs to address. Our aim is to present new empirical evidence that can lead to a more balanced understanding of the multifaceted nature of Hong Kong��s colonial past.55
II: Deconstructing Colonial Policing
Introduction
A (re)newed understanding of colonial police requires breaking ranks with the past usage of the term, a deconstruction project.
The deconstruction project starts with an understanding of how British colonial rule over Hong Kong was actualised, with law (Letters Patent, Royal Instructions), through delegation (Governor) and by way of bureaucracies (Secretary of State and Colonial Office). Alternatively, there is a need to ascer-tain the relative powers of British versus Hong Kong Government officials in influencing, setting and implementing colonial policies. Ultimately, whether, in what manner and to what extent Hong Kong Government was allowed to work autonomously, and if needed, at cross-purposes from the sovereign in the best interests of Hong Kong, is the puzzle.
Conventional wisdom has it that legally the Governor in Hong Kong worked at the pleasure and behest of the Crown. Historically, this is not how Hong Kong was governed. The colonial governance in Hong Kong, as a polit-ical act, was the joint product of a collective enterprise involving the Crown, colonial officials, Governor, Cadets and Chinese community members, each playing their assigned role separately and collaboratively:
The interaction of these different component parts had an important bear-ing on the power relationship between them. Governors appointed by Britain, often with no prior experience of Hong Kong, to govern for a term of five years through senior civil servants who has spent a whole career there. Unofficials were leaders in their own communities, who may have been new to Governors but were well known to senior civil servants. Some Secretary of State were influential and strong-minded such a Churchill, Passfield and Lyttelton, Some has a clear idea of what they wanted to achieve�KSome Colonial Office offi-cials, through the force of personality and intellect exercised considerable influence on Hong Kong��s policies, in particular Gerald Gent and Sidney Cain. Parliament could also be a conduit for the expression of British public opinion on Hong Kong��s affairs. Its influence�Kwas more often indirect.56
If one were to ask who spoke for Hong Kong and promote her interests in the colonial bureaucracy, one need not venture too far outfield to find this rep-resentation in the Hong Kong governors. Most Hong Kong governors knew and cared about Hong Kong, for example, Governors Davis (8 May 1844 to 21 March 1848), and more than a few were in love with Chinese culture and Hong Kong people, for example, Governors Hennessy (22 April 1877 to 30 March 1883), to the point of challenging the Colonial Office��s assumptions on and prejudices against Hong Kong, as a place, people and culture. The conten-tious relationship and conflict of interests between the role of Colonial Office and Hong Kong Government is best attested to by Alexander Grantham, upon assuming the Hong Kong Governorship after WWII:
But in a crown colony, where does the allegiance of the governor lie: to the Colonial Office or to the colony? Normally, no conflict arises, but occasion-ally it does, and the situation is not improved by a tendency on the part of the Colonial Office to treat a crown colony as though it were a sub-department of the Colonial Office. I know that the Colonial Office officials do a conscien-tious and honest job at which they work hard, but it is just a job. They have no attachment or loyalty to the colony with which they are at the moment concerned. They do their best, but their loyalty, naturally, is to Britain and, in the last resort if a clash of interests occurs, the colony is scarified. Nor do I think that people in Britain fully appreciate the fact that Britain acquired, and remains in, Hong Kong for her own purposes�Xprincipally trade. She therefore became, and is, responsible for the welfare and protection of the people. Undeniably, the residents should play their part, but there is too much an assumption in Britain that the people of Hong Kong are fortunate to be there�Xwhich is true enough�Xand that therefore it is they who owe a duty to Britain, which is also true up to a point. Fundamentally, though, it is Britain that owes the duty to the Colony.57 (Italic supplied)
Through the years and with many people, colonial policing has taken on ideological meanings, far away from its historical context, factual content and empirical anchor, to the point of being distortive, and in more than a few cases inflammatory. Six assumptions inform the current inquiry:
First, colonial policing took many forms, explored in ��(A): Colonial Policing in Multiple Forms��.
Second, colonial policing was ��people�� policing explored in ��(B): Colonial Policing as ��People�� Policing��.
Third, colonial policing was ��pluralistic�� policing, explored in ��(C): Colonial Policing as ��Pluralistic�� Policing��.
Fourth, colonial policing was ��collaborative�� policing, explored in ��(D): Colonial Policing as ��Collaborative�� Policing��.
Fifth, colonial policing was ��discretionary�� policing, explored in (E): Colonial Policing as ��Discretionary�� Policing��.
Sixth, colonial policing was ��more or less government control�� policing, explored in ��(F): Colonial Policing as ��More or Less Governmental Control��.
Breaking down ��colonial policing�� this way allows one to see that the term ��colonial policing�� has little essential communicative content, and must derive meaning from application and context.
A: Colonial Police in Multiple Forms
One Crown Colony�XMany Colonial Policing
From a critical reading of colonial policing history, one learns that colonial policing was not all alike everywhere, nor did it remain unchanged over time. Even the putative father of colonial police, Sir Charles Joseph Jeffries, recognised that colonial policing evolves over time and would get to be more civil in late-stage colonial policing.58 However, there are exceptions in WWII decolonization process,58 whereby informal de facto decolonization come before official decolonialisation59 as with HKP.60 That is a clear and indis-putable evidence pointing to the fact that colonial policing in Hong Kong after the 1950s was more civil than colonial, except for ongoing political sur-veillance, for example, strengthening SB functions with British Palestinian Police transferred, and exceptional public order management, for example, the 1967 riots.
Simply, colonial policing improvised, adjusted, mutated and morphed to suit colonial missions and/or soothe liberal conscience. For example, by the late 1960s (if not earlier), Hong Kong was a colony only in name. In 1968, a copy of Governor Sir David Trend��s press release was published in Hong Kong Police Magazine�XChinese edition, arguing that the HKP was an institution subject to law and held accountable to the people, that is, was democratic. Sir Trend started off by making clear that the Hong Kong government cannot do what-ever it wants, and most certainly cannot do anything without legal authority, public approval and people��s best interest. If Sir David Trend were taken at his words, by 1968, the HKP was more a democratic institution than a colonial force. Thirty years later (1996), another Hong Kong Governor took the initia-tive to democratise Hong Kong, this time formally, contrary to the spirit of the Joint Declaration. This angered the People��s Republic of China leadership, who wanted the HKP to be run very much the same way as in the colonial days.
The thesis that colonial administration and colonial policing had to adapt to social circumstances of the moment and change with the political tempo of the time in complex, delicate and dynamic ways is best captured by the last Governor of Hong Kong, Chris Patten, in his farewell to Hong Kong book:
Naturally, there were always reasons why the time was not quite right for democracy (in Hong Kong). The postwar Governor, Sir Mark Young (1941�V47), had unveiled ambitious plans for beginning the same process of democra-tization that was being triggered at the time in other British colonies. After his departure, and for three decades to come, the development of representative government was buried in a permafrost of official disapproval. Some of the reasons for this made passing sense. The flood of refugees into Hong Kong, and the social and economic demands they made, created administrative priori-ties other than political reform. There were worries that free elections would see the community polarized between supporters of the principal mainland political identities, the Communists and the Kuomintang. And there was the brooding and military presence of China. Treat Hong Kong like other British colonies, senior Chinese officials including Premier Zhou Enlai warned, and the territory may be deluded into thinking that it will one day share their des-tiny and achieve independence. Not for the last time, the Chinese Communist party��s shadow was allowed to blot out the sun.61
B: Colonial Policing as ��People�� Policing
One Crown Colony�XMany Kinds of Colonial Officials62
This section begins with a necessary clarification. ��People�� policing alludes to the fact that all policing is a people��s business. This does not mean the conventional notion of policing for and by the people, as in Peel��s policing by consent.63 What ��people��s�� policing refers to is the fact that it takes colo-nial officials (British and Chinese) to act as human beings, not agents of the state, in order to police the people of Hong Kong. If colonial policing is to be understood, the HKP must be unmasked. The living, breathing people behind the badge, uniform and gun must be revealed. The impact of personal attributes and collective mentality of the colonial officials must be reckoned with. By the same token, learning more about the colonised people, their history and culture, hopes and dreams, fears and apprehension is a vital part of reconstructing their perception and reception of the HKP and colonial policing.
The starting assumption underscoring this line of inquiry is that peo-ple are not the same in what they think (cognition), feel (emotion) and act (behaviour). British and Chinese, within and between groups, do not share the same values and interests, personality or culture.
Take the case of HKP expatriate officers. They are not a homogeneous group, in background and outlook. Their character and personality were formed long before they arrived in Hong Kong. Many of them worked as police officers before in England or other colonies.
According to anti-colonialism critiques, the HKP was commanded by these expatriate officers, zealously devoted to colonial cause and loyal only to the Crown. They were pre-disposed by character and ingrained in training to be abusive to the Hong Kong people as lower-class subjects. However, in real life, Hong Kong-bound expatriate officers, like all young people of their time, had their own personal agenda, for example, adventurism or to realise a dream, and life course to follow, for example, economic security, professional achievements and personal actualisation, and in that order.64
Many Colonial Personalities
If there is anything that is evident to students of Hong Kong political devel-opment, especially with those who study the HKP, it is that for most of the time Hong Kong and the HKP were not run by rule of law, but were far more driven by distinct personality, from Governor to Chief Magistrates to Police Superintendent. As a result law and order of Hong Kong under Governor Davis was not the same as under Governor Hennessy all for good reasons and with huge impacts. The same can be said about policing philosophy and style between Walter Deane (1866�V1892) and Francis May (1893�V1902),65 both cadet officers turned Captain Superintendents.66
More pointedly,67 Governor Lockhart believed that the Hong Kong people should have a dominant voice in the running of Hong Kong, since they were in the majority, educated, and capable and were responsible for financially supporting in Hong Kong, whereas British and Europeans were sojourns, having no intention to stay and improve Hong Kong, beyond ways that would help them get rich.
As an aggregate, expatriate colonial officers might share commonalities in demographics, personal disposition, work experience and life stages, to sufficiently distinguish them from their cohorts in England or Europe, but they were certainly not predictable to the point of sharing the exact outlook of life or conduct at their job.68
Like many of their Chinese counterparts coming to Hong Kong at the time, the expatriate officers came for an adventure and ended up calling Hong Kong a home (away from home); making friends, getting married, building career, amassing fortunes, and yes, getting drunk with the locals. Their personal values, interests and fortune were inevitably and irrevocably tied to Hong Kong, where they now work, live and play. For all intents and purpose, for better or worse, Hong Kong is their home,69 if only temporarily and transitionally, as Professor Gold��s research into the mindset and lifestyle of British migrants revealed70:
Hong Kong is a place of opportunity (and high rewards)�KAside from work, leisure, travel opportunities and general ��lifestyle��, augmented by low rates of income tax (15 per cent), are key motivators among British migrants. In the taxonomies of migration they operate at the intersections of ��economic�� and ��lifestyle�� migration, categories that need to be understood as capturing a lose collage of individually negotiated motivations�KTransience and transition lie at the centre of migrant lives and landscapes. Transience captures the substance of the lives of British migrants who live permanently temporary lives in Hong Kong�KTemporariness surfaces in mundane decisions about storing furniture in the UK and in deferring decisions to buy curtains and sofas sometimes for up to twenty years. Temporariness also avoids confronting conflicting futures within families and between couples who may disagree on its geographical location. Temporariness and its subverted conflicts thus structure the configu-ration of intimacy in migrant families. Transition captures the shifting global and local social and political landscape on which they operate. All social land-scapes are in transition in the sense that they are always in process, always being made, but transition in Hong Kong has additional and particular ele-ments of transition set out above. (italic supplied)71
Colonial policing research also needs to take into account the domes-tication of colonial officers, some by choice, for example, marriage, and others by force of circumstances, for example, economic needs. Still the result is the same. Hong Kong was not only a place to live but was part and parcel of their life, and in time personality. Hong Kong has caught up with them.72 For example, Sir David Akers-Jones, 86, served the Hong Kong Government for 30 years, ending as Chief Secretary and Acting Governor. He has lived in Hong Kong for 67 years, that is all his life. He is no more an expatriate than any other Hong Kong person, born and bred locally, with a Hong Kong heart, mind and soul.73 As Ackers-Jones said in his memoir: ��We stayed on after retirement because we scarcely knew anywhere else and because in Hong Kong we have so many friends and so much involvement��.74 So did Elsie Tu, British social activists turned legislative councillor.75
Finally, there are those who have left, but still want to return, and retire in Hong Kong, as a permanent foreigner:
I first arrived in Hong Kong as an 18 year old in 1976, recruited in the UK to join the as was then, Royal Hong Kong Police Force. I spent until 1982 there until I finally left. I regret that decision to this day and regularly go back for short trips. As my current UK career draws to an end I would love to retire back to where I spent my formative years.76
Independent Colonial Officials
The British Empire was run by people, not rules. People are moved by ideas and ideals, seldom by charters and mandates. Realising this, it is best to investigate into imperial and colonial officers, how they think and what they do, in context and with issues, in order to fully understand how colonial policing worked in Hong Kong. As applied, this means policing policy and practice in Hong Kong ultimately depended on who was in charge of what; here, people��s demographics, background, training and experience matter. Thus, one can be fairly sure of the following, when it came to colonial policy formulation and execution�XBritish imposed, Hong Kong disposed, and people matters:
[T]he secretary of state for the colonies was ultimately responsible to the British government, and thence to the UK Parliament, for the peace, order and good government of the colonies, day-to-day responsibility for administra-tion was effectively devolved to the governors and the colonial governments. There were occasions when London made demands on the colonial authori-ties�Xwhich might be accepted or vigorously resisted�Xbut in most respects British colonies were governed internally rather than by the imperial centre.77 (Italic supplied)
That said, it is a well-known fact that the form and content of ��colonial policing�� as with direction and course of ��colonialism�� are driven by person-alities (both coloniser and colonised) and less so by British Colonial office. In this regard, Gavin Ure observed:78
There was no clear linear progression in the development of the Hong Kong government�� autonomy�K The exercise of autonomy was as much the result of changing political pressures as it was of the personalities and the belief of the principle actors involved, in Britain as well as Hong Kong, and their willing-ness and determination to act upon.
The HKP is a disciplinary paramilitary force. Within the HKP, offi-cers, from Commissioner to Constable, are trained to obey legitimate order. Thus, it is rare for HKP officers disobeying orders from above. But that does not mean that the HKP, particularly those at the senior levels, are robots in accepting instructions they find in their professional opinion not to be appropriate, feasible, or more simply not for the good of Hong Kong.
One such case is that of the sudden resignation of Commissioner of Police Edward Tyrer (December 1966 to July 1967) for health reasons dur-ing the May 1966 to December 1967 communist riots. The ��resignation�� was shrouded in secrecy.79 On 4 July 1966, five HKP officers were killed at the Sha Tau Kowk border police post by communist militias. On 14 July 1966, Commissioner Tyler flew to the United Kingdom for consultation of HKP organisation matters with senior members of the Commonwealth Office. On 21 July 1966, the Commonwealth Office announced that Commissioner Tyler��s resignation for health reasons was approved by the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Affairs, with Deputy Commissioner Yates taking over the HKP with immediate effect. It was later revealed by a journalist Gary Ka-wai Cheung that Commissioner Tyler had not resigned but was relieved of command because of a disagreement with the then acting Governor Gass, who wanted the riot to be suppressed. This is the first and last time within public knowledge that an HKP Commissioner was relieved of command for failure to obey a legal order.80 Whatever the true reasons may have been for the relieving of command, the sudden dismissal of a Commissioner of Police due to disagreement of policy indicates that behind closed doors colonial officials did disagree.
Middle-Class British Cadets
In discussing the influence of British cadet officers on Hong Kong adminis-tration, Lethbridge, an old Hong Kong hand and esteemed professor at Hong Kong University, observed:
At that time it was a small territory with a population squeezed into a few urban enclaves, where everyone lived cheek by jowl and officials were highly visible and often met in the street. In such a constricted society the quirks of an official, given the system of government, often influenced important administrative decisions, over which the general public could exercise little control.81
Beginning in the 1860s, OxBridge ��cadet officers�� had tremendous influ-ence in the administration of the colony. These ��cadets�� resembled each other in family background, education training, social connection, political philos-ophy and personal sentiments.82 They were also proficient with the Chinese language, knowledgeable about Chinese culture, subscribed to Confucian teachings and adopted a paternalistic attitude towards the Chinese. Eventually, these ��Cadet Officers�� made Hong Kong what it is today, by their personality, conviction and drive. Professor Lethbridge again observed that in the early colonial years for the most part, Hong Kong Government was run by well-established cliques and personalities (with the HKP, it is the ��horse stable�� system):
Between 1862 and 1941 the top ranks of the British colonial civil service were chosen from a small group of Oxford and Cambridge trained English ��cadet officers��. Most served in several colonial ports during their careers, and spoke multiple languages. They were often assigned to lead government depart-ments in service of commercial trade. According to a historian, three future cadets became Hong Kong governors, five others were high commissioners, and four more were chosen Colonial Secretary. The successors to Grand Pre��, Hyndman, Cavalho, and d��Almada all came from the cadet list.83
Who then are these people who came to govern Hong Kong?
They were middle-class Britons with a mission to serve and protect the Hong Kong people from their own perils who, to them, were not unlike those of the underclass in England. It is true that cadets were not there to liberate Hong Kong, but it is also true that they are not there to domesticate and exploit the people either as an expression of racial superiority, as mainstream anti-colonialists would have it. Unlike the military officers, commercial trad-ers or spiritual gurus, who came to Hong Kong for conquest, market or salva-tion, the cadets came to build a better society in British image, at the nadir of its world power. As observed by Faure: ��Even at its mightiest, Britain had no social policy on Hong Kong as such. It applied British justice and periodically enforced standards that had been tried in Britain, whether or not they had succeeded in Britain or were suited to Hong Kong��.84
What was good for the British people was good for the Hong Kong people, including a rigidly enforced paternalistic, class system. In this way, colonial rule by the cadets is meant to be a replication of British paternalistic society at home, more so than the creation of an oppressive dominion abroad; how-ever, much of it is viewed to the contrary by the subservient locals at the roots and critical foreigners from afar.85 Again in Professor Lethbridge��s words:
In sum, the typical cadet came from a solid, though not rich, upper middle-class family, went to a public school, but not to the most prestigious, and then went up to one of the older universities, where he read classics or history and was noted for his application to study and interest in healthy recreation. The bounder, the aesthete, the hearty and the rake were not represented in the ranks of the cadets. Given this common background, training, and the fra-ternity of class, cadets came to the field with many shared assumptions about, and attitudes towards, the people they governed in the colonial territories. Robert Huessler, for example, argues that the attitude of British Colonial offi-cials ��was not unlike that which they maintained from childhood towards the lesser orders at home. One ruled the people and protected them from local and foreign injustice. Otherwise one lived apart��. Perhaps a better analogy would be the model prefect at an English public school. The model prefect is expected to be fair, just, upright, dignified, and withal concerned about his charges. However, he is not likely to support ideas of equality and permissiveness: he must exercise authority.86
In conclusion, it was Professor Tsang who observed that good gover-nance does not require having the most intelligent people up top.87 Good governance must have efficient, effective, productive and non-corrupt indi-viduals at the frontline. In essence, good administration is more important than good policy in the provision of good government. In Hong Kong and since the 1870s, this is exactly what the cadet provided.88 The Hong Kong cadet officers had to pass extremely difficult civil service examination and lengthy Chinese language and culture training before they were allowed to serve under the watchful eyes of senior cadet officers in high places. Once appointed, they were also expected to be familiar with local customs, ways and means, and functioned in ��paternalistic�� ways much like the ��fuwu guan�� in imperial China in solving Chinese citizens�� problems, resolving people��s disputes and promoting community interests, in line with Chinese traditions and community expectations.89
The institutionalisation of this cadet scheme, with a benevolent ethos and infectious esprit de corps, led to successful mediation and effective trans-lation of what would have been ill fitting and offensive colonial policies in the service of the local people. In fact, Tsang is confident that the best protection against British colonialism was none other than its own colonial officers, first the governors, and then the cadets. While appointed by the Crown, these wayward and prideful officers had grown to love Hong Kong as much as the Britain they left behind. They were ready, willing and able to champion and shelter the Hong Kong people from the prejudices, errors, abuses and excess from the White Hall or Colonial Office, in making Hong Kong a better place to live, work and play. It was the dedication and sacrifice of these colonial officers that created the miracle that Hong Kong became. Again, in Professor Tsang��s words:
The most basic safeguard is, however, the nature of the Hong Kong govern-ment itself. The highly sophisticated modern bureaucratic structure of the government means that senior civil servants have tremendous scope for frus-trating the wishes of a Governor, particularly a new arrival�KConservative, cautious, and with a worldview narrowly focused upon Hong Kong, their esprit de corps requires them to act as the guardians of what they believe to be Hong Kong��s best interests, and to prevent anyone, even the British govern-ment, from rocking the boat.90
This is exactly what cadet Walter Deane (1840�V1906) did when he served as the Captain Superintendent (1866�V1892) at the age of 25. His tenure lasted 26 years, the longest ever. While in service, Deane was able to make the HKP more efficient, clean and responsible to the Chinese.91
Working-Class Europeans
Europeans in Hong Kong come in all sizes and shapes, having reached Hong Kong both with intentionality and by fortune. The British Cadet grade colonial police officers were hand-picked and grown for high places; a rare breed. Many of the European officers recruited from abroad were from the lower class, not to speak of those who dropped out, jumped ships and deserted.92 Where people come from usually determine how they end up, in the social ladder, and these officers were no exception. The lower class ended up being a working class unto themselves, ostracised by the European middle and upper class, and isolated from the Chinese commu-nity. The street officers�Xconstables and sergeants�Xbefore they made ranks belonged to the lower class. This group of expatriate officers were the ones who executed colonial policing policy in the street every day. How they interpreted their mandate and applied the law define what colonial policing was in practical terms. However, the European working class, like work-ing class everywhere, cared more about making a living and making do, than upholding the lofty goal and high expectations of their occupation; they did not understand them in the first place. Their life experience and home culture might have disposed them towards thinking and acting like a Western, for example looking down on the locals, but they were definitely not only driven by colonial policy, whether the policy was exploitative or paternalistic.
More significantly, it is better to understand what the HKP frontline officers did in context of their situation in life; guided by self-interests and determined by utility calculus. In the end, the working class police did what was right by them and not that of the British Empire. In the context of Hong Kong, with a decadent lifestyle and much tempting opportunities, it was (and still is) most necessary not to rock the boat, and to get rich fast93:
In 1845, Charles May, a London police officer, was brought out to organize the new police force. Most of the early police recruits were obtained locally from the army, navy, and merchant marine; but in time policemen were recruited directly from Britain or from other colonial territories. The quality and morale of the force was never high�K.But to this class, unfortunately, the chief objection was the readiness with which they yield to the temptation offered by the many public houses, and many of the deaths among the European con-stabulary were ascribed to their excessive indulgences in ardent spirits, a great portion of which, sold by the low tavern-keepers, was of the most abominable and deleterious description.94
Adventurous Expatriate Souls
Hereunder are the background and aspirations of a few expatriate officers when they first came to Hong Kong, and joined up as HKP officers.
Claude and Reginald Earnshaw, who are brothers to each other, came to Hong Kong in 1918 in search of job and better opportunities. After a few years, they moved on to pursue other interests:
Claude and Reginald Earnshaw were born in Battersea at the turn of the 20th Century�KAfter the war the brothers wanted to broaden their horizons and they joined the Hong Kong Police. Recruiting had ceased during the war but a large intake of 34 men arrived during 1919 and a further 21 in 1920. However, after a couple of years the brothers decided that there were better opportunities to be had outside of the Force. Reginald became the Manager of the Kai Tack Motor Bus Company and Claude became the Manager of the Palace Hotel.95
A British university graduate joined the HKP in 1978. He was unhappy with the social and economic conditions in the United Kingdom. He did not know what to do with his life, still less about Hong Kong:
When I left U.K. in 1978 to join the Hong Kong Police, this country was still in the grip of the 3-day week. Uncollected rubbish littered the streets. Unemployment was on the rise. Punk rock was a busted flush and disco was forging ahead powered by the hair and hips of Mr. Travolta. I had a so-so psy-chology degree and not much idea what the future held. My only mental images of Hong Kong were scenes from Enter the Dragon with Bruce Lee kicking ass�Xor the opening moments of You Only Live Twice which showed James Bond (as ever) shagging for England and suggested MI6 operated from a sunken liner in Hong Kong harbour. Well, I thought, if it��s good enough for James Bond�K96
Another British applicant for the HKP in the 1980s joined for the adven-ture, who never intended to make a career, still less calling Hong Kong home:
I applied as a RHKP Inspector way back in the late 80��s. It looked like a great adventure, and I��d always had a mild fascination with that part of the world. Even at that time, the writing was on the wall for Hong Kong and they were taking very few Europeans into the Officer entry program each year. While I was in the application pipeline the whole Tiananmen Square massacre occurred and made me rethink the whole plan. I didn��t ever see myself mak-ing a long term career over there but I could��ve fulfilled the first contract (5 years IIRC) and been out of there before the Chinese came in. I knew I could never stay on after the ��handover���KI just couldn��t see myself working for one of the most brutal, murderous, totalitarian regimes ever known in history. But, maybe that was just me !!!97
The above three testimonials from 1918, 1978 and 1980s point out that expatriates joined the HKP less for serving the Crown than to realise their own dreams.98
Ambivalent Local Officers
What about the locals who joined as colonial police officers? Why did they join? What did they want? Did they change overnight into colonial officers? Did they work for the British in the day, reverting to being indigenous self at night?
Take the case of the recruitment of local young men into Papua New Guinea Colonial Police (PNGCP)99 as an example. Colonial (police) policy in Papua New Guinea requires local representation, facilitation and execu-tion. Ultimately, it needed local people��s acceptance, by way of personifica-tion and embodiment, failing that at least symbolic representation. This fell on the shoulder of local young men joining the PNGCP, swearing allegiance to the Crown.
Who were the young who joined up with PNDCP? What were their moti-vations? More importantly, were their motive and purpose to join PNGCP compatible with official colonial rhetoric, namely, for love of colonialism and loyalty to the Crown?
It turned out that the young people, like young people everywhere, did not join PNWCP to pacify the nation nor civilise the people. They joined for individual reasons and personal gains, which often had few things in com-mon with the PNGCP��s espoused goals and objectives, secular or moral. Most young people joined PNGCP because of money, power and respect, not aspiring to be a colonial police officer, still less to serve the noble cause of colonialism.
For example, Naguwean learned ��that policemen earned more money than mine workers. He was impressed with the power of the government and�Kdeflected to those who worked for the government�K.the perceived respect that would be forthcoming from the villagers because of it�K��100
Many did join for a higher cause, namely, to put an end to internal strife and civil war: ��Boino, Kambian, and Yegova, for instance, believed that the colonial government could put an end to internecine warfare and brought pace and ��development�� to the communities�Kthey wished to contribute to the process�K��101
A few joined with personal agenda, such as to settle scores, to protect the highland people and teach the coastal people a lesson:
I joined the police force because the policemen from the coast came and made a mess of the life of the people from the highlands. I wanted to stop their arro-gant behavior�Kmake sure the policemen from the coast did not overstep the line. We very much wanted to take revenge�K demonstrating to them that our own people were capable of looking after us.102
A minority joined PNGCP to follow the footsteps and achievements of their fathers; to become the big man and leader�Xhead man�Xof their village. Since accumulating wealth, experience, and leadership capacity through traditional means took a long time (or in some cases would be impossible to achieve), join-ing the PNGCP was a much preferred if not the only viable alternative:
At the time of his enrollment�Khe (Amero) was preparing himself to achieve the status of his father. However�Kbecoming big-man�Kinvolved much toil and hardship�KAchieving these leadership qualities and accumulating the required wealth promised to take a long time�Khe was not keen on working for the government�KHe wanted to work for the government for five or more years and then return to the village, with the symbolic ��power�� the government had bestowed on him, and, through its influence, achieve the status of a big-man, quietly and cheaply.103
Finally, some people joined to take revenge on others who took their family��s life:
Kamuna��s younger sister, Sobia�K(was fetching water when)�Kenemy tribe pounced on Soba and killed her�KWhen the opportunity came for him to join the police force, he did so gladly, because he hoped to get his revenge through the police�KKamuna in 1920 was still very much influenced by the beliefs and aspirations of his ancestors, payback killing for unwarranted deaths was the law that he and his people understood.104
To sum up, locals joined PNGCP for all sorts of reasons, none of which has anything to do with colonialism, for or against.
In the context of Hong Kong, young people also joined the HKP for vari-ous reasons. Most joined for security of employment and good welfare and benefits. More than a few joined for illegal and lucrative payoffs in fame and fortune. This is how five HKP officers described their reasons for joining.105
Kong Chi Yin106 joined the HKP in 1967 as a PC and retired in 2011 as a sergeant. It was written as an oral history project. Since it is a non-directed biographic account of his career with the HKP, it is useful as a no-holds-barred first person account of his circumstances and reasons for joining the HKP. Kong joined the HKP, against his parents�� wishes, because he wanted a better career prospect than steel and iron work.
After dropping out of junior secondary school, CY Kong was referred by his distant uncle to work as boy at a trading company, which would allow him to further his studies at an evening school after work. He was indecisive then, and at last he made up his mind to work at the iron and steel works. Later on CY Kong was influenced by his fellow countryman and was determined to enter himself for an exam for prospective policemen. That fellow countryman, who was one year older than Kong, lived in a squatter at Pei Bin Street in Nga Tsin Wai. When in Form 1, CY Kong was entrusted by that fellow country-man��s mother to look for a school for her son, so he accompanied her son to apply for a place in a school at Boundary Street. As the squatters were cleared, that fellow countryman was resettled in Kwun Tong, and joined the Police Force at the age of 18. CY Kong, upon learning about it, was lifted and con-vinced that he was good enough for a try. In his opinion, the work at the iron and steel works was rough, and his poor qualifications would hinder him from competing with the many other job hunters and confine him to such occupa-tions as ticketing officer, fireman and driver. A recruit police constable was paid about 300 dollars a month, which was quite good compared with those occupations. His father was in opposition to his becoming a policeman due to the deep-rooted belief that good boys never become cops. His mother never had much expectation of him and simply hoped that he would have a normal job. CY Kong��s rank was Police Constable when entering the cadet school. He graduated in August 1965, and was posted in a police station report room in the beginning. He planned to study English after his employment, but it fell through in the end due to others�� influence. Today he still regrets about this. In 1971, he became Detective Police Constable (DPC, commonly known as CID). He had been attached to Yau Ma Tei, Kwun Tong as other police stations. In 1976, he was promoted Sergeant. He had been married before the promotion. In 1977, his eldest daughter was born. In the same year, he applied for the police quarters, and moved out of Nga Tsin Wai right after that. The require-ments of applying for quarters in those days depended largely on the no. of family members and length of service.107
Sergeant Mr. Leung Shiu-yuk joined the HKP in December 1966 and was subsequently promoted to Sergeant and Station Sergeant in 1978 and 1984, respectively. He joined the HKP to get rid of the Triad. His first encounter with the Triad came in the 1960s:
At that time, I was only a 14 year old naughty boy. One day, one of my play-mates came to my home with his father after I had a quarrel with him. The man kept on complaining to my father and even claimed he was a triad mem-ber. My father, who was a teacher, was so scared that he slapped my face to calm the man down.108
Leung was speaking on the record with OffBeat. One can only wonder what his true reasons were. Official or not, people have multiple reasons for joining, and many of them changes over time as with one��s life circumstances. This was no different for Leung.
Another PC joined in 1974 because he thought it was a good-paying, secure and fun job:
I joined HKP in 1974 and thought of making a living, and not have to use my brain to study hard�K.after 20 years, I am about to retire�K.I would choose to be a police officer again, because in policing, I can learn about knowledge, wisdom and courage.109
PC Ling joined HKP in 1977, the year the HKP officers staged its first- ever police rebellion against the ICAC, in order to clean up the HKP:
A good person does not become police officers�KMy parents are from the grassroots. Mother was a hawker in the street. When I tended the stall, I witnessed police and gangster soliciting protection money from the hawkers. The police constables also wanted the hawkers to volunteer to be arrested for obstruction, to show they are doing their job. We lived then in subsi-dised government housing. People living in resettlement district witnessed many police conduct which is much like licensed thugs. In order to change the quality of the police, I sincerely believe that it cannot be done by pub-lic opinion, alone. There need to be more young people with idealism and competency to join the HKP. If everyone believes that good people cannot change the police. There will be no hope for the police. I make up my mind to be a good police, to serve the people and enforce the law, setting an example for others.110
Finally, there are those who joined because the HKP wanted them as a result of their past service, for example, defended Hong Kong in WWII, proven loyalty, supported British in controlling Hong Kong and needed their connections, communication with N.T. villagers.111
After Cheung Koon Fu was trained in the East River Column��s base, he worked as a liaison officer in Sha Lo Tung until the Japanese surrender in 1945. After the war, East River Column departed for Mainland China and the Hong Kong-Kowloon Independent Battalion was disbanded. Members of the Battalion could choose to go north to China or quit the force and stay in Hong Kong. Cheung Koon Fu had a wife and daughter, so it was not convenient for him to leave. In 1946, he was admitted into the police to become Hong Kong��s first police officer from Sha Lo Tung. After the war, Hong Kong businesses were in a depression, and the young Hakka settlers faced unemployment because village agricultural land was short, causing a serious problem to public order. To reassure the public, the Hong Kong Government encouraged young Hakka people to apply to join the police, fire service, artillery and other disciplinary forces. Several villagers from Sha Lo Tung worked in the artillery and fire service at that time. The police made the exception to admit Hakka indigenous inhabitants. They sent a Hakka Inspector of Police to the New Territories to recruit police cadets. Candidates had to pass a language test by writing out a piece of newspa-per clipping ready by the police��s translator in the local dialect (Cantonese). Before the war, young Hakka people only received education in Hakka lan-guage, so most of them could not speak the local dialect well. Many people failed the test as a result and faced difficulties also in finding jobs in the urban area. Cheung Koon Fu used to study in Tsim Sha Tsui and took pri-vate tutoring from a primary school teacher, so he passed the test smoothly. For those Hakka people who failed test, the government encouraged them to move to Britain. The immigration application procedures then were simple. Cheung Koon Fu thought that encouraging enlistment and immigration was a political means by the British to solve security problems in Hakka vil-lages in the New Territories.
In 1963, Inspector Wong joined because he was bored with his desk job as an accountant:
After high school graduation, I was admitted to University of Hong Kong for architecture studies. My father felt that our family has doctors, accountant and financial related occupation. In order to get people to mentor me, I joined the historical and prestigious Peak, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. as an accountant under study. While I worked for ��Peal�� I was engaged with numbers all day long. I did not have any interest. I am an action oriented person. How can I sit still in a chair and live with numbers? At that time, I am bored with com-mercial law. I failed the examination. I wasted five years without achieving anything�K.I then proposed to join the HKP.112
The above examples and discussion focus entirely on the individual moti-vation for joining the colonial police, here and overseas. But ��people policing�� analysis goes beyond individual contributions to the shaping of the HKP; the culture of British officers and ethos of Chinese rank and files, collectively, also had much to do in how the HKP behave as an organisation.
With this introduction of cultural theory of colonisation, it is possible to map the contour and gradient of colonial policing in Hong Kong. Adopting this mode of analysis departs from the elite rendition of colonial policing as imagined, with a heavy dosage of ideological bent, and proceeds in favour of a grassroots understanding of colonial policing, as lived, with tantalising details of each individual case. Such cases defy typecasting, and all of them yearn to be heard.
Many Colonised People
Turning to the colonised people, they also had a decisive role to play in shaping colonial rule. Hezel observed the complexity of colonial rule in the Marshall Islands as follows:
The conventional view of colonial rule is that, outgunned and over-awed by superior might, islanders simply submit to the inevitable and bowed before their conquerors. Truth is more complex. Certain factions in these island soci-eties, even if they have no direct hand in the political takeover, welcomed the new colonial masters and saw to it that their own interests were served and their power enhanced under a foreign flag.113
Neither ��colonial policing�� in IRC mode114 or Chinese ��dual track�Xindirect rule approach�� fairly and accurately portrait the complexity and dynamism of the ��colonial policing�� in action.115 ��Colonial policing�� as practised by HKP was ��colonial policing�� with Hong Kong�VChinese characteristics. As such, it could not be understood without thorough understanding of Chinese historical, cultural and social context.116 It is of interest to note that thus far the issue of how Hong Kong Chinese society and culture affected HKP culture, conduct and performance has rarely been studied.117
C: ��Colonial Policing�� as ��Pluralistic�� Policing118
This section begins with reference Leo F. Goodstadt, first Head of the Central Policy Unit. In his recent book, he has this to say about British atti-tude towards collaboration with the Chinese: ��In dealing with internal chal-lenges, the colonial administrations�� instinct was to disengage itself from the Chinese world. From the earlier way of British rule, colonial officials pre-ferred to minimise the scope for conflict with the Chinese population by using intermediaries��.119
��Pluralistic policing��120 means that there are many social control agents doing policing duties working side by side at any moment than what meets the eye. Theoretically, there is only one central police agency; in fact there were many others who work with the central police agency to bring about effective control. For example, in the case of auxiliary policing, police func-tions were organised along regular versus reserve dimension, commodity policing along principle versus agent dimension, private policing along public versus private dimension, community policing along legal versus social dimension. In as much as many policing theories�Xrational choice theory,121 routine activities theory,122 nodal policing theory,123 expecta-tion theory124�Xcall attention to the existence of multiplicity of social control�Xpolicing agencies/agents, there is a need to determine what counts for a gem or species of ��plural mode�� sufficient to be integrated under the rubric of ��pluralistic policing�� regime. Otherwise, the concept of ��pluralistic policing�� is either too porous (everything goes) or ill defined (escape obser-vation) to be of use.
In the current context, in order to illuminate and explicate, for purposes of deconstruction and reconstruction of colonial policing��, ��pluralistic polic-ing�� describes the active cooperation and/or collaboration of other policing agents�Xagencies under HKP control for the purpose of advancing ��colonial-ism�� purpose or interests.
In Hong Kong, ��people policing�� developed alongside with ��colonial polic-ing��.125 However, they had few things in common. Still, the two did inter-sect spatially, for example, marine versus land division, Hong Kong versus Kowloon versus N.T., Peak versus Central, functionally, for example, Special Constable in time of war versus Police Reserve in times of emergencies, inter-act collaboratively,126 for example, HKP versus District Watch Forces, for mutual benefits, due to convenience and/or out of necessity.
The rationale for ��pluralistic policing�� is best supplied by the advocates in a different era, that is, in the twenty-first century, for a different cause�Xsocial integration:
At the same time most western societies have become more and more hetero-geneous. In major cities diverse ethnic and lifestyle groups lead separate lives. Rules for one group about acceptable conduct will seldom entirely agree with another��s�XBorn Again Christians and gays are unlikely to agree, for exam-ple. Outside of a thin core of public morality�Xalmost everyone will agree that murder, theft and fraud are crimes�Xgroups would be better off setting and policing their own standards. Citizens would have to accept that differ-ent rules applied to different communities with informal self-regulation and arbitration.127
Theoretically speaking,128 ��pluralistic policing�� exists and existed because a single agency has limited resources to satisfy different expectations, due to inadequacy or mismatch of resource to a problem. ��Pluralistic policing�� is also needed in tending to single problem with many expectations, for exam-ple, from multiple expectations to multiple constituents.
��Pluralistic policing�� requires coordination and integration: such as whom to do what and how, given a problem set. Who is responsible for what jurisdictional domain, for example public disorder versus family deviance, with what method, for example, compensatory settlement versus punitive control,129 and under what circumstances, for example, crisis intervention versus problem solving.
Similar ��pluralistic�� challenges existed in other ��realms�� of social control beyond policing, such as dispute resolution with ��rule of law versus custom-ary social control��:
The international community largely remains unsure of how to approach customary justice and tends to design interventions that alternately ignore or replace customary systems. The best approach, we have found, lies more in the middle. Customary justice systems should not be seen as separate or parallel, but an integral, if often deeply flawed element of the wider justice sector.130
D: Colonial Policing as ��Collaborative�� Policing
��Pluralistic policing�� calls for multi-party involvement with crime control or problem solving. ��Collaborative policing�� details the nature and kind of relationship and interaction between parties engaging in crime control and problem solving.
The premise that ��colonial�� policing is ��collaborative�� policing is based on the simple but compelling thesis that the ��dictatorship�� (minority) cannot impose its will and secure its rule without the consent and compliance, coop-eration and collaboration of the ruled (majority), however strong. That is to say ��colonial�� powers could not have securely ruled by force alone. As political scientist Karl W. Deutsch observed in 1953:
Totalitarian power is strong only if it does not have to be used too often. If totalitarian power must be used at all times against the entire population, it is unlikely to remain powerful for long. Since totalitarian regimes require more power for dealing with their subjects than do other types of government, such regimes stand in greater need of widespread and dependable compliance hab-its among their people; more than that they have to be able to count on the active support of at least significant parts of the population in case of need.131
Elaborating on that, Dr. Gene Sharpe, the grand master of non-violent struggle, informs us that all political powers, especially dictatorship, have an Achilles�� heel and are vulnerable to attack.132 The first of the flaws is the aforementioned non-cooperation of the people: ��The cooperation of a multi-tude of people, groups, and institutions needed to operate the system may be restricted or withdrawn��.133 This is particularly the case with essential services, for example, knowledge workers or army/policy. Sharpe further suggests 198 ways of defying the will of the dictatorship through non-cooperation:
Methods of nonviolent protest and persuasio.n are largely symbolic demonstra-tions, including parades, marches, and vigils (54 methods). Noncooperation is divided into three sub-categories: (a) social noncooperation (16 methods), (b) economic noncooperation, including boycotts (26 methods) and strikes (23.methods), and (c) political noncooperation (38 methods). Nonviolent intervention, by psychological, physical, social, economic, or political means, such as the fast, nonviolent occupation, and parallel government (41 meth-ods), is the final group.134
From the perspective of the British colonial ruler, the incentive to col-laborate is that of necessity: Niccolo Machiavelli had much earlier argued that the prince ���Kwho has the public as a whole for his enemy can never make himself secure; and the greater his cruelty, the weaker does his regime become��.135
As applied to Hong Kong, and in the heyday of colonial rule in the 1860s, Sharp��s observation that a colonial master depends on the colonised for effec-tive rule and survival makes a lot of sense:
The challenge for the colonial government in the 1860s was how best to re-established its credibility and how to organise, and communicate with, the large and increasingly permanent Chinese population in the colony without having to reply so exclusively on the narrow points of contact provided by middlemen such as Caldwell�KAt the same time, the colony could not survive without its Chinese population: not only did its economy and revenue depend on the network of Chinese trade that now embraced Hong Kong; the daily functioning of European society was paralyzed without the supplies, labor, and connections they provided, as the mass boycott in 1858 demonstrated.136
Advanced here, ��collaborative policing�� is not a new discovery. In the annals of colonial Hong Kong history, ��collaborative policing�� has been inti-mated many times. Several of these intimations are henceforth discussed.
First, in 2005, Cindy Yik-Yi Chu wrote about ��Foreign Communities in Hong Kong, 1840s�V1950s�� which provide the social and cultural context for pluralistic and collaborative ordering.137 Professor Chu��s book Foreign Communities in Hong Kong, 1840s�V1950s is an edited volume documenting the experiences of various foreign communities�XBritish (Chapters 2 and 3), German (Chapter 4), Catholic (Chapter 5), Japanese (Chapter 6), Interment (Chapter 7), Indian (Chapter 8) and China Hand (Chapter 9) in adjusting to Hong Kong during their time, chronologically from 1840 to 1950.138 In so doing, the book captures the change of circumstances in Hong Kong and how people relate to the changes, in making history, at the individual, com-munity and society levels.139
One key lesson learned from the book is captured by the following para-graph: ��Foreign communities are far from being monolithic entities�K.Hong Kong was made of different ethnic and professional groups, with different background and experiences, minding their own business, with their own dreams��.140 The study of policing in Hong Kong is the study of how these people come to terms with securing their life (in dealing with crime) and ordering their relationship (in resolving disputes), in a conciliatory way, if not collaboratively.
Understood this way, the study of policing in Hong King is actually the study of cultural exchange and group interface, in meeting different individ-ual expectations and collective desire, in the midst of conflicting personality and custom, attitude and tradition.141
Second, at around the same time (2005), John M. Carroll in Edge of Empires: Chinese Elites and British Colonials in Hong Kong142 made out a case for collaboration between British and Chinese. In Chapter 3, ��Strategic Balance: Status and Respect in the Colonial Context��, Carroll explores the fissures in British colonial rule that left room for local Chinese elites to cul-tivate their power and influence. In early Hong Kong, a wide gulf separated the colonial government and its Chinese subjects:
Colonial ignorance, indifference, and incompetence created a demand for ser-vices that these merchants were in a special position to offer. Through charita-ble and voluntary organizations, they resolved civil and commercial disputes, provided medical facilities, and created a voice for the Chinese community. By offering such services, local Chinese merchants were able to take advan-tage of Hong Kong��s position at the edge of the Chinese and British empires to enhance their own power and prestige.143
To emphasise this point, Carroll repeated the now-familiar stories of the founding and operation of the Man Mo Temple (1847), the Tung Wah Hospital (1872), the District Watch Force (1866), the reorganised District Watch Committee (1891), the Nam Pak Hong Kung So Merchant Association (1868), and the Po Leung Kwok charitable organisation (1880).
Since collaboration is working together to achieve a common objec-tive�Xpeaceful coexistence, ��collaborative policing�� presupposes a mutuality of goal(s), shared interests amidst divergence in values; an assumption that while values can never be compromised, interests are always negotiable. In contested relationship and situations of conflict, finding mutuality amidst differences (�D�s�P��) or finding common grounds amidst differences) is the goal of all goals.
From here, the first observation is that the mutuality of goal(s) under-scoring ��collaborative policing�� in colonised Hong Kong means that the perspectives of the coloniser (British) and colonised (Chinese) did not need to be identical. For example, order and stability was a desired goal for the British and Chinese, albeit for different reasons, purposes, and to a different degree. British colonists wanted order to promote trade; to them, order was an instrumental good. The Chinese wanted order for the sake of harmony and out of a loathing for chaos, both ideological goods.
To the British colonialists of the time, the ��indirect rule�� governance model as ��collaborative policing�� was justified as follows:
Indirect rule reduced the costs of colonial administration, gradually incorpo-rated indigenous authorities into the colonial bureaucracy and enlisted them as agents to implement two essential aspects of colonial rule: the collection of revenue and the maintenance of law and order�Kthe gradualist polices of run-ning Empire at minimal cost and with minimal force was a cause of self-con-gratulation by many colonial powers, who saw their systems of trusteeship as fulfilling the main criteria of good, if somewhat authoritarian governance�K144
Second, mutuality of interests in ��colonial policing�� leading to ��collab-orative policing�� is likely to happen when both parties viewed coercive or imposed control as a non-zero sum game, where collaboration yields more benefits to coloniser and colonised alike. In collaborative policing, that is, ��dual track justice�� or ��indirect rule��, the British defined the rule and the colo-nised part take in self-governance. Here, the British traded concrete admin-istrative control for symbolic sovereign control. Such an arrangement brings to mind the principal versus agent relationship in common law, wherein the principal appoints and empowers agents to act on his behalf, with contractu-ally defined scope, duty and authority, negotiated beforehand:
Inherent in the Principal�VAgent (P�VA) relationship is the understanding that the agent will act for and on behalf of the principal. The agent assumes an obligation of loyalty to the principal that she will follow the principal��s instructions and will neither intentionally nor negligently act improperly in the performance of the act. An agent cannot take personal advantage of the business opportunities the agency position uncovers. A principal, in turn, reposes trust and confidence in the agent. These obligations bring forth a fidu-ciary relationship of trust and confidence between P and A�K.An agent must obey reasonable instructions given by the P. The A must not do acts that have not been expressly or impliedly authorised by the P. The A must use reason-able care and skill in performing the duties. Most importantly, the A must be loyal to the P. The A must refrain from putting herself in a position that would ordinarily encourage a conflict between the agent��s own interests and those of the principal (note: one might reflect on the role of certain Enron executives on ��outside�� limited partnerships that did business with Enron in the early 2000s). The A must keep the P informed as to all facts that materially affect the agency relationship.145
Finally, mutuality of (separate) interests might collapse into one ��colo-nial policing�� when the British and Chinese used each other to achieve their respective goals, now merged. This is what is called in Chinese �P�ɲ�., ���ۧQ�� (same bed, different dreams, using each other to achieve individ-ual goals).146 For example, in colonial Hong Kong, the British colonialists (Caldwell) used Chinese middlemen to gain control (information, influence) over the Chinese.147 The Chinese middlemen use their association�Xaccess to British authority (through Caldwell) to consolidate their power, secure their leadership and advance their interests.148 Another example is the Tanka:
For more than a thousand years, the Tanka had been treated as uncivilized people or sea pirates and had been discriminated against by the land peo-ple�K.they were prohibited from taking the civil service examination�K owning property and marrying inland inhabitant�K Collaboration with the Westerners brought to them not only economic gain but also advancement in political and social status. In return for their help, the British granted them land, and they were able to speculate on property and became rich. To reverse their fate of political exclusion, some of those successful under the British rule assumed the functions of leaders of the local gentry, equivalent to traditional literati�K (without)�Ktake the civil service examination�K149
The mutually beneficial ��collaborative policing�� regime survived the early colonial days, and eventually turned into institutionalised corruption rack-ets with detective staff sergeants acting as go-between for the British expa-triate officers and Chinese crime syndicates in the 1950s�V1970s. The British enjoyed a semblance of effective crime control and the detective staff ser-geants got rich and powerful: a deal made in heaven. The ICAC described it in ��The rise of the detective sergeant�� thus:
The territory was then divided into three main police regions: Hong Kong Island, Kowloon and the New Territories. Each region had its own chief detec-tive sergeant, and under him were detective sergeants responsible for criminal investigations and were invariably Chinese. This was largely because many high ranking expatriate officers could not speak Chinese. They therefore had to rely on their Chinese detective sergeants when carrying out investigations. This core group of detective sergeants also served as a bridge between non-English speaking citizens and expatriate police officers. Despite their lowly rank, they wielded enormous influence.150
It was an open secret in those days that the detective staff sergeants were in control of the HKP, not the CP.151
In (Detective Staff Sergeant) Lui Lok most powerful moment, if a new Commissioner of Police did not give him face, such as not visiting him when coming on duty, he would react by not taking serious criminal investigation, until the Commission visited him personally. As to dealing with the gang-sters�� world. Lui Lok insisted that the four big gang families all give him face. ��I do not need to make arrest personally. If there are cases to be solved. I will go to the head of the gangs and demand delivery of criminals��. It can be said that he cover up the sky with one hand.152
From ICAC records, it is now understood that before the 1970s, ��collab-orative policing�� in Hong Kong involved three parties, namely, the expatriate officers, the Chinese CID officers and the underworld, through their respec-tive leadership.
In as much as ��collaborative policing�� was an inter-dependent relation-ship, with collaborating parties relying on each other to achieve goals of policing, it promised to turn ��colonial policing�� on its head, with the tail (Chinese CID officers) wagging the dog (British colonial officers), instead of the other way round.153
E: Colonial Policing as ��Discretionary�� Policing
The image of a crisp uniform and stern discipline, often associated with colonial policing, suggests a well-oiled paramilitary machine, in service of the Crown. But appearances are deceptive. Police everywhere have power to selectively (not) enforce the law as they deem fit and proper, on policy ground, due to factual circumstances, or for self-interest, individual or institutional. In the annals of police research, police powers have often been used against the marginal and powerless, making for discrimination charges. The same charge has been levelled against the HKP, as not keeping faith with the rule of law, in early colonial days: ��Caldwell was in a position to pervert course of justice at the expense of the Chinese community. This was achieved ��by influencing proceedings in the Magistrate��s Court, and to have used his powers to silence his enemies�� or by selective enforcement of the law��.154
Selective enforcement of law (discretionary policing) is a defining characteristic of colonial power, employed in order to soften opposition or consolidate power. In the former case, full force of law only applies to the most radical and intransigent political elements, lest it inflame the popu-lace.155 In the latter case, colonial policing is held in reserve in support of indirect rule.
A careful examination of history of colonial policing in Hong Kong finds that ��discretionary�� exercise of power was often used to shield native Chinese from the brunt of culturally disagreeable Hong Kong law, for exam-ple, use of opium by Chinese elites and opera singers was tolerated,156 such as in the case of the fame opera singer Sun Ma Sze Tang.157 Discretionary policing was even conducted in such a way by frontline HKP officers to sub-vert British colonial law in favour of local justice, for example, use of law to harass disagreeable or immoral conduct. Otherwise, not enforcing colonial law was used to compel cooperation with ��Chinese�� policing scheme. Under the Four HKP CID Staff Sergeants era in the 1950s, CID Sergeants were able to use selective (non) enforcement of law as inducement for gangs to police themselves:
Many police officers, knowingly or unknowingly, had informers who were Triad members and through them the societies obtain a certain degree of official protection, either directly through bribed or indirectly by obtaining advance informant of Police action contemplated against them.158
F: Colonial Policing as ��More or Less�� Governmental Control
��Colonial policing�� can accommodate and incorporate ��colonised policing�� under the rubrics of ��more or less government�� social control theoretical framework.
As a final analysis, the key to understanding colonial policing in Hong Kong is to investigate in what manner, to what extent and under what cir-cumstances was the HKP organised (mission, role, function) and operated (method and style) in colonial versus indigenous ways. This requires answer-ing two separate but related questions. First, could policing in Hong Kong, at a given point in time,159 be characterised as (non) ��colonial�� in nature, form or style? Second, was the HKP organised like and did it function as a colonial police force in theory or practice? Both of these questions require one to first address the overall question of: What is colonial policing and how does a colonial police force look like? More simply put: What is the true nature of colonial police? To this final subject matter, the last section of this chapter turns.
III: True Nature of Colonial Policing
Colonial HKP Is Not Monolithic, Omnipresent and Omnipotent
The colonial HKP, like all other agencies of control, was not monolithic, omnipresent and omnipotent. As an organisation and bureaucracy, it had many ill-fitting parts, pursuing multiple goals, with different strategies and level of resources, engaging in multiple tasks in variegated context. As such, the HKP cannot be distilled into this or that, much less colonial or dictatorial.
The takeaway from the study of policing is that police work is never done. Simply put, available police resources are limited, and the demands for ser-vices are unlimited. Thus, priorities were set, opportunity costs were consid-ered, cost effectiveness and marginal utility calculation were the cornerstone of police resource deployment, zero tolerance was the exception, not the rule, and discretion was the norm.
The other observation is that policing is more about surveillance and monitoring than policing and controlling. The colonial HKP were not exempt from this observation. In as much as that is true, the HKP could not be expected to be present in all time and space due to the aforementioned limited resources. Without knowing all, the police cannot be all things to all people at all times. In this way, the colonial HKP could not afford to or otherwise be made to be omnipresent.
Finally, the colonial HKP is not and could not hope to be omnipotent. This is so because the HKP had at its disposal only limited resources, that is, law, gun, and legitimacy in solving people��s variegated problems, changing needs and dynamic expectations.
Colonial Policing Is Not Anti-Local
First, colonial policing should not be considered ipso facto as anti-local, confrontational or adversarial, in form or substance. This is not to deny that colonial police had an indispensable and important role to play in defining the relationship between the coloniser and the colonised, either as a ready reserve or emergency force, when the coloniser or colonised peo-ple��s values or interests were in a collision course, or when they could not come to terms with each other. Still, both parties realised, from experience and with foresight, that they needed to go along and get along, in reducing their differences and managing their distances sufficiently so as not to cross each other��s path to thereby require intervention of colonial policing. In this regard, Cole observed, ��A major misconception about colonial policing is the assertion that it was mainly public order policing�Xa viewpoint that over-emphasises the confrontations with ��natives�� and creates an impres-sion of colonisation as dealing mainly with anarchy and ��barbarism��.160
Second, colonial policing, whatever its agenda or method, did not pre-clude, and in fact necessitated the performance of routine law, order and ser-vice functions, in a responsible, efficient and effective manner. That is to say colonial policing and civilian policing did intersect and converge, requiring long- and short-term coordination and integration, whether this coopera-tion occurred for the public good or out of self-interest. At the end of the day, law and order and crime and punishment are everybody��s business. Cole observed:
But the colonial society was not, itself, crime free. Crime in the colonial soci-ety could be liked, although not entirely, to new socio-economic problems cre-ated by colonial political economy. Hence, some of the colonial police forces were established specifically to control crime�K161
Good political policing entails good social policing, for example, social policing can be used as a way to achieve socialisation or surveillance func-tions, such as household registration in China. Social policing buttresses political policing, for example, in a stable society with a happy people, it is much more easy to reproduce colonial order. In fact, in order to govern well, a coloniser needed to conduct effective social policing and to avoid partaking in dysfunctional political policing, in order to earn the trust of the ruled, that is, gain legitimacy, allegiance, obedience, and failing that induce instinctual compliance with the law. More succinctly, superlative (colonial) policing�Xfighting crime, providing order and delivering ser-vice�Xwas the most effective way to connect and unite the coloniser and the colonised. Beyond that, the colonial police��s capacity to fight crime effectively, ability to maintain order efficiently and readiness to provide service satisfactorily sent a clear message that colonial police was an insti-tution or force to be reckoned with. The colonised people needed to be told by repeated iteration and consistent reinforcement that colonial policing could be tough and rough or soft and measured, in tending to the needs of the people or quelling discontent. The colonised people have a real choice: follow the law and they will be protected; challenge the system, they will be sanctioned as criminals.
Third, colonial policing did not prelude, and indeed welcomed, civilian policing. A negotiated peace between the coloniser and the colonised, even with sub-optimal terms and conditions for both, was better off than constant skirmishes between the two, as they tried to maximise each other��s goods. This was Hobbes�� central message, in calling for social contract in the midst of a dog-eat-dog world.162 In stating this, the argument is that Hobbes�� social contract has application to all sorts of governance arrived at between (un)equals, not just democratic government. The assumption is that a coloniser��s power to rule is never total or perpetual. In relationship building, with friend or foe, co-existence is the rule and conflict is the exception. Justice principles aside, functionally speaking, induced consent to colonial rule was as good in effect as consent freely arrived at. That is the lesson of ��free�� market. Economic agents are never free. They all laboured under limited choices, as constrained by their own economic circumstances. Like economic market, there is no per-fect democracy between equals, everyone��s choice is constrained and limited.
��Indirect rule�� was just one such kind of negotiated settlement. It was much less risky and costly for a coloniser to negotiate a settlement with the colonised people to govern themselves with their own rules, by their own leaders, within their own community, than for the colonisers to supervise and punish them, from outside in, top down and high-handed fashion. Cole observed:
Generally, civilian policing appeared to prevail during the latter years of colo-nization�K.after the pacification process was completed and the colonial states were well established. The most conspicuous features of civil policing during the colonial era, however, were the various forms of local police systems that were set up at territorial, village or district level�Koften referred to as ��native�� or ��tribal�� administration�K163
True Nature of Colonial Policing in Hong Kong
As observed and discussed, there is no denial that colonial policing, as a political instrumentality, spoke the voice of the colonial master, at the expense of the colonised. But it is also observed that seasoned, prudent and judicious colonial masters, for political or personal reasons, were inclined to reconfigure or align colonial policy with local values and interests, catering to the colonised��s hopes and dreams, meeting their needs and wants, and finding common ground with colonisers if possible (and trad-ing favours if they could not), to make colonial rule a win�Vwin situation. This is to observe that pragmatism not ideology, reality not theory, was the guiding principle of colonial administration.164 In this way, colonial polic-ing took on a Janus-faced, hybrid personality: customised in response to the complexities of the situation, adapted to the vagaries of the time and adjusted to take account of the dynamic change in the moment.
Colonial policing took shape on the fly and mutated over time, with the colonial police knowing what not to do, than what ought to be done. Necessity, expediency, exigency are the motherhood of colonial policing; speaking in ideological terms and justifying with higher principle only as an afterthought, and most likely in passing.
IV: Conclusion
This chapter problematises the idea, ideal and practice of colonial policing in search of a more grounded understanding of the true nature and nuanced reality of colonial policing.
First to notice is that in the beginning (1841�V1844), there was no colonial police or policing to speak of. For one thing, there was no (coherent and stable) colonial policy over the governance of Hong Kong. For another, there was no idea on how to pacify�Xbringing about law and order to�XHong Kong. Without policy on governance and idea of policing, personalities, events and situations rule the day. That being the case, policing in Hong Kong is not central and uniform, that is, colonial policing, with one (British) or limited (in-direct) rule fits all, as much as it is, decentralised and diversified, that is, ��pluralistic��, where each to his/their own.
��Pluralistic�� policing should not be understood as unbounded, unprincipled, unstructured or undisciplined, worse dysfunction. ��Pluralistic�� just means the obverse of ��monopolistic��, with many social control agents, centres or organisa-tions, competing for dominance, as in the case of family versus church, and col-laborated or coordinated for effect, as in the cases of District Watch Force.
Looking from the perspective of colonial history, ��pluralistic�� policing makes sense in describing law, order and control in early colonial Hong Kong. Policing in colonial Hong Kong was to be filled by ��colonial police��, failing that the void was filled by default with ready and willing policing agents or institutions of all colour and shape, from family discipline to pri-vate guards, and even Triads.
However, from a Hong Kong-centric perspective, looking at Hong Kong history, especially from bottom up, one finds that neither ��colonial polic-ing�� nor ��pluralistic policing�� quite describes the situation. Hong Kong and its residents were fairly well ordered and sufficiently protected, before the arrival of the British. The crime and disorder brought on by colonisation�Xcommercialisation, urbanisation and seafaring�Xwhile beyond the control of the locals, were not impacting their life, as much. Personal/family self-help and commercial private policing were ready to resolve disputes, fight crime and maintain disorder in Hong Kong. At the end of the day, before 1945, the British colonial HKP had little motivation or capacity to interfere in Chinese ways of life.
During those years, pirates prowled the water outside Hong Kong and thugs roamed the city at night. Public police existed in name only. To secure their own safety, the European elites retained personal guards. To protect their property, commercial establishments hired private security. The safety and security of local residences and sojourn Chinese labourers were left to their own accord, to the charge of village pack (baojia) or mutual aid organ-isations (Man Wu Temple). In time, the indigenous and informal Chinese social control was found wanting, and the Chinese elites took the initiative to start the District Watch Force to fight crime and Tung Wah detectives to protect women and children. This initiative was kidnapped by the colonial police to pacify and regulate a resentful indigenous crowd:
As years passed and the Chinese community grew numerically and in sophis-tication, the need for indigenous private security was felt by this Chinese elite�K.Chinese merchants in their attempt to initiate the District Watch Force�K control by�Kthe Government exerted from the outset.165
Investigating into colonial policing of Hong Kong requires perspective and discernment to avoid being sidetracked by ideology and misled by con-ventional wisdom. Here, Professor Carroll has much to offer with his book Edge of Empires (2005). The book seeks to ��explore the fissures in British colo-nial rule that left room for local Chinese elites�� to exert control, specifically, in early British rule in Hong Kong. In the book, Carroll cautioned:
We need more than theoretical criticisms or defenses of Orientalism, subaltern studies, and post-colonialism; we need more local histories that both engage and challenge these approaches�KColonies were not just about exploitation; they were also about how people learned to work within cracks (pp. 9�V10).166
In the case of colonial Hong Kong:
The gulf between government and governed, the government��s failure to pro-vide adequate medical facilities for its Chinese subjects, and its inability to provide a secure business environment all helped Chinese merchants obtain recognition by providing services to the local Chinese population and the government (p. 10).167
Finally, in Chapter 3, ��Strategic Balance: Status and Respect in the Colonial Context��, Carroll explores the fissures in British colonial rule that left room for local Chinese elites to cultivate their power and influence. In early Hong Kong, a wide gulf separated the colonial government and its Chinese subjects:
Colonial ignorance, indifference, and incompetence created a demand for ser-vices that these merchants were in a special position to offer. Through charita-ble and voluntary organizations, they resolved civil and commercial disputes, provided medical facilities, and created a voice for the Chinese community. By offering such services, local Chinese merchants were able to take advan-tage of Hong Kong��s position at the edge of the Chinese and British empires to enhance their own power and prestige.168
At the end of the day, colonial policing had more to do with Chinese policing Chinese, than total British rule.
One more important issue needs to be raised. Throughout this chapter, there has been a focus on debunking ��colonial policing�� as a concept and practice. There is little attention paid to the idea that Chinese are not alike, in ethnic origin (Hakka vs. Punti), cultural sentiments (Hong Kongese vs. Chinese), and regional identity (Shanghai refugees vs. Hong Kong locals), which suggests many degree of separateness between and among Chinese groups. Given this sensitivity to and understanding of the Chinese diaspora, it is necessary to revisit the issue of what counts for ��colonial policing�� and what counts for ��Chinese policing��. As applied and in more concrete terms, how did different ��Chinese�� policing organisation and style, individually or in collaboration with the HKP, affect understanding of ��Chinese policing�� as ��colonial policing��, free of essentialist tendency and chauvinistic pretensions? At this juncture, it bears to recall the admonition of Wing Shing Law:
Criticizing the essentializing tendencies manifested in those Chinese nation-alistic discourses, diaspora cultural studies passionately argue for a kind of post-colonial politics which can engage battles on two fronts: that is to say, they try to safeguard Hong Kong as a space for identification where both British colonialism and chauvinistic Chinese nationalisms can be held in check. (p. 4)169
Otherwise there is a risk of jumping from the fire-pan of anti--colonialism into the fire of politically correct nationalism, both of which are myth bearing and factually distortive in the effort to unravel the mystery behind ��colonial policing�� with Chinese characteristics. The fact of the mat-ter is, if colonial policing with Chinese characteristics means anything, it is the fact that Chinese characteristics come through in numerous ways, and change over time and space. The only thing that is certain in the study of colonial policing with Chinese characteristics is that such policing takes up unique forms and styles within indigenous political economy.170 That being the case, it is imperative to investigate how the Chinese elites and powers-to-be used colonial policing to their own personal advantages (political) and for the benefit of the group. For them, to be successful in improving Hong Kong�VChinese interests, it was best to embrace and deploy British colonial policing, in the image and to the liking of the Chinese, rather than to resent and dismiss it outright.171 Viewed in this manner, Hong Kong colo-nial policing was neither British nor Chinese, but a hybrid, with concepts from the British, such as legal justice, and practices from the Chinese, such as street justice.172
Endnotes
1. M. E. Page and P. M. Sonnenburg, Police and policing, Colonialism: An International, Social, Cultural, and Political Encyclopedia. A-M. Vol. 1 (ABC-CLIO, 2003), p. 475.
2. J. Morris, Pax Britannica (London: Faber and Faber, 25 November 2010), p. 197. It is ironic that while the people usually enjoyed the grandiose of British imperialism in far-fetched places, there was no serious thought about what to do with British settlement and possession, later dependency and association. In fact, to the public and politicians: ��the issues of Empire were mostly glamor-ous irrelevances, whose effect on domestic politics was normally peripheral�K�� (p. 202). There was never a Minister of Empire (p. 204). The Parliament left the colonies to the executive branch. The Colonial Office was established in 1854. Before that, colonies were administered by Secretary of State for War and the Colonies, and some (like India) with the Foreign Office. The office was run by 23 ��clerks�� who while experienced as foreign experts had little research support. They knew very little about the ins and outs of colonies, and perhaps cared less. In the end, the colonies were trusted to be run themselves, baring extraordinary circumstances, for example, insurgency in Malaysia or riots in Hong Kong (p. 205). Cultural ignorance aside and political disinterest not-withstanding, this does not stop Britain, as the titular head of a vast empire, to claim moral superiority and assert social distance from the colonised people. (See Chapter 8: ��Caste��.)
3. It is argued that Hong Kong has thrived under a kind of indirect rule, resulting in the people enjoying increased autonomy T.-W. Ngo, Hong Kong��s History: State and Society under Colonial Rule (London and New York: Routledge, 2002).
4. F. Madden, The End of Empire: Dependencies Since 1948, Part 1: The West Indies, British Honduras, Hong Kong, Fiji, Cyprus, Gibraltar, and the Falklands, Vol. 1 (Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing Group, 2009), p. xiii.
5. ��German European townships of Windhoek and Swakopments in Southwest Africa; the French ��communes�� and European settlements in Algeria, Cochin-China (South Vietnam), Senegal, French Equatorial Africa, New Caledonia and the New Hebrides; the Spanish colonial township of Santiago in Chile; the Portuguese colonial settlements in East and West Africa��. (B. A. Cole, Post colonial policing, In: R. I. Mawby (ed.), Policing across The World: Issues for the Twenty-First Century (New York: Psychology Press, 1 February 1999), pp. 88�V95. (Cole discusses the characteristics and impact of colonial policing.)
6. Ibid.
7. This note moves the RIC discussion and debate in two directions. First, it is said that a picture is worth a thousand words, and seeing is believing (literally and figuratively); both hinted at the impact of visual presentation on our sense, affecting our understanding, which is cognitively based but emotionally laden, if not driven. Second, meaning of things is cultural in nature. Culture as ideas and beliefs are people based. To get to the roots of what RIC is or is not, we need to know how people think, and more importantly, feel. For these reasons, some RIC pictures and discussion on the web is helpful with our analysis. http://www.boards.ie/vbulletin/showthread.php?t.=.2056739068.
8. R. I. Mawby, Policing across the World: Issues for the Twenty-First Century (London: Psychology Press, 1 February 1999), p. 88.
9. Ibid., p. 13.
10. ��Colonialism�� in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (��Colonialism is a practice of domination, which involves the subjugation of one people to another��.) First published Tuesday, 9 May 2006; substantive revision Tuesday, 10 April 2012. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/colonialism/
11. R. J. Horvath, A definition of colonialism, Current Anthropology, 13 (1): 45�V57, 1972.
12. C. Jeffries, The Colonial Police (London: Max Parrish, 1952), p. 30.
13. L. A. Leach, The Ordinances of the Legislative Council of the Colony of Hongkong Commencing with the Year 1844 (Hong Kong: Norton and Government Printer, 1890), p. 45.
14. The language of the PFR (preamble) reads in pertinent part: ��it is expedient that provisions should be made ��it is considered expedient that provision should be made for the establishment of an effective System of Police within the Colony of Hong Kong�Kunder a Police Ordinance�K����
15. Section III: ��3. And in order to provide for one uniform system of rules and regulations, throughout the whole establishment of police in Hongkong: Be it enacted, that the said Chief Magistrate may from time to time, subject to the approbation of the Governor for the time being, frame such orders and regula-tions, as he shall deem expedient for the general government of the men, to be appointed members of the Police Force under this Ordinance�K��
16. Hong Kong was the by-product of opium trade, and the spoil of the Opium War (1839�V1844). C. Munn, Four: The Hong Kong opium revenue, 1845�V1885, In: B. Timothy and B. Wakabayashi, Opium Regimes: Britain, China and Japan �V 1839�V1952 (CA: California University Press, 2000), pp. 105�V125. As expected, opium was a big business for the British as exports and a steady revenue in Hong Kong on retail consumption. The value of opium imported from India between 1903 and 1915 amounted to the following: 1903�V1904 3,576,431 pounds sterling; 1904�V1905 4,036,436, 1905�V1906 3,775,82.6; 1906�V1907 3,771,409; 1907�V1908 3,145,403; 1908�V1909 2,230,755; 1909�V1910 3,377,222; 1910�V1911 3,963,264; 1911�V1912 3,018,858; 1912�V1913 2,406,084; 1913�V1914 1,084,093; 1914�V1915 110,712 ��Statistical Abstract Relating to British India, 1905�V1906 to 1915,�� and ��Statistical Abstract Relating to British India, 1903�V1904 to 1912�V1913��. E. L. Monte, The Opium Monopoly (New York: Macmillan, 1920), p. 37. Opium retail and monopoly generated a sizable and steady income for the Hong Kong government, which was strapped for cash with limited Home Office assistant, especially in the early years. The role of the police was in enforcing the opium regulations, formulated to protect monopoly of opium farm and integrity of the export opium trade. Munn, p. 110.
17. P. Howell, Race, space and the regulation of prostitution in colonial Hong Kong, Urban History, 31 (2): 229�V248, 2004. (As a subject of sexual politics, the preva-lence of prostitution in a new-found colony challenges the colonist��s sense of self, purity of race, and vision for the world, civilisation of others (Chinese), denominated in moral, scientific and cultural terms. Prostitution as practised in China (spilled over to Hong Kong), as distinguished from European vari-eties, does not bespeak passion of (men) run amok or commercialisation (of sex) gone astray but reflects fundamental flaws of a degenerated nation, bent on contaminating all those who cross its path (European colonists) and promise to destroy the civilized world as we know it (in the West.).
18. Ordinance 14 of 1844, An Ordinance for the Suppression of Public Gaming in the Colony of Hongkong. [10th June, 1844.] The preamble reads: ��Whereas, it is expedient to suppress the pernicious Practice of Public Gaming in the Colony of Hongkong�K�� Notwithstanding Ordinance 14 of 1844, gambling in Hong Kong spread like wildfire: ��Gambling on the part of the navies had reached such a climax at this period (1860s) that neither the law regulating the subject nor the steps taken by the Government to endeavor to eradicate the evil had been of any avail��. The fact that the police was on the payroll of illicit gamblers did not help. J. W. Norton-Kyshe, The History of the Laws and Courts of Hongkong (Hong Kong: T.F. Unwin, 1898), p. 109.
19. From the Editorial: ��The report of the Acting Captain Superintendent of Police for the last year is of special interest�KThe figures�K show that�K both serious crimes and minor offences have increased to�Kan alarming extent. So far as statistics are concerned, there was more crime in the Colony last year than in any similar period for at least a decade��. China Mail, 8 April 1898.
20. According to the first Registrar General of Hong Kong, Samuel Fearon: ��Chinese people whose habits, character and language mark them as a distinct race. Careless of the ties of home and those moral obligations, the observance of which is deemed absolutely necessary to the preservation of the national integrity; uneasy under the restraint of law and unscrupulous of the means by which they live, they abandon without hesitation their hearths and household gods, their birthright and their fathers�� tombs to wander, unrespected, whither gain many fall. The unsettled state of the Colony, and the vast amount of crime during its infancy afford abundant proof of the demoralizing effects of their presence��. C. Munn, Anglo-China: Chinese People and British Rule in Hong Kong, 1841�V1880 (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2008), p. 68.
21. C. Yik-Yi Chu (ed.), Foreign Communities in Hong Kong, 1840s�V1950s (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005).
22. ��Letter to the Editor: Sir, the disgraceful scenes of which our streets are the arena, call loudly for magisterial interference; each day they become worse and worse�KI can only allude to the drunken delinquencies of our soldiers and sail-ors; for the conduct of our native population, by contrast, is truly admirable��. Friends of China, 25 April 1842.
23. ��From the Editorial: Robberies, and attempts at robbery, have been very fre-quent�Kwe are aware of two instances in which gentleman had their silk umbrellas snatched out of their hands, and the rogues disappeared in the gloom of night and eluded pursuit�K��. Friends of China, 23 December 1843.
24. K. Chin, Triad societies in Hong Kong, Transnational Organized Crime, 1 (1): 47�V64, 1995. (Abstract: Triad societies, which originated between 1842 and 1930 when secret society members from China emigrated to Hong Kong and formed mutual aid organisations, can be categorized into four major groups: the Chiu Chao, the Wo, the 14.K and the Big Four. There is a conflict of opinion on how tightly structured these groups are. Triads appear to be involved in criminal activ-ities ranging from drug trafficking and prostitution to gambling and extortion.)
25. F. Dikotter. A paradise for rascals: Colonialism, punishment and the prison in Hong Kong (1841�V1898), Crime, History and Society, 8 (1): 49�V63, 2004. http://chs.revues.org/515
26. C. Jeffries, The Colonial Police (London: Max Parrish, 1952) (Colonial policing requires the imposition of order against populist resistance calling forth the adoption of Royal Irish Constabulary (RIC) model of policing in organisation, operations and style, as distinguished from Peele��s London��s Metropolitan Police (LMP), that is, civil order maintenance with law and consent. Jefferies also postulates that militaristic RIC policing would in time be replaced by civil LMP policing when habitual obedience to British rule is obtained.)
27. Whether colonial policing in the body of RIC ��revert back�� or ��advance to�� civil mode is more than a semantic difference. ��Revert back�� suggests that policing is always civil in nature, thus it is abnormal and exceptional for it to take up arms. Advance to suggests that the policing has always been militaristic in form and militant in operations, and gets to be civil when historical or social conditions allows.
28. D. M. Anderson and D. Killingray, Policing the Empire: Government, Authority and Control, 1830�V1940 (Studies in Imperialism) (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1991), pp. 2�V4.
29. C. W. Ng, The Establishment and Early Development of Police System in Hong Kong. Ph.D. Thesis, Department of History, Chinese University of Hong Kong.
30. A. Kerrigan, Policing a colony: The case of Hong Kong 1844�V1899, Ph.D. disser-tation with Cardiff Graduate Law School, University of Wales, under the super-vision of Dr. Carole Jones.
31. P. Burroughs, Crime and punishment in the British Army, 1815�V1870, The English Historical Review, 100 (396): 545�V571, 1985.
32. There is evidence to suggest that HKP was not influenced by the RIC, in its for-mative year. Captain Superintendent of HKP Henry May (1893�V1902) was an Irish who arrived in Hong Kong in 1897. The first batch of Irish officers did not arrive until 1898. Attempts to recruit from the RIC were made in 1871, 1880, 1881 and 1893, but to no avail. See Public Record Office (CO): CO 129/154, 31-59; CO 129/191, 69; CO 129/196, 51-7, CO 129/259, 393.
33. R. E. Neustadt and E. R. May, Thinking in Time: The Uses of History for Decision-Makers (New York: Free Press, 1986), Chapter 9: Placing Strangers, pp. 156�V180.
34. P. Burroughs, Crime and Punishment in the British Army, 1815�V1870, The English Historical Review, 100 (396): 545�V571, 1985.
35. President��s special message to the Congress on crime and law enforcement, dated 9 March 1966.
36. S. Huntington, The clash of civilizations? Foreign Affairs, 72 (3): 27�V47, 1993.
37. While disparate impact might suggest discriminate intent, and has been taken as such in U.S. Constitutional jurisprudence, it is not necessary so. For example, Chinese were treated to harsher punishment, such as flogging, because the British adopted Chinese punitive law and because the British did not know how to reform the Chinese. F. Dikotter, A paradise for rascals: Colonialism, punishment and the prison in Hong Kong (1841�V1898), Crime, History and Society, 8 (1): 49�V63, 2004.
38. J. W. Norton-Kyshe, The History of the Laws and Courts of Hongkong (Hong Kong: T.F. Unwin, 1898), p. 51.
39. Ibid., p. 57.
40. I do not say ��law and order�� because Chinese do not know law, and Caine put order about law. Thus, Caine obtained some measure of respect from the Hong Kong people.
41. S. E. Hamilton, Watching over Hong Kong: Private Policing 1841�V1941 (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2009/12), especially Chapter 3: District Watch Force, pp. 39�V58.
42. Institutionally, the HKP is haunted by its colonial past, authoritarianism and paramilitarism. A. Jiao, The Police in Hong Kong: A Contemporary View (Lanham, MD: United Press of America, 2007), Chapter 3.
43. H. Y. F. Choy, Schizophrenic Hong Kong: Postcolonial Identity Crisis in the Infernal Affairs Trilogy, Transtext(e)s Transcultures ��奻���� [En ligne], 3.|.2007, mis en ligne le 15 octobre 2009, consulte le 21 mai 2013. http://trans-texts.revues.org/138.
44. K. C. Wong, Policing in Hong Kong (Farnham, Surrey, England: Ashgage, 2012), Chapter Five: Policing Computer Crime in Hong Kong.
45. M. Farley, Colony��s expatriate police see ��97 as incentive to hand in badges, S.F. Times, 6 December 1996. D. Greenless, Hong Kong��s police force is a handover bright spot, New York Times, 24 June 2007.
46. K. C. Wong, Policing in Hong Kong (Farnham, Surrey, England: Ashgage, 2012). Chapter Seven.
47. B. Cole, Post-colonial systems In: R. I. Mawby (ed.), Policing across the World (London: UCL Press, 1999), pp. 88�V108.
48. A. Jiao, The Police in Hong Kong: A Contemporary View (Lantham, Maryland: University Press, 2007), Chapter 2.
49. P. Childs and R. P. Williams. An Introduction to Post-Colonial Theory (London, New York, Toronto, Sydney, Tokyo: Harvester Wheatsheaf/Prentice Hall, 1997).
50. K. T. So (Ĭ�A��) The Hong Kong police as a new paradigm of policing in a post colonial city. MPA Thesis, Department of Politics and Public Administration, University of Hong Kong (1999), Workshop on British Colonial Policing in Historical Perspective, University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, 22 June 2010.
51. Policing in versus policing of Hong Kong draws the distinction between general policing by all people/institutions versus specific policing by the government.
52. M. Brogen, Emergence of the police�XThe colonial dimension, British Journal of Criminology, 27 (1): 4�V14, 1987.
53. In determining the nature of policing, colonial or others, strategy and tactics matters. For example, the trademark of imperial�Vcolonial policing is to impose order. With indigenous�Vdemocratic policing is to facilitate self-governance. Yet the strategic goal of imposed order could be achieved through induced compli-ance or indirect rule. In the case of New Zealand, this was achieved through minimal policing and tribal rule. In the case of Hong Kong, it was achieved through ��dual track�� justice and indirect rule. R. Hill, Chapter Four: The policing of colonial New Zealand: From informal to formal control, 1840�V1907, In: D. M. Anderson and D. Killingray (eds.), Policing the Empire: Government, Authority, and Control, 1830�V1940 (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 1991), pp. 52�V68, 52�V53. J. Gallagher and R. Robinson, The imperialism of free trade, In: A. Seal (ed.), The Decline and Fall of the British Empire (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), pp. 1�V18.
54. Chapter 1: Governance in a Colonial Society, In: S. Tsang (ed.), Governing Hong Kong: Administrative Officers from the 19th Century to the Handover to China, 1862�V1997 (London and New York: L.B. Tauris, 2007).
55. T.-W. Ngo, Hong Kong��s History: State and Society under Colonial Rule (London: Routledge, 2002), p. 2.
56. G. Ure, Governors, Politics and the Colonial Office: Public Policy in Hong Kong, 1918�V58 (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2012).
57. A. Grantham, Via Ports: From Hong Kong to Hong Kong (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1 January 2012), p. 108.
58. The Colonial Police (London: M. Parrish, 1952).
59. R. Hawkins, Chapter Two: The ��Irish model�� and the empire: A case for reas-sessment, In: D. M. Anderson and D. Killingray (eds.), Policing the Empire: Government, Authority and Control, 1830�V1940 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1991), pp. 14�V30.
60. With HKP reform, the HKP has gone through decolonisation without being decolonised.
61. Chapter 1 to C. Patten, East and West: China, Power, and the Future of Asia (New York: Times Book, 1998). http://www.nytimes.com/books/first/p/patten-east.html
62. S. Tsang, Governing Hong Kong: Administrative Officers from the 19th Century to the Handover to China, 1862�V1997 (London: I.B. Tauris, 15 December 2007).
63. Sir Robert Peel Principles of Policing #7: ��To maintain at all times a relationship with the public that gives reality to the historic tradition that the police are the public and that the public are the police, the police being only members of the public who are paid to give full-time attention to duties which are incumbent on every citizen in the interests of community welfare and existence��.
64. G. Schloss, Expat cops on the outside, SCMP, 3 July 2001. http://www.scmp.com/article/351387/expat-cops-outside (There was a time when expatriate police in the then Royal Hong Kong Police Force were treated like royalty. Recruited from overseas, mostly Britain, they were given spacious flats, a job for life�Xor at least until 1997�Xon pensionable terms with promises of fast promo-tion and annual trips home.)
65. May was born in May in Dublin, Ireland on 14 March 1860 to a distinguished family. His father was Rt. Hon. George Augustus Chichester May, Lord Chief Justice of Ireland. He went to Harrow School and Trinity College, Dublin, graduating with 1st Honour in Classics and Modern Languages (B.A. in 1881). He was appointed to a Hong Kong Cadetship in 1881 and was the Assistant Protector of Chinese, private secretary to Governor Sir George William Des V.ux and later private secretary to Acting Administrator Digby Barker from 1889 to 1891. He went on to be Assistant Colonial Secretary in 1891 and Acting Colonial Treasurer in 1892 before ending up as a Legislative Councilor in 1895. From 1893 to 1902, May was the Captain Superintendent of the Hong Kong Police Force, and Superintendent Victoria Gaol and Fire Brigade for Hong Kong between 1896 and 1902. After that he held the posi-tion of Colonial Secretary for Hong Kong in 1902�V1910, and became an act-ing administrator of Hong Kong in 1903, 1904, 1906, 1907, and 1910. In 1910, May was appointed Governor of Fiji and High Commissioner Western Pacific, a position he would hold until 1912. http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/Francis_Henry_May
66. Heads of the Force 1841�V1945, OffBeat Issue 772. http://www.police.gov.hk/-offbeat/772/eng/f04.htm
67. H. J. Lethbridge, Sir James Haldane Stewart Lockhart: Colonial civil servant and scholar, Journal of the Hong Kong Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, 12: 56�V86, 1972.
68. P. Leonard, Expatriate Identities in Postcolonial Organizations (Farnham, Surrey, UK: Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., 2010), pp. 84�V87. Old colonial or new cosmopoli-tan? Changing white identities in the Hong Kong Police, Social Politics, 17 (4): 507�V535, 2010.
69. A. Memmi, The Colonizer and the Colonized (Boston: Beacon press, [1957] 1996), 19�V25
70. C. Knowles, ��It��s not what it was��: British migrants in postcolonial Hong Kong, Sociology Working Papers, 11: 1�V25, 2007. http://eprints.gold.ac.uk/8376/
71. Ibid.
72. A set of photos: ��Hong Kong 70s & 80s�� (1965�V1990) posted by Tom Jackson who went to British school in 1960s elicited the follow remarks:
Steve 14-Feb-2011 12:35
Oh btw. I am always explaining to people here in mainland China that many English/Europeans were also often born in HK and that these people are in fact also Hong Kong people. Here they seem to think that ONLY Chinese people can be called Hong Kong people in mainland China & that is very racist thinking in anybodies book! When they ask where do I come from I say Hong Kong, they often look at me confused as if I am joking and then ask where my family is from
�K. Steve 14-Feb-2011 12:19
I live near Nanjing, Jiangsu in mainland China now. Hong Kong was and is a very important childhood memory and made me feel part Chinese (I am 100% Anglo), but my wife is Chinese and I love so many Chinese things. Living in Hong Kong introduced me to a different culture than my own and led to a love for & respect for Chinese things that has stayed with me my whole life. I am 41 now! I still feel betrayed by the UK government about the handing back of the whole of Hong Kong and not just the NT as was agreed in the 99 year lease! http://www.pbase.com/anubis_photo/hong_kong_70s__80s
73. Sir D. Akers-Jones, Time-Out Hong Kong, 11 April 2012. http://www.timeout.com.hk/big-smog/features/50004/sir-david-akers-jones.html
74. D. Akers-Jones, Feeling the Stones: Reminiscences by David Akers-Jones (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2004), p. xii.
75. E. Tu, Colonial Hong Kong in the Eyes of Elsie Tu (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2003).
76. Homesick For Hong Kong, 11 November 2009. http://www.batgung.com/Twenty-years-in-Hong-Kong.
77. M. Banton, Administrating the Empire, 1801�V1968: A Guide to the Records of the Colonial Office in the National Archives of the UK (London: Institute of Historical Research and the National Archives of the UK, 2008), p. 21.
78. G. Ure, Governors, Politics and the Colonial Office: Public Policy in Hong Kong, 1918�V58 (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1 June 2012), p. 217.
79. S. Kevin, Ex-police chief takes secret of his departure to the grave, South China Morning Post. Hong Kong: SCMP, 5 September 2004.
80. �i�a���A�m���C�ɰʡG����ԫ���v���������n�C����G����j�ǥX���� [K. W. Cheung, The 1967 Riots �V The Watershed of Post-war Hong Kong History (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2012), pp. 121�V122], 2012�~
81. H. J. Lethbridge, Hong Kong cadets, 1962 to 1941, Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society Hong Kong Branch, 10: 37�V56, 38, 1970.
82. Ibid. (Given this common background, training, and the fraternity of class, cadets came to the field with many shared assumptions about, and attitudes towards, the people they governed in the colonial territories.)
83. Over the Bamboo Ceiling, Far East Culture, 31 May 2013. http://www.macstudies.net/2013/05/31/over-the-bamboo-ceiling-early-macanese--enterprise-in-hong-kong/
84. D. Faure (ed.), A Documentary History Hong Kong (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1997), p. 12.
85. G. Bickley, Chapter 3: British Attitudes toward Hong Kong in the nineteenth century, In: Y. Y. Chu (ed.), Foreign Communities in Hong Kong, 1840s�V1950s (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 39 pp.
86. Ibid., p. 44.
87. S. Tsang, Governing Hong Kong: Administrative Officers from the Nineteenth Century to the Handover to China, 1862�V1997 (London: I.B. Tauris, 2007), p. 1.
88. Ibid., Chapter 2: ��The cadet scheme��.
89. Ibid., Chapter 3: ��Benevolent paternalism��.
90. S. Tsang, A Documentary History of Hong Kong: Government and Politics (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1995), p. 11.
91. S. Tsang, Governing Hong Kong: Administrative Officers from the Nineteenth Century to the Handover to China, 1862�V1997 (London: I.B. Tauris, 2007), Ibid., p. 25.
92. H. J. Lethbridge, Condition of the European working class in nineteenth cen-tury Hong Kong, Journal of the Hong Kong Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, 15: 88�V113, 1975.
93. This is the same individual mentality and organisational ethos that perpetu-ate the institutionalised corruption in Hong Kong. For the individual officer, the reasoning went something as follows: I am here to have a good time. Or, I do not know why I am here. (For that matter whatever opportunistic reason would do: ��I am to make money��.) I will do what I am told to do, but with mini-mal effort. As to enforcing the law, such as gambling, drugs or prostitution, it is useless. Gambling is the Chinese favourite past time. Drugs are condoned by the Chinese and promoted by the British. As to prostitution, there is noth-ing wrong with it. Besides, we are all lonely here. No one really cares: Not the British. Not the Chinese. Not the Europeans. Thus, they cannot be eradicated. If I do something about them myself, I am the one to get hurt by the Chinese operators and British who are on the take. It is thus best for me to go along and in order get along. No one is getting hurt, since all these elicit behaviour is mostly done by the Chinese. Why should I care? I might as well close my eyes and get paid for it.
94. H. J. Lethbridge, Condition of the European Working Class in nineteenth cen-tury Hong Kong, Journal of the Hong Kong Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, 15: 88�V113, 1975.
95. The Earnshaw Brothers, 25 August 2012, Hong Kong Cemetery. http://-hongkongcemetery.blogspot.co.uk/. For a few of the life stories of how many.expats from the United Kingdom came to join HKP, see Hong Kong Police Ancestors. http://hongkongpoliceancestors.blogspot.com/2012/09/-the-bristol-bobbies.html
96. S. Griffins, What was it like as a Brit in the Royal Hong Kong Police? The Crime Vault, 19 April 2013. http://www.thecrimevault.com/exclusives/what-was-it-
like-as-a-brit-in-the-royal-hong-kong-police/
97. http://www.policespecials.com/forum/index.php?/topic/99871-.former-royal-
hong-kong-police-officers/
98. For the dreams and aspirations, adventures and misadventures, fame and for-tune, of those few British police officers who ended serving HKP in a bygone and long forgotten era (the 1880s and 1890s), see ��The British Boobies�� Hong Kong Police Ancestry, Sunday, 2 September 2012. http://hongkongpoliceances-tors.blogspot.com/2012/09/the-bristol-bobbies.html
99. A. I. K. Kituai, My Gun, My Brother: The World of the Papua New Guinea Colonial Police, 1920�V1960 (Honolulu, Hawaii: Hawaii University Press, 1998), Chapter 2: ��Recruitment of Police��, pp. 42�V85.
100. Ibid., p. 52.
101. Ibid., p. 52.
102. Ibid., p. 52.
103. Ibid., p. 53.
104. Ibid., p. 54.
105. K. Y. Wong, The Lighter Side of a Hong Kong Police Inspector��s Career in the 1960s (Hong Kong: Joint Publication, 2008).
106. Kong Chi Yin, Treasury, Nga Tsin Wai Village Committee. Male. DOB: 1946. 66 years old. ��Reason for and course of becoming a policeman through exams after dropping out��. (09/06/12) Hong Kong Memory. http://www.hkmemory.hk/collections/oral_history/All_Items_OH/oha_86/records/index.html#p64820
107. Ibid.
108. Lifelong Battles against Triad, OffBeat Issue 662, 5 November�V18 November 2003. (��The incident reinforced Mr Leung��s determination to become a police-man. Despite disapproval from his parents, he did not give up his ambition��.) http://www.police.gov.hk/offbeat/763/eng/
109. kee14840 2010-5-13 21:54 Hong Kong Police Club. http://www.pcchk.com/thread-25729-1-1.html
110. �n�J���t Last updated: 01/06/2012 07:25:24. http://lingsir.org/pol02.htm
111. Cheung Koon Fu. DOB: 1921. 90 ��The Government encouraged young indig-enous settlers in New Territories to enlist in the army or immigrate in the early post-war period (I)�� (26/11/2011). Hong Kong Memory. http://www.hkmemory.hk/collections/oral_history/All_Items_OH/oha_112/records/index.html#p73018
112. �����g Last updated: N/A. http://lingsir.org/grow.htm. I (author) joined for the same reason to reform and transform the HKP. My father was against me join-ing because to him it was corrupt beyond repair. I felt otherwise. I recall telling him: ��This is a Hong Kong dollar coin. It has two sides to it. You are right to observe that the HKP is corrupt and cannot be changed. I am also right to take up the challenge. If no one join the HKP. It will never be changed��. In spite of his objection, my father helped me to join, without me knowing it.
113. F. X. Hezel, SJ, Strangers in Their Own Land: A Century of Colonial Rule in the Caroline and Marshall Islands (Honolulu, HI: University of Hawaii Press, 2003), pp. xiii�Vxiv.
114. C. J. Jefferies, Colonial Police (London: M. Parrish, 1951). Colonial police in ��Irish Constabulary�� mode is characterised by (1) organised along rigid military line; (2) police lived in barracks and away from the people; (3) centrally con-trolled, nationally.
115. D. M. Anderson and D. Killingray, Consent, coercion and colonial con-trol: Policing the empire, 1830�V1940, In: D. M. Anderson and D. Killingray (eds.), Policing the Empire: Government, Authority and Control, 1830�V1940 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1991), pp. 1�V2. (Recent colonial policing research ��has raised serious questions about Jeffries��s oft quoted assertion that Irish and Metropolitan models of policing determined develop-ments in the colonies. The colonial reality was clearly much more complex��), p. 12.
116. Ibid. In the study of colonial police, historical and local context matters a great deal, p. 12.
117. J. T. Martin, How Chinese Culture Might Inform a Distinctive Kind of Modern Policing. Paper presented at University of Sidney Forum at University of Hong Kong, 2010.
118. Colonial ��dual track�� policing bracket, as it anticipates ��pluralistic policing�� in modern time with both conceding the inadequacy, inefficiency or ineffectiveness of a centralised policing authority in the state. J. Merritt, Pluralist models of policing: Legislating for police powers, a cautionary note from England and Wales, Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies & Management, 32 (2): 377�V394, 2009.
119. L. F. Goodstadt, Uneasy Partners: The Conflict between Public Interest and Private Profit in Hong Kong (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2005), p. 10.
120. J. Merritt, Pluralist models of policing: Legislating for police powers, a caution-ary note from England and Wales, Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies & Management, 32 (2): 377�V394, 2009.
121. R. V. Clarke and F. M. Marcus, Introduction: Criminology, routine activity, and rational choice, Advances in Criminological Theory: Routine Activity and Rational Choice, 5: 1�V14, 1993.
122. L. Cohen and F. Marcus, Social change and crime rate trends: A routine activity approach, American Sociological Review, 44 (4): 588�V608, 1979.
123. A. van Sluis, P. Marks, and V. Bekkers, Nodal policing in the Netherlands: Strategic and normative considerations on an evolving practice, Policing, 5 (4): 365�V371, 2011.
124. Expectation theory of policing proposes: ��The person closest to a person, by impact or with request, is the person to solve the problem��. (Problem is defined as expectation denied. Expectation is met by suitable resources.) K. C. Wong, Chinese Policing: History and Reform (New York: Peter Lang, 2009), Chapter 8: Chinese Theory of Community Policing, pp. 185�V227.
125. Most colonial police forces are supplemented by indigenous enforcers. Ibid.
126. The ��collaborative policing�� thesis is part political critique and part revision-ist historiography of ��colonial policing�� paradigm. It challenges the long-held assumption that Hong Kong as a colony can be effectively policed, imperialisti-cally, imposingly and coercively, without the active participation of the Chinese, in multifarious ways and in a variety of sites. J. Carroll, Edge of Empires: Chinese Elites and British Colonials in Hong Kong (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005), Chapter 1.
127. P. Hirsh, Statism, pluralism and social control, British Journal of Criminology, 40 (2): 279�V295, 2000.
128. Ibid. See State Police Powers as a Social Resource Theory, pp. 195�V198.
129. Chapter 1: Styles of Social Control, In: A. V. Horowitz (ed.), The Logic of Social Control (New York: Plenum Press, 1990), p. 22, Table 1; D. Black, The Behavior of Law (New York: Academic Press, 1976), p. 5.
130. Engaging Customary Justice Systems. Haki Legal Empowerment, White Paper. October 2011. http://www.lepnet.org/group/access-justice/file/haki-legal-
empowerment-white-papers
131. K. W. Deutsch, Cracks in the monolith, In: C. J. Friedrich (ed.), Totalitarianism (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1954), pp. 313�V314.
132. G. Sharpe, ��Chapter Four: Dictatorship Have Weakness��. From Dictatorship to Democracy, 4th edition (Boston: Einstein Institute, 2010), pp. 25�V28.
133. Ibid., p. 26.
134. Ibid., p. 31.
135. N. Machiavelli, The discourses on the first ten books of livy, In: The Discourses of Niccolo Machiavelli (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1950), Vol. I, p. 254.
136. C. Munn, Anglo-China: Chinese People and British Rule in Hong Kong, 1841�V1880 (New York: Routledge, 16 December 2013), p. 323.
137. Y. Y. Chu, Foreign Communities in Hong Kong, 1840s�V1950s (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005).
138. Ibid., pp. 3�V4.
139. Ibid., p. 4.
140. Ibid., p. 5.
141. Ibid., p. 6.
142. J. M. Carroll, Edge of Empires: Chinese Elites and British Colonials in Hong Kong (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005).
143. Ibid., p. 60.
144. D. Killingray and D. Omissi (eds.), Guardians of Empire: The Armed Forces of the Colonial Powers C. 1700�V1964 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999).
145. Principal�VAgent Relationship. http://www.ruf.rice.edu/~schuler/principal-agent.html
146. J. M. Carrol, Chinese collaboration in the making of British Hong Kong, In: T. W. Ngo (ed.), Hong Kong��s History: State and Society under Colonial Rule by Tak (New York: Psychology Press, 1999), pp. 13�V30; W. S. Law, Collaborative Colonial Power: The Making of the Hong Kong Chinese (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2009), Chapter One: ��Social Fabric of a Collaborative Colonialism��, pp. 9�V31.
147. C. Munn, Anglo-China: Chinese People and British Rule in Hong Kong, 1841�V1880 (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2008).
148. Yen-p��ing Hao, A ��new class�� in China��s treaty ports: The rise of the comprador-merchants, The Business History Review, 44 (4): 446�V459, 1970.
149. W. S. Law, Collaborative Colonial Power: The Making of the Hong Kong Chinese (Aberdeen: Hong Kong University Press, 2009).
150. A Police Detective Sergeant and the Mystery of His Wealth, ICAC, http://www.icac.org.hk/new_icac/eng/cases/detective/DETECTIVE%20SERGEANT_Eng.pdf
151. This author was told by CIDs boastfully, at dinner parties. See also R. Godson, Menace to Society: Political-Criminal Collaboration around the World (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 2003), especially T. W. Lo, Chapter 8: Minimizing crime and corruption in Hong Kong, pp. 231�V257, 241.
152. ��It is a myth that the son of Lui Lok worked for ICAC (�f�֭ӥJ�Y���G�p�u�Y��c) 2010-5-21 09:42. http://www.pcchk.com/viewthread.php?tid.=.28072&extra.=.&page.=.1
153. J. Cheng. Police corruption control in Hong Kong and New York City: A dilemma of checks and balances in combating corruption, BYU Journal of Public Law, 23 (2): 185�V220, 2009.
154. S. Tsang, A Modern History of Hong Kong (New York: I.B. Tauris, 15 August 2007), p. 52.
155. B. Bowling and J. Sheptycki, Global Policing (Sage, 16 December 2011), p. 21.
156. P. Lee, Opium Culture: The Art and Ritual of the Chinese Tradition (Rochester, Vermont: Inner Traditions/Bear & Co, 2006), p. 99.
157. N. Tosches, The Last Opium Den (New York, NY: Bloomsbury Publishing USA, 5 January 2002), p. 30 (Sun had a permit to use opium until he died in 21 April 1997).
158. Before 1900, Hong Kong was infested with Triads. This inhibited crime preven-tion, investigation and prosecution. In fact, many police officers were Triads. The use of Triads in aid of policing is real (p. 63). The use of Triad to control the lower class is nothing new, for example, Republican era (1897) (p. 64) or WWII Japan Occupation (p. 72). K. Bolton and C. Hutton (eds.), Triad Societies: Triad Societies in Hong Kong (London and New York: Taylor & Francis, 2000).
159. Policing in Hong Kong, colonial or indigenous, changes with time. With colo-nial police, there is much difference between early colonial (1841�V1860s) versus middle (1950s) versus late (1970s�V1990s) colonial periods. Royal Hong Kong Police Force taking on a less colonial look, The Daily Gazette, 17 September 1995.
160. Ibid.
161. Ibid., p. 91.
162. ��In such a condition, there is no place for industry, because the fruit thereof is uncertain, and consequently, not culture of the earth, no navigation, nor the use of commodities that may be imported by sea, no commodious building, no instruments of moving and removing such things as require much force, no knowledge of the face of the earth, no account of time, no arts, no letters, no society, and which is worst of all, continual fear and danger of violent death, and the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short��. Hobbes, Leviathan (1651), XIII.9.
163. Ibid., p. 91.
164. J. S. E. Opolot, The resilience of the British colonial police legacies in East Africa, Southern Africa, and West Africa, Police Studies, 15 (2): 90�V99, 1992. (��British tried to pursue a policy of pragmatism, caution and compromise for a number of reasons, e.g., lack of manpower and resource, to lack of understanding and facility. British then turn to use of local institutions and leadership or create new ones��.)
165. Abstract.
166. S. E. Hamilton, Private security and government: A Hong Kong perspective, 1841�V1941, Ph.D. Dissertation, Hong Kong University (1999) (Abstract).
167. Ibid.
168. Ibid., p. 60.
169. W. S. Law, Collaborative Colonial Power: The Making of the Hong Kong Chinese (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2009), p. 4.
170. Ibid., p. 200.
171. Ibid., Chapter 4: Double identity of the colonial intelligentsia: Ho Kai, pp. 76. Hong Kong intelligentsia of the time, the likes of Wu Ting Fang and Ho Kai, was keenly aware of the weakness of China, and were thus less critical of colonial rule and method. This is quite apart from, and indeed is in spite of their vested interest. (Jia Yang Gui Zhi�X��false or pretend foreign barbarian��.) For them, as public intellectuals and sage scholars in their preferred identity and call, they have adopted the maxim of the ��Yangwu Yundong�� of borrowing from the West to strengthen the East.
172. S. C. Lau, Worshipping KuanTi: A study of subculture in Hong Kong police force and the triad. Hong Kong University Thesis, 2000.
Table 2.1.Varieties and Characteristics of Colonial Rule
Type of Colonial Rule
Political Characteristics
Economic Characteristics
Social Characteristics
Company rule
Minimum government since primary interest is profit.
Little government support for education, health care, and other services.
Primary emphasis on ��law and order��-keeping peace.
Exploitation of natural resources.
Profits for company most important economic goal.
Alienation (taking away) of land from African peoples.
Forced labour policies necessary for profits.
No money spent on social services such as education and health care.
Social/cultural dislocation brought about by forced movement of people for labour.
Direct rule
Practised primarily by French, Belgian, and Portuguese colonialists.
Minimal government lack of revenue.
Laws created and enforced by European colonial officials, even at the local/rural levels.
Emphasis on law and order.
Traditional political authorities such as chiefs removed from power.
Used ��divide and rule�� tactics.
Exploitation of natural resources for export.
Minimal taxes on exports so as to maximise profits for European companies.
Revenues used to support law and order.
Harsh labour policy to insure ready supply of inexpensive labour.
Limited development of economic infrastructure.
Little revenue spent on developing social services schooling, health care, social security.
Social and cultural dislocation due to economic and.labour policies.
Urbanisation.
Spread of Christianity in non-Islamic areas.
Indirect rule
Practised primarily by the British in West Africa (Ghana, Nigeria, Sierra Leone) and parts of East Africa (Uganda, Tanganyika).
Minimal government lack of revenue.
Laws made by European colonialists, but used traditional African leaders (chiefs, headmen) as intermediaries in local government.
Emphasis on law and order.
Used ��divide and rule�� tactics.
Exploitation of natural resources for export.
Minimal taxes on exports so as to maximise profits for European companies.
Revenues used to support law and order.
Harsh labour policy to insure ready supply of inexpensive labour.
Limited development of economic infrastructure.
Little revenue spent on developing social services schooling, health care, social security.
Social and cultural dislocation due to economic and labour policies.
Urbanisation.
Spread of Christianity in non-Islamic areas.
(Continued)
Table 2.1 (
Type of
Political Characteristics
Economic Characteristics
Social Characteristics
Settler rule
Stronger government system to protect political rights of settlers.
Government policy oriented to protect and support settler population.
African populations denied political participation or rights.
Harsh repression of African political movements.
African populations ruled directly by European (often settler) officials.
Strong emphasis on law and order.
Infrastructural support for settler-owned businesses.
Heavier taxes to support the development of the settler population.
Harsh labour policies used to guarantee an inexpensive labour force.
Little revenue spent on developing social services schooling, health care, social security.
Social and cultural dislocation due to economic and labour policies.
Urbanisation.
Spread of Christianity in non-Islamic areas.
Source: Unit Two: Studying Africa through the Social Studies. Module 7B: African History, the Era of Global Encroachment. http://exploringafrica.matrix.msu.edu/students/curriculum/m7b/activity3.php.
90
Policing in Hong Kong
91
Assessing Colonial Policing
89
3
Assessing Colonial Policing1
British in Hong Kong often felt that they had to compromise their own -cultural values and moral standards in order to deal with local circumstances and demands�Kstrike a balance between morality and pragmatism.2
Cindy Yik-Yi Chu (2005)
This top-down view renders imperialism a phenomenon which is catalyzed by and viewed from the metropolis. In many instances, it is an emphasis that results in a one-way reading of empire, in which ideas and politics flow from the center to periphery. My reading is a more fluid one, which contends that changes in nations are as much the product of influences from empires as from internal and domestic pressure, dissent, and debate.3
Philippa Levine (2013)
Introduction
This chapter is devoted to assessing colonial policing in Hong Kong.
The need for and the contribution of such a study is pressing and appar-ent. First, there are current few assessments of colonial policing in Hong Kong, in theory or practice. This study promises to do both, thereby filling an important literature gap. Second, so far, investigation into colonial policing has been mostly descriptive. Critical analysis and evidence-based assessment of colonial policing is in short supply. Third, whatever assessment there is, it is of a ��knee-jerk�� kind, to the effect that colonial policing is ipso facto objec-tionable as an instrumentality of British imperialism.
The chapter is divided into five sections. Section I ��Framework of Analysis�� discusses the importance of context and perspective in assessing policing work. It adopts conflict theory as a point of departure for analysis, but argues for a much more expansive and inclusive application. It suggests moving beyond passionate but narrow-minded political advocacy that is dressed up as critical analysis of the HKP��s legitimacy, to a more dispassion-ate and multi-faceted social, moral and utility discussion on the HKP��s per-formance. Section II ��A Cultural Model of Analysis�� moves away from a more cynical conflict model to a more accommodating cultural process of sharing and understanding. Cultural analysis asks, what do the people on the street think and feel about colonial policing, rather than what the intellectual elites and political partisans do? Section III on ��Theoretical Assessment�� argues that for the street people in Hong Kong, Western political legitimacy is not the only litmus test of acceptance for Hong Kong government and compliance with HKP. Hong Kong people, being pragmatic, can and do approve of HKP based on performance criteria, such as social utility tests, or for no reason at all, that is, they could not care less. Section IV is on ��Empirical Assessment��. In this section, the chapter discusses first-of-a-kind reaction to the HKP by Chinese rank-and-file officers through allegoric essays written in the official Hong Kong Police Magazine�XChinese edition (HKPM-CE) in the 1960s. The essays, individually and as a corpus, tell of how Chinese officers view HKP on a range of issues, from Western cultural imposition, to HKP discipline, to per-sonal coping strategies. Section V is a ��Conclusion�� calling for an increasingly in-depth and nuanced study of the impact of (Hong Kong, Chinese) culture on HKP and policing in Hong Kong, a subject matter that has escaped atten-tion despite its obvious relevance and importance. The assumption is that colonial policing in Hong Kong is ��Policing with Hong Kong characteristics��, the title of the Chapter 4 to follow and a take away from this chapter.
I: Framework of Analysis
In formulating an analytical framework, the following methodological ques-tions are necessary: from whose perspective, in what context, with what assumption and for what purpose is the assessment being conducted? A per-spective limits as much as it focusses our attention. Context informs as it distorts analysis. Assumptions (factual and value) anchor analysis but skew judgement. Purpose provides direction as it restricts investigations. Together, perspective, context, assumptions and purpose facilitate as it hinders our assessment process. The lesson here is not only whether perspective, context, assumption and purpose (generally ��perspective and context��) be taken into account. Undoubtedly they should. The lesson is that we should be balanced and judicious in considering all these factors.
As to the necessity of perspective and importance of context, one is once again reminded by Waddington, a police officer who turned academic, that in assessing the role and performance of the police during public order polic-ing, there is a need to take into account viewpoints of police (state) versus people (rioters), anchored within a larger social�Vpolitical context (political marginality of rioters, legal impotency of police):
The Police role is justified by the claim that they are not suppressing protest inconvenient to the government, but merely enforcing laws against violence and disorder. However, for politically marginal groups, expressing dissent through constitutional channels is a recipe for continued subordination.4
The message here is that there are always two (and more) sides to a story, competing for dominance, endlessly.
As to the significance and utility of context in helping to understand the nature of policing, Waddington has this to say:
The main lesson is that the nature of policing, including the role that weap-ons play, cannot be divorced from the context in which policing takes place. Particularly influential are whether the civil population are considered ��citi-zens��, the relationship of the police to the military, and the scale of resistance to state authority.5
This means that what the colonial police stood for�Xprotector or oppres-sor, friend or foe�Xcannot be understood without first understanding the police and society relationship.
Waddington��s invitation to look at public order policing (a defining colo-nial policing function) with perspective and in context is much welcomed. However, his mode of analysis does not go far enough. It should be expanded.
As a critique, Waddington��s analysis appears unduly political and stereo-typical. Still, taking Waddington��s dualistic analysis of public order policing to heart, the perspective can be expanded to include all stakeholders�� per-spectives other than the police and rioters. For example, within the ranks of the police and rioters, there are infinitely more perspectives than political, and there are more roles people play than nemeses. Most certainly, there are more interests and values at stake.
In real life, when the HKP engages the public, especially in violent con-frontations, there are more than two parties with vested interest. An untold number of people are affected, if only circumstantially and indirectly, inci-dentally and marginally and fleetingly and temporally.
Stakeholders to colonial policing (including participants and afflicted parties), depending on their role and involvement, disposition and perspec-tive, values and interests and status and stature, are likely to hold a differ-ent opinion about colonial HKP performances. Furthermore, police�Vpublic encounters are infinitely more complex, dynamic and fluid to be painted with a broad brush and summarised in general terms.
People, especially those on the street, are rarely, if ever, disposed towards ��for this�� or ��against that��. Drawn to grandstanding and given to exaggeration, the rallying cries of ideologues or utopians see no middle group. Likewise, police in the eyes of the public and at street level are more different and colourful than just black and white. This is especially the case when HKP officers and Hong Kong people come from diverse backgrounds, with unique experiences and dissimilar convictions. For example, to the Hong Kong people, HKP officers are as likely to behave as ruthless Police Tactical Unit (PTU) officers in suppressing civil disturbance (1956, 1967 riots) as they act as resourceful street officers or brave Emergency Unit (EU) officers tending to citizens�� personal needs (999 calls) and the community��s collective cri-sis (1962 Typhoon Wander). In essence, HKP officers, notwithstanding their colonial roots and steep PTU traditions, are men for all seasons, reasons, occasions and situations.
To most Hong Kong people on the street, the perception and reception of HKP is defined by the moment: a traffic ticket here and a 999 call there, or a young beat officer everywhere. It is always a routine and low-visibility encounter, but with huge personal consequences, for example, a tired officer acting out of role that leads to an otherwise resolvable domestic incident that turns sour. Such encounters do not allow for political considerations at the moment, and are still less fitted for ideological rendering in hindsight. Any generalisation of HKP and officers�� performance is likely to be misinformed inadvertently or politicised intentionally.
PTU and EU officers are mentioned as examples to make a point. More often than not, these outfits are singled out by liberal elites and critical schol-ars for damnation for re-enacting their pre-1997 colonial para-militaristic role6 and repressive colonial functions,7 and in doing so, obstructing HKP reform and setting back Hong Kong��s political development. In this regard, critical scholars and liberal elites might just as likely be overestimating HKP��s para-military ethos of the past as they are underestimating the HKP��s civil mentality of the present. In their headlong and heart-strong rush to demon-strate (demonise) that militaristic HKP is not compatible with democratic governance, they fail to understand what the HKP�VPTU�VEU is doing, and how they are acting in post-1997 Hong Kong.
To the liberals and critically inclined, both PTU and EU are cut out of the same cloth, before and after 1997. Both are organised in para-military ways, are controlled centrally, are isolated and insulated from the people, organisa-tionally and culturally, have enhanced coercive capabilities, are mobile, first responders to emergencies and crisis and are symbols of force field extension, on a moment��s notice. As a result, by association, the HKP is still considered as a para-military, repressive and coercive force, serving the colonial inter-ests of the British master then (pre-1997) and acting as an instrumentality of the state (alternatively HKSAR or PRC) now (post-1997). In making such an observation, it rarely matters to the detractors (ideologue and political pun-dits) that the HKP can use its militaristic organisation and coercive skills in the service of people, in both colonial setting and community-policing era, for example, keeping violent criminals, the likes of ��Big Boss�� at bay8 or fore-stalling ��terrorists�� on the edge.9
The Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde persona of the HKP police officer defies easy and clear demarcation, and to some, definitive assessment. Furthermore, there is also a distinct possibility that the militaristic mentality and aggres-sive conduct of HKP officers might be a result of HKP culture or training, and more to do with the Hong Kong people��s culture. Hong Kong�VChinese are given to rank consciousness, hierarchy and strict discipline in the pursuit of perfection. Thus, it is hardly co-incidental that Hong Kong people like uniform organisations of any kind�Xfrom Boy Scout, to Red Cross, to Civil Aid Service.
II: A Cultural Model of Analysis
Reflecting on Conflict Theory
The analytical model and assessment approach utilised by this work, while informed by conflict theory, is not confined by it.
As a political theory, Marx��s conflict theory observes the existence of class conflicts and ideological dominance in a capitalistic world, manifested as class warfare ending in revolution10:
The history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles. Freeman and slave, patrician and plebeian, lord and serf, guild-master and journeyman, in a word, oppressor and oppressed, stood in constant opposi-tion to one another, carried on an uninterrupted, now hidden, now open fight, a fight that each time ended, either in a revolutionary re-constitution of soci-ety at large, or in the common ruin of the contending classes.
The stage is set, according to the conflict theorists and post-1997 radical reformers: the HKP, the last and most iconic symbol of colonial power, needs to be destroyed, completely and resolutely, to free up cultural space for a new Hong Kong to grow and blossom.
Whatever the merit and contribution of conflict theory to political development in Hong Kong, it does not help with understanding the HKP��s mission, vision, role and function, which requires an open-mind discourse and dispassionate analysis, far removed from the diatribes of the morally right or wrong, politically correct or incorrect and ideologically pure or corrupted.
In the face of death and destruction, pain and suffering, the options of HKP are to savage the moment. Nothing more. Nothing less.
Return of Human Agency
Cultural theory (of risk)11 argues that people��s disposition towards colo-nialism and colonial policing is contextual, constructed, relational and interactive in formation. In doing so, it rejects Marx��s (pseudo) scientific worldview that the world is stratified along the pre-existing capitalistic versus proletarian lines. Instead, it advocates for the return of the human agency with autonomy, creativity, transcendence and indeterminacy of thought and action.
As a social agent, a human being is capable of configuring and tran-scending circumstances he finds himself in; in denying the past, transcend-ing the present, forging the future and most importantly, in (re)defining of the self. Thus observed, there is not one super-ordinary, true or cor-rect meaning to a social phenomenon, towards colonialism or otherwise. Colonialism and colonial policing are many things to many people; in time, place, situation and context. As Rayner12 observed with defining risks:
[A]n encompassing definition (of risk) is impossible. Instead he prefers a poly-thetic concept of risk which implies that there is a ��family�� of definitions with many links but no single feature that is common to all of them. We shall see that this approach may lead to a community of deliberation rather than con-sensus over a single interpretation. It is this ��framed�� flexibility that may pro-vide cultural theory with its best opportunity for theoretical advance in the coming years.13
As such, the meaning of colonialism depends less on the ��objective�� real-ity of what it is but rather on what people�Xall those who are in contact with or afflicted by colonialism�Xsubjectively perceive, feel and understand of what colonialism is all about.
Before and after 1997, the impact and implications of colonisation and decolonisation, in process and outcome, hinge on the perception and recep-tion, thinking and feelings of individuals caught up in the social milieu that is a new statehood�Xa lifestyle in the making.
Assessment Standards
After providing for a multi-faceted cultural frame of reference in deciphering colonialism, it is possible to set forth standards or criteria to evaluate colonial practices, such as policing. In most instances, frame determines standards and evidence. More simply, what is it that counts for successful reform in a decolonisation/democratisation project? Here again, the person, perspective and purpose matters.
Varieties of Perspectives: In the past, HKP expatriate officers would assess the HKP in more ideological terms, for example, has the HKP been efficient and effective in conducting colonial policing in Hong Kong? Chinese HKP frontline officers would assess colonial policing more prag-matically, that is, how colonial political mandate affects their delivery of social service, ethnic morality and street justice. With the public, they were only interested in how well the colonial police performed in main-taining order, stopping crime and doing justice. For example, suppress-ing triads, and keeping violent demonstrations at bay. Above everything else, the public asked ��how do the police, when called or encountered, meet with my expectations in solving my problem as a social resource��?14 Viewed in this light, the acceptance of the HKP by the Hong Kong people was and is based on one simple and straightforward criterion, that is, in what way and to what extent the HKP, when mobilised or encountered, is meeting with my expectations, of all kinds. This is a performance, and not a process test.
III: Theoretical Assessment of the HKP: Colonial Policing and Political Legitimacy15
Introduction
People have been fascinated with the legitimacy of HKP, as a colonial force, since 1844.16
In the West, there are two ways of assessing the political legitimacy of a government and policing, that is, with process or by performance.17 First, with legitimacy based on the process, one focusses on the process of HKP formation, for example, fair recruitment,18 and performance, for example, being transparent (��process legitimacy�� or PP1).19 Second, with legitimacy based on performance, we focus on what and how well the HKP conducted policing (��performance legitimacy�� or PP2).20 In the traditional Chinese moral universe, this would be a debate between minsheng (���͡Xpublic welfare) versus minzhu (���D�Xdemocratic practices). Safe to assume, from a Chinese perspective, there is little necessary relationship between process and performance. For example, fairness of recruitment does not ipso facto bring about better police performance in result, for example, the integration of woman police constable (WPC) into HKP in the 1950s.
The conventional wisdom in Western democracies is that PP1 determines PP2, absolutely and completely.21 There are two renditions to this thesis:
First, without PP1 in process (political accountability, e.g., check and balance) and/or practices (legal accountability, e.g., substantive or proce-dure due to process rights), PP2 (fight crime, maintain order, protect rights and provide service) is not possible, in theory. To the public this means that PP1 is a pre-requisite for PP2, a necessary but not a sufficient test for legiti-macy. As applied, without PP1, the HKP as a colonial force could not earn the trust, respect and approval of the colonised people (PP1), however well it performed (PP2).
Second, without PP1 in process and practice, PP2 is not or less likely to be obtained, empirically. That is to say, undemocratic police (non-PP1) performs less well or not at all as compared to democratic policing, to the satisfaction of the public. In context, since the HKP was a colonial force and served the interests of the British government, it was not or less respon-sive to the needs and aspirations of the public. Thus, it was not a legitimate institution.
The Debate
Both of the above PP1 and PP2 assessment standards reference a politi-cal legitimacy test. Since the common (not elite) Chinese in Hong Kong do not participate in a Western moral universe, still less subscribe to the Eurocentric ideological imperative, Western political legitimacy tests have little relevance and at worst are inappropriate in assessing the merits or acceptance of colonial policing in Hong Kong. If that is the case, the con-tinuous assault on the HKP during the post-1997 period, in particular, the accusations of the HKP perpetuating an illegitimate colonial policing mentality and practice are ill placed. It certainly is putting the cart before the horse.
In Hong Kong, the debate between an efficient�Veffective government and legitimacy of governance is a timeless one. In its heydays, the Hong Kong colonial government was known for its administrative efficiency and effec-tiveness, and not political accountability. Thus, even in the 1970s when the Hong Kong government tried to change from ��benevolent authoritarianism�� to ��consensual government�� and came up short, the government was still able to earn a high mark for keeping the public satisfied ��with an efficient admin-istration which could meet the needs of the population��.22
Turning to post-1997 with the ascendance of political awareness, govern-ment efficiency is put to the test, and the people found it wanting. Professor Cheung observed: ��Since 1997, the Hong Kong SAR has been suffering from one legitimacy crisis after another. The infallibility of the administrative state, long held responsible for Hong Kong��s success story in the final decades of British colonial rule, has by now been largely eroded��.23
The proposition advanced here is that the legitimacy of HKP should be judged by Hong Kong people in local context and with Chinese standards, and not based on imported Eurocentric standards, claimed to be universal. This is called cultural legitimacy test, which, broadly defined, includes the material, moral and social considerations, without accentuating one over another.
On top of the colonial-in-name versus non-colonial-in-fact discussion (Chapter 9: ��Hong Kong Police Reform in the 1950s��), this study aims to explore the issue of whether Western political legitimacy standards are com-patible with Hong Kong�VChinese cultural (or social) acceptability test.
The thesis here is that HKP might be less politically legitimate (before 1997) and still be deemed culturally acceptable by a large number of ��sweat and labor�� (�ҭW�j.) Hong Kong people. In essence, political legitimacy is not the only, nor is it the sole litmus test for public acceptance, especially for people on the street. People��s acceptance of others in everyday life, including government institutions, hinges on a multitude of considerations, including economic, moral and social factors: ultimately, what people believe to matter, matters.
Conversely, the HKP might be able to be considered politically legitimate by the Western (or Westernised) Hong Kong elites but still fail the cultural legitimacy (social acceptance) test to a vast majority of Hong Kong people. This is the most likely scenario when Chinese cultural versus Western legit-imacy litmus tests are mutually exclusive as Hobson��s choice. The case in point, Hong Kong Democratic Party wanted ��Big Boss�� to be tried in Hong Kong in the name of the rule of law and procedural justice (PJ), while most of the Hong Kong people were very happy for ��Big Boss�� to be executed in China, expeditiously and summarily without a lengthy trial. Professor Vagg wrote:
One can thus envisage a police force operating illegitimately in the narrow sense of the word but enjoying a popular legitimacy. In addition, it may be that certain illegitimate police activities are widely thought to be socially useful and to that extent legitimate.24
The point Vagg is trying to make, that is, narrow (elite) versus broad (pop-ular) legitimacy or to some political legitimacy versus social utility, points to a larger debate that has thus far escaped well-deserved attention, that is, for what kind (educated vs. uneducated), segment (foreign vs. local) or number (majority vs. minority) of people and with which value frame (Western vs. Chinese vs. Westernised Chinese) should the HKP be assessed, historically and currently. Thus far, the discussion and debate over the approval of HKP performance has always been one sided, that is, dominated by Western val-ues, without realising that Hong Kong�VChinese values and interests need to be taken into account, philosophically (what does legitimacy mean in polic-ing of Hong Kong?) and empirically (how might Westernised policing affect the Chinese way of life?), in any legitimacy or acceptance test.
In a larger context and more fundamentally, debating legitimacy in Hong Kong is a debate over cultural hegemony and imperialism, conducted in the name of universal rights and natural law versus collective welfare and local custom.25
The legitimacy�Vacceptability of the HKP brings to the forefront the perennial and tenacious struggle for dominance between Eastern and Western culture globally, which Huntington aptly labelled as ��clash of civilizations�� and Fukuyama dismissively called it ��end of history�� debate, presaging intermittent global war (Huntington) and permanent peace (Fukuyama):
There is not only a profound difference between classical Eastern and Western thought at the metaphysical level (with many commonalities between Daoism and the postmodernist thought supported by Cohen), but much evidence to suggest also a correlation between East-West metaphysical divergences and other East-West differences in cognitive and behavioral patterns. These dif-ferences are not rooted in race or biology; indeed, they are not only socially constructed but highly malleable, with considerable variety within cultures, and exposure to a different culture eventually alters one��s own mode of think-ing and even one��s understanding of selfhood. They also vary considerably within cultures. At the same time, these differences are reflected in many forms of East-West interpersonal interaction, from business negotiations, to dispute resolution mechanisms, to the development of international human rights standards, in ways in which those participating in such cross-cultural dialogue may not be fully or consciously aware.26
The differences between Huntington and Fukuyama are more than a matter of discourse on the divergence versus convergence on culture, suscep-tible to mediated, middle-ground settlement. At heart, it is a cultural identity and national character struggle, not given to the give-and-take compromise. So far, the HKP has been re-inventing itself (post-1997) with a Western play-book, unreflectively, without attending to the Chinese sense and sensitivity, mindfully. The same can be said of most of what HKP did. This is the perni-cious effect of colonialism.
A Political Legitimacy Test Defined
What is a political legitimacy test? There is no simple answer to this ques-tion. One rendition of colonial policing is: ��Policing throughout the period was imposed on the people and never enjoyed their consent�Kcolonial polic-ing had little to do with serving the community and everything to do with upholding the authority of the colonial state��.27
This definition separates colonial policing from other kinds of policing, for example, civil and democratic policing, solely on the basis of political legitimacy, that is, imposition of authority versus the consent to rule. This definition makes two claims, one is philosophical (strong�Vabsolute) (PP1) and the other empirical (soft�Vrelative) (PP2).
The philosophical claim (PP1) asserts that undemocratic colonial police were ipso facto not entitled to rule and deserving of obedience because they violated personal autonomy and the social contract. In essence, lack of consent amounts to illegitimacy and denial of self-determination, and a vitiates author-ity. This is an ontological argument. The foundation of this claim is based on social contract, that is, an atomistic individualism claims.28 It goes without saying that the philosophical foundation of Western polity is not only alien but obverses to Chinese thinking, such as individualism versus collectiveness.29
The empirical claim (PP2) postulates that colonial policing being uncon-sented to is more likely to work against public interests and thus more likely to be resented and rejected by the people. This is a teleological statement. The foundation of this claim is based on utility. This claim has two species. First, unconsented-to policing breeds discontent leading to disobedience. Second, unconsented policing leads to uninformed (bad) policing. Bad polic-ing ill served the interests of the public. Both claims are based on one simple assumption�Xpolitical legitimacy matters.30 The question is, does political legitimacy matter, for what, to whom, in what way and under what circum-stances?31 It is on this front that the Western legitimacy test versus Chinese social acceptance test finds a common ground, based on utility auditing.
Why and What ��Legitimacy�� Test for Colonial Policing?
There are three objections to judging the popular acceptability of ��colonial policing�� on Eurocentric legitimacy grounds alone.
First, legitimacy is an open-ended search for a normative standard for acceptance of political authority. There are many normative legitimacy stan-dards, other than European standards.
Second, political legitimacy is not the only test for the ��acceptance�� of government. The Hong Kong people could reject colonial policing on political legitimacy grounds and still accept the HKP on other moral (street justice), social (order and security), utility (collective social welfare) or personal (harmonious relationship, reciprocity) grounds. In Professor Vagg��s words:
Formal legitimacy and popular legitimacy32 are not necessarily related, and the latter is more likely to be influenced by popular views of police behavior than by the legitimating accounts and processes of legitimation�K (118)33
In other words, even if the Hong Kong people accept a certain kind of legitimacy test, it might not be (predominately) political. Hong Kong people can adopt their own legitimacy benchmark in assessing the merit of colonial policing, for example, performance benchmarks, such as efficient and effec-tive policing.
Finally, the act of respect for office and compliance with the police, especially in a cross-cultural context, might be beyond normative reason-ing or above logical accounting. People might be ��motivated�� or ��disposed�� to do things for no ��good�� reasons by following ��dao�� or following what comes with nature;34 or what amounts to ��go with the flow��. Or, in some instances for no reason at all: ��I have better things to do. This is not worth my time��.35 In most instances, on most issues, for most of the time and with most of the people, government performance is accepted by the people just because they could not care less, that is, falling within a ��zone of indif-ference��.36 That is also the reason why people do not vote. True autonomy knows no bound.
By saying so, there is of course no denying that reasoning as a way of making sense of the world and decision making is very much a cognitive process for rational people trained to think in a certain way. It is cultur-ally bound, in style, process and content.37 As such, ��reason�� has been tied to logic (��logos��), allowing people to claim non-reason and reason, as illogical and unacceptable. But for most people, non-reasoning is the default mood�X-people couldn��t care less, most of the time, with a ��live and lets live�� attitude .38 The mantra on the streets of Hong Kong is and was, ��Knowing you can change in life and living with those things you cannot��. It is the science of letting go, in colonial Hong Kong as of now.
Hong Kong People Can Define Legitimacy Differently
Conceptualising ��Legitimacy��
Gilley has defined legitimacy as follows: ��Legitimacy is an endorsement of the state by citizens at a moral or normative level. It is normative by concep-tual definition. It is analytically distinct from that form of political support derived from personal views of goodness��.39
In the West, the most dominant school of thought on legitimacy is that of process or constitutive legitimacy. Consistent with Weber, Tyler defined legitimacy as a ��belief that legal authorities are entitled to be obeyed and that the individual ought to defer to their judgments��.40 Conceptualising this way, ��legitimacy�� is a concept that is content-neutral, and open-ended, but also context specific and culturally bound.
In theory and as applied to the United States, Tyler��s legitimacy concept turns to procedural fairness rather than performance effectiveness, that is, legitimacy based on fair procedure (quality of decision-making process) rather than on legitimacy based on the pragmatic effect of police perfor-mance (in deterrence, performance and distributive justice).
Tyler��s legitimacy definition is sufficiently vast to take on culturally rela-tive, situationally contingent characteristics as a concept. It takes on values in context and embraces standard as applied. What is legitimate authority worthy of respect, as an inner personal compass, needs to be discovered in time, place and people.
Thus, the replication of Tyler��s idea of legitimacy based on Western con-ception to colonial policing in Hong Kong without conceptualising legitimacy in a whole new cultural context might just be obeying Tyler in the breach.
How legitimacy looked and felt in colonised Hong Kong is the challenge that needs to be addressed. In what way did the concept of legitimacy differ in democratic policing in the United Kingdom versus colonial policing in Hong Kong is the issue. In essence, how does legitimacy of authority differ across cultures?
In studying legitimacy and obedience in imperial China, one finds that what makes for a legitimate authority worthy of respect and obedience depends on personal virtuosity of the ruler, social status of leaders and moral standing of people, and not PJ. For example, benevolence (virtuosity test) and parents (status test) deserve respect and obedience.
Traditional Chinese people are taught to defer to and comply with official personifying integrity, benevolence and fairness, that is, ��qing guan�� (�M�x). A virtuous and benevolent official commands instant respect and lifelong obedi-ence. The case in point is the folk hero and cultural icon gracing the annals of Chinese social control literature: ��Bao Gong�� or Bao Zheng (�]�@) (999�V1062) of the Song dynasty was known for pursuing factual truth and substantive justice without fear or favour, and at all cost, with little concern for procedure nicety.
Furthermore, in contemporary Asian societies, in Hong Kong as in Taiwan, status and relationship matter. Legitimacy of authority hinges on a person��s status (seniority, rank), the relationship between parties (intimacy, guanxi) and reciprocity (bao). For example, officials are supposed to behave like parents, earning trust and demanding respect by providing protection, care, support and guidance to his/her charges; within a mentor versus pro-tege reciprocal relationship of trust and loyalty for life.
The lesson here is that legitimacy is socially constructed and culturally bound. Finding of legitimacy and obedience in Hong Kong ought to start with a cultural audit, and not the transplanting of a sterile political�Vmoral imperative.
Finally, in attributing legitimacy and commanding obedience, situa-tion matters. After 9/11, President George W. Bush violated every rule in the constitution, procedural (��Terrorists Surveillance Program��) and substantive (��enhanced interrogation��), but his extra-legal order was followed by the pub-lic, with enthusiasm and without fail.41
Measuring ��Fairness��
It is now common to measure Tyler��s concept of ��legitimacy�� as ��procedural justice��. This is measured by questions such as ��How often do the police �K solve problems in a fair manner�� or ��treat people with dignity, respect, equal-ity and human rights��. This way of measuring ��procedural justice�� raises a number of issues that need attending to lest we run into difficulties interpret-ing the findings. For example, what if HKP violates the rights of the criminal to save innocent life (i.e., the ��ticking bomb�� issue in fighting the terrorism context)?
First, PJ is not a one-size-fits-all construct. PJ takes on many forms and consists of many dimensions that differentiate one kind of PJ from another. For example, the U.S. due process and the U.K. natural justice are both procedural in nature (procedural due process), that is, rule following, and substantive in kind (substantive due process), that is, fundamental fair-ness doctrine (an outcome test) trumps procedural rules (a process test). Thus conceptualised, procedural fairness is a product of the process and substance combined; each of them intersecting and inter-penetrating, with one implying the other. The two kinds of due process justice�Xprocedure and substantive�Xare symbiotic twins, with each living the life of the others. That is to say, procedural process makes for a (more) right outcome (a kind of substantive justice) and substantive justice (including the right outcome) trumps procedure rule in exceptional cases, for example, to avoid unfair rule to an unjust outcome. PJ thus favours the accused at the expense of victims and society, whereas substantive justice favours the victim and soci-ety against the offender. Both are subject to claims of wrongful decisions: violations of the former case mean many guilty people would be free to do more harm (violating more rights) and in violation of the latter, a few inno-cent persons would be convicted (to vindicate more victims�� rights and offer more protection).
Given this understanding of the procedural and substantive justice interface, there needs to be a renewed effort to ascertain what is measured in PJ�Xwhat does being treated in a ��fair manner�� mean? One thing is for sure, whatever it means, it cannot mean ��procedural justice�� as a rule-bound process alone, without being mindful of substantive justice considerations. If that should be the case, Tyler��s theory fails and for a good reason: the Emperor has no clothes on. PJ is not the end-all-be-all of legitimacy.
Second, the legitimacy survey asks respondents whether the police have performed their duties in a ��fair manner�� as indicators of procedural fair-ness. But what does ��fair manner�� mean?�XDoes ��fair manner�� policing mean full enforcement of all laws or only zero tolerance for some laws/cases? If so, how can ��fair manner�� assessment get away from a distributive justice debate over selective enforcement at a policy level and street justice at an operational level? More significantly, how can zero-tolerance policing with an eye towards substantive merits (who and what deserves zero tolerance) be termed procedurally fair at a policy, strategic and operational level?
�XDoes ��fair manner�� policing apply to enforcement of ��unfair law�� in ori-gin (H.L.A. Hart), content (segregation law) and impact (disparate impact law)? If not, how can it be said that ��fair manner�� policing is a valid measure of police legitimacy, and is not being contaminated by other social, politi-cal and economic corruptive forces at work? ��Fair manner�� enforcement of unfair law has the potential of making for more unfairness. This is the claim of Marx. Capitalistic rule is never fair because elections favour the rich and the powerful.42
Additionally, in measuring ��fair manner�� policing, it is important to identify whether or not respondents are capable of disassociating police per-formance (activities-based legitimacy), from what the police do (role-based legitimacy), who they are (identity-based legitimacy) and how they perform policing (style-based legitimacy). Beyond that still, can respondents separate ��fair manner�� policing from what other political authorities, for example, executive and legislative branches of government, do or do not do in instruct-ing and confining the police? If there are no means to separate and validly identify ��fair manner�� policing from ��fair�� legislation and/or ��fair�� police role, how can it be said that police legitimacy alone in procedural matter brings about law compliance? In essence, there is more to legal compliance than (narrow) procedural fairness.
Third, ��fair manner�� policing, if it ever matters, has little to do with fair-ness in substance (fair rule) or process (fair application of rule), but every-thing to do with the attitude of officers and style of enforcement. How law is applied in a manner and style turns people on and off, to the extent that it affects the citizens view of the law, in fairness and utility. This is the les-son with alienating versus integrative shame (Braithway, Sherman). Tyler��s ��procedural fairness�� measures respect and politeness which has nothing to do with fairness of procedure, but everything to do with mannerism in the process of rule enforcement.
Hong Kong People Can Accept ��Colonial Policing�� without Legitimacy
It is time to move away from judging colonial policing with a sterile, eth-nocentric and elitist conception of ��legitimacy�� in search of other dynamic, pluralistic, populist ��acceptance�� or ��tolerant�� yardsticks that allow the input of the colonised Chinese people. The suggestion here is that legitimacy test is but one of the many tests for qualifying acceptance (degree of embrace-ment) or tolerance (degree of dissention) of political authority. Alternatively, government authority need not be legitimate and still is accepted. In real terms, to the Chinese people on the street of Hong Kong, and arguably with people everywhere, people��s livelihood (����) and well-being is much more important than people��s (abstract) rights (���v), as a litmus test for govern-ment acceptance.
Survey data from China show that most people are extremely satis-fied.with the central government performance to the tune of 80% on an average (rising each year between 2003 and 2009) (Figure 3.1) (notwith-standing the fact that China is rejected by many as a non-democratic, one-party state).
In the early days of Hong Kong, merchants came to Hong Kong to make money and sojourners came to Hong Kong to escape persecution. They were not concerned with colonialism and its administration. In the post-World War II years, Chinese immigrants came to Hong Kong to find a fortune and build a new home. They were not interested in politics. After 1997, a whole new generation of Hong Kong people, born and bred, were and are more in tune with politics. But still, they are more fond of making money and desir-ous of stability, than pursuing political reform. Public opinion surveys are fairly clear and consistent�XHong Kong is more of a free, equal and rule-bound commercial centre, and is most certainly not a political town.43 Hong Kong people know it; they vote with their feet to come and stay. This shows that process legitimacy is not the only game in town.
To corroborate this argument, an account is presented of what an imag-ined HKP PC with an American education44 would say about the acceptabil-ity of ��colonial policing�� which has failed the Western-liberal legitimacy test. Interviewer question: What do you think legitimacy means in the context of Hong Kong?
Respondent�XHKP PC:
In the beginning, due to necessity, people all around the world naturally pur-sue survival, security, order and happiness as end goals. These are substantive goods or end goals of life.
.With the advent of industrialisation, many people around the world set up a machine-like process to achieve, secure or maintain survival and happi-ness. These are called process goods, that is, instrumentalities for living and survival.
.It is my understanding that people all around the world prefer substantive goods over process goods intuitively, that is, felt, not cognitively,45 and instinc-tively, that is, not mediated by mental processing. For example, when in con-flict, substantive goods will trump process goals, instinctively.46
.The strongest claim for preferring substantive goods over the process is that the process does not necessarily guarantee substantive goods. It might have a contrary effect: witness India, the biggest democracy with a dismal record of economic equality. Process goods benefit others, and substantive goods benefit the self. No individual or country can survive for long if they allow process goods to come before substantive goods. The case in point is the U.S. ��exigency rule�� allowing for doing away with Fourth Amendment war-rant requirement for search and seizure when in pursuit of a dangerous sus-pect. Or, the suspension of the U.S. Constitutional check-and-balance regime in favour of the Presidential executive leadership in national emergencies, such as in fighting terror.
.The Arab Spring is a case study of substance versus process goods. If Arab Spring stands for anything, it stands for the fact that rules are to be disobeyed, at times violently, if the rules stop people from getting what they want, in survival and happiness.
.On occasion of the Arab Spring, President Obama had this to say about process goods�Xdemocracy:
.On December 17, a young vendor named Mohammed Bouazizi was dev-astated when a police officer confiscated his cart. This was not unique. It is the same kind of humiliation that takes place every day in many parts of the world�Xthe relentless tyranny of governments that deny their citizens dignity. Only this time, something different happened. After local officials refused to hear his complaint, this young man who had never been particularly active in politics went to the headquarters of the provincial government, doused himself in fuel, and lit himself on fire. Sometimes, in the course of history, the actions of ordinary citizens spark movements for change because they speak to a long-ing for freedom that has built up for years. In America, think of the defiance of those patriots in Boston who refused to pay taxes to a King, or the dignity of Rosa Parks as she sat courageously in her seat. So it was in Tunisia, as that ven-dor��s act of desperation tapped into the frustration felt throughout the country. Hundreds of protesters took to the streets, then thousands. And in the face of batons and sometimes bullets, they refused to go home�Xday after day, week after week, until a dictator of more than two decades finally left power.47
.As a consummate politician, President Obama used Bouazizi to make his case for a new dawn in democratising the Middle East, as he should. But what he failed to grasp is the fact that the only reason why Bouazizi, the street ven-dor, killed himself, is not that he yearned for freedom and democracy, it is that he was not allowed to make a living. Simply put, Bouazizi��s death had nothing to do with civil rights or dignity, but still less freedom and democratic governance. It has everything to do with survival. In Chinese, it is called ��min-sheng��, which literally means ��people��s livelihood��.
.If Bouazizi lived in a more prosperous place, such as Hong Kong, there is considerable doubt that Bouazizi would need to burn himself. This is evi-denced through Hong Kong��s history: the city experienced a civil disturbance (riots) that led to many deaths and injuries, and 1800 people were arrested in 1966 over a 25 cents (50%) fare increase in Star Ferry harbour crossing, when Hong Kong was very poor and laboured under an ��enlightened�� British colo-nial rule. Forty-five years later, Hong Kong, with few democratic institutions and processes has one of the highest Kennedy ratios (rich vs. poor index) in the world. Police arrest street hawkers daily, but there is no suicide, and no riots. This is not a result of democratic institutions, competent policing nor fair judiciary. This is because street vendors can always find other economic opportunities to ��put a roof over the head��.
.In essence, people on the street and people in the corridor of powers do not see eye to eye on the cause of and cure for public grievances. Street people talk about survival; in Hong Kong, it is colloquially termed ��find eat��. Elites talked about ideals, colloquially known as ��blowing water��. From the ��street�� people��s perspective, concrete�Xparticular�Xmaterial needs for economic survival, and not abstract�Xgeneral�Xphilosophical ideas such as democracy and justice, are the cause for discontent and rioting.
.The elites always do things in the name of the people on the street, to sat-isfy their sense of being. Their worldviews, such as globalisation, are beyond the reach of the commons. Street people are doers. Elites are thinkers. Street people are rewarded externally and in small dosages; the elites are rewarded internally, and dream big. In terms of values, street people are materialistic and pragmatic, and elites are idealistic and principle minded. In terms of interests, street people want immediate gratification and elites tend to defer gratification.
The above discussion is meant to show that governance is not (or less) about process goods (democracy) favoured by the rich people/country, but it is always (or more) about substantive goods (survival at the low end and hap-piness at the high end) for the working people.48
What the HKP PC shows is that any decision-making starts from an identification of all the relevant factors for consideration and an evaluation of such factors. The outcome of such an identification and evaluation pro-cess is entirely dependent on the decision makers�� perception, perspective, values and interests.49 The range of one��s perception and mix of one��s values can either be given at birth (nature) or acquired through social condition-ing (nurture), and press into service in situations (pragmatic considerations). They can also be affected by outside constraints, for example, blind sided by one��s social/institutional role or restricted by legal/customary norms. People��s perception and values are influenced by factors as diverse as per-sonal background, individual experience, cultural expectations, institutional loyalty and organisational structure.
The ultimate issue being raised by the HKP PC is why the minority intel-lectual elite��s right-based process goods are allowed to trump the majority street people��s utility-denominated substantive goods.50
The answer is with Darwinism, that is, survival of the fittest. The people with the brain are able to outsmart and out talk the people from the street, much like the weak but intelligent humans are able to put the strong but mindless animals behind the bar. The same goes for civilian control of the military. The military has arms. The civilians have the smart. What if, one day, the military has both smart and arms, would they not rise to the occa-sion and disband the civilian government, as in Egypt disposing of President Morsi, an elected official?
Returning to HKP and colonial policing, to the liberals, it matters not whether HKP is giving the people of Hong Kong what they want the most�Xorder and security and with it stability and prosperity. The liberal elites want something different. They want to have their vision of the world vindicated, all in the name of the people and democracy.
The elites know too well without ��convincing�� the people that it is in their best interest to struggle for individual rights and not materials goods; the elites�� personal privileges (free speech) and lifestyle (air-conditioned library work) cannot be sustained. The magicians call this ��prestige�� and the crooks call this slight of hands. Both are meant to deceive others for personal gain. Freedom of speech allows elites to speak their mind but make possible por-nography that ruins family values.
This is the true story behind the legitimacy debate of colonial polic-ing in Hong Kong: elite Eurocentric liberalism versus popular Hong Kong pragmatism.
Cross-Cultural Law Enforcement
The legitimacy debate over colonial policing presupposes the sharing of the universal moral universe, thick or thin.51 But what if there is a separate and distinct moral universe dividing the Chinese and British? Then, the topic is not easily penetrable. Such was the case in the 1840s, and was arguable for each generation of migrants, in the 1950s, 1960s and 1990s. In such cases, both parties would have had their own reasons for enforcing and complying with rules. To the extent that the coloniser and colonised did not share in a unifying and integrated moral universe, talks of one-size-fits-all legitimacy have little relevancy. As a result, the decision to accept colonial policing or comply with colonial police hinged any number of other more pragmatic considerations, from fear of punishment to avoidance of trouble, or more simply adaptation and escape.
A Chinese Legitimacy Test
Legitimacy in China, defined as the morality authority to govern,52 was based on Mandate in Heaven (�ѩR).53 The Mandate existed if the nation is pros-perous and happy; the Mandate was denied when the country was afflicted with calamities�Xstorm, flood and famine. An Emperor who was worthy of a Mandate from Heaven and the support of the people was one who was virtu-ous in character (moral legitimacy) and benevolent in deeds (performance legitimacy).
Given this rudimentary understanding of the traditional Chinese notion of legitimacy, the study proceeds to how the HKP Chinese police officers assessed British colonial rule.
IV: Empirical Assessment: HKP Chinese Officers on HKP
Introduction
The investigation into HKP has suffered from the usual problems of lack of source materials and scholarly interests. As intimated (Chapter 1), not much has been written on HKP,54 still less on its history, especially from below and on the street.55 Given the storied history of Hong Kong as a col-ony and the importance of HKP on colonial administration (1941�V1997), it is surprising that there are very few efforts to explicate the HKP��s political role in colonial administration and document its impact on social develop-ment. Of those few that are available, they are hardly accurate and com-plete. They fail to tell the readers the whole story of what HKP means to the Hong Kong people.
Historiography is about discovering and interpretation of obscured and scattered facts, and not rendering of a final reality. It is story telling by victors (gun), elites (rich) and intellectuals (pen), with a given focus, framework and perspective to match. Thus far, the study of HKP history has been focussed on HKP as a law-and-order institution, for good (British) or ill (Chinese). The framework is one of colonialism, masked as benevolent paternalism. The perspective is from the top down (HK government) and afar (England). The voices of the people of Hong Kong on policing are rarely, if ever taken into account,56 nor are there any HKP historical records built upon the testimonials57 on the frontline (Chinese) officers. In the 1950s, the HKP tried to decolonise without democracy, and voices from below started to surface (Chapter 9).
An institutional history of HKP written from above (administration), afar (political) and aloof (economics) has no hope of capturing the ��Spirit of the Age�� or Zeitgeist. Viewed in this way, HKP history is both subjective and constructed: a narrative about the ruler and ruled, corruption and progress, and not about what and how Hong Kong people perceived and received their policy.
In investigating into HKP history, there is a need to draw a clear distinc-tion between studying HKP as a political instrumentality of control or sup-pression versus social institution to maintain order or provide service. For the first 100 years (1844 �V1944), HKP knew the first, not the second.
Finally, it must be realised that investigating into the HKP institution-ally is not the same as studying policing in Hong Kong, functionally. The same goes with political analysis and social observations. In Chinese soci-ety from antiquity, a Weberian type of police existed. A formal, bureau-cratic, legal, professional and coercive organisation of social control, did not exist. Policing (social control, order maintenance) was conducted informally and pervasively, with education, surveillance and sanction, by the family and community, with the endorsement and support of the state. Thus observed, studying the HKP as a political�Vsocial control insti-tution historically, while a valuable and interesting intellectual exercise, would still be relatively uninformative about how policing�Xsocial control of Hong Kong people�Xwas conducted or realised. The study of how Hong Kong policing works requires the studying of much more than how the HKP works as an institution.
After the Second World War, policing of Hong Kong was conducted by the Hong Kong�VChinese under British command and control, that is, CID under the head of Detective Sergeants (Chapter 9). At the end of the day, HKP rank-and-file officers applied the law, executed the policy and provided services to the public, as they see fit. To understand colonial policing at the time, the typical HKP Chinese police officer��s disposition, attitude and senti-mentality towards policing in Hong Kong matters.
Research in this area is handicapped by lack of sources. Thankfully, it is now possible to ascertain the views of the HKP rank and file on a range of issues in HKPM-CE that first appeared in the 1960s. An offspring of HKPM in English, HKPM-CE was edited mostly by HKP-serving officers. Both were HKP official publications to improve internal communication and exter-nal public relationship. HKPM-CE was under the stewardship of a Chinese Inspector (Lee Fok Cheung)58 working with a number of rank-and-file offi-cers. It is supported by HKP Welfare Department.
Beyond the news of the day, for example, ��Remembrance day ceremony��59 and informational materials, for example, ��Christmas custom��,60 provided by the editorial staff, many of the original contributions came from HKP-serving officers, occasionally outsiders and civilian staff, in the form of essays, for example, ��Men and Animal��,61 short stories, for example, ��Snow��62 or personal reflection, such as ��The first time��.63
As a data source, the HKPM-CE is unique. The editorials and contribu-tions allow the public, for the first time, to get into the mind of the HKP officers, who speak on aspects of their job or reflect generally about policing, on their own terms, with their own words and about their own feelings.64 This is how one Chinese police columnist first described, then compared and contrasted HKPM and HKM-CE, lending credibility and validity to the publications:65
At first the magazine is in English. Gradually, half of the content was in English. The English version is more humorous. Authors write about inter-esting stories in their divisions. Each sub-division (���Y) is allowed to write whatever they like. If there are more ��stories�� then the ��column�� (�a�L) becomes bigger. Stories are all about police canteen culture, sport activities and officers mess and transfers/promotion. As to Chinese version, it tilts towards more culture and explanation and personal development. It is more practical. This is especially helpful to the rank and file�K. It can be said that HKPM reflects the effective side of HKP. Since it is written by the police themselves, the writ-ing may not be as professional, but it is well liked, because it is about the ��fam-ily�� and thus more intimate.66
A number of factors, however, affect the utility and limitation of this set of HKP officer-generated materials.
First, HKPM-CE is an official HKP publication. The materials appear-ing were subjected to editorial censorship, in theme, content, style and tone. While purportedly: ��The magazine is a free forum��, it is also subject to explicit screening criteria: ��Ideas must be pure��.67 In the context of time (the 1950s) and place (HKP), this means that what was being published must have passed an internal litmus test. Only those information and opinion found not to be contrary or offensive to HKP policy and stance were allowed to be published. In essence, it was a politically correct, rather than totally free, publication.
Second, the editors and contributors were mostly serving officers, with seniors in the lead. As such, beyond official editorial policy, there were rules that set the outer limits of what is deemed to be fit and proper. There was also a subtle effect of explicit self-censorship, due to professional con-siderations. The HKP, then more so than now, is a strict disciplinary force. Officers are supposed to do as they are told, and not speak their mind, freely. Speaking one��s mind is not against policy, but it is against organ-isational culture.
Third, HKP officers shared in a ��kiss up�� mentality. They say things to ��please�� (affecting what is said) or at least ��not to offend�� (affecting how it is said). This raises the issue of whether what was (and is currently) said is truthful, reliable and valid.
Fourth, all the above, to a large extent, are exacerbated by a Chinese cul-ture, which is rank and status consciousness, and is habituated to please.
Fifth, unlike HKPM, many of the pieces published in HKPM-CE are under a pen name. That means that there is little personal accountability. It is arguably good that lower-rank officers can speak with anonymity and thus more freely. But anonymity also means that there is no check on reliability and validity.
Sixth, the HKPM-CE is a first attempt to offer an open forum for the rank and file to offer their opinion and express their views. The novel nature and experimental status of the publication undoubtedly affected the editors and contributors, for example, editors and contributors were likely to be more cautious and conservative before they learn about the acceptance of the magazine by the powers to be.
The above conditions and caveat notwithstanding, it is clear that HKPM-CE is a valuable resource to researchers, that is, an opportunity to listen to voices from below. As to the cultural significance of Chinese officers speaking up, it offered a forum for the Chinese to comment on their work, for example, what Confucius thought about free speech.
Confucianism and HKP Free Speech
There is no right to free speech in China. In fact, open criticism of the Emperor and Imperial officers were dangerous encounters, courting death.68 However, there was a duty to speak the truth to power, in circumspective ways.
Inherent in Confucianism was the obligation for any degree holder to speak out when the government deviated from Confucian ideals. Unlike the West, Confucianism did not legally guarantee a loyal opposition, but it justified one ideologically. To criticize government misdeeds was not the literati��s rights, as in the West, but their responsibility.69
In imperial China and now with the HKP, speaking up was done indi-rectly, and tactfully, but unmistakably and forthrightly, in allegorical ways:70
Indirect methods reduced risks of criticism. Hence there is a tradition of allegorical political criticism. This indirect method, called ��pointing at the mulberry to revile the ash��71 or ��killing the rooster to warn money��, obliquely chided the regime under the guise of discussing another historical period or an abstract philosophical concept�K. Their messages were more abstract than concrete, more general than specific. They, too, shrouded their ideas in erudite discussions of ideology, philosophy, literature, and history.72
The HKPM-CE, examined closely, allows readers to ascertain the views and opinions of the Chinese HKP officers on colonial administration and HKP management. Indeed, if one were to read and interpret the contributions of the Chinese officers in HKPM-CE beyond the plain text and literal construction, one soon finds that many of the writings have indirect and allegoric meanings critical of, at the very least divergent from, HKP colonial policy and practices. Viewed in this light, HKPM-CE is one of the very first HKP official internal staff survey, speaking of several issues of importance and concerns to the officers.
Research Data Overview
For the current research project, a convenient sample of six (6) issues of HKPM-CE has been selected for analysis.73 As an illustration, HKPM-CE, Vol. 8 (4) (Winter, 1964) contains 24 published pieces including two cartoons in 25 items. Eighteen longer pieces are reported here so that readers can have a feel of how the HKPM-EC is organised.
1. ��Police Training Camp�� (PTC) by 3311 is an introduction to PTC, Fanling�Xits purpose, mission, organisation, training process and experience at PTC (pp. 2�V3).
2. ��Unique discussion on forensic skeleton examination�� from an infor-mation archive educates HKP officers as to what skeleton exami-nation as a species of forensic science is all about; from how it is conducted and what one can tell by examining the skeleton (pp. 4�V5).
3. ��Police and politeness�� by Cpl. 255 admonishes HKP officers to be polite in interacting with citizens lest they get into trouble from causing physical fights to attracting citizens�� complaints (p. 5).
4. ��Bird of a feather�� by Huang Yang (���ϡXpen name) is a personal-interest story. It describes in great detail bird rearing as a hobby in Hong Kong (p. 6).
5. ��Business and creativity�� by PC7237 is an opinion piece about dete-riorating work ethics with young officers in the HKP (�s�L). They are afraid of working hard and try to avoid responsibility at every turn. In the HKP, the bad habit of leaving to others what one can do for oneself is called �j�}�Ǥ�, a soccer jargon describing how one passes one��s ball to another (p. 7).
6. ��Black Pool�� is an information piece by an editorial office in the city of Black Pool, where the annual conference of the International Police Association was held (pp. 8�V9).
7. ��Money and the law�� by PC3795 observes the corrosive effect of money on law. The essay uses a case study from China, statistical data from the United States and teaching of Mengzhi (Mencius: �s�l) to make the point that people who are preoccupied with money are likely to ignore the law. On its face, the author is just making a gen-eral observation about the corrosive and corrupting effect of money on the rule of law and justice administration. But the essay could also be interpreted as saying that HKP is very corrupt. Everyone is trying to get more and more money while on the take. During the time, HKP coined the term�X��police businessman�� (�t��) to describe police officers who were on the take with the rank and office for sale. In modern economic terms, each post has a mar-ket value with return on investment (ROI) calculation. The real message is about HKP corruption because the author closes the essay with the following: Mengzhi (�s�l) visited with the Emperor of Liang (��f��). When the Emperor asked how Mengzhi could benefit his country, Mengzhi said that people should not be talking about benefits or utility but should only be talking about benev-olence and righteousness. If everyone from top to down is con-sumed with personal utility, the nation is doomed. This is because everyone is coveting others�� wealth and treasure, with no end to the utility quest (p. 10).
8. ��Personal Radio�� by HKPM is a correspondent��s description of the personal radio carried by the U.K. police (p. 11).
9. ��Goodbye�� by PC 6536 is a short poem (p. 11).
10. ��Thousand face monster�� is a martial art story by Cheng Kong (pp. 12�V13).
11. ��The Royal Canadian Mounted Police�� is an essay by Cheng Kong describing RCMP CID and Identification Bureaus (pp. 14�V15).
12. ��Around New Territories�� by PC3793 takes the readers once around NT (pp. 16�V17).
13. ��A story about photographing�� by Sung Chai Gong is a story the author enjoys on taking photo (p. 19).
14. ��Editorial�� invites readers to share what the HKPM-CE has to offer (p. 20).
15. ��Life responsibility�� by PC2032 tells about the author��s attitude towards life and work. It makes clear that life is there for working hard and discharging duties; not for being lazy and avoiding respon-sibilities. The opinion piece serves as an admonition for young peo-ple (p. 21).
16. ��Selected Hong Kong Law�� is from the information archive. It provides an overview of HK criminal law for police officers (pp. 22�V23).
17. ��Road safety campaign�� is an information piece on the purpose and conduct of road safety in the Colony (p. 24).
18. ��Preliminary discussion on finger printing�� by PC4720 is about the author��s work experience with the fingerprint unit (p. 25).
After reading this volume of HKPM-CE, one gets the impression that there was a substantial difference between Chinese versus British in the choice of subject matter, perspective, reasoning process and writing style, more generally cultural variations.
In terms of subject matter, there were four main groups of publications, that is, experiential (day at work with the fingerprint unit), to personal (bird earing, fishing), to reflective (life as a duty) and to creative (poetry).
In terms of perspective, they all looked at the world differently and in nuanced ways. Their accounting of the shared universe was all very individu-alistic, subjective and particularistic, leaving one with a distinctive feeling that deep inside, each of them lived a different world of their own. This challenges the basic assumption that Chinese in general, because of culture, and HKP offi-cers in particular, as a result of personal background, professional, training, peer socialisation and work experience, thought, felt and acted in a uniform manner.
In terms of reasoning, there were a shared moral universe and similar conduct norms (Mengzhi, Confucianism). All of them tried to reconcile the utopian world they had aspired towards, since birth, with the reality they observed and confronted, at work, again in their own ways.
In terms of writing style, they ran from classical to popular. Overall, two things are gleaned from the writings:
First, the Chinese were as good a thinker and writer as the British. Thus, one is hard pressed to dismiss the Chinese as lesser of an equal as the British, in intelligence, education and culture. In fact, in some cases, the Chinese demonstrated that they were much better thinkers than the British, in clas-sical or modern terms. For example, in ��Money and the law��, PC3795 was able to draw upon Chinese authority and the U.S. data to support his thesis that at a theoretical, empirical and practical level, that Hong Kong society (by extension of the HKP as an organisation) being financially dominated and utility driven, was a morally flawed (by traditional Chinese measures), dysfunctional and unsustainable order.
Second, it is clear that the Chinese officers shared a different value system and adopt alternate world views, than the British.
On Wisdom of Colonial Rule
The essay ��Everyone has some small smartness�� from the archive retells.a fable.from Africa, with a message: listen to other people who have some -creative ideas and wisdom to share, as an adage in Africa says: ��A single mind cannot be trusted to offer up good solution��.
As told, the fable is a simple but instructive one. There is an old spider. It is so smart that he knows everything there is to know. It knows how to build bridges, construct dams and weave cloth. It embarks on a journey around the world and collects the wisdom of the world to put it in a jar, without sharing it with any other. It then wants to place the jar on top of the world��s tallest tree. As it climbs up the tree, it puts the jar in front of itself. A young spider tells the older spider that it can climb faster with the jar on its back. The old spider thinks for a while and realises that it does not have all the ideas, since ideas can grow. It drops the jar on the ground, and it breaks open. People come from all over to recover the knowledge.
The fable might very well have been included as a simple story with a kernel of wisdom from Africa. But it could also be interpreted as a vehicle to send a message to the colonial government and the HKP boss in par-ticular. In the HKP then, as a colonial force and military organisation, orders were given above, to be followed below. The rank-and-file officers were not supposed to have any ideas because the colonial master and those in military commands know best. However, because the colonial master and police bosses did not know the local culture and ground condition/situation, their decisions were likely to be wrong, and in many cases failed in reality.
The allegory here is that the British colonial government might have gone around the world and collected all the knowledge and wisdom in the world in those matters that matter�X��building houses, constructing dams, weaving cloth���Xbut they should not be so quick to dismiss the ideas from the ��small spider�� who has an experience of its own. The second message here seems to be while the British are busy collecting and storing old ideas, other people are generating more and more new ideas. In that case, of what good are ideas when they are not put to good use, for example, sharing with others and in the process generating more and better ideas?74
On HKP Discipline
In ��Baber��s authority��75 the author (Stupid and Dumb) related his experience in having to face up to the police station barber four times a month, as a matter of HKP discipline; short hair and crisp turn out. The essay could be construed as reflecting rank-and-file opinion about HKP discipline at the time, in a light hearted, but truthful way. The observations are not flatter-ing ones: HKP discipline is strict, intimidating, agonising and above all else, discretionary (discriminatory) and undemocratic.
The pen name of the author, title of the essay and the introductory two headlines tell us clearly that this is an allegorical piece. The pen name of the author is ��stupid and dumb��. It is a way to show how ��stupid and dumb�� the HKP was, in maintaining tight discipline and strict rule.76 The title ��Barber��s Authority�� in Chinese (���v�x���v�¡�) sounds exactly the same as ��judge��s authority�� (���k�x���v�¡�). The essay is thus more about dispensation of dis-cipline by police officials (�k�x) than the cutting of hair by a barber (�v�x). The thematic headline is also a dead giveaway of the purpose of the essay. It tells us that in front of �v�x or �k�x, that is, colonial police authority, every-one has to bow their heads, from high to low ranks: ��You have conquered the world with both of your fists, who dare to fight back? With a small iron in hand, shaving of heroes and notables, who dare not to bow heads��? The HKP, just like the barber, imposed discipline on all who come before it, foreign and domestic.
There were a number of allegorical statements made with going to the barber, as working for the HKP:
First, the barber, as with the head of HKP, is all powerful. Within the HKP (and the colonial government), there is a central authority that controls all the heads, absolutely and unforgivingly (see below). No one is excused, or spared, in the hands of the barber or colonial authority. In the hair saloon, it is the bar-ber who has ultimate control. In the HKP, it was the Commissioner of Police:
From my own perspective and feeling, barber is the most authoritative person in the world. He not only controls the head of laminates and dignitaries, but all the heads in the world. The ��head�� (�Y) means ��first�� (��), respectable people in high place are called ��leaders�� (����) (��head that leads��). Head is the most important part of the body. You can see under the hands of the barber, heads of leaders and VIP up above and common people and lackeys down below, are all controlled by the barber.
Second, colonial authority and HKP discipline were exercised at real (on whatever you do) and symbolic levels: ��Each police officer, must be sub-jected to barber authority four times a month��. The short hair-cut require-ment reminded the HKP officer that he/she was in a disciplinary force. Failure of appearance was deemed as failure of the pledge of loyalty. The length of the hair is made a conclusive measure of one��s commitment and competence.
Third, working for the HKP, as with visiting the barber, was an agonising and excruciating experience; like sitting on an electric chair. The only differ-ence was that visiting the barber is a short-term engagement with an end, and working for the HKP was a 24/7, lifelong engagement.
How unpleasant it is to have the hair cut (alternatively working for HKP) �K first, one needs to report to the barber (HKP authority). Once sit in the honor-able chair (working with HKP), people feel like they are sitting in an electric chair. While sitting on an electric chair would be over in a moment, sitting in a barber��s chair is torturous. This barber chair promises at least one hour of enjoyment. Short time pain is better than long term. How about going to bar-ber? There is at least three times a month? Who ask you to join the police. You have to cut your hair more.
Simply put, once you join the HKP, you can expect the discipline to last regularly and intermittently for the rest of the career, and for some, life.
The message here is that HKP owns and controls every rank-and-file offi-cer 24/7, completely and totally, and for life. There is no escape. When you are not with your barber, you still have to think about the next barber visit. The failure of discipline is death by electrocution and with torture along the way.
Fourth, when you visit the barbershop (work for the HKP), you will be covered with a white cloth (HPK green uniform) with a white collar around your neck (HKP uniform with a blue tunic collar in winter and a starchy shirt collar in winter):
From the mirror, one looks 100% like a clown, like a baby screaming for milk, with both hand under the white sheet (in HKP uniform or otherwise private life), and cannot move (your professional, personal self is under discipline). Even if you are the most troublesome person. You will be sitting there in a civilized and polite way. (You would conform, at least pretend to put up and put out) Peacefully and properly seating, awaiting the disposition of the barber. (You just sit back and relax, and take what is coming. The HKP owns your life.)
Once a person joined the HKP, he has to be well behaved, even for the worse kind of people. (In the 1950s, the HKP recruited a lot of people with unsavory background because the standards were low, or non-existent. Many of these came across the border. More than a few joined because they were not fit for jobs outside. Some of them were gangsters. Finally, decent people do not join the HKP.)
Sixth, once a person is on the barber chair, he is completely at the dis-posal of the barber, at will and with wimp. The hairs, dropped on your neck, are causing pain and itch. What can you do? Tolerate:
Short hair falls on your neck �K you cannot scratch, even though you cannot tolerate. Then the barber demonstrates his authority, and move your head left and right according to the need of his work�Kentirely according to his wish and wimp. Tiredness is yours, tolerance and self control is dependent on train-ing and discipline�K
The above passage is perhaps the best description of what it was like to be working for the HKP as a PC. One was completely at the disposal of the British officials, with intolerable and enduring pain of the body, itch of the heart and bruise of the soul, with no way out other than to tolerate and endure.
The conclusion tells all:
The whole face becomes a battle ground for him. All you can do is to close your eyes and pray. But he does not allow you to take his work for granted. He specifically shaved around the corner of your eyelids ��unnecessarily��, in order to make you shiver in cold sweat. But whatever the pain, you can only object and cannot complain.
Notwithstanding advances in political system, going to barber shop it is traditionally dictatorial. Once you sit on the barber chair, there is no democ-racy, the barber is king.
In the 1960s, Hong Kong government might have been democratising but the HKP, steeped in tradition and stern in discipline, did not follow suit.
On Rule of Law
In ��Mass psychology and the law��, 77 the author (with a pen name)78 of ��Horse not going forward�� (�����e)79 commented on the purpose, function and operation of the law. The focus is on how to make the ��mass�� (�s��) follow (voluntarily) or conform (coercively) with the law, psychologically.
The thesis of the essay is that in order for the law to work, it must serve the needs of the Hong Kong people and be voluntarily obeyed. The wholesale cross-cultural transportation and imposition of British law on Hong Kong is not well conceived and ill advised. It is a doomed project, from the beginning to the end.
The essay starts with a preface statement from Guanzi:80 ��If everyone from high to low officials, from the respectful to the base people, obeys the law, then we would have achieved perfect governance��. In a straightforward way, the statement just means that law should operate in such a way that everyone would see fit to obey. However, read allegorically, it might be suggesting that the current legal system is a huge failure in that perfect governance is not achieved, since it is not applicable to the high officials and is not effective against the privileged. Interpreted this way, it was a direct indictment against the Hong Kong government and British governance, with the HKP as a prime example. It would be doubly insulting since it was one of the avowed purposes and consistent justifications of colonisation to bring the rule of law to Hong Kong in an effort to tame the Chinese and develop trade with China. That is to say, as suggested by this allegory, the idea (law as an instrumentality of the government) and ideal (law as an ideology of governance) promoted by colonialism failed in Hong Kong, at both theoretical (ideological and not sci-entific) and operational (coercive and not psychological) levels.
The author starts the essay with the premise that ��law is not self execut-ing��, citing Mengzhi: ���{�k����ۦ桦.81 For the law to be truly effective, it must be designed in such a way as to optimise its ��stimulating�� impact on people. The author asked rhetorically: ��What is law? From a psychological point of view, law is a stimulus (��E��) to stop or induce average people to engage in certain conduct��. Thus, it is imperative to study the psychology of the mass towards law, in cognition, emotion and disposition.
The author further opined that if one were to study the mass psychology of law, an effective legal regime (specific legal provisions) must fulfill three constitutive and operational conditions: (1) Having a stimulating�Xdeterring or inducing�Ximpact on average people; (2) the stimulating impact must be proportionate with conduct under control and (3) stimulating impact must not be counter-productive to the purpose of law.82
From a reading of the essay, the constitutive�Voperational conditions of law are very clear: (1) law has a deterring or inducing impact, and (2) law as a stimulus has a proportionate impact on conduct. If so, the question is why colonial rule-policing failed in Hong Kong.
The author��s central thesis is that British colonial rule failed its essential purpose of re-enacting British rule of law in Hong Kong because, as a trans-ported and imposed foreign control system, it failed to first understand and then meet Hong Kong�VChinese people��s cultural orientation and psychologi-cal needs.83 This is what the author said:
Why is there a need for the third condition (adjusting to local conditions)? It is because if the law is not build upon mass psychology, then the stimu-lating effect of law on the people might be against the purpose of the legal stimulus, that is to say the punishment might be running counter to the purpose of the law�K. To conclude, we cannot use laws from a psychologi-cally different ethnic group to any other ethnic group.84 A certain system of law cannot be made to apply to another ethnic group with different psycho-logical make up. If the law is not fitting with the psychology of the ethnicity of the mass, this would inevitably and invariably lead to violating of law by all people. If few people violate the law, it is treated as criminal, if a majority of people violate the law, this is treated as a right. Violating the law becomes a necessity of living.85
The essays tell us how HKP Chinese rank and file officers thought about British law and HKP discipline:
First, law is not self-executing.
Second, law cannot be imposed coercively. It must be followed volun-tarily and willingly, which is an inducement proposition.
Third, in order for law to work, it must be enforced or obeyed across the board, from senior British to junior PC. The law must be applicable to all and enforced without fear or favour.
Fourth, in order to make people follow the law, the law must cater to Hong Kong people��s needs, culture and conditions.
Fifth, a legal regime cannot be transported from the United Kingdom to Hong Kong without being customised to fit local conditions and culture, and expect to work.
The pen name of the author was a dead giveaway of the intent and pur-pose of the piece. The name �������e�� or ��a horse that does not move for-ward�� tells us that the law could not work until it reflected the local culture, protected local interests and was applied evenhandedly. Alien colonial law imposed was no law�Xineffective, dysfunctional�Xat all.
On Accommodating Alien Culture
In the short essay ��The meaning of Christmas��, PC Li seeks an answer to the question: ��What is the real meaning of Christmas (in Hong Kong)��? Is it for the rest and relaxation of overworked HKP officers? Is it for wining and din-ing with friends and relatives? Is it for gifts giving? (Of course, these ques-tions are posed for non-believers, including the author). The real question for the author was why HKP and the HK public have to celebrate a religious holiday and pay tribute to a God from another culture?
The answer given by the author, a non-believer, is that Jesus has proven by his act to be worthy of respect. Jesus died on the cross to save the world. He showed us that love conquers hate and mends conflicts. He also showed us that with self-sacrifice and unrelenting effort that we can bring peace and love back to the world.
Between people, only love brings people together forever, creating a glorious history. Hate and conflict can never solve any problem. But I believe that Jesus is a heroic figure deserving of our respect. We have endured a lot of pain and suffering, and all kinds of misunderstanding requiring us to com-promise our integrity and dignity to beg for survival (�e���D��).86 But we should understand that the suffering endured by Jesus Christ was thousands of times more than ours. He loved all people, including the worse ones, the selfish ones. He loved them all universally. To love people, he is willing to sacrifice and suffer.87
The essay would not be worth attention and further examination for -allegory, without the above gratuitous statement on: ��We have endured a lot of pain and suffering, and all kinds of misunderstanding requiring us to compromise our conscience, integrity and dignity to beg for survival (�e���D��)��. What did the HKP officers endure, that required surrender-ing of their dignity for survival? The author must have been alluding to the HKP officers�� humiliating and agonising experience in having to work for a colonial government, as a second-rate citizen in a wholly-controlled place and organisation.
By joining HKP ranks, the author and his peers suffered from two kinds of indignities. First, the author and others had given up their nation for personal glory (���D�a)88 instead of sacrificing their lives for righteous-ness (�٨����q).89 Second, the author and others had now sided with the powerful to exploit the weak, that is, helping the British colonisers to control their own. Worse, the British could not effectively rule Hong Kong without the help of the Chinese officers.
The humiliation and suffering of Hong Kong people as colonised people and the Chinese HKP officers as colonising agents were brought on by the British grand colonial scheme. The British colonising acts need to be for-given with God��s love before any healing begins. (Here, the author is talk-ing about God forgiving the British for coming from thousands of miles to make life difficult for the Hong Kong people generally and HKP officers specifically.)
By writing the essay, the author is also pleading for understanding and forgiveness from the HK people. HKP are also victims of historical circum-stances. Hopefully, with love and compassion, their personal relationship with the HK people can move beyond the past to build a better future.
The last allegory is a profound one. According to the author, while Hong Kong people might not have believed in Jesus as a religious figure, what Jesus did was for real, and deserves respect. In essence, Hong Kong could still learn to love and follow Jesus��s example without believing in him as a spiritual fig-ure. By the same logic, Hong Kong people should judge British rule not by its colonial title, but by what the British performed in real terms. Should that be done, like in the case of Jesus, Hong Kong people would find that British rule is more civil than colonial.
Seeking Truth: Integrating Culture, Science and Experience
In an essay ��Discussion on autumn noises��,90 the author (PC9676 from N.T. Division�XDa Mai Du Police Station) debated the epistemology of ��autumn noises�� (���n). Does it come from cultural icons�� imagination (speculation), people��s experience or scientific evidence?
The essay begins with the author relating different Chinese poets�� and philosophers�� (��yin yang��) understanding of where ��autumn sound�� comes from: To the poets, it comes from birds. To Ou Yangzhi, it derives from the yin-yang and five elements. The author then offers up his own foot patrol experience at night in the wilderness. He experienced exactly what the poets talked about. Then, he discussed the contribution of science in helping to understand the natural principle of things and cause-and-effect relationships between matters. He closes with the following:
With every phenomenon in the society, generally speaking, they all have causal relationship, if we observe these university rule, we can get proper understanding and draw logical conclusion�KOf course, things are never that simple. From academic principle to practical use, there must be practical application, before one can grasp what is real. What Auyang wrote about origin and reason for ��autumn sound�� is based on yin and yang cos-mos relationship and five elements which I was briefly exposed to in passing. My true exposure to autumn sound: came after that (by experience and with science.)91
This essay tells us a lot about HKP Chinese officers at the lowest rank, that is, how PCs thought, discovered knowledge and sought truth.
Chinese PCs, given the opportunity, could think deeply, articulate clearly and engage others provocatively.92 PC5447 might have been a minor-ity, but HKP at the lowest rank was populated by deep thinkers and well-read Chinese philosophers, who were not properly recognised by the British, for the lack of (British) recognised credentials. For human resource management and research, it raises the issue of how to properly ascertain the qualification and capacity of police officers under the British rule.
The way PC5447 posed the question�Xhow do we learn about ��autumn sound��?�Xis very creative and original. It shows that PCs were not only fol-lowers of orders, but were capable of asking independent questions, of the most complicated and discerning kind. To insist that PCs only obeyed, but not questioned, orders, the HKP might have been a valuable human capacity and resource.
The way PC5447 goes about analysing the puzzle shows that he is cross-disciplined and integrative in thinking: philosophy provides for untested ideas, scientific research provides evidence in support of theory building and clinical street experience perfects the scientific discovery. Speculation, obser-vation and experience provide for a comprehensive approach to the under-standing of a phenomenon, here ��autumn sound��.
Allegorically, PC5447 might be trying to show that colonial policing theory and policy on the book must take into account reality and condi-tions on the street of Hong Kong, and are supported by scientific research based on natural principles of things. More importantly, words of wisdom by philosophers or the imagination of poets while not substantiated by sci-entific evidence still merit attention if they comport with work experience on the job.
In essence, at the end of the day, implicit knowledge (experience) should be able to add to what we know through cultural assimilation as wisdom and scientific discovery. The other message might just be discovery of the truth�Xor to PC5447�Xwhat works on the job requires an integration of culture, sci-ence and application.93
On Dealing with Adversities (under British Rule)
��Turbulence vortex of life�� by WPC Kwok Siu Fung (���p��) deals with a recurring subject in HKPS-CE, that is, how to negotiate the recurring and unending adversities of life, within and without the HKP. It discusses, in personal terms and intimate ways, how a young WPC feels and acts in the face of life course challenges within the HKP, community and soci-ety. The WPC explains the impact and her response to distresses in life, though not the cause. We can only guess. The WPC was troubled because she had to deal with some of the wise aspects of policing: ridicule by the public as a colonial ��running dogs��; rejection by family/friends for join-ing an all less-than-honourable job; harassment from male officers and belittling from the public as a WPC, dismissive treatment by the Chinese superior and discrimination from British superiors. The problem as described as WPC Kwok:
Ever since I was hit by a life course event due to unavoidable circumstances, I have to face up to meaningless and laughable situations. I begin to under-stand what fate has installed for me. I now understand what sadness means. Living in an ugly world and cruel reality makes me realize, that those sense-less ridicules made me feel that I am being abandoned by the society. I have now a person without self-confidence. I have no desire, with life as tasteless (meaningless). Life and living is old, too old. I know that a weak person can-not beat the strong in being achieved. What good are consoling words (from others)? Swirling in my heart is a vortex of turbulence and sorrow. I go round and round in the vortex, finding no way out. Should I be swimming upstream against the current or drift down stream with the flow? But I do neither. I just go round and round in the vortex, until my brain swirls and heart sinks. But I am still living, and force to live those brand and meaningless life, one day at a time.
On first look, the essay suggests a troubled mind, needing help. The solu-tion the WPC offers for her mental anguish is to put things in perspective, realising what she has to encounter in life is the same for everyone, since antiquity: ��The world and human have billions years of history. Our life is just a small part of this larger whole��.
If we realize our plight is not unique, but a common cause for sorrow and despair of the whole humankind, then we should not blame ourselves or any-one for what is happening. Instead we should find meaning of life in our living space�Kwe should not be hiding in a corner in a sullen manner blaming self and others�KWe should stand up and defeat the vortex of turbulence, clarify our life goal, and dash forward with all our might.
While written up as an individual account of personal problem solving�Xwhat to do when one is down and out, having turned unto a laughing stock of others�XKwok��s piece is anchored within a larger social context and cultural milieu. To that extent, it is revealing of common sentiments, for example, frustration, and universal tendencies, for example, avoidance, within the Chinese diaspora and HKP ranks. Extrapolating from the observations made and applying lessons learned to a colonial policing context, one can begin to understand how a WPC at the time dealt with self-doubts and public ridicule working as an Imperial police officer and colonial ��running dog�� in a Chinese society. The choices were few, consequences stark and the prospects dim. The take away lesson is a simple one, and very Chinese: look inside, not outside for one��s problems�Xbe confident, be resilient, be resourceful and be hopeful. A resilient person has to be able to create meaning to and purpose of life, and act upon it in a resolute way. Fight and do not relent in the face of adversities is a life challenge for everyone.
The WPC story of the self is a poignant account of how Chinese, in gen-eral, deal with life problems (here in facing up to colonialism). Unlike the Western culture, Chinese people are taught to accept, to fit in, not change or challenge the reality; at least not radically. The personal challenge for the Chinese officer was in how to make an intolerable situation marginally better when it cannot be optimally changed. This requires tolerance and sufferance in equal measures.
When Occidentals think of rebellion, the Orientals talk about accep-tance. For the Chinese, adopting a non-confrontation to colonial rule was to rationalise things out like the WPC, that is, being strong and resilient, creat-ing meaning of survival and for survival, one day at a time.
The WPC��s attitude finds resonance with another author (Lo Su��s) in a poem titled ��Be Strong��.94 The context there is that Lo was responding to a police friend��s essay on ��Imaginative song in a traffic kiosk�� which was too pessimistic in content: ��People have sadness and happiness, togetherness and separation. The sky above has full as well as half moon. Why do you have to be down and out all the time, with sullen face��.95 He pointed to success-ful people from the past (Han Shun) and present (Sun Yat Shan). Europe (Beethoven) and America (Edison) to suggest all successful people have con-fronted insurmountable difficulties, Beethoven was blind and Edison was dumb. Why not take lessons from them in living adversities and creating the meaning of life with your own hand: ��Difficulties and despair is not rope that ties people�KWhy not throw away worries, and take out the knife, to cut the mountain in half�KLife is struggle. Loving with every ��moment��, ��minute��, ��hours�� has its own high purpose��.96
Concluding Thoughts
There is a substantial difference between Chinese versus Western culture (Table 3.1). In a close study of HKPM, one finds that the Chinese look inside for satisfaction. The British look outside for excitement. The Chinese are engaged in more soul searching, for example, writing poetry, while the British take part in more sensation seeking, for example, going around the world. The Chinese wanted to find internal order in an inherently disorderly world, for example, adapting to British values without compromising the Chinese core. The British tried to reshape order in making new ones, for example, imposing British values on a Chinese population, at least on the surface.
How the Chinese HKP officers dealt with cultural imposition at a per-sonal level is an issue. The above brief venture into HKPM-CE affords a rare opportunity to investigate the sentiment, disposition and attitude of the HKP rank-and-file officers towards work and life, and more importantly, how to deal with issues and problems on and off the job.
From the evidence, Chinese officers harboured a lot of resentment and pent-up frustration against British colonial rule, from how colonial rule was administrated to how HKP discipline was fashioned. As reluctant colonial citizens and dutiful HKP officers, they found ways of speaking back to the colonial master and HKP superiors with allegorical stories and essays, while at the end of the day obeying and complying with British rule.
Finally, what was the effect of placing one set of values�Xculture�Xorder (British) over another set of values�Xculture�Xorder (Chinese)?97 How did the British (coloniser) and Chinese (colonised) co-exist under one roof�Xorgan-isationally (formally), professionally (interactively), socially (informally) and personally (intimately)? Specifically, how did the Chinese officers adjust to the British aspiration, feeling and thinking, ways and means and vice versa?
Here, Robert Merton might be of help with his anomie�Xstrain theory. According to Robert Merton, criminality and deviance in America resulted from a disjuncture between cultural goals�Xwhat it means to be successful, and structural means�Xhow best to go about to achieve success.98 By this, he means when society tells us to chase after the American Dream to be suc-cessful, for example, get rich and money talk, but does not provide people with the legitimate structural means to do so, for example, having no edu-cation or given no opportunity, we now have an adjustment problem, that is, an anomie condition. People do not know what to do: should they work hard, still hoping to be successful? Or fight back, by breaking rules to attain goals? Merton identifies five modes of adaptation: conformity, innovation, retreatism, ritualism and rebellion. Each adaptation mode corresponds to a person��s understanding of his own situation. For example, a law-abiding person who has a deep faith in the American Dream would work harder to be successful, against all odds. These are the ��conformist��. However, there are people who yearn for success, but are jilted by the system, which offers an unequal opportunity or no means to be successful. This group of people will do whatever it takes to get rich without necessarily following rules. These are the ��innovators��, some ending up as deviants (Table 3.3).
One way for the HKP to live the British dream with few opportunities (lack of promotion opportunities) and little skills (language) was for them to adjust, as Merton suggested. A Chinese police officer could act as a conform-ist in conduct but still remains dissentered at heart. In Chinese terms, being one heart (with) two utilities (�@�ߤG��). This �@�ߤG�� strategy allowed the Chinese to reconcile the two distinctive different systems of values and cul-ture. As a strategy, �@�ߤG�� was realised in two ways.
The ��conformist�� way was to act as a British colonial officer at work (pub-lic) and behave as a Chinese person at heart (private); a Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde kind of approach.
The more ��rebellious�� option was not to adjust but play ��obey in public but�� to disobey in private (���^����), that is, conforming in words but dis-agreeing in action.
Still, a third alternative was to conform ritualistically. Again, there were two renditions to this strategy, that is, �����u�� versus �C�� �H���C
�����u�� is acting to conform in such a realistic manner that for all intent and purpose, it is real, both to the actor and to the audience. This strategy was most often deployed by undercover cops who had to live the life of another person, and be completely submerged in gang culture before they could do the job effectively. With this kind of strategy, there is a real risk of going native with play acting, and may in time lead to conversion of values after long submersion in an alien culture.
The utility of �����u�� is that it reduces cognitive dissonance.
�C���H�� is to not to take things seriously, translated into doing things as told, in a mindless and non-chalant, and playful way. �C���H�� attitude and conduct is personified and made famous by .�� (��Jigong��). The com-mon expression for people who engage in this strategy or work ethic is: ��It is just a job�� or more blatantly: ��It is all a game��. The suggestion here is that if you play the game well, you will be rewarded and promoted, the same as those who worked hard, and has nothing to show for it.
In the end, there were those officers who refuse to go along and get along. These were officers who challenged the British at every turn. In Hong Kong, these were people who resist, rebel and stir up trouble for the British. These were the people who engage in confrontation (�d���) and make trouble �d�·�. In time, such officers would leave as protesters or be driven out as a result of disloyalty.
V: Conclusion
This chapter examines and assesses colonial policing in theoretical as well as empirical terms. In the process, it argues for a pluralistic and cultural analytical framework, taking into account the perspective, context and pur-pose of the assessor. Theoretically, it argues that Western legitimacy test for colonialism based on the process is not compatible with the Chinese basis of acceptance of rule based on performance. Empirically, the chapter offers up, for the first time, Chinese officers�� opinions towards colonial HKP in the form of essays in HKPM, with allegorical meaning. The result is a revealing bared-for-all account of how it was like to work for the British in the 1950s, with different officers adopting different coping strategies to accommodate the alien rule, all with a Chinese cultural orientation.
This preliminary and exploratory study points to the need for further study of how Chinese officers engaged British colonial policing, and how Chinese culture impacted on HKP and policing in Hong Kong. Further research direction or issues include:
What kind of Chinese people joined the HKP? Why did they join?
How did demographics and the background of Chinese police officers affect their performance as a colonial official?
What kinds of identity and image, strategy and tactics, method and style, did Chinese officers adopt in doing colonial policing? How did they compare with the British or Indians?
How did Chinese culture impact upon HKP, organisationally and opera-tionally? How was policing colonial Hong Kong similar to or different with policing other colonies?
Ultimately, in what way can it be said that there was a specific kind of policing called: policing with Hong Kong characteristics? As intimated by another author, speaking about researching into police in Hong Kong99:
But, again, projects may need to be tailor-made for Hong Kong��s very different conditions, e.g., police officers within the same force who cannot commu-nicate in each other��s languages let alone the languages of the civilians they encounter, very limited involvement of legal advisors during police interroga-tions, local attitudes towards official use of force, local attitudes towards the benefits of obtaining confessions, and the colonial and paramilitary history of the police force.100
To answer this most important question, it becomes necessary to the pur-suit of a new line of inquiry, that is, ��Policing with Hong Kong Characteristics��?
Endnotes
1. M. Brogden, The emergence of the police: The colonial dimension, British Journal of Criminology, 27.1: 4�V14, 1987.
2. Y. Y. Chu (ed.), Foreign Communities in Hong Kong, 1840s�V1950s (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005). (��The close and frequent contact with Chinese has significant impact as they went through the process of adaptation and adjust-ment. And just as the various members of the disparate British community had different opinions on various issues, so they came to create and embrace quite diverse images of the Chinese and other foreign communities��.) (p. 40).
3. Chapter 1: Comparing colonial sites, In: P. Levine, Prostitution, Race and Politics: Policing Venereal Disease in the British Empire (New York: Routledge, 11 Jan., 2013).
4. P. A. J. Waddington, Towards paramilitarism? Dilemmas in policing civil disor-der, British Journal of Criminology, 25 (1): 37�V47, 37, 1987.
5. Chapter 9: Armed and unarmed police, In: R. I. Mawby (ed.), Policing across the World: Issues for the Twenty-First Century (Psychology Press, 1 February 1999), pp. 151�V165. Mao has considered counterrevolutionaries as a class enemy, thus deserving harsh treatment, with no recourse. 4. The correct han-dling of contradictions among the people Mao Tse Tung, Quotations from Mao Tse Tung. http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/works/red-book/ch04.htm
6. A. Jiao, The Police in Hong Kong (Latham, MD: University Press of America, 2007).
7. In 2004, Raymond W. K. Lau, Community policing in Hong Kong: Transplanting a questionable model, Criminal Justice, 4(1): 61�V80, 2004, in which he argued that CP failed in Hong Kong for a number of reasons, from a lack of cohesive community (new immigrants without roots, mainlanders in conflict with locals and the rich and poor divide) to institutionalisation of para-militarism in HKP to threats of instability pre- and post-1997. This has led Lau to the conclusion, intimated in the title, that imported (Western) community-policing model is questionable when applied to Hong Kong.
8. K. C. Wong, One Country, Two Systems: Cross-Border Crime between Hong Kong and China (New Brunswick, NJ; London: Transaction Publishers, 2012).
9. K. C. Wong, The Impact of USA Patriot Act on American Society: An Evidence Based Assessment (Nova, 2007).
10. K. Marx, A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, 1859. https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1848/communist-manifesto/ch01.htm or in the common ruin of the contending classes.
11. J. Tansey and T. O��riordan, Cultural theory and risk: A review, Health, Risk and Society, 1 (1): 71�V92, 1999.
12. S. Rayner, Risk perception, technology acceptance, and institutional culture: Case studies of some new definitions, In: B. Ruck (ed.), Risk Is a Construct (Munich: Knesebeck, 1993), 93.
13. J. Tansey and T. O��riordan, Cultural theory and risk: A review, Health, Risk and Society, 1 (1): 71�V92, 1999, p. 72.
14. K. C. Wong, State Police Power as a Social Resource Theory, 2000. Citizens below as distinguished from the police above do not look at crime as legal violation, but as a problem, personally.
15. Bradford, Ben, Jackson, Jonathan and Hough Mike, Police legitimacy in action: Lessons for theory and practice (21 March 2013). (Forthcoming, 2013). B. Bradford, J. Jackson and M. Hough, Police legitimacy in action: Lessons from theory and practice, In: M. Reisig and R. Kane (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Police and Policing. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Available at SSRN. http://ssrn.com/abstract=2236691
16. J. Vagg, The legitimation of policing in Hong Kong: A non-democratic per-spective, In: O. Marenin (ed.), Policing Change, Changing Police: International Perspectives (London: Taylor & Francis, 1996), p. 107.
17. ��In 1947 a former commissioner of the prewar Hong Kong Police responded to the crisis in local policing by composing the Pennefather-Evans Report, an anal-ysis and recommendations for problems with the HKP. The chief weakness the report identifies was the failure of the Hong Kong Police to inspire identification among the public it governed (294). Among the strategies for police reform, the report advised an increase in local hires, an expansion in operational duties, and an enhancement of professional training��. A. Burton (ed.), After the Imperial Turn: Thinking with and through the Nation (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2003), p. 293.
18. H. L. A. Hart, Concept of Law (London: Oxford University Press, 25 October 2012).
19. D. Beetham, The Legitimation of Power (Basingstoke, Hants: Macmillan, 1991) (Political legitimacy is realised through following established rules, providing justifiability of the law and consent of the people.)
20. ��The requirements of performance legitimacy commonly agreed upon by schol-ars, with varied emphases notwithstanding, include maintaining stability and economic progress, government efficiency, an incorrupt government, the rule of law, provision of basic social services, and protection of civil liberties��. W.-man Lam, Revisiting political legitimacy in Hong Kong, Paper Presented at the 61st Political Studies Association Annual Conference (Transforming politics: New Synergies). Department of Politics & Public Administration, The University of Hong Kong (Email: [email protected]), p. 7.
21. I. Scott, Political Change and the Crisis of Legitimacy in Hong Kong (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1989).
22. T.-Wing Ngo, Hong Kong��s History: State and Society under Colonial Rule (New York: Routledge, 2002).
23. A. Cheung, Governance in Hong Kong: In search of identity, legitimacy and trust. This paper was first presented in a lecture of the Chair Professors Public Lecture Series of The Hong Kong Institute of Education on 23 October 2009.
24. J. Vagg, The Legitimation of Policing in Hong Kong: A Non-Democratic Perspective, p. 107, O. Marenin (ed.), Policing Change, Changing Police: International Perspectives (New York: Taylor & Francis, 1996), p. 119.
25. K. C. Wong, Policing in Hong Kong (Farnham, Surrey, UK: Ashgage, 2011), Chapter 5.
26. L. A. Ballard. The Dao of privacy, Express, 2011. Available at: http://works.bepress.com/lara_ballard/1
27. B. Cole, Post-colonial systems, In: R. I. Mawby, (ed.), Policing across the World. (London: UCL Press, 1999), pp. 88�V108, 89 citing Killingray, 1991, p. 123.
28. R. Ashcraft, John Locke: Critical Assessment (London: Routledge, 1991), p. 524. (��The argument of the [Second] Treatise is that the government is not legitimate unless it is carried on with the consent of the governed��.)
29. C. Biddle, Individualism vs. collectivism: Our future, our choice, Terms of Service, 7(1): 2012. http://www.theobjectivestandard.com/issues/2012-spring/individualism-collectivism/
30. Legitimacy is the basis of government authority. (��Legitimitatsglaube��) is: ��the basis of every system of authority, and correspondingly of every kind of willing-ness to obey, is a belief, a belief by virtue of which persons exercising author-ity are lent prestige�� M. Weber, In: T. Parsons (ed.), The Theory of Social and Economic Organization (New York: Free Press, 1964), p. 382. R. Bendix, Max Weber: An Intellectual Portrait (CA: University of California Press, 1977), pp. 294�V297. (According to Weber, there are three kinds of legitimate authorities, being legal, traditional and charismatic.)
31. G. LaFree and N. A. Morris, Does legitimacy matter? Attitudes toward anti-American violence in Egypt, Morocco, and Indonesia, Crime and Delinquency, 58 (5): 689�V719, 2012.
32. I take Vagg to mean popular reasons.
33. See note 16, surpa.
34. ���D�w�g- Dao De Jing��. http://ctext.org/dao-de-jing
35. As a young traffic cop in Hong Kong (1970), I have been told many times that time is money. Violators just take the traffic ticket as a cost of doing business. They treat police enforcement just as one of their employee missing work or kids get-ting sick; happenings that need to be dealt with as a matter of course. When asked by HKU surveyor: ��Hong Kong is currently facing various problems. What kind of problems are you most concerned with? (per poll), a majority of HK people are more much concerned with ��livelihood problem�� then ��economic problems�� and last ��political problems��. Last survey return (16�V19 June 2014) it was 55.9 vs. 18.3 vs. 21.8%. Eight years ago (19�V21 June 2006) it was 53.1 vs. 41.7 vs. 3.7%, with the rest do not know. Hong Kong University, Public Opinion Poll. http://hkupop.hku.hk/chinese/popexpress/mostcon/mconq88/poll/datatables.html��
36. R. T. Golembiewski and K. W. Kuhnert, Barnard on authority and zone of indif-ference: Toward perspectives on the decline of managerialism, International Journal of Public Administration, 17 (6): 1195�V1238, 1994.
37. N. Kompridis, So we need something else for reason to mean, International Journal of Philosophical Studies 8 (3): 271�V295, 2009.
38. ��Live and let live�� have nothing to do with moral relativism, and everything to do with following the ��dao�� (way) or what matters to a person. By implication, there are many things in life and with the world all of us care about, but we have one life to lead and 24.h to spend. We are managing our time judiciously. In practice, this means hold fast and let go at the same time. R. A. Epstein, Live and let live, Wall Street Journal, 13 July 2004, http://online.wsj.com/articles/SB108967435840661816. (��The path to social peace lies in the willingness on all sides to follow a principle of live-and-let-live on deep moral dispute��.)
39. B. Gilley, The meaning and measure of state legitimacy: Results for 72 countries, European Journal of Political Research, 45 (3): 499�V525, 2006, 499.
40. T. Tyler and Y. Huo, Trust in the Law: Encouraging Public Cooperation with the Police and Courts (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2002), p. 16.
41. K. C. Wong, USA Patriot Act on American Society: An Evidence Based Assessment (Hauppauge, New York: Nova Science Publishing, 2007), Chapter 1.
42. The rich get richer, and the poor get a prison.
43. HKU: ��Trend of core social indicators (1-6/1997 to 1-6/2014)�� shows that degree of democracy (D) bears no relationship to compliance with the rule of law (F), degree of freedom (F), degree of prosperity (P) and degree of stability (S). For example, in 1-6/97: D is 6.76, L is 7.25, S is 7.45, F is 7.75 and P is 8.1. In 1-6/07: D is 6.1, L and P are 6.8, S is 7.3 and F is 7.6. In 1-6/14: D is 6.35. S is 6.85, L is 6.9, P is 7 and F is 7.35.
44. This fictitious account of the HKP officer is driven by the research method in this book, that is, listening to the voices of HKP officers at ground zero (rank) and at frontline (duties).
45. This does not mean that there is no reason, or in the ultimate analysis, it is unreasonable for preferring end goods over process goods.
46. This means that it is a matter of reaction, as a matter of disposition and out of habits; commonly called the survival instinct.
47. Remarks by the president on the Middle East and North Africa. White House, Press Release, 18 May 2011. http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/05/19/remarks-president-middle-east-and-north-africa
48. Mengzhi made clear that people must be well fed before they can enjoy other things in life.
49. See generally D. Needham, The Economics and Politics of Regulation (Boston: Little Brown, 1983), Chapters 3 and 4.
50. The same observation applies to China. Tony Saich at Harvard��s Kennedy School of Government finds that between 80% and 95% of Chinese people were either relatively or extremely satisfied with the central government.
51. A. A. An-Na��im, Problems of universal cultural legitimacy for human rights, In: A. A. An-Na��im and F. Deng (eds.), Human Rights in Africa: Cross-Cultural Perspectives. (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1990).
52. Professor D. Bell, Political Legitimacy in China: A Confucian Perspective The Inaugural Confucius Lecture, co-presented with the Confucius Institute at the University of Sydney (5 October 2011).
53. Mandate from heaven was first used in Zhou Dynasty to overthrow Shang Dynasty.
54. A. Jiao, Police in Hong Kong: A Contemporary View (Latham, NJ: University Press of America, 2007).
55. I. Ward and S. Geng, The Hong Kong Marine Police 1841�V1950 (Hong Kong University Press, 1991); S. E. Hamilton, Watching over Hong Kong: Private Policing 1841�V1941 (Hong Kong University, 2008).
56. Such as opinion survey.
57. Such as oral history.
58. HKP Chinese Inspector (1940�V1960) (������y����(�@�E�|���X�����~�N)). http://www.police.gov.hk/offbeat/851/chi/h14.htm
59. Hong Kong Police Magazine�XChinese Edition, 11 (4): 5, Winter, 1966.
60. Ibid., p. 24.
61. Ibid., p. 16.
62. Ibid., p. 10.
63. Hong Kong Police Magazine�XChinese Edition, 11 (4): Winter, 1966.
64. The ��insider��s view�� of HKP is a fast-growing literary gem in Hong Kong, post-1997. See Devil besieged police station�XExperience with HKP for 10 years. (�r���t�] ~ ����ĵ��Q�~�g��). http://cforum.cari.com.my/forum.php?mod.=.viewthread&tid.=.2650053 W. Wadsworth, Book: In the Shadow of the Noonday Gun, South China Morning Post, 23 December 2012. (��His anthology��s finest yarn, Inside Job, about an attempt to apprehend a cat burglar at the force��s living quarters, hints at life in a colonial-era ��chummery��. But nostalgia buffs might feel that the author could have opened up more on the day-to-day aspects of colonial police life via conversations over beer and curries at The Hermitage, the banter after rugby training at Boundary Street, and hushed asides on careers and cases on the bowling green. Policemen are people too��.); ��Grandfather class retirees of retiree association discussed police history��. �����ѯŰh�з|�|����ĵ����v��. http://www.police.gov.hk/offbeat/826/chi/h14.htm
65. �e Sir on Duty�X�X �mĵ�����x�n 17 April 2013.
66. Ibid.
67. Hong Kong Police Magazine�XChinese Edition, 11 (4): 18, Winter, 1966.
68. K. C. Wong, A comparative study of laws of assembly in China: Historical con-tinuity or political departure? Asian-Pacific Law and Policy Journal, 7 (1): 184�V241, 182�V199, 2006.
69. M. Goldman, China��s Intellectuals: Advise and Dissent. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1981).
70. Ibid.
71. ����|�i������.�i (Zh.�� s.ng ma huai) is one of the 36 Startagems (�T�Q��.) @26. http://www.cob.sjsu.edu/jiang_w/winter2012/ClassMaterials/36stratagems.pdf.
72. Ibid., p. 7.
73. Hong Kong Police Magazine�XChinese Edition, 10 (4): 6, Winter, 1996.
74. Hong Kong Police Magazine�XChinese Edition, 11 (2): 11, Summer, 1967.
75. �v�x���v�� Hong Kong Police Magazine�XChinese Edition, 11 (4): 6, Winter, 1967.
76. K. Mading, Research on family values and culture change in Hong Kong��s mod-ern Chinese novels, Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society Hong Kong Branch, 8: 156, 1968. (The author, Dr Mading who is a vice-consul in the German Consulate General in Hong Kong, observed in his doctoral research that HK people, par-ticularly lower class and juveniles, reject British rule of law.)
77. �s���߸̻P�k�� Hong Kong Police Magazine�XChinese Edition, 11 (4): 8, Winter, 1967.
78. Chinese authors sometimes use ��pen name�� to make a statement about self and/or others. J. Sterling and S. Jiang, Prolific Nobel winner��s pen name? Not talk-ing, Cable News Network, 11 October 2012. http://www.cnn.com/2012/10/11/world/sweden-nobel-prize-literature/ (��Mo told local media in 2003 that his pen name is a word play on his original middle name, but also a reminder to himself that he should talk less and write more��.)
79. The name, read in context of the time, might suggest that he/she is fast with ideas/action but is staying behind, by choice (humility in Chinese culture) or due to force (British policy of restricting Chinese or PC or both as a colonial policy).
80.�m�ޤl.���k�n (Guanzi. Deploying law): �g�ڤW�U..��.�k, ��..�j�v�C (If everyone from high to low officials, respectful and base people, obeys the law, then we have perfect governance). http://tieba.baidu.com/p/1659540104
81. �m�s�l.��.�]�W�^�n�{�������H.�F, �{�k����H�ۦ� Menzhi: Li Lou: ��Benevolence itself is not sufficient for administration, having law is not self executing��. http://www.confucius2000.com/confucian/tfabnyzxzdjjhy.htm
82. The author did not cite any source. But what the author��s suggestions recall is the classical criminological stance as to the purpose and effect of punishment. See T. Draper, An introduction to Jeremy Bentham��s theory of punishment, Journal of Bentham Studies, 5: 1�V17, 2002.
83. Post, Robert, Law and cultural conflict. UC Berkeley, Public Law Research Paper No. 120. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract.=.396860 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.396860
84. J. Da, On several problems in legal transplantation, Journal of Politics and Law, 2(3): 107�V109 (September, 2009). (Internally, China has experienced with mul-tiple transplantation of law, e.g., from Tang and Qing dynasties. Law must reflect history and culture. Transplanted law must be customised and localised before it is accepted and operative.)
85. L. Benton, Law and Colonial Cultures: Legal Regimes in World History (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp. 7�V12.
86. Online dictionary. http://cy.5156edu.com/html4/11089.html
87. Hong Kong Police Magazine�XChinese Edition, 10 (4): 6, Winter, 1966, second to last paragraph.
88. http://baike.baidu.com/view/262636.htm
89. Mengzi said: I desire to live, I also desire being righteousness. If I cannot have both, I will sacrifice life for righteousness. http://baike.baidu.com/view/27507.htm?fromId.=.658767
90. Hong Kong Police Magazine�XChinese Edition, 10 (4): 6, Winter, 1966.
91. Ibid. Last two paragraphs.
92. That the HKP was filled with talented people at the lowest ranks might be sur-prising to some who assumed that lower rank necessarily means low education achievement, or laziness of mind. This was certainly not the case in the 1950s and 1960s. During the time, many refugees came from the mainland because of the civil war in China (1945), establishment of PRC (1949), cultural revolution (1966) and famine. These new immigrants were of a different kind, some with very good educational background, professional achievements and personal experience. Many of them were rich and from the middle class.
93. In this regard, Sherman��s evidence-based policing, dismissive of police practical experience and implicit knowledge is ill advised.
94. ���j�_�� Hong Kong Police Magazine�XChinese Edition, 11 (2): 13, Summer, 1967.
95. Ibid. First stanza, last four lines.
96. Ibid. Last stanza.
97. M. C. Davis (ed.), Human Rights and Chinese Values (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1995).
98. R. K. Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure (New York: The Free Press, 1968).
99. Book review by Janice Barbyn: Introduction to the Hong Kong Criminal Justice System, In: M. S. Gaylord and H. Traver (eds.) (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1994. xvi.+.200pp., paperback, HK110).
100. Ibid.
Figure 3.1.Percentage of citizens relatively satisfied or extremely satisfied with government. (Professor Saich Surveys: 2003�V2009. Tony Saich is the professor and director of the Ash Center for Democratic Governance and Innovation at the Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University. This article also appeared in the most recent edition of East Asia Forum Quarterly, ��Governing China��.43)
Table 3.1.Some General Differences between Chinese and Western (American) Cultures99
Chinese
Americans
Conception of the self
Collectivist: Higher value placed on group cooperation and individual modesty.
Individualist: Higher value placed on self-reliance. Self-promotion is more accepted. High value placed on ��freedom�� from externally imposed constraints.
Social relationships
Formal, hierarchical: People are most comfortable in the presence of a hierarchy in which they know their position and the customs/rules for behaviour in the situation.
Informal, egalitarian: People are most comfortable with their social equals; importance of social rankings is minimised.
Friendship
Small number of close, lifelong friends who feel deeply obligated to give each other whatever help might seem required.
Large collection of ��friends�� and acquaintances which changes over time and involves only limited mutual obligations.
Obligation
Relationships with other people involve reciprocal obligations.
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