labour-relations-and-labour-conditions-in-hong-kong — Page 3

In the Japanese firm, employment security was cited by close to two-thirds of the respondents as one of the three items most satisfied with This figure compares with about one-fourth in the American firm. The second most frequently cited item in the Japanese firm was pay, chosen by 40 per cent of the sample versus about one-third of the American sample. In the case of the American firm, 84 per cent of the respondents chose hours of work as one of the three items most satisfied with, compared with only 36 per cent in the Japanese firm. The second most frequently chosen item in the American firm was co-workers, selected by 40 per cent of the respondents compared with 28 per cent in the Japanese firm. 16
This study, furthermore, suggests that the upward mobility available to local employees within this type of multinational enterprise may be relatively limited. A majority of the respondents employed in both the American and Japanese firms viewed chances of promotion as one of the items with which they were least satisfied. However, there was an unequivocal commitment expressed to the Japanese firm by their employees who "were more likely to prefer present employment to previous jobs, considered it rather difficult to find a comparable job in the local labour market, and intended to stay longer with their firm than workers in the American firm". 17
III. THE IMPACT OF MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES
There are two main effects of multinational enterprises on industrial relations in Hong Kong. The first relates to the pattern-setting influence of these enterprises, especially in high-technology industries, in terms of transfer not only of hardware applications but also of "scientific" methods of management. The second concerns the role of these foreign investments in the creation of local employment opportunities; expatriate capital is responsible, for instance, for about 10 per cent of industrial employment.
Notwithstanding this positive "overspill" effect of expatriate business, and despite the development strategies adopted by neighbouring countries and areas such as Singapore, the Republic of Korea and Taiwan, China, in attracting foreign investments and expanding an export industrial sector based on multinational enterprises,18 the Hong Kong Government has hitherto adhered to a laissez-faire approach towards industrial development. It has limited its role in this respect essentially to the provision of infrastructural support and of some minimal regulative institutions. Nevertheless, signs of modification in this traditional stance have recently emerged, as exemplified by the 1979 Advisory Committee on Diversification which canvassed the possibility of policy changes vis-a-vis foreign investment:
In order that industrial investment promotion may be better organised, we recommend that the IIPCC (Industrial Investment Promotion Co-ordinating Committee) should be wound up, and that responsibility for advising on overall promotional strategy be vested in the Trade and Industry Advisory Board (TIAB). We also recommend that the TICD (Trade Industry Commerce Department) should be given central responsibility for developing overall promotional strategy and for co-ordinating such activities.19
However, the fundamentals of a non-interventionist policy in dealing with foreign investment were upheld:
�E�E�E the twin principles of non-discrimination between local and overseas companies and of the non-availability of fiscal advantages should continue to be observed: individual companies must continue to
decide, on the basis of entrepreneurial considerations and having regard to labour, health, safety and environmental protection requirements, which locations and industries offer the best return for their investment.20
The importance of multinational enterprises in job creation should be qualified by the point made earlier regarding the restricted opportunities for promotion to senior positions perceived by their local employees. There is a dearth of empirical information on the extent to which managerial appointments in these multinational enterprises are filled by indigenous staff. On the basis of impressionistic generalisations, the predominant recruitment pattern appears to be that of senior executives from the multinationals home countries, especially where
1
they are of Japanese origin.21
This raises the broader issue of indigenisation in the context of the Government1 s manpower and employment policies. At present, there is no legislative prescription for multinational or other enterprises to employ local recruits at a stipulated ratio of its workforce, in spite of the existence of administrative controls to regulate the admission of foreign workers into the territory.
The authority to grant foreigners permission to stay
and work in Hong Kong rests with the Immigration
Department, which acts upon the advice of the Labour
Department based upon the current state of the labour

market, and normally requires the attestation of the recruiting employer. Apart from general considerations of relative local scarcity of the specific type of labour, the possibility of any transfer of technical know-how from the imported labour is a test criterion commonly employed. The foreign workers currently admitted into Hong Kong tend to be at either end of the occupational hierarchy -either unskilled workers, because of the current high level of employment that leaves openings for, say, domestic servants from the Philippines or construction labour from Thailand, or professional or managerial staff recruited to occupy posts which require a special level of training and expertise which Hong Kong is not yet sufficiently advanced to supply fully (e.g. technologists, managers or journalists from the developed countries). Intake of the latter category is expected to contribute, in the long run, to technology transfer to Hong Kong, in addition to the effect of its frequent association with foreign investment.
IV. OTHER INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS ISSUES
IV.l Immigration and employment
IV.l.l The problem
Localisation of the labour and employment markets is not only affected by the personnel policies of multinational enterprises but also by the impact of population movements. A major problem besetting the Hong Kong economy towards the turn of the 1980s was generated by the massive influx of immigrants at that time. The stampede, first caused by tides of refugees from Viet Nam and followed by heavier waves of illegal immigrants from China, not only dampened the local job market but also placed a strain upon the State's provision of housing, education, medical care and other "social wage" resources to the community.
Hong Kong's role vis-a-vis the Vietnamese refugees has been to provide them with a place of first asylum rather than to assimilate them as a host country of permanent settlement, although at the height of the Vietnamese exodus (1979 was, for instance, labelled as the "Year of the boat people" by the Government) refugee camps in Hong Kong accommodated a total of more than 66,000 people from Indo-China. Under the sponsorship of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), most of these camps were initially operated on an "open" basis whereby the inmates were allowed a wide latitude of daytime freedom. The refugee card issued for identification at one time served as a de facto temporary work permit; and the admission of these refugees into the labour market was viewed as a timely relief to the shortage of semi-skilled and unskilled labour that plagued the Hong Kong economy in the late 1970s. Nevertheless, towards the turn of the decade, this refugee phenomenon had been increasingly resented by the local host community for diluting employment opportunities and standards and causing sporadic agitational unrest. In 1982, the refugee camps for new arrivals from Viet Nam became converted into "closed" institutions, primarily to act as a disincentive to other Vietnamese who wished to make Hong Kong their place of asylum in fleeing their country. The inmates in the closed centres were not allowed to seek outside employment, their visits were regulated and they were subject to the centre's governing rules. During 1984, 3,694 such refugees were settled
overseas, while an additional 2,230 had arrived and 553 had been born in Hong Kong.
Converging with the inflow of Vietnamese refugees was the pressure of inunigrant movements from China around the turn of the 1980s. The bulk of the Chinese inunigrants who arrived during this period were illegal entrants without proper official documentation, attracted by Hong Kong's materialistic affluence and encouraged by China's liberalisation of domestic political control, as well as the tolerant "touch-base" policy hitherto adopted by the Hong Kong Government on illegal Chinese inunigrants. Illegal inunigration from the mainland reached an alarming level by mid-1980; during August and September, an estimated 23,000 illegal inunigrants arrived at Hong Kong each month. The magnitude of the influx eventually forced the Hong Kong Government to rescind its "touch-base" policy, whereby illegal Chinese inunigrants who succeeded in evading arrest at the border and in the countryside and who subsequently secured acconunodation in urban areas had previously been allowed a de facto right to stay on in the territory. Accordingly, from October 1980 onwards, illegal inunigrants lost their former privilege of administrative clemency after reaching the "base". They were now equally liable to arrest and subsequent repatriation as those caught before reaching Hong Kong. In order to facilitate detection, the Inunigration Ordinance was amended making it mandatory for all adult residents of Hong Kong to carry their identity cards or equivalent documents, and to produce them for inspection upon demand by police, inunigration or other authorised officials. Failure to produce proof of identity in this connection might result in arrest and become a punishable offence, and an inunigrant thus apprehended would be liable to an expulsion order should his identity remain unauthenticated.
An inunediate ramification of tightened controls on (illegal) inunigration from China and other places was the introduction to the legislative framework of the notion of a "lawfully employable" person, which linked the right of residence with the right of employment. By virtue of a 1980 amendment to the Inunigration Ordinance, all forms of employment were to be limited to those who were "lawfully employable". Such a person was defined at law according to the criterion of whether or not he was in possession of either of the following identity documents:
(i)
an identity card, as issued by the Registration of Persons Office under the Registration of Persons Ordinance;

(ii)
a valid travel document for instance, an official passport;


(iii) a police warrant card;
(iv)
a Vietnamese refugee card;

(v)
a certificate of exemption under the Registration of Persons Ordinance to cover blindness, infirmity or old age.


It thus became an offence, since the effective day of enactment (28 October 1980), for the employer to recruit any new employee without inspecting the above credentials to ascertain that the latter was "lawfully employable". Equally, it also became illegal for the employer to retain a serving employee, should he not be "lawfully employable", after 3 November 1980. An employer convicted of employing a person who was not "lawfully employable" became li<:J.ble to penal sanctions, with a maximum penalty of HK$50,000 fine and one year's imprisonment. In conjunction with this, the employer was also given the statutory duty of maintaining an up-to-date record of each employee in the workplace, including (i) the employee's full name as entered in his identity card or any other attested document defining him as "lawfully employable", and (ii) the type and number of the document in question. Inspections might be carried out at the workplace at any time by an immigration officer, immigration assistant, police officer, senior labour inspector or labour inspector in order to check the employee records maintained by the employer, as well as to ascertain the employees' "employability".
These enhanced official controls, given their unprecedented stringency, served to stem the tide of migration, with net immigration brought down from the respective heights of 180,000 and 100,000 in 1979 and 1980 to a low level of 33,000 in 1981. At the end of 1981, the population growth rate for that year had stabilised at 1.7 per cent, attributable chiefly to natural growth, as compared with the migration-inflated growth rates of 2.6 per cent in 1980 and 6.1 per cent in 1979. The pressure had further subsided towards the middle of the decade. During 1984, an average of 26 illegal immigrants a day were
arrested at the border, compared to the rate of illegal immigration at 450 a day in 1980. However, there has been a regulated inflow of legal immigrants from China who are permitted settlement in Hong Kong. The figure for 1984, for instance, numbers 27,700 legal immigrants. At the same time, these new immigrants have also made a considerable impact on labour force characteristics and the job market. These effects are briefly discussed below.
IV.l.2 Socio-economic implications of massive immigration
According to the Commissioner of Census and Statistics, the age and sex composition of the recent large-scale immigration into Hong Kong was chiefly responsible for the visible drop in the average age of the population and the increase in the proportion of males to females. Thus, among the recent illegal immigrants, there were 3,164 males to every 1,000 females and 90 per cent of these males were aged between 15 and 34. By contrast, the sex ratio of the overall population in 1981 was 1,094 males per 1,000 females, as compared to the level of 1,048 for the period 1976-81, which had been relatively free from massive immigration.
These immigrants affected the local employment market by augmenting the economy's unemployed "reserve labour pool" and raising labour force participation rates (table VIII.9).
Official data also demonstrated that this immigrant group surpassed the local population in terms of labour force participation rates at all ages. Thus, 65 per cent of female immigrants were gainfully employed, compared with
44.4 per cent in the local female population. At the same time, the immigrant segment of the labour force showed a higher activity rate of men aged 20 to 34 (98 per cent) than that of the non-immigrant local population (95 per cent). Such disparities were probably explicable in terms of the greater readiness of immigrants to enter the labour market at lower levels and at younger ages. It follows that as many as 73.9 per cent of the immigrants entered industrial occupations against 48.4 per cent of the local population in similar employment. In aggregate terms, immigration from China during the five-year period 1976-81 -thanks to its youthful and male biases -contributed to an increment of 290,000 persons in the working population, a figure which accounted for 48 per cent of the total increase in the labour force during this period. Reflecting
Table VIII.9 Labour force charcteristics, 1979-85
Labour force Unemployed Labour force Unemploy-(No. of (No. of partici-ment rate persons) persons) pation rate (%)
(%)
1979 2 141 000 61 100 62.0 2.9 1980 2 323 400 87 300 63.0 3.8 1981 2 489 500 96 400 66.3 3.9 1982 2 498 100 91 000 64.7 3.6 1983 2 540 500 113 900 64.5 4.5 1984 2 606 200 101 000 65.5 3.9 1985 2 598 600 81 000 64.8 3.1
(Mar.) 1985 2 644 200 97 900 65.2 3.7 (Sep.)
Source: Census and Statistics Department, Hong Kong monthly digest of statistics, Nov. 1985, table 3.1, p. 4.
this flow of immigrants, the aggregate labour force grew at an average rate of 5.6 per cent each year from 1976 to 1981, outstripping that of the previous five-year period by 50 per cent.
Given the high propensity of immigrants seeking employment in the job market, these new arrivals were
seen to make an important contribution to the rise of unemployment and the curtailment of the sustained trend in
real wage increases since the mid-1970s. By a spiral
effect, these labour market shifts further induced a rise in the labour force participation rate, as explained by an analysis in the official review 1981 Economic background:
From past experience, fluctuations in the labour force participation rate tend to coincide with fluctuations in the unemployment rate in that they
usually move in the same direction. This is to be expected since at times when conditions in the labour market are such that the rate of increase in household incomes has fallen behind expectations, households probably find it necessary for additional members to work in order to maintain the rate of increase in
household incomes that they have become used to. To the extent that recent immigration caused the unemployment rate to rise and constrained the rates of increase of wages rates and hence of household incomes of a great number of families, part of the rapid growth rate of the labour force was induced by immigration.22
Although the immigrant movement of the late 1970s and early 1980s had largely abated by 1983, it has not merely impinged upon the macro-level job market but has also entailed important socio-political repercussions as regards the assimilation of immigrants into the host society. The population "explosion" has thrown out of balance the Government's social planning on the provision of various forms of public services, as well as creating incessant problems of assimilating these immigrants of different socio-economic backgrounds and expectations into the indigenous community. Strains on housing, medical care, education and welfare have become increasingly visible; and social tensions, although they have not yet resulted in any large-scale upheavals or unrest, are evident from the creeping rise in serious crime.
Both official publications and academic research have confirmed the suggestion that the bulk of this immigrant component of the labour force has been absorbed principally into the unskilled and semi-skilled types of industrial employment among manufacturing enterprises. At the beginning of the decade, for instance, the Hong Kong Government's Half-yearly economic report for the second half of 1980 presented such a sectoral pattern of the distribution of immigrants (table VIII.lO).
Such observations have been corroborated more recently by the employee survey conducted by Turner, Fosh and Ng in the summer of 1985 in the context of updating their earlier study, The last colony: But whose?. The overall employee sample incorporated a supplement of 250 respondents who were recent immigrants since 1976. It was reported by the researchers that -
recent immigrants have on the whole gone to less-skilled and lower-paid jobs. The proportion occupying skilled or higher positions is not much more than one-third that among established Hong Kong belongers, and only a fifth of them came into our higher earning bracket, against more than a third for
Table VIII.lO Percentage distribution of immigrant workers by economic sector, 1980
Economic sector Percentage of new (immigrant) workers
Manufacturing 53.5 Wholesale and retail trade, 14.8
restaurants and hotels Construction 12.7 Services 12.1 Transport, storage and communications 3.6 Finance, insurance, property and 2.2
business services Public utilities 0. 7 Agriculture, fishing, mining and 0.2
quarrying
Source: Hong Kong Government, Half-yearly economic report, second half of 1980.
workers of local origin What is especially notable is their much lower level of information about the functions of unions and the remarkably small proportion who have had any contact with or experience of the Territory's labour organisations.23
Considered to represent a kind of "submerged class" in the Hong Kong labour force, these new arrivals may remain quiescent "so long as the relatively modest ambitions for income which draw them across the boundaries with the mainland are satisfied".24 Nevertheless, their comparative expectations are likely to rise. Given the marginal status of immigrants in employment and Hong Kong's vulnerability to cyclical world trading conditions, their frustrated expectations may be expressed as an outburst of "disorganised protest" (like wildcat strikes) of a kind which is beyond the scope of the normal industrial relations procedures from which these new workers are virtually excluded. 25 The comparative character of the immigrant (since 1976) versus the non-immigrant components of the employee sample in the 1985 survey is briefly summarised in table VIII.ll.
Table VIII.ll Characteristics of immigrants
and non-immigrants, 1985
(percentages)
Characteristic Immigrants Non-immigrants
Proportion of operatives and 73 44 unskilled workers
Proportion with monthly income 20 35 exceeding HK$3,000
Knowledge of unions:
Proportion knowing what 46 57
unions do
Proportion with direct 8 38
experience of unions in
Hong Kong
IV.2 Trade union membership and decline
Another problematic development of Hong Kong industrial relations highlighted in earlier chapters is the almost sustained trend of decline in the size of the unionised labour force -in relative as well as in absolute terms. Although the period 1967-81 as a whole witnessed an unprecedented increase in both the number of unions and aggregate membership (when over 100 unions were registered and declared aggregate membership more than doubled), union density began to fall after climbing to a peak of 25.2 per cent in 1976. The rate, sliding back to 16.2 per cent in 1981 (vis-~-vis the 1968 level of 13.5 per cent), fell not only because of the faster expansion of the waged and salaried labour force. More significantly, the drop since 1978 also reflected the contraction of the union population itself. Reaching an apex of 404,325 in 1977, the aggregate size of declared membership declined thereafter, to 345,156�P in 1981. In 1982, the absolute decline in the trade union population was arrested, when the total rose slightly to 351,525. It continued to recover very sluggishly, reaching 357,764 by 1984. However, union density remains stagnant at around the level of 16 per cent.
A variety of factors have been advanced in explanation of such a retreat. Some contend that the decline was hardly surprising and by no means unique to Hong Kong, while pointing to the almost universal tendency of unions today to lose their popularity, notably in Western industrialised economies such as the United Kingdom and the United States, caught in the stagflation syndrome. Others observe that the membership decline has been exaggerated by changes in the technical procedure of computing the strength of employees'
unions. Specifically, it has been pointed out that:
Part of the sharp decline in aggregate declared
membership between 1980 and 1981 was due to the
reclassification in 1981 of the Hong Kong Graziers
Union, whose membership consists of persons in jobs
related to agriculture, from an employees' union to a
mixed organisatipn of employees and employers. The
declared membership of the Graziers Union in 1981 was
22,655.26
There are other factors of a more intrinsic character that have impinged upon labour's self-organisation in Hong Kong, especially among the traditional manual groups. The main brunt of membership losses has been borne by the left-wing Federation of Trade Unions (FTU) and, to a lesser extent, by their right-wing counterparts, led by the Hong Kong Trade Unions Council (TUC). Both the FTU and TUC are based chiefly on the blue-collar sector of the labour force. Conversely, the politically neutral groups of unions, organ1s1ng chiefly the civil service and other white-collar occupations, have advanced in both absolute and relative membership strength, despite the overall decline of union density.
The docility (by the criteria of Western trade unionism) of the politically polarised labour movement of the traditional manual groups led by the FTU and TUC has been widely documented, as reviewed in an earlier chapter. Their receding membership, it may be readily argued, testifies to their own organisational fragility and "the ambivalent attitude which workers mostly display towards them". 27 As Turner et al. contend, it is only on account of "their individual historic or1g1ns and the political situation of Hong Kong" that they have been "constrained to adopt the formal mode of trade unions, and to fulfil certain orthodox trade union functions". 28 As such, they are probably conceivable more as a "locally specific combination of friendly society and socio-political organisation" than as labour1 s institutionalised agent for "economic bargaining and political pressure" -functions that typify trade unionism in most capitalist industrial countries.29 Indeed, they often lack the organisation, leadership and power resources for these activities. Their limited capacity to meet the "needs and aspirations among the workers of Hong Kong", in the face of the latter1 s changing character (as they are constituted increasingly of the younger, the better educated, the more dynamic and those less constrained by the "refugee" mentality) helps to account for their declining membership.
Two other developments have further eroded the popular appeal of these "veteran" labour organisations, conceivably because they fulfil some of the roles of conventional trade unionism. These relate to the Government 1 s enhanced programme of legislative intervention apd the zealous attempts of labour pressure groups (mostly church-sponsored but non-union voluntary organisations) to represent the voice and interests of the workers. Recent official sponsorship of labour reforms has paradoxically increased workers 1 dependence upon the Government instead of encouraging self-reliance to achieve better conditions of employment. "Earlier distrust of trade unionism and preference for legislative protection over voluntarily negotiated arrangements are reinforced amongst the bulk of the collectively quiescent labour force, now that the administration appears more ready than before to play the role of their 1protection 30
1."
At the same time, the rise of those pressure groups concerned with the status of the working class but which operate outside the purview of the Trade Unions Ordinance has been viewed with apprehension by the traditional union sector for eroding their grass-roots base of support. Two church-sponsored organisations, the Protestant Hong Kong Christian Industrial Committee (CIC) and its Catholic counterpart, the Industrial Relations Institute (IRI), are the most vocal and effective. These non-union labour organisations started with wo~kers 1 education programmes in the early 1970s but have since diversified their activities. At present, their functions include labour education, intervention in labour disputes (where they assume in most cases an advisory role to the workers involved), informal sponsorship of newly created unions (such as the Hong Kong Social Workers Union and the Mass
1
Transit Railway Operating Department Staff Unions, all politically independent unions, having used the office of
the CIC as provisional headquarters), and acting as self-appointed spokesmen for labour's interests on public policy issues. With regard to the last role, the CIC in particular has campaigned vigorously for public action and legislation involving such labour issues as maternity pay, social insurance, job security, severance pay, protection against unfair dismissal, annual bonuses, work safety and employees' compensation. 31 To the extent that these labour-oriented pressure groups have been popularised as effective agents in canvassing these public policy issues, the incentive for workers to join or remain as members of trade unions may be impeded, especially since these voluntary bodies do not charge any union dues for rendering almost equivalent services.
The decline in the union population might have reflected another fundamental problem of trade unions in terms of their leadership, administration and organisation. An observer has noted in this connection that "The union leadership has remained more or less intact since the 1940s They need to take a look at their organisational structure. They lack the grass-roots -they are not well organised on the shop floor". 3 2 Given the vulnerable character of the unions' organisational structure, their membership base could be easily disrupted or curtailed, as when their members move house or change jobs, or when their employers relocate their enterprises, especially in the context of recent urban renewal.
Driven .by their anxiety to revitalise their image among the younger segment of the labour force, the FTU and the rue have made overt attempts to de-politicise their programmes of work. Both labour groups have been anxious to make explicit their ideological stance, that "in the future, politics will take a back seat to workers' interests. At the FTU, this may in part be due to Peking's pragmatic leaders who do not want the boat rocked in already jittery Hong Kong; at the TUC, it may be an acknowledgement of the local government's detachment from activity that China might see as undesirable". Under
33
this strategy of "pragmatising" the trade union agenda, unions now try to adapt their policies "to meet the needs and know the problems of the young workers". These include, inter alia, sponsoring recreational outings and evening seminars to increase contact with young workers, and campaigning as well as putting pressure on the Government to pass pro-labour legislation.
IV.3 Changing configuration of the labour movement?
Paradoxically, the dilution of the local trade union movement's vanguard image has not purged the unions of their political role. Instead, with the gradual transition from a "civil service" type of colonial administration to a popularly elected representative government for the territory, as outlined in Chapter II, the effective role of trade unions as the representative organisations and spokesman of labour is likely to be enhanced. Under the 1984 official White Paper, The future development of representative government in Hong Kong, trade unions are designated an electoral role in determining, together with other so-called "functional constituencies", the elected component of the law-making Legislative Council. In place of their (ormer character as "a locally specific combination of friendly society and socio-political organisation",35 they are developing their "ministerial" capacity, this time as the standard-bearer of labour participation in the domestic arena of electoral politics. To the crop of labour pressure groups increasingly integrated into the established system, the political method of "legal enactment" may eventually offer a more viable and pertinent approach than voluntary collective bargaining to securing the improvement of working conditions. Through its participation in the Labour Advisory Board (the principal consultative organ of the Government's labour legislation programme and employment policies), and its co-option on to the Legislative Council, organised labour is now granted recognition and participation in a new form of industrial tripartism. The successive tiers of the consultative Labour Advisory Board and the Legislative Council may offer representatives of workers, emplpyers and government a centralised forum for the )discussion and joint determination of official policies relating to wages, employment conditions, manpower and labour law.
As a sequel to the designation of "labour" as a functional constituency, the union movement hitherto known for its fragmentation, pluralistic organisation and ideological factionalism -is seemingly in search of a more integrated and consolidated framework. This is evident, for instance, in the merger movements in several industries where multiple unions have existed, as well as overt signs of alignment and realignment of union coalitions taking place in 1984. Specifically, three instances of federation of trade unions have occurred. The Federation of Civil
Service Unions was formed in July 1984 out of 25 unions of government employees. This was closely followed in September by the reconstitution of the Liaison Office of Public Service Unions into a union federation which. under the new name of the Joint Organisation of Unions, now extends its membership sphere to the private sector. The third federation-like league of trade unions, formed by the coalition of 13 affiliate and four associate unions from the private sector, was established in November under the name of the Federation of Hong Kong and Kowloon Labour Unions.
Apart from these so1idarity moves across trades and occupations in the private and public sectors, the formation of industry-wide organisations has also been spearheaded by the success in mid-1985 of the printing unions in achieving unison -by way of firstly federation and subsequently reconstitution into an ,amalgamated union. Analogous actions followed among unions in the textile industry and the restaurant and catering trade, where preparatory committees were established with the prospect of implementing mergers in their respective trades.
Such structural shifts were heralded by the Secretary for Education and Manpower of the Hong Kong Government as a sign of trade unionism's "increasing political sophistication".36 Describing the "recent combination of four separate trade unions and a trade union federation in the printing industry into a single trade union by amalgamation" as a "significant development", he registered an optimistic note in his address to the 1985 Conference on Trade Unions and Labour Organisations in Hong Kong:
This may be an indication, which the Government notes with interest, that the traditional pattern of union organisation in Hong Kong is undergoing change, and that unions are concluding that any loss of autonomy of an individual trade union in such rationalisations will be more than counterbalanced by the advantages of a strong and united voice in pursuing their aims.37
The industrial partnership between labour and capital at the institutional central level was manifest more or less for the first time during 1985 in the joint formulation by employers' and workers' representatives of the proposal for a long-service payment scheme. More importantly, such a development has induced the left-and right-wing sectors of the labour movement to co-operate, at least on an ad hoc basis, on specific issues of labour interests.
That the opposing factions within the labour movement are prepared to moderate their ideological polemics and to establish a limited degree of mutual co-operation is attested, furthermore, by the outcome of the first elections to the Legislative Council in September 1985. The two seats returned for the labour functional constituency were shared between these two camps, when one candidate each from the FTU and the TUC was elected uncontested.
However, the rapprochment has up until now been partial rather than global. This is in view of recent developments on the inception of a two-tier assembly appointed by China in the context of drafting the future Basic Law for Hong Kong when it becomes a Special Administrative Region under Chinese sovereignty by 1997. This assembly, made up of a dual structure comprising a Basic Law Drafting Committee and a Basic Law Consultative Committee, incorporates a significant element of labour representation. In spite of China's expressed interest in representing all sections of labour and society in the authorship of the Basic Law, the right-wing group of trade unions has stayed away from any participation in this Basic Law drafting/consultative machinery.
Outside the orthodox labour movement, solidarity links between the established trade unions and the non-union labour pressure groups headed by the C IC have also been problematic. Adopting a more radical stance than the former, the ere waged a vigorous campaign against the legislative proposal to introduce a long-service gratuity in 1985. It castigated the trade union representatives on the Labour Advisory Board for being incorporated into the establishment, and hence colluding with capital to produce a "compromise" scheme that would divert future chances of conceiving an officially sponsored central provident fund or social insurance programme. The growing visibility of the local labour movement was again demonstrated in a recent argument over the Committee's endeavour to sponsor its director in entering the Basic Law Drafting Committee. The attempt was aborted, reportedly due to the denial of support from the left-wing group of trade unions headed by the FTU.
IV.4 The ILO and Hong Kong
Another important issue for which public op~n~on in the labour sector has been canvassed is the future status of Hong Kong's participation in the ILO and, as a corollary, the application of international labour Conventions to this
territory upon its reversion to China by 1997. The restoration implies that, by then, Hong Kong will cease to participate in the ILO as a "non-metropolitan" territory under the United Kingdom but will probably continue its affiliation by virtue of its status as China's Special Administrative Region. It may be technically problematic for Hong Kong to retain its present inventory of international labour Conventions already applied and, even more importantly, to adopt new international labour standards, in view of the ILO constitutional requirement that the application of any Conventions to a "non-metropolitan" territory is dependent upon their already being ratified by the sovereign member State to which it belongs. Up to the present, China has registered 14 such ratifications, in contrast to the total of 77 Conventions ratified by the United Kingdom and 33 Conventions applied in full (as well as 19 applied with modifications) to Hong Kong.
Part of the answer to the issue of harmonisation between China and Hong Kong's respective positions with regard to their recognition of international labour Conventions may rest in the innovative formula of "one country, two systems" promulgated by China in order to preserve the capitalist system in Hong Kong for 50 years. This mode of accommodation was made explicit by the Sino-British Joint Declaration on the Future of Hong Kong in respect of its international relations:
The application to the Hong Kong Special Admini-strative Region of international agreements to which the People's Republic of China is not a party but which are implemented in Hong Kong may remain implemented in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. The Central People's Government shall, as necessary, authorise or assist the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government to make appropriate arrangements for the application to the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of other relevant international agreements. 38
Furthermore, the problem of seeking parity between China and Hong Kong may be circumvented if it can be argued that the subject-matter of the Convention is within the self-governing powers of the territory (i.e. Hong Kong). It can declare, via China's communication to the ILO, its acceptance of the obligations engendered by the Convention concerned. However, such an arrangement may be problematic if the ILO sees this "as a route to an 'exception'
procedure, by which a member State could ratify Conventions but only for particular areas of its choice. This could open the way, for instance, to countries which wished to show a good record of Convention-adoptions doing such things as ratifying those applying to agricultural employment but only for their big cities".3 9 According to Turner, the greatest difficulty in accommodating the application of international labour Conventions for Hong Kong in 1997 "may not be in [China's] attitude, where good will may be assumed, but in a difficulty of fitting an arrangement which is bound to be in some respects unusual into the structure, customs and procedures of the IL0".40
Notes
C.L. Hung, "Fpreign investments", in David Lethbridge (ed.), The business environment in Hong Kong, Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1980, p. 214. The situation of the 1970s is in contrast to that of the 1960s, when the number of industrial firms established with foreign capital was relatively small. Of the 395 foreign manufacturers with ascertainable dates of commencement, 277 (or 70.2 per cent) started business in 1970 or later. See also C.L. Hung, "Foreign investments", in David Lethbridge (ed.), The business environment in Hong Kong, Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 2nd edition, 1984, pp. 186-188.
2 Specifically, an analysis of industrial employment, production and exports in 1974 indicates the relative importance of the foreign capital sector as follows:
Total for Foreign Percentage Hong Kong manufacturing of total
establishments
No. of establishments
at 31 Dec. 1974 31 318 247 0.79
Industrial employment
at 31 Dec. 1974 600 218 58 823 9.80
1974 Exports
(in HK$ million) 22 911.34 2 498.80 10.91

See Hung, "Foreign investments", 1984, pp. 193, 197.
3
Hung, "Foreign investments", 1980, p. 215.
4
Hong Kong Government, Hong Kong 1985: A review of 1984, Hong Kong: Government Printer, 1985, p. 73.
5
Hung, "Foreign investments", 1984, p. 204.
H.A. Turner et al., The last colony: But whose?, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980, table 7.13, p. 80.
Hong Kong Institute of Personnel Management, 1985 IPM pay trend survey, Hong Kong, 1985, Ch. I I I, para. 6.1, p. 12.
Joe England and John Rear, Industrial relations and law in Hong Kong, Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1980, p. 92.
9 Turner et al., op. cit., p. 46.
10 England and Rear, op. cit., p. 93.
II ibid., P�P 93.
12 ibid., p. 191.
13 ibid., pp. 191-192. See also Turner et al., op. cit., p. 58.
14 Y. Nihei, M. Ohtsu and D.A. Levin, "A comparative study of management practices and workers in an American and a Japanese firm in Hong Kong", in David Levin and Ng Sek-hong (eds.), Contemporary issues in Hong Kong labour relations, Hong Kong: Centre of Asian Studies, University of Hong Kong, p. 148.
IS ibid.
16 ibid., pp. 25-26.

11 ibid., p. 33.
18 Thus, they have established specialised official agencies to encourage the promotion of overseas investment in domestic industries (e.g. the Economic Development Board in Singapore and the Bureau of Foreign Investment Promotion of the Economic Planning Board in South Korea).
19 The abrogation of the IIPCC was recommended in view of its failure to achieve co-ordination of the full range of functions involved in industrial investment promotion. Such a state of fragmentation is considered by the Committee to "generate confusion in the minds of, and cause inconvenience to, overseas companies which are genuinely interested in investing in Hong Kong". Hong Kong Government, Report of the Advisory Committee on Diversification 1979, Hong Kong: Government Printer, 1979, paras. 496-498, pp. 293-295.
20
ibid., paras. 497-498, pp. 294-295.
2 1 The exception, however, is the post of the personnel manager, for which a local incumbent is usually engaged -particularly in the manufacturing sector where the labour force consists predominantly of semi-skilled workers who are Cantonese and non-English speaking. It is also evident, nevertheless, that these personnel managers are entrusted with little decision-making power other than routine administrative functions. An obvious example is their (invariably) circumscribed capacity to negotiate on behalf of the company in the event of an industrial dispute with its workers. The impotency and the ineffectiveness of the personnel manager in these cases always contribute to the escalation of workers' protests and delay in the dispute resolution.
22 Hong Kong Government, 1981 Economic background, Government Printer, 1982, p. 38, para. 4.5.
23 See H.A. Turner, The prospect for trade unions in Hong Kong, concluding address to the Conference on Trade Unions and Labour Organisation in Hong Kong, 4-6 Sep. 1985, Hong Kong, University of Hong Kong, Centre of Asian Studies, pp. 12-13. Also Patricia Fosh, H.A. Turner and Ng Sek-hong, A preliminary report on the employee attitude survey, July/August 1985, an unpublished report to the Centre of Asian Studies, University of Hong Kong, Sep. 1985.
24 Turner, "The prospect for trade unions in Hong Kong", op. cit., p. 12.
25 ibid., p. 13.
2 6 David A. Levin and Ng Sek-hong (eds.), "Editor's introduction", in Contemporary issues in Hong Kong labour
relations, Hong Kong: Centre of Asian Studies, University of Hong Kong, forthcoming, note (48), p. 57.
27 H.A. Turner et al., The last colony: But whose?, op. cit., p. 145.
28
ibid.
29
ibid.
10 Ng
Sek-hong, "Industrial relations and voluntarism: The Hong Kong dilemma", in International Labour Review (Geneva, ILO), Vol. 121, No. 6, Nov.-Dec. 1982, p. 73.
3 1 Levin and Ng Sek-hong (eds.)., "Editors' introduction", op. cit., note (52), p. 58.
32 Ng Sek-hong, cited by John Bussey in the South China Morning Post, 31 Oct. 1982 (in an article entitled "HK' s labour pains: Unions in desperate struggle to stem membership slide").
3 3 South China Morning Post, 31 Oct. 1982, op. cit.
34 ibid.
3 s H.A. Turner et al., The last colony: But whose?, op. cit., p. 145.
36 N.J. Henderson (Secretary for Education and Manpower, Hong Kong Government), Opening address, delivered to the Conference on Trade Unions and Labour Organisations in Hong Kong, 4-6 Sep. 1985, Centre of Asian Studies, University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, para. 3, p. 2.
37 ibid.
38 A draft agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the People's Republic of China on the future of Hong Kong, Annex I: "Elaboration by the Government of the People's Republic of China of its basic policies regarding Hong Kong", s. XI, p. 22.
39 H.A. Turner, "'Hong Kong China', 1997: A general note on its relations with the UN International Labour Organisation, and particularly the future
application of ILO Conventions", in K.E. Thurley,
H.A. Turner and Ng Sek-hong, The International Labour
Organisation in Hong Kong: A background brief with notes of comments (Hong Kong, New City Cultural Service, 1986).
40 ibid.
APPENDIX A
WAGE NEGOTIATION IN HONG KONG
Given the relative absence of formal collective bargaining and the limited role of official intervention, the notion of "workplace permissiveness" has been ,used to describe the typical process of wage negotiation in Hong Kong. In essence, it envisages a situation under which wages are decided at the individual workplace, subject to little or no external constraints or regulations save the market forces of supply and demand.
Other rationales for this "non-bargaining" situation may be identifiable. Thus, some writers equate the wage-setting process to a managerial function, arguing that it is more efficient for management to set the initial wage rates for various jobs. These wage rates would then be adjusted in the light of subsequent experience to ensure that the workers obtain a "fair deal". This theory claims that wage determination by bargaining would be inefficient in that it would divert workers' attention from the production process and cause delay; moreover, the workers may always "protest" against an unfair wage reward by handing in their notice in a tight labour market. Contrary to the classic exposition of the Webbs, the absence of wage bargaining is not considered incompatible with the protection of workers' interests, thanks to the cushioning effects of the "free market".
Two variable dimensions may be introduced to help explain the twin phenomena of "non-bargaining" (where the employer regulates the wage price unilaterally) and "workplace permissiveness" (where wages and other norms of employment are to be left to vary with specific enterprises) in the Hong Kong situation delineated above. The first is the degree of employees' participation in wage fixing and the extent to which their involvement is
227
formalised. The second relates to the degree to which the process of wage formulation is decentralised, as defined by the relative level at which wage rates are regulated, i.e. the economy, the industry, the company or the plant. The following diagram presents these two dimensions:
HIGH (Industry-wide determination)
D 0 z c
H
(Employer cartel) (/) (Industry-wide collective
H
(.) bargaining, I'Ll
Cl e.g. United Kingdom)
I'Ll
(.)
4;
LOW._------------------~~~----------------~HIGH
(Non-bargain) EMPLOYEES'S ~ PARTICIPATION (Formalised
A z 8 f-<4; o::; (.) B collective bargaining)
(Non-bargain plus work-place permissiveness I'Ll E-< z H (Plant-wide collective bargaining,
e.g. Hong Kong) e.g. United States)
LOW

(Enterprise-specific determination)
It appears that, granted the features of "workplace permissiveness" and "non-bargaining", wage determination in Hong Kong may be represented by cell A. This entails a situation in which employees are little involved in wage determination, the conduct of which is fragmented and devolved to the level of the individual enterprises, with little integrative linkage between them.
Employee participation in wage formulation
In fact, it is an oversimplification to conceptualise the rather varied process of wage determination in Hong Kong under the global theme of "non-bargaining" and "workplace fragmentation". Other than formalised collective bargaining, there exists in practice a spectrum of wage negotiation activities that conceivably allows the workers a varying degree of participation in setting their wages. The following takes a cursory look at two major alternatives to non-bargaining and collective bargaining,
namely, informal wage haggling and consultation in the process of wage determination.
Informal wage negotiation in
three situations
Situation A
The first situation under which informal wage haggling occurs is found within the traditional craft occupations where it is well established "custom and practice" for the craftsmen to haggle with their employers over the terms of their employment. Typically, this arises over piece work or daily engagement on the casual (craft) labour market. The following case study of the carpentry occupation in the furniture-making industry illustrates how haggling over piece-work rates is carried out.
It was discovered that for piece-work employment in this trade, the calculation of the wage rate for an assigned piece of work was usually denominated in terms of the expected number of work shifts required to produce the piece in question. Two variables were involved simultaneously in the wage-setting process: the first was the wage rate per shift and the second the estimated number of shifts required to complete the work. As a rule, the determination of these two variables required negotiation between the employer and the worker. Bargaining over the first variable tended to revolve around such factors as the comparable wage rate per shift used in other firms
(i.e. the going rate or market rate), the skill standard of the craftsman concerned and the quality of the product desired. After both parties had agreed on the price for each shift of labour, the employer would then propose pay terms on the basis of his own estimate of the number of shifts required. In parallel, the craftsman also made his own estimates of the number of shifts needed to complete the job, deciding at the same time whether to accept the employer's offer or to negotiate for a higher estimate of the number of shifts required. The difference between the employer's and the worker's estimates would accordingly define the zone of their bargaining.
This mode of craft bargaining over piece work, in spite of its individualistic and job-specific nature, was found to be prescribed by certain unspecified norms or customs of the trade. These customary rules, in turn, helped institutionalise the negotiation procedures since
they were almost universally shared among both employers and craftsmen on an industry-wide basis. Several procedural norms or informal rules were identifiable in this connection.
The first was that bargaining should be carried out between the individual worker and the employer or his agent, usually the foreman. This was because of the unstandardised nature of furniture products, so that it was more expedient to set separate wage and time conditions relating to different workers and work assignments. A second norm was of a proscriptive nature, namely, that no work should be started until and unless the conditions for the job were agreed upon. Both craftsmen and employers therefore agreed that it would be adverse to their mutual interest if wage differences between the parties were allowed to persist without quick resolution. The employers were under pressure to meet the production deadlines as laid down by the buyers, whereas the piece-rated craftsmen wished to avoid loss of daily earnings due to delays in settling the terms. To accommodate the need for flexibility, formality was rarely imposed (by the employer) on the procedures for wage negotiation. Instead, most employers in the trade claimed that their workers were able to enjoy almost unrestricted freedom to approach them at any time on wage issues. Such purported permissiveness was hence suggestive of the employer1 s readiness to recognise the right of the worker as a negotiation partner.
Nevertheless, the freedom to discuss wages at any time was not without qualification. According to the third procedural norm of wage bargaining in the craft trades, the craftsman was not expected to try to alter a wage agreement with the firm, once the substantive terms had been decided upon prior to beginning a work assignment. In such a "small-batch" system of craft production, it was evident that the employers would be highly vulnerable should workers threaten to leave their jobs or projects before completion. None the less, such acts were generally disapproved of throughout the trade by craftsmen (and employers too) as unethical and improper, in violation of the basic craft obligation "to abide by one1 s own words". Indeed, the notion of (unspecified) "trust" appears to sununarise the essence of traditional craft morality and helps ensure the "fairness and equity" of wage labour transactions.
However, it is recognised that "trust" as such represents primarily a source of moral sanction; its
efficacy as a regulatory force largely depends upon the existence of a particularistic or closed craft labour market within which the members (employers as well as craftsmen) are linked to each other by interlocking webs of personal ties. Indeed, this "trust" element in the bargaining process of the furniture-makers was manifested in the fourth procedural norm, that of relying solely upon oral agreement for settling wage terms. Putting agreements on paper would be a sign of inadequate faith in mutual trust. Of course, unwritten agreements could have offered the additional advantage of allowing greater flexibility, especially for craftsmen who might have to move between plants or seek wage adjustments between jobs.
On the other hand, wage haggling on the daily rate of
hire could be recognised in pockets of "casual labour
markets" which operated on the periphery of stable
continuous employment in the industry. Small pools of

these temporary workers, compr1s1ng mostly craftsmen of lesser skill or ability (for instance, because of age) or those laid off from their shops, were available for casual hire by the day. They tended to congregate at specific locations -notably playgrounds or tea-houses -and waited for employers or their foremen to come by and offer jobs. It appears that this type of market served to help the employers to cover contingencies, as when under pressure to meet production deadlines or to cope with a sudden spurt in demand, or else it was patronised by subcontractors engaged in outdoor decorating contracts and operating with work crews of variable size. Where there was fluid flow of information between the buyers and sellers of labour, wage haggling in this casual labour market resembled quite closely the auctioning process, with the daily wage price floating in response to supply and demand. Nevertheless, it is suspected that mutual bidding did not go entirely unregulated. For instance, these "casual" craftsmen might organise themselves into small groups, led by an informal leader or subcontractor who represented other workmates in bargaining with any prospective employer for the service of the group.
Situation B
The second type of wage haggling may be found in such industries as garment-making, textiles, plastics and machine shops in connection with the engagement of mobile semi-skilled production workers. These workers are known to organise themselves into small floating units, moving
between industrial establishments where their services are required. Under this system, there is generally no regularised wage relationship between the members in the work gang and the user firm. Hiring instead takes the form of labour subcontracting whereby remuneration is paid on a straight piece-work basis, specific to the job at issue. These industrial work groups may be said to be more or less autonomous and self-managing; as such, they do not come under the managerial prerogative of the host company. Notwithstanding, it is customary for a measure of continuity to develop out of these transient "subcontract" relationships, since the crew can expect retention by the firm when business is brisk and, conversely, priority of recall if laid off in a lean period.
It appears that where the supply of semi-skilled production workers is tight, medium-siz~d and small plants are prone to adopt such a practice in order to adjust their manpower size to align with seasonal fluctuations in production. These casual work groups can be viewed as small collective bargaining units, normally covered by a contract negotiated and executed between their gang leader and the host firm. This leader, commonly known as pao tao, usually undertakes, on behalf of his group, to complete the specified task or a particular batch of products by a given delivery time at an agreed rate per piece or an overall price. Therefore, determination of these wage terms almost invariably involves some negotiation or renegotiation between the host company and the head of the crew prior to the inception of every job assignment.
Situation C
In addition to the two situations discussed above that pertain to non-union modes of bilateral wage negotiation, there is yet a third possible situation that involves haggling of a more discontinuous nature. This is the conflict-specific type of negotiation that is discussed in Chapter IV. In principle, such haggling can occur in almost every sector of the economy, although its incidence is more commonly found in manufacturing industries.
Wage consultation
A systematic procedure of representative consultation with employees or their unions over wage issues is identifiable on a limited scale among a number of major establishments in Hong Kong. For most public utility
corporations, the management would inform the trade union concerned of the company's proposed wage adjustments before the annual wage revision. The comments and counter-proposals of the union would be taken into consideration before the final decision on wage increases was announced to the employees throughout the company. A slightly variant form is practised by some of those few enterprises which have instituted joint consultative procedures based upon employee representation. In these cases, the consultative machinery may serve as a forum for negotiation with the employees' representatives on the issue of periodic wage reviews. A third alternative if for the union to present to firms in the same trade or industry a common wage demand based on a survey of workers' opinions. These demands may not be formally accepted by management, but they will give the firms some indications of the extent of the wage increases that the workers desire.
Conclusion
From the foregoing survey of negotiation practices, it is clear that wage determination in Hong Kong is far more complicated than that represented by the notion of "non-bargaining", or that of formalised "collective bargaining". In this connection, a typology of wage negotiation practices in Hong Kong may be constructed as follows:
Degree of institutionalised worker participation in wage-setting decisions
Unstructured/spontaneous Representative/organised
Individualised modes
~Collective modes~
( I \ I I I Non-Craft Sub-Con-Union Wage Collective bargain-haggling contract flictual wage joint bargaining ing 1abour bargaining represen-consulta-
haggling in dispute tation tion
Degree of institutionalised worker participation in wage-setting decisions
The degree of co-ordination between enterprises in the wage determination process also varies from situation to situation. At one end, collective bargaining may be based upon the enterprise itself (as in the case of the Cable and Wireless Ltd.). Conversely, wages may be negotiated on an industry-wide basis at the other end of the scale, typically so in the traditional craft trades. Even where individual companies in the industry are covered by separate agreements or consultative arrangements, a high degree of inter-plant integration may still exist in order to harmonise the negotiated standards. An example of the "bonus contract" may be found among the public utilities and in the cotton-spinning trade. By the same token, the "non-bargaining" type of wage determination is not invadably fragmented between the individual shops, with employers adjusting wages elastically in response to "free" competitive market levels. Instead, in industries such as electronics and banking, there are maintained informal yet regular exchanges of wage and employment information between managements. These exchanges serve to ensure mutual comparability with reference to the "going rate", lest competition on the labour market should get out of hand.
APPENDIX B
INTERNATIONAL LABOUR CONVENTIONS ON WHICH A DECLARATION HAS BEEN MADE FOR HONG KONG BY THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM
No. of Conventions
Applied without modification 31 Applied with modification 20 Decision reserved 24
The Conventions belonging to each of these three categories are listed below:
Applied without modification: 31 Conventions
No. 2 -Unemployment Convention, 1919 5 -Minimum Age (Industry) Convention, 1919 7 -Minimum Age (Sea) Convention, 1920 8 -Unemployment Indemnity (Shipwreck) Convention,
1920 11 -Right to Association (Agriculture) Convention, 1921 12-Workmen's Compensation (Agriculture) Convention, 1921 15 -Minimum Age (Trimmers and Stockers) Convention, 1921 16 -Medical Examination of Young Persons (Sea) Convention, 1921 19 -Equality of Treatment (Accident Compensation)
Convention, 1925 22 -Seamen's Articles of Agreement Convention, 1926 26 -Minimum Wage-Fixing Machinery Convention, 1928 29 -Forced Labour Convention, 1930 32 -Protection against Accidents (Dockers) Convention,
(Revised), 1932
235
42 -Workmen's Compensation (Occupational Diseases) Convention (Revised), 1934 45 -Underground Work (Women) Convention, 1935 50 -Recruiting of Indigenous Workers Convention, 1936 58 -Minimum Age (Sea) Convention (Revised), 1936 64 -Contracts of Employment (Indigenous Workers) Convention, 1939 65 -Penal Sanctions (Indigenous Workers) Convention, 1939 74 -Certification of Able Seamen Convention, 1946 81 -Labour Inspection Convention, 1947 84 -Right of Association (Non-Metropolitan Territories) Convention, 1947 94 -Labour Clauses (Public Contracts) Convention, 1949 97 -Migration for Employment Convention (Revised), 1949 98 -Right to Otganise and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949 105 -Abolition of Forced Labour Convention, 1957 108 -Seafarers' Identity Documents Convention, 1958 115 -Radiation Protection Convention, 1960 122 -Employment Policy Convention, 1964 124 -Medical Examination of Young Persons (Underground Work) Convention, 1965 151 -Labour Relations (Public Service) Convention, 1978
Applied with modification: 20 Conventions
No. 3 -Maternity Protection ConventiJn, 1919 10 -Minimum Age (Agriculture) Convention, 1921 14 -Weekly Rest (Industry) Convention, 1921 17 -Workmen's Compensation (Accidents) Convention, 1925 59 -Minimum Age (Industry) Convention (Revised), 1937 63 -Convention concerning Statistics of Wages and Hours of Work, 1938 82 -Social Policy (Non-Metropolitan Territories) Convention, 1947 86 -Contracts of Employment (Indigenous Workers) Convention, 1947 87 -Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention, 1948 90 -Night Work of Young Persons (Industry) Convention (Revised), 1948 92 -Accommodation of Crews Convention (Revised), 1949 95 -Protection of Wages Convention, 1949 101 -Holidays with Pay (Agriculture) Convention, 1952
133 -Accommodation of Crews (Supplementary Provisions) Convention, 1970
141-Rural Workers' Organisations Convention, 1975 142 -Human Resources Development Convention, 1975 144 -Tripartite Consultation (International Labour Standards) Convention, 1976 147 -Merchant Shipping (Minimum Standards) Convention, 1976 148 -Working Environment (Air Pollution, Noise and Vibration) Convention, 1977 150 -Labour Administration Convention, 1978
Decision reserved: 24 Conventions
No. 24 -Sickness Insurance (Industry) Convention, 1927 25 -Sickness Insurance (Agriculture) Convention, 1927 27 -Marking of Weight (Packages Transported by Vessels) Convention, 1929 35 -Old-Age Insurance (Industry, etc.) Convention, 1933 36 -Old-Age Insurance (Agriculture) Convention, 1933 37-Invalidity Insurance (Industry, etc.) Convention 1933 38 -Invalidity Insurance (Agriculture) Convention, 1933 39-Survivors' Insurance (Industry, etc.) Convention, 1933 40-Survivors' Insurance (Agriculture) Convention, 1933 44 -Unemployment Provision Convention, 1934 56 -Sickness Insurance (Sea) Convention, 1936 68 -Food and Catering (Ships' Crews) Convention, 1946 69 -Certification of Ships' Cooks Convention, 1946 70 -Social Security (Seafarers) Convention, 1946 77 -Medical Examination of Young Persons (Industry) Convention, 1946 88 -Employment Service Convention, 1948 89 -Night Work (Women) Convention (Revised), 1948 99 -Minimum Wage Fixing Machinery (Agriculture) Convention, 1951 100 -Equal Remuneration Convention, 1951 102 -Social Security (Minimum Standards) Convention, 1952 114-Fishermen's Articles of Agreement Convention, 1959 120 -Hygiene (Commerce and Offices) Convention, 1964 135 -Workers' Representatives Convention, 1971 140 -Paid Educational Leave Convention, 1975
INDEX
accidents, occupational 143 ad hoc group bargaining/meetings 72, 90, 91' 114-15 Advisory Committee on Diversification (1979) 204 affiliation outside Hong Kong 62-3 agency shop 64 Air Pollution Control Division 142-3 allowances 135 amalgamation 62, 63, 67, 218 ambulatory labour 166, 169 and Employment Ordinance 169-70 subcontracting system 29 American Chamber of Commerce 83,202 annualleave 128-9 anti-union discrimination 119-20 protection against 60 anti-union discrimination clauses 64 arbitration, oftrade disputes 108 armed forces, not unionised 60 asbestosissee pneumoconiosis association, right ofguaranteed 59 Association ofExpatriate Civil Servants (AECS) 92
Bankruptcy Ordinance 150-1 bargaining arrangements 87 Basic Law Consultative and Drafting Committees 219
birth control, government policy 177 birth rate 32n blue-collar workers 30,80-1, 132-3 board ofinquiry 108 Boilers and Pressure Receivers Ordinance 49 bonus contract 234 bonus payments 135, 200 breakdowns, and rest days 126 business failures and insolvency 149-51 Business Registration Ordinance, and Insolvency Fund 152 businesses private, no intervention 13, 16 small, role of 28-9 too small for joint consultation 112
Cable and Wireless Ltd. 91-2 Cable and Wireless Limited (Hong Kong) Staff Association 92 Cantonese enterprises 116-17 capital, local 116 careers guidance 50 casual labour market 166, 231 child labour 184n China and industrial conflict 99 migration to Hong Kong 3-5, 145,209 moderation ofimage 74 Chinese General Chamber of Commerce 83
ChineseManufacturers' Association
83 civil servants 118-19 civil service,collective bargaining
within 92-3 claims 100, 106 classstructure weak 17 cleanlinessat work 141 closedshop 64, 65 CodeofLabour Relations Practice
143 collectiveagreements 60, 77 collectivebargaining 60,76-7,
138,233 absence of 227 legal norms on 87-8 practiceofin Hong Kong 88-94
CommissionerforLabour 107-8 Committeeon Diversification 28 common law 42 Companies Ordinance (1933), and
insolvency 149-50 comparability 92-3, 98 conciliation 106, 107 conciliationservice 48, 59,87-8 congestion atwork, prevention 142 constructionsector 6 contractsofemployment, written
118 contracts, local and overseas 50-1 Contractsfor OverseasEmployment
Ordinance 47 cooling-offperiod 105-6 CottonIndustry Workers' General
Union 90 CottonSpinners' Association 90 cottonspinning, union tradition 90 criminal and law-enforcement
injuriescompensation 182
death, compensation for 172-3 differentials 132-6, 137 disability/infirmity allowance 182 disputes, trade union involvementin
95 DiversificationCommittee 35n
economicgrowth, post-war, high 8
education 13, 15-16, 180-1 andworkerattitudes 163-5 electronicsindustry 26, 27, 167, 168,192,193,202
uniondocility 89-90 employee protection 45-6 employees 143, 201
compensation (injury/ disease) 171-4
earnings: averagemonthly 29, 30; inter-sectoralcomparison 131-2
and occupational safety 140-1 participationin wage formulation 227,228-9 and trade union freedom 64 Employees' CompensationAssessment Board 49 EmployeesCompensationDivision 49 Employees'CompensationOrdinance 47,49,171
employers 180 compulsoryinsurance 174 liabilityto compensate for injury
andoccupationaldiseases 171-4 to assign rest days 126 employersand employees, expectationsof 54-5 Employers' Federation of Hong
Kong 83 employers' organisations 81-4 employment
by industry group(1955) 23 in manufacturing 193 minimum age for 158 ofwomenand children 44
EmploymentAgency Regulations 51 Employment(Amendment) Ordinance (1985) 153-4 EmploymentofChildren Regulations 50, 184n employmentcontract, no automatic transfer 146-7 EmploymentOrdinance 46-7, 124,125,126, 157,160-1,175
EmploymentOrdinance and annual leave 128-9 long-service payments 184 severancepay legislation 146,
147-9 andstatutory holidays 127 and wage protection 151
employmentpractices, variations in
20-1 employment rights 46, 124 employmentsecurity 99 employmentstandards, regulated
94 exports 22,24 externalcapital, role of 26
Factoriesand Industrial Undertakings Ordinanceand Regulations 47, 49, 123, 140-1, 143, 157-8, 159-60
FactoriesandWorkshops Ordinance
(1932) 158-9 FactoryInspectorate Division 49 family, importance of 18 family labour 116 federation 62,63,67-8,217-18 Federation if Civil Service Unions
217-18 Federation ofHongKong Industries 83 FederationofHongKong and Kowloon LabourUnions 218 FederationofHong Kong Printing TradeWorkers' Unions 68, 90
female labour findings of1981 survey 163-5 increase in 27
femaleunionisation rate 79 financial incentives, short-term
116-17 fire hazards 141 flexibility 137, 230
vs.insecurity, ambulatory labour
169-70 footwear industry 27 foreign industrialenterprises, size of
191
foreign investment 26, 191-201, 204-5, 222n rationale of 196-9 freedom ofassociation and labour relations 62-74 fringe benefits 117, 118, 139, 200
garment-makingindustry 167, 168, 192
union docility 89-90 General ChamberofCommerce 83 government, as an employer 99 governmententerprises 11R-19 governmentexpenditure 179 government and legislative system
constitutionand processof
legislation 38-40 principalorgans 37-8 trade union participation 40-1
grossdomesticproduct (GDP) 5, 7, 8, 11, 12 Guardingand Operation of Machinery Regulations 140 guild structure, and collective bargaining 89 guild tradition, and union participation 81
healthcare 181 holidays 136
and rest days 123 HomeOwnershipScheme 180 homeworkers andsubcontract
labour 165-70
Hong Kong as a capitalist society 13, 16-17 a commercial city-port 4 dependency status 43 economicdevelopment, affected
by demographic changes 5 historyof 1-3 institutionalframework 13-19 nominally a free-port 25 socio-economicbackground
3-13 transferto China 2-3 Hong Kong Chinese Civil Servants' Association (HKCCSA) 92
Hong Kong Federation ofTrade Unions (FTU) 52, 53, 68, 74, 214-15,216
Hong Kong Industrial Relations Association 85 Hong Kong Institute ofPersonnel Management (HKIPM) 85 survey on joint consultation 112, 119-20
Hong Kong and Kowloon Restaurant and Cafe Workers' General Union 91
Hong Kong and Kowloon Trade Unions Council (TUC) 52, 68, 74, 214-15, 216
Hong Kong Management Association 85 Hong Kong Social Workers Union 215 Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region 3 housing 117,139,180 'human capital' 26
identity cards 207 Illegal Strikes and Lock-outs
Ordinance (1926) 101 illiteracy rate, decline in 13 immigrants 209-13
Chinese 3; illegal 206, 207; lacking skills 145; legal 209 Vietnamese refugees 206-7
immigration 3-5 and employment 206-9 massive, socio-economic
implications of 209-13 Immigration Department 51 Immigration Ordinance 50, 207 incentives, short-term 200 income, no long-run shift from
capital to labour 13, 14 indemnities 172 Independent Commission Against
Corruption 98 indigenisation 205 individualism 17 industrial conflict
current pattern of 95-9 devolution of to shop-floor 95 regulating laws 100-6 settlement machinery 106-8
IndustrialEmploymentof Children Ordinance 158
Industrial Employment (Holidayswith Pay and Sickness Allowance) Ordinance 123, 175
Industrial EmploymentOrdinance (StatutoryHolidays and SicknessAllowance) 127
industrialgrowthfactors conduciveto 25-32 indicators 192 since WW II 19,22
industrial relations andlabourlaw 42 and occupational safety 143-4
Industrial Relations Institute (IRI) 215
industrial relationsinthe workplacejointconsultation 111-14 management's perception and
recognition of trade unions 119-20
and personnel practices 114-19 industrial revolution, 1950s 5 industrial safety 44 Industrial Safety and Accident
PreventionCommittee
139-40 industry, light 27 inflation, effect on wages 130 institutional framework
governmentand legislative system37-41 labouradministration in Hong Kong 44-56 labour law and international labour conventions 41-4 insurance, compulsory (employees)
50 integrationproblems 211 international labour Conventions
159 applicable to Hong Kong 59-62
international labour Conventions applicationoftoHong Kong after reversion 219-21 �P
applied: with modification 236-7; without modification 235-6
decision reserved 237
as a source oflabour law 43-4 International Labour Organisation (ILO) 43-4, 159,219-21 investment factors for foreign firms
196-9
Japan, investment in Hong Kong 26,193 jobinformation, dissemination of
139 jobmobility 139, 145 job security 118, 124, 146-54, 216 Joint Associations Committee on
Employer/Employee Relations 83-4 joint consultation 59, 60, 91, 92, 111-14,118-19 joint consultation committees, some
satisfactory areas 113-14 joint-stock companies (British) 118 Junior Civil Service Council 93
Kowloon Peninsula 1
labour administration administrative framework and
functions 44-51 early colonisation days 44 government non-interventionist
approach 54 labour policy formation and its philosophy 51-6
traditionofin British Empire 53 Labour Advisory Board 52-4,217 labour conditions (1939) 4 Labour Department 45, 87-8 labour force 25, 27,138,209-11
characteristicsof 210
distribution: by occupation 10; sectoral and industrial (1961-81) 8, 9
stratified 30-1, 32
unionised, decline in 213-14 labour instability, mythical 144 labour law 217
characteristicsof 41-4 labour legislation 44, 45, 46-7,94,
215 administrationof 48-51 cost implication for private
industry 46 early 21-2 generally liked by female
employees 163, 164 industrial sector only 123-4 policyofconsultation 51-2
labourmarket 139, 146 labour mobility 144-6 labour movement
changing configuration of? 217-19 docilityof 54,76-9,214 labour policy formulation andits philosophy 51-6 labour pressure groups 215-16, 217,219 labour reforms, government sponsored 54-5 Labour Relations Ordinance 47, 100, 101, 107 Labour Relations Service 48, 59,
77,87 Labour Tribunal 77, 106-7,169 Labour Tribunal Ordinance (1972)
59,106-7 labour turnover 145 labour-management
communications/dialogue 114-15 labour-management disputes 59,
100 laissez-faire policy 16-17 'lawfully employable'
person 207-8 lay-offs 146 legal system, inherited from UK
42 legalism in labour issues 55 Legislative Council 217,219
Liaison Office of Public Service Unions 218 licensing system, for public
meetings/processions 103-4 living standards 8, 13 Local Employment Service 51 lock-out, legal definition 100-1 long service payments 153-4, 218 low profit, low pay 29
male/female ratio, immigrants 209
management, perception and recognition oftrade unions 119-20
management practices, American and Japanese firms 203 manufacturing economy, variable
composition of 27 manufacturingsector 5, 6, 8, 29, 81 early industry and working conditions 19-22 factors conducive to industrial
growth 25-32 foreign investment 191-9 importantattributes-impact on
employment 26-32 indistrial take-off (1950s and 1960s) 22-4
union membership 82 maritime industries 5, 22 market forces, seen as protection for
wages 88 married women 186n MassTransit Railway Corporation
98 MassTransit Railway Operating
Department Staff Unions 215 materialistic egotism 18 maternity leave 128, 176-7 maternity pay 176-8, 216 medical care 30, 117 medical services, subsidised 181 merger movements 217 Minimum Wage Ordinance 136 minimum wages 136-8 multi-committee system 114 multinationals 26, 84
impact of 204-5
personnel practices 200-3 scientific management 117-18, 200,202 multiple unions 217
negotiations, individual 94 New Territories 1 night work, and women 157, 158,
159, 161 non-bargaining 227,228,233, 234 non-industrial activities, shift
towards 6, 8 notificationsystem, public meetings104
occupational accidents 143 occupational diseases, employees' compensation 174 OccupationalHealth Division 49-50, 142 occupational health and safety,
regulation of 139-44 occupational health/hygiene 141-3 OccupationalHygiene Unit 49, 50,
142 occupational interest groups in civil service 99 Occupational Medicine Unit
49-50, 142 official strikes 77-8 opium 1-2 outworkers/outworking 165, 187n overseascontracts 50-1 Overseas Employment
Ordinance 50-1 Overseas Employment Service 50-1 overtime 137, 157, 159, 160, 162,
185n overtime rates 125 owner-operators 116
paternalism 116, 118 pay 90, 125, 137 pay structure, disputes 98 peaceful picketing 73, 102-3 permanent disability, compensation
for 173-4 personnel management, growth of in
Hong Kong 84-5 Personnel Management Club 85 personnel practices 115-19
in multinationals 200-3, 223n picketing, legal rights of 102-4 piece-work 116 piece-work rates 20, 90, 229 plant or business shut-down, rules
for 128-9 plastics industry 27, 167, 168 Pneumoconiosis (Compensation)
Ordinance and Fund 47, 49, 174-5 pneumoconiosis, special
compensation 174-5 police force 60, 98 political influence on industrial
conflict 99 political strikes 101 population growth rate 208 population movement, demographic
history of 3-5 poverty line 183 primary production 5, 7 Printers' Association 90 printing, well-established union
tradition 90 private business organisations 83 private ownership, primacy of 13 Private Sector Participation Scheme
180 problem-specific committees 72 production, export-oriented 5, 22,
29 professional institutes 84-5 promotion, prospectsof in
multinationals 203,205
Protection of Wages on Insolvency Ordinance and Fund 47, 48, 151-2
Protestant Hong Kong Christian Industrial Committee (CIC) 215-16
public assistance 181-2 public expenditure 13 on social and economic services 178, 179
public holidays, official 127
Public Order Ordinance 103-4 public sector
employees prone to militance
95,98,99
growth of 178 public utilities 81, 119, 232-3 putting-out 28-9, 165, 166
quarrying and construction, levy for Pneumoconiosis Fund 175 quasi-collective bargaining 90-1
recession, effect of 130 reconciliation, preference for 78 redundancy 146, 147-8 registered union, obligations 73-4 registration 60, 62,65-6, 71
ofemployers' associations 81,83 rents, low 180 rest days 125-6, 160 restaurant trade, unionised 90-1 rule-making, external desired 55
safety at the workplace 139-40 safety standards, mandatory 140 safety subcommittees 49 scientificmanagement 117-18 secondary production 5-6, 7 secret ballots 67, 68 security, worker concern for 189n securityschemes 117 Selective Placement Division 50 Senior Civil Service Council 93 SeniorNon-Expatriate Officers'
Association (SNEOA) 92 severance pay legislation 146,
147-9, 150 Shanghaineseenterprises 117 ship building and repairing 22 shop stewards, non-existent 64-5 sick pay/medical care 30 sickness allowance 175-6 silicosissee pneumoconiosis Sino-BritishJoint Declaration on
Future ofHong Kong 3, 37,
220 Sino-Japanese hostilities, and
Chinese migration 4 skill differentials 133-6 social mobility 18 social security 181-4 social structure and values of
employment 17-19 social wage 157, 178-84 SocialWelfare in the 1980s, White
Paper 182-3 Societies Ordinance (1949) 71-2 society, refugee character of 18 Special Register 51 spinning and weaving industry 27,
161 statutelaw 42 statutory holidays 127 strikers, legally defined immunities
101-2 strikes 100-1 structural fluidity 17-18 structural readjustment 27-8 subcontracting 116, 165, 166, 167,
168
and wage haggling 231-2 subordination, notion of 42 sympatheticactions 101
technology transfer 205 telecommunicationsindustry 91-2 termination bargaining 90 tertiary sector 5, 6, 7, 8, 90-1 textile industry 22, 27, 161, 192 Trade Boards Ordinance 136-7 trade disputes 100, 107-8
trade union immunities 101-2 trade union agenda, pragmatised216 trade union freedom as a legal right62-3 trade union immunitites, and trade disputes 101-2 trade union movement polarisation in 74 weakness and internal division of 88 trade unions affiliations 77
constitutions 70-1 as corporate bodies 72-3 docility of 89-90, 119, 138 encouraged in civilservice
118-19 and freedom ofthe individual
64-5 a future electoral role 217 immunities and obligations 73-4 and labour legislation 51-2 left-wing 81 legal capacity 71-2 low involvement inindustrial
safety 144
membership 213-16; legalcriteria and safeguards69-71; recentchangesin 74-6
and multinationals 202 newly created 215-16 registration 65-6, 71;
cancellationof 66; refusal of
60, 62,65-6 rights and privileges 59-60 weak and ineffective 64-5, 78-9
Trade Unions Ordinance (1971)59,60,65,68,72-3,83,100 and peaceful picketing 102-3 Trade Unions RegistrationRegulations 59 traditional trades, and collective bargaining 88-9, 233 Traffic Accident Victims Assitance
Fund 182 transport workers' unions 80-1 trust, in wage negotiations 230-1
UKgovernment, declarations on international labour Conventionson behalf of Hong Kong 43-4, 235-7
UK, investmentin Hong Kong 193 unemployment 8, 182
and immigration 210-11 unfair dismissal 146, 216 union density 76
inter-sectoralcomparison of 79-81
UnionofEating Establishments Employees 91 union funds, legal limits on
application of 68-9 union shop 64 union-management procedures,
lacking 77 United Nations High Commission
for Refugees (UNHCR) 206 unlawful assembly 103-4 USA, investment in Hong Kong and
SE Asia 193, 199
Vietnamese refugees 5, 206-7 voluntary negotiations, importance of 60 voluntary work on rest days 126
wage club 202 wage consultation 232-3 wage determination and the labour
market 138-9 wage gaps, narrowing of 136 wage haggling 229-32 wage levels 8, 13
real 33n, 129-30, 131 wage negotiation 227-34
informal 229-32 wage rates 20 wagesecurity 151-2 Wage Security Unit 48 wages:
and bonuses 133-6 as priority debts in bankruptcy and
windingup 150 differentials 132-6 minimum wage 134-7 paid by local and multinational
enterprises 200-2 welfare benefits 135-6 welfare corporatism, American
multinationals 202 welfare fund, use of 68 white-collar militancy 79, 99 white-collar workers 76, 79, 127
women, and night work 157, 158, 159, 161 women and young persons occupational safety provisions 140 regulated working conditions 123,124-5,157-8 Women and Young Persons' Division 50
Women and Young Persons (Industry) Regulations 50, 124-5,157, 160-1
women and young workers 157-65
work injury and occupational diseases, employees' compensation for 171-4
work organisations, diversity of
115-19 work stoppages 95,96 workers, characteristics of 213 workers organisations
changing role and status 217-19 docilityoflabour movement 76-9 inter-sectoral comparison ofunion density 79-81 recent changes in union membership 74-6 workers organisations and
representatives 61-2 workforce, instrumentalism of 18 working day, length of 21 working days lost through disputes,
various countries 97 working hours 124-5 women and young workers in industry 157, 158-62
working time and holidays, contemporary pattern of 124-9
workmen's compensation 123-4 workplace permissiveness 55, 227, 228 workshops, small 19, 20
'yellow-dog' contracts, illegal 64 Youth Employment Advisory Service 50