a-history-of-hong-kong-frank-welsh-revised-edition — Page 1

A HISTORYof HONGKONG
Fran. Welsh�P
'Magnificent, compendious and much-needed' JONATHAN MIRSKY, The Times

A HISTORY OF HONG KONG
By the s11me 11uthor
TIIE PROFIT OF TIIE STATE TIIE AFFLICl'ED STATE UNEASY CITY BUILDING THE TRIREME FIRST BLOOD
TIIE COMPANION GUIDE TO THE LAKE DISTRICT A HISTORY OF SOUTH AFRICA DANGEROUS DECEITS

A-HISTORY OF HONG KONG
Frank Welsh
-
HarperCollinsPublishers
HarperCollinsPub/ishers 77-85 Fulham Palace Road, Hammersmith, London W6 8JB
First published in paperback by HarperCollinsPub/ishm 1994
This revised edition published by HarperCollinsPub/ishm 1997
First published in Great Britain by
HarperCollinsPub/ishm 1993
Copyrightc Frank Welsh 1993, 1997
The Author asserts the moral right to be identified as the author of this work
ISBN O 00 638871 X
Set in Linotron Ehrhardt
Printed and bound in Great Britain by Omnia Books Ltd, Glasgow
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior
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This book is sold subject to the condition that it shall not, by way of trade or otherwise, be lent, re-sold, hired out or otherwise circulated without the publisher's prior consent in any form of binding or cover other than that in which it is published and without a similar condition including this
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CONTENTS
FOREWORD xi
FOREWORD TO THE REVISED EDITION xv
INTRODUCTION Unwilling parents 1 I
I THE TWO EMPIRES The last dynasty 11; An empire acquired in a fit of absent-mindedness 18; A cross and costly voyage 25 II
2 A STREAM OF SILVER The plant of joy 32; Insolent, capricious, and vexatious procedures 38; I never saw a chest of opium in my life 41; A set of popinjays 4 7; A snug business 50; Who can desire a war with China? 57 32
3 THE HUMILIATION OF LORD NAPIER The epitaph drear: 'A fool lies here/Who tri-:d to hustle the East' 62; A matter of national prestige 68; Not to lose the enjoyment of what we have got 71; Your most humble and obedient servant 76; The War of Lancelot Dent's Collar 79; Opium and whisky 97 62
4 UNJUST TREATIES? A protecting joss 101; Guns at the Porcelain Tower 114; The Poppy War is ended 120; An umpire between the empires 12 5 IOI
5 A BARREN ISLAND A free and inexpensive asylum 132; Methods of proceeding unknown in other British colonies 143; Respectable and opulent Chinese 152 132

6 THE DAVIS RAID 155
A negro streaked with leprosy 155; The dreadful sight of an Engli,hman
being hanged 161; Sulphur, pitch, b.:er or porter -and opium 167; If
they .mack our p.ople, they will be shot 17 5

7 RETRENCHMENT 184
Houses of bad fame, billiard rooms anJ boats 184; Chinese 2: Plenipo-
tentiary 1 199

8 THE TUMULT AND THE SHOUTING DIES 211
A reckless spirit of hostility 211; Kowloon 223; What a land is this ...
228; Not too Scotch 233; Unlawful games 236; A royal visit 242
9 SOME DISTASTEFUL TOPICS2252
The evils of sewage flushing 252; ... syphilis is only communicable by
contact 261; I have had my eyes on those junks for a quarter of a century
266; Travellers' tales 276
10 FORTRESS HONG KONG 280
The defence of greater Britain 280; In search of la gloire 285; General
Sargent's guns 292; The politics of plague 297
I I A SLIGHT EXTENSION TO THE COLONY OF
HONG KONG 313
A suitable occasion for action 313; The lease hath all too short a date 321;
Scoundrelly leaders of secret societies 334; Sir Marthew's railway 342
12 HONG KONG AND THE CHINESE REVOLUTION 347
Pernicious parliamentarians 34 7; An act of high patriotism to fornicate
352
13 A COLONIAL BACKWATER
Faces shut like doors 374; A war with Japan! But why should there be a
war with Japan? 386; Little sisters 393; Stumbling towards the twentieth
century 399
14 THE GREATER EAST ASIA CO-PROSPERITY SPHERE 4o5
A passive and shameful acquiescence 405; Essentially a blockade 410;
Thanks to Japan, we are now a free people 417; The British Empire has
been entirely written off 423; The electorate of Britain didn't care a brass
farthing about Hong Kong 434
15 BETWEEN FOUR STOOLS 442
Anglo-Saxon attitudes 442; Autodecolonization 460; Stiff upper lips 466

16 THE GOLDEN YEARS
The judicious application of cash 475; Cori:uption, the most infallible
symptom of constitutional liberty 489; Losing nerve 494
17 RECESSIONAL 503
Now, when you say that ... 503; Further proceedings stood postponed
518; Tanks in Tiananmen Square 523; Voluntas Populi Suprema Lex?
EPILOGUE 544
Picking up the pieces 55.; Upstanding, flourishing and trading 559
APPENDIX A: BRITISH GOVERNMENTS AND
PROMINENT CHINESE 568
APPENDIX B: GOVERNORS OF HONG KONG 574
NOTES AND SOURCES 575
BIBLIOGRAPHY 602
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS 619
INDEX 621
MAPS
THE COLONY OF HONG KONG, I 993 ANCHORAGES IN THE CANTON DEL TA, I 840 HONG KONG HARBOUR RECLAMATION
CHINA
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(
Lam Isla
Mirs Bay
,Wu Ul
.uen Wo Hui
. Centres of Popufation
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f . .=iks
THE COLONY OF HONG KONG 1993

FOREWORD
My interest in Hong Kong was first aroused by a visit there in 1970, following the acquisition, by a London bank of which I was a director, of Llie Dao Hang Bank, one of the colony's larger Chinese banks.
Shortly afterwards, in 1972, my family bought Flass, the Westmor-land house built in 1849 by the Dent brothers, Lancelot and Wilkinson, formerly merchants of Canton and Hong Kong. It was the Chinese authorities' threat to arrest Lancelot Dent that had, in 1839, set in motion the events that led to the first Anglo-Chinese war, commonly known as the 'Opium War' (commonly but erroneously, as I endeavour to prove in Chapter 3). As a result of that war Hong Kong was ceded to the British Crown, most of the Canton trade following the flag, and the firm of Dent's becoming one of the most influential in the new colony. Flass, together with its remaining furnishings (the Chinese bed in the Gulbenkian Museum of Oriental Art in Durham is worth a look), precisely reflected the tastes of those early Victorian 'merchant princes'. In some interesting details Flass also exemplified the differ-ences that distinguished the Dents from their great rivals, the Jardines and Mathesons. Modest by comparison with the Highland palaces constructed by James and Alexander Matheson, Flass reflected the primmer, less flamboyant character of Lancelot Dent; its distinction lay in such details as the hand-painted wallpaper, the ivory door-furniture, and the Italian wrought-metal work. As the house was open to the public we put together, with the help of the Abbot Hall Museum in Kendal, a small exhibition illustrating the development of the China trade. In writing a short guide to this I took the first steps that later led to the present book being produced.
Some apologies need to be made in advance. Any history of an
xii A HISTORY OF HONG KONG
Anglo-Chinese enterprise is unhappily likely to be both one-sided and patchy. One-sided since scholars equipped to deal with Manch,.�P and Chinese official documents housed in the Historical Archives in Beijing may well not be alert to the nuances of nineteenth-century British politics and society; and any academic might find some difficulty in dealing with the sharply commercial aspects of the colony's history. A writer with no Chinese, on the other hand, has to rely on translations and selection from the great mass of available material, and as a result this work, in addition to its other defects, is inescapably Anglocentric. Dealing with so extensive a subject as the history of a society over the better part of two centuries in the compass of a single volume leads either to bland generalizations or to selections of episodes that seem
FOREWORD
heartfelt. A visit to Beijing, which was made possible by Laura Rivkin of the Great Britain-China Association, Tony Farrington of the India Office Library, and Feng Zizhi, Directer General of the State Archives Bureau in Beijing, led to obtaining the help of Xu Yipu, Deputy Head of the First Historical Archives and Shen Lihua, Deputy Chief of the Foreign Affairs Division of the State Archives. Their unstinting and friendly assistance enabled us to identify some material which maygive a new understanding of Anglo-Chinese relations in the 1840s. The most difficult task of translating from cursive classical Chinese was ably performed by Charles Aylmer, of the Cambridge University Library. In Hong Kong Dr Elizabeth Sinn and Dr (Chan Lau) Kit-ching patiently instructed me on several issues, and the inexhaustible hospitality of Dr John Cheong and Dr Priscilla Roberts was combined with guidance on subjects as diverse as the Canton trade and modern American history. To them, and to those other members of the History Department, especially Dr Adam Lui, who uncomplainingly put up with an uninvited guest, I am grateful. As I am also to the Vice Chan-cellor, Professor Wang Gungwu, Sir Albert Rodrigues, the Pro-Chancellor, Dr Norman Miners, Dr Peter Wesley Smith, the Master and Staff of Robert Black College. In Hong Kong I also owe thanks to Lord and Lady Wilson, Sir Piers Jacobs, Sir Jack Cater, Simon Murray, Gordon Wu, and especially to Clare Hollingworth and to Mark and Maurine Sabine. Nigel Cameron, Susanna Hoe and Alan Birch, all historians possessing much greater experience of Hong Kong than mine, were particularly kind. Mark Pinkstone and Shirley Wong of the Government Information Services Department, Dr Joseph S.P. Ting of the Hong Kong Museum of History, and Dr Thomas Lau of the Government Records Service provided much valuable material. To Mark and Lesley Henneker-Major, and to Philip and Mary Walker I owe introductions to many Hong Kong residents, including the Honourable Miriam Lau, Angus and Bibi Forsyth, and Peter and Tricia Carton.
In retrospect I realize how much instruction I have gathered from conversations over the years with such wise and knowledgeable men as Lord Gore-Booth, Sir Colin Crowe and Sir John Colville, whose experience in both foreign affairs and in the byways of Westminster was difficult to parallel. More rec.ently I am also indebted to John Page Philips, the Revd. Elliott Kendall, John M. Scott, D.B. Ellison, Mrs
M.J.F. Logan of the FCO, Robert Maxtone Graham, Yen Chung,Professor James Cassels, Jonathan Saville of the Rowley Gallery,m
xiv
A HISTORY OF HONG KONG
Shirley Hazzard (Mrs Francis Steegmuller), George and Ellie War-burg, Mary Turnbull, and Leonard Rayner.
The staff of the libraries I have used, in Britain, Hong Kong, France and America, were unfailingly patient to an inexperienced and barely computer-literate researcher. I arr, e:;pecially grateful to John Yaxley, the Hong Kong Commissioner in London, who went out of his way to be helpful, and to the Commission's librarian, Ursula Price, as well as the obliging staff of the National Maritime Museum's library. Particular thanks are also due to Jardine Matheson for permission to use their archives.
For permission to reproduce illustrative material I am obliged to the Bibliotheque Nationale, Paris; Brigadier G.H. Cree and the Trustees of the National Maritime Museum, Greenwich; the Hong Kong Government Information Service; the Trustees of the British Museum; the Wellcome Institute Library, London; the Royal Hong Kong Police; and the South China Morning Post. The Martyn Gregory Gallery has generously made available the painting which appears on the cover of this book.
One problem facing any book on China is whether transliterations from the Chinese should be according to the Wade-Giles system, the most usually found in books published before about 1985, or inpinyin,the method now adopted universally. Since most historical works in English -including the magnificent Science and Civilization in China of Dr Joseph Needham -that the reader might come across employWade-Giles, or a variation of it, this has been used for all references prior to the establishment of the People's Republic in 1950. Contem-porary Chinese proper names, on the other hand, are given in pinyin.Between the two classes are such names as those of Chiang Kai-Shek and Mao Tse-tung, which still appear in the Western press in that form. As well as avoiding 'a foolish consistency' this compromise, it is suggested, will save a lot of trouble in referring to indexes; as a safe-guard important historical names are introduced in both systems.
Hong Kong Cantonese names present a peculiar problem. Dr W.K. Chan in Appendix III of his fine book The Making of Hong Kong Society gives at least fifty-four different way'> of presenting any such name in English; add to this the use of Christian names as well as Chinese names, and the difficulty in adopting a standard becomes apparent.
Another fruitful field of misunderstanding is that of the Hong Kong unit of currency. The silver dollar was traditional in the Canton trade,

FOREWORD
and therefore adopted as the currency of commerce by Hong Kong, although transactions were often recorded in taels, the Chinese ounce of silver. Early colonial accounts were prepared in sterling, but the Hong Kong dollar. became the official unit for all purposes in 1862, its value fluctuating according to the price of silver. Since 1981 the Hong Kong dollar has been tied to the US dollar, at a rate ofmHK$7.80 = USS1. Unless US dollars are specified the Hong Kong dollar is used throughout this book. When comparisons are made with the UK, figures are also sometimes given in pounds sterling.
Explanations are also .eeded of the following measures:
tael = 1 Chinese ounce = 11/3 oz avoirdupois
h,kh = 100,000 (Indian accounts are prepared in lakhs: one million,
one hundred and fifty thousand = 11,50,000)
mau or mou = approximately one-third of an acre
It should be noted that both the second-in-command in the Hong Kong administration and the Secretary of State for the Colonies in Whitehall are frequently referred to as the 'Colonial Secretary'.
FOREWORD TO THE REVISED EDITION
As the date of China's resumption of sovereignty over the British colony of Hong Kong approaches, anxieties over the future are increas-ingly expressed. The electoral advances proposed by the last Governor, Christopher Patten, served certainly to stimulate democratic debate, but also aroused fierce opposition from the Chinese government. Politi-cally active people in Hong Kong were divided, often bitterly, between those who believed the only guarantee for Hong Kon g's future stability and prosperity lay in a good understanding with China, and those who welcomed the new energy released by democratic debate. Businessmen and the Civil Service were aimost invariably partisans of an accommo-dation with Beijing, but many professionals, academics and workers' representatives were anxious to defend their new democratic rights. Acerbic arguments arose between those who, like Sir Percy Cradock,
A HISTORY OF HONG KONG
xvi
had dedicated many years to reaching an agreement with the Chinese government, and the Governor, whose actions, they argued, had jeop-ardized the hard-won agreements.
This revised edition therefore summarizes the controversy, and attempts to assess the last Governor's work. It also contains corrections, emendations, and the results of some recently published work -and indeed those of at least one hitherto unpublished document, the politi-cal testament of the colony's originator, Charles Elliot.
In its preparation I have benefitted from much advice and assistance.
I am particularly grateful to The Right Honourable Christopher Patten, the Hon. Emily Lau and Christine Loh, Sir David and Lady Akers-Jones, Sir Percy Cradock, Sir David Ford, Ming K. Shan, Frank Ching, Kim Salkeld and John Walden; William McGurn, Martin and Helen Booth, Arthur Waldren and Thomas Lee have all providedvaluable corrections and suggestions. Vivienne Wong, Stefan Spurr,Robert Lacey, Gordon Wise and Julie Baldwin have been abundantly helpful. And all those friends in Hong Kong whose encouragement was recorded in the first edition and who continued to give constant support are gratefully thanked for their tolerance and patience.
In spite of such abundant counsel many errors doubtless remain; they are then inescapably my own.
Frank Welsh
December 1996

INTRODUCTION
Unwilling parents
Hong Kong, that natural child of Victorian Britain and Ch'ing China, has been a source of embarrassment and annoyance to its progenitors since it first appeared on the international scene in 1842. Neither parent was initially prepared to recognize the infant: the British Foreign Secretary, Lord Palmerston, described it as 'a barren island, which will never be a mart of trade'. He would much have preferred more ready money, or the larger and more prosperous Chusan, and immedi-ately sacked the envoy who had been responsible for negotiating the barren island's cession. Queen Victoria, however, was quite amused by the idea that her little daughter might be 'Princess of Hongkong'. For his part the Chinese Emperor Tao-kuang, forced into acknowledg-ing the loss of this minuscule piece of his territory, hitherto almost certainly unknown to him, by the guns of the Royal Navy levelled at the walls ofNanking, was baffled. He concluded that 'these barbarians always look on trade as their chief occupation; and are wanting in any high purpose of striving for territorial acquisition ... It is plain that
'1they are not worth attending to.a
Closely associated with a notorious drug-smuggling trade, the cir-cumstances of the birth were disreputable. Ever since, Hong Kong has presented Britain with a series of irritations; scandals concerning opium, prostitution, gambling, flogging and .corruption, together with quarrels be:tween Governors, civil servants, government departments and the community, erupted and arrived in Whitehall -and have not yet ceased to arrive -with depressing frequency.
Nor was China much pleased with the loss of the island. Hong
A HISTORY OF HONG KONG
Kong might be nothing more than an inconsiderable pimple on the great empire's extremity, but it has been and remains of symbolic significance to the rulers and the people of that empire. An even more insignificant foreign�P body, the Portuguese settlement at Macao, has been left unremoved for over four centuries, but the method bv which Hong Kong was ceded to the British has been a continuing aggr.vation. It came as the result of the first armed clash between�P China and the West, from which China emerged decisively and rapidly as the loser. The cession of Hong Kong was followed by increasingly rapacious demands for territorial and commercial concessions from foreign governments which left China, by the end of the nineteenth century, defeated, indebted and humiliated. Many myths have become encrusted around this first foreign encroachment, and have invested the subject of Hong Kong with a powerful emotional charge. As the loss of Hong Kong initiated these depredations, its recovery in 1997 will, it is believed, mark the end. The history of the colony is therefore indissolubly linked with that of quna's relations with the West, and with the development of the West's attitudes towards China.
At a time when colonialism and imperialism are seen as irredeemably wicked, and democracy as a panacea for all society's ills, it is perverse of Hong Kong, until recently a colony without any democratic insti-tutions, to be both successful and an agreeable place in which to live. It might be expected that a small community would, in economic matters, out-perform China herself, hampered as that great country has been by a runaway increase in population and periods of erratically bad government, but Hong Kong also compares well with the other 'little Asian dragons' -South Korea, Taiwan and Singapore. Commercially it is as least as successful as any of these countries, and it enjoys better protection of personal freedoms. Hong Kong's corruption, compared with that of Taiwan or Korea, is kept within decent bounds, and the undemocratic Crown Colony does not have any of the pettifogging restrictions imposed by democratic Singapore (where long hair and chewing gum, for example, are statutorily banned).
Moreover, Hong Kong is more successful than Britain. Its growth rate in the last decade has been rapid -from about 50 per cent of British Gross Domestic Product per capita in 1980 to more than 85 per cent in 1990 -and as ear!y as 198 1 Hong Kong had actually bettered Britain in such important indices as the expectation of life at birth (72.4 and 71.1 years respectively for men, and 78.1 and 77.1 years for women).
INTRODUCTION
It may be illuminating to compare progress in British-administered Hong Kong to that in an American-administered territory. Puerto Rico, with a comparable population --4 million as against 6 million -has been under American control for the same period (since 1898) as the greater part of Hong Kong has been under British rule. Certainly Puerto Rico has more democratic institutions -an elected governor and administration -with the United States retaining control of such items as foreign and defence policy, but in most respects the people of Hong Kong have a better time of it. Infant mortality is strikingly less: 4.8 per thousand in. Hong Kong, 12.7 per thousand in Puerto Rico, and 10.5 per thousand in the USA. Expectation of life at birth is today higher in Hong Kong than in Puerto Rico, at 74.75 years for mer. and 80.53 for women against 69.6 and 78.5 (and higher than in the USA, with 72 and 78.9). Other indicators of a decent standard of living -absence of crime, pupil-teacher ratios, newspaper readership, illegitimate births, quality of public transport, free provision of health services -also show Hong Kong ahead of Puerto Rico, sometimes by a considerable margin, and m many instances again better than the United States. The murder rate in Hong Kong, for example, is 1.64 per 100,000 people; in the USA it is 7.91 per 100,000.2
Present-day Hong Kong shows little sign of a colonial presence, and even less of a colonial past. On the slopes of Victoria Peak, hidden behind overtopping skyscrapers, lies concealed what was once the centre of the colony. Government House, resembling nothing more than a Japanese railway station, St John's Cathedral, a banal piece of colonial Gothic architecture, the French Mission House, and Flag-staff House, formuly the elegant quarters of the General Officer Commanding, once looked proudly out on a harbour on which lay the sleek grey cruisers of the China Squadron. Today these remnants of empire look up into the bedrooms of the Hilton Hotel and the offices of the Bank of China. Government House was absurdly re-modelled in the Japanese style -including the addition of an incon-gruoHs Shinto-esque tower -during the occupation in the Second World War, and has never been rebuilt; the cathedral was looted at the same time; Flagstaff House, the only intact survivor of the earliest days, is now devoted to a collection of teapots. Queen Victoria has vanished from Statue Square, where the only memorial is now -entirely appropriately for this temple of commerce -. that of a bank manager. The spot where the Union flag was first raised in the colony, in Possession Street, is unmarked; the proposal to commemorate the
A HISTORY OF HONG KONG
4
150th anniversary raised a vigorous protest from civil servants, and was allowed to drop.
No uniforms are. to be seen in the streets except those of the police
-almost invariably Chinese. Nor is economic imperialism much inmevidence. In the car park of the Government Offices, which mightreasonably be expected to contain at least some produ. of the colonialpower, nothing can be seen but Toyotas and other Japanese vehicles;mthe senior civil servants are allowed Mercedes cars, and only themGovernor himself is driven in a Rolls-Royce.
The obvious trappings of empire have been fading steadily since the end of the Second World War. In 1950 the British government d.is-patched a force equivalent to two fully equipped divisions to warn off the Chinese People's Liberation Army. By 1967 a single British soldier stood on guard at Government House while thousands of demonstrators massed outside. At that time Hong Kong still looked what it had been for a century -a colonial backwater, where the cricket pitch occupied the city centre, benignly guarded by Sir Aston Webb's Supreme Court, with the art deco building of the Hongkong and Shanghai Bank as a backdrop. On the waterfront the new Mandarin Hotel and the City Hall stood out well above the surrounding blocks; along at Wanchai the police station looked out directly over the harbour.
Today the court building survives, and houses the Legislative and Executive Councils, but the cricket pitch has vanished, and the Hong-kong Bank's magnificent new inside-out headquarters shrinks beside that of the Bank of China, the dominating symbol of the People'sRepublic's presence. The Mandarin Hotel, now not what it was, and the City Hall, showing its age, are dwarfed by the office buildings that soar above them. At Wanchai reclamation has advanced the land by nearly a quarter of a mile, and a similar expansion is pushing the Central waterfront north. Seen from Kowloon the skyline of what was the city of Victoria now changes by the week, but continues to constitute the most spectacular of views, with the tightly-closed ranks of fine buildings rising from the harbour up the misty slopes of the Peak.
Inland from Kowloon, in the New Territories, the new towns hardly existed at all twenty-five years ago, the settlements at Tsuen Wan and Tuen Mun housing perhaps in all three hundred thousand people.Today over two and a half milli&n live in the new towns, linked by the sparklingly cle.n and efficient Metro and the modernized railway.While the older communities remain uncompromising blocks of multi-storey housing, Sha Tin, the largest, has a university, a new racecourse,

INTRODUCTION
concert halls, and all the amenities that might be expected of a city of
half a million.
Hong Kong's skyline might be that of a more picturesque Man-hattan, but at street level Hong Kong is evidently a Chinese city. Even in Central with its concentration of Western tourists and businessmen, and certainly in the new towns, where there is hardly a gwei/o to be spotted, the crowds are as Chinese as those of Canton or Shanghai.But Hong Kong is uniquely diverse; apart from the well-established Indian and Portuguese communities, its population is mainly Canton-ese, but with half a million others having come from all parts of China to this British colony in search of security and prosperity (con-ditions which are regarded with some pride in the rest of the country). Pea:.ants from Shandong or Sichuan, visiting Beijing, take home post-cards of the marvels of Hong Kong along with those of the Temple of Heaven. They can, however, only guess at the style, energy and ebullience of that remarkable fusion of cultures. That has to be experi-enced for itself, on the streets among the absorbed and bustling crowds, and in the offices of the enterprises which have placed Hong Kong among the most advanced economies in the world.
In order to explain the evolution of Hong Kong some reference to the political history of Britain, Europe and China during the last, two centuries is needed, since events elsewhere have so decisively affected the colony's development. Contemporary writers in China have diffi-culties in analysing this sensitive period in their country's history. The achievements of Communist China in the last fifteen years, especially when compared with the previous chaos under the Kuomintang, have encouraged an always latent chauvinism; the fate of those who ques-tioned the regime during the days of the 'Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution' has discouraged any inclined to be critical. Only very recently has a less engaged view become possible, and otherwise seri-ous Chinese historians still condemn too close an attention to facts as 'undesirable pragmatism in historical study'.3 Works published by the state-controlled Foreign Languages Press generally analyse the period in terms of imperialist exploitation.
There certainly was the most ruthless exploitation of China, but it came later in the nineteenth century, and the worst culprit was no European power, but China's old feudatory, Japan. Nor was Britain, at the time of the acquisition of Hong Kong, an expansionist power in the mould of France or Germany. During the formative years of the colony British opinion and policy was in a stage of development,
A HISTORY OF HONG KONGe
.
with frequent changes of governments in Westminster, often accom-panied by realignments of parties as Tories developed into Conserva-tives and Whigs to Liberals.4 Administrations were always at odds with large sections of public opinion, frequently disagreeing with the actions of their representatives in China, and invariably much more concerned with those domestic issues which would decide the next elections than with any colonial difficulties. Only towards the end of the century was public opinion to seem more bellicose and ready to support colonial wars with some degree of enthusiasm. Even this waned rapidly after the poor showing of the Imperial forces in the Boer War and the return of a Liberal government. A little later, after the end of the First World War, many senior men in the Foreign Office saw Hong Kong as an impediment to good relations with China, and pressed for the colony to be restored to Chinese rule, a sentiment which has never entirelydissipated.
The analyses of Communist apologists usually reflect Marxist theory rather than the evidence itself. Consider for example the Soviet Aca-demician S.L. Tikhvinsky, editorofTheModernHistory ofChina (1972): 'In January 1 840, Queen Victoria declared in her speech at the opening of Parliament that the British government was in sympathy with the actions of Captain Charles Elliot and the British merchants in China. Following the Queen's approval, Lord Palmerston no longer hesitated to start hostilities against China.' In fact almost everyone was annoyed with Elliot, the British representative in China, especially those mer-chants who considered him to have caved in to Chinese threats; and the idea of Lord Palmerston dithering until the twenty-year-old Queen, who at that time was still clinging nervously to Prime Minister Lord Melbourne's coat-tails, had signified her approval is absurd.
Only by exposing such fallacies, and describing political events in England, is the development of Hong Kong explicable. Take, for instance, the Napier mission of 1834, which, by its failure to reach a reasonable commercial agreement between Britain and China led to the war that brought the new colony. That unfortunate episode was due primarily to the confused arrogance of Lord Napier himself, who should never have been selected for so sensitive a responsibility. The question of why so unsuitable a choice was made has never been asked by historians of Hong Kong or China, but the answer is simple: the Whig government of Lord Grey had an obligation towards Napier for services rendered during the difficult passage of the 1832 Reform Bill, and Napier put in a claim for just such a post.
INTRODUCTION
Or take the story of Sir John Bowring, surely the most remarkable man ever to be Governor of the colony. 'Quack Doctor' Bowring, as Palmerston called him, had been a Radical M.P ., the closest friend and executor ofJeremy Bentham, editor, spy (according to the French), steelmaster, financial expert, hymn writer, and translator from Russian, Hungarian and Spanish. When appointed Governor of Hong Kong, and representative of Britain to the whole of China and lndo-China in 1854, Bowring, former Secretary of the Peace Society, precipitated the second Anglo-Chinese war. The results of this war were decisive for the future of all Asia: but how this proto-European with no Eastern or indeed any colonial experience came to be a prime mover in these great affairs has never been explained, or the details exposed of his conspiracy with Sir Harry Parkes, the British Consul at Canton, to force the opening of hostilities.
And why, root of the current problems, did the British government in 1898 only require a ninety-nine-year lease of the New Territories, rather than outright ownership, if it really was party to an unprincipled rush to dismember China?
The explanations, which are detailed in Chapters 3, 7 and 11, are to be found in the changing policies of British governments and the personalities of British Cabinet Ministers, the perennial need to reward faithful party supporters, and the pressures exerted by international 1ivalries, which can only be understood in the context of eyents in Britain and Europe.
The course of history in China must also be noted, for Hong Kong is a British colony only in a special sense (the British government do not even like to call it a colony: in official pronouncements Hong Kong is referred to as a 'territory', but this is more due to a desire to shuffie off responsibility than to semantic accuracy). Properly speaking, a colony is a settlement made by emigrants in a foreign land, with a degree of self-government: Australia and North America were colonies in this sense. Hong Kong is an animal of a different species: even before its official foundation, the austere and industrious Sir James Stephen, Under-Secretary for the Colonies -and grandfather of Vir-ginia Woolf -noted that 'methods of proceeding unknown in other British colonies must be followed in Hongkong, and that the Rules and Regulations ... must, in many regards, bend to exigencies beyond the contemplation of the framers of them'.5 Other colonies, many a great deal smaller, have become independent nations, but HongKong remains a Crown Colony, one where the home government is
8 A A HISTORY OF HONG KONG
responsible for the administration and where the inhabitants have only the most restricted representation. It would therefore be more accurate to describe Hong J(ong as a Chinese colony that happens to be run by Britain.
This anomaly has led to an often considerable degree of insulation between the colony and the upheavals that have rack.d the mainland. Neither the Taiping rebellion of the 1850s, which devastated much of southern China, nor the Boxer disturbances at the tum of the century, which caused massacres of Europeans in the north and led to the occupation of Peking by foreign troops, brought more than ripples to Hong Kong, which for the first eighty years of its existence enjoyed a tranquillity unparalleled elsewhere in the region. While Britain remained the undisputed world power, attempting to keep on good terms with the Chinese authorities, this domesticated outpost of empire continued undisturbed. Only after 1 898, when, in response to increas-ing pressures on China from other Western powers, the British acquired the lease of the New Territories, was the Hong Kong govern-ment pulled into closer contac.t with events on the mainland.
From the Chinese side, too, some clarifications are needed. Hong Kong was given a flying start by the immigration from Canton and Macao of almost all the foreign community, who flocked to the 'barren island' on the heels of the Royal Navy's first landing party. The colony's early history is therefore a continuation of that of the Canto_n trade, and some explanation of how that important branch of international commerce worked is essential. Some of the myths can also profitably be examined; was the 'Opium War' really about opium; did the valiant peasants of the village ofSan-yuan-li defeat British troops in 1841; was the Treaty settlement of 1842-43 unequal and unjust? The emotions aroused by these questions (and I suggest the answers are all in the negative) continue to bedevil exchanges between China and Britain. In spite of the twentieth-century's upheavals, the past of China is very much alive in the national consciousness, and historical continuity has by no means been broken. Jonathan Mirsky of the Observer has noted how the present leaders of China pride t.hemselves, as did the Ch'ing mandarins, on being able to produce elegant calligraphy and correct verse. Alain Peyrefitte, who as a Minister under successive French governments has had excellent opportunities for studying modem China, commented: 'I was struck [in 1971] by the strange similarities between the Maoist state and the one Macartney [the British ambassa-dor in 1793) had confronted. There was the same cult of the Emperor,

INTRODUCTION
Mao merely replacing Qianlong . . . the s_ame concern for the rituals of protocol . . . the same adherence to a common set of references that provided the answer to everything ... '6 and so on for a total of thirteen parallels. Similarly Ssii-Yu Teng and John King Fairbank observed: 'In spite of all the furore of change in recent decades, the hold of the past is still curiously strong in present-day China. Not far below the surface lies the ancient civilization of the Middle Kingdom, a subsoil which limits and conditions the new growth.'7
In the same period Chinese institutions have changed radically, while those in Britain have remained apparently unaltered. The last Emperor of China died working as a gardener in Communist Beijing, while in London Queen Victoria's great-great-grand-daughter, suc-cessor to the last Emperor of India, still sits on the throne, with the Houses of Lords and Commons still forming the High Court of Parlia-ment. Such continuity is deceptive. Since Lord Macartney, on behalf of the Honorable East India Company, first attempted to establish relations with China in 1793, the character and position of Britain in the world has undergone drastic changes. In that year Britain was a small agricultural country, recently deprived ofits most important over-seas possessions, the North American colonies, but with developing industries at home and an equivocal but rapidly consolidating position in India. Within only a few years the nation was transformed into a world imperial power, the inheritors of the Indian raj, with a chain of colonial acquisitions forced from the French, Dutch and Spaniardsand domestic industries that made it 'the workshop of the world'. After less than a century of unprecedented power a slow decline began that brought Britain, from ruling one quarter of the world's population, to being one of the less prosperous Western European states. The mas-sive social engineering needed to enable Britain to function as an imperial power transformed British society in the nineteenth century; it proved a good deal more successful than that subsequently required to adjust to the decline, and the history of Hong Kong reflects these uncomfortable changes.
The rise of the British Empire phased "'ith the fall of the Chinese. In that same year of 1793 China felt secure within her extensive boun-daries, the Middle Kingdom, centre of the civilized world. Power was entrusted to the Emperor, a figur. of cosmic significance, the Heavenly Dragon, comparable to the Sun and the Pole Star, the fount of wisdom and justice: Most Powerful Monarch, Wisest Ruler, Exponent of Heaven's Law. Holding as he did the mandate of Heaven, the Emperor
JO A HISTORY OF HONG KONG
was himself accepted as personally divine, of greater religious signifi-cance than had been even the Byzantine Impcrator, Supreme Augus-tus, Instinct with Divinity. He was both autocrat and high priest, entrusted by Heaven with the governance of China for the welfare and the glory of its people. The visible incarnation of the Han people, the Emperor personally presided over the great sacrifices in the Temple of Heaven in order to ensure good harvests and the blessings of the gods. In theory his divine attributes ensured that whatever the Emperor did must be correct and beneficent; when things began to go wrong this was taken as a sign that the mandate of Heaven had been forfeited, and that it was time for a change of dynasty. The responsibilities of godhead were taken more seriously than those of contemporarylea<lers; the last Ming Emperor, before he hanged himself (in 1644), apologized to his ancestors and to his people: 'Now I meet with Heaven's punishment above, sinking ignominiously below ... May the bandits dismember my corpse and slaughter my officials, but let them not despoil the imperial tombs nor harm a single one of our people.'8
Chinese society was imbued, as it had been for nearly two millennia, with the principles of Confucius, and society fell into the categories prescribed by Confucian philosophy. In this hierarchy the peasantry were accorded second rank in the state, immediately below the rulers, and above the craftsmen; at the very lowest level, persons of the most meagre consideration, who contributed little to the welfare of the com-munity, were the merchants. When eventually Western traders, who had no such conceptions of their humble condition ('the princes of the earth -the MERCHANTS,' according to one of the most famous of them, James Matheson9), met Chinese officials, a clash, at least of cultures, was inevitable. Given the supreme self-confidence of both parties it was almost equally certain that this would lead to armed conflict.

I
THE TWO EMPIRES
The last dynasty
A confrontation between China and the West became increasingly likely from the beginning of the nineteenth century, and when it came resulted in the cession of Chinese territory to the British. But why, when the choice was made, it fell upon the outstandingly unattractive island of Hong Kong requires a detailed explanation.
The rocky and precipitous island of Hong Kong is one of the hun-dreds scattered in the Pearl River estuary: not the largest, nor the most prominent, nor, at the time of its acquisition by the British in 1842, the most populous, and certainly not the most fertile. It was an uncon-sidered appendage of an isolated Chinese county to which no one had paid much attention, even though the Pearl River had been one of the most important commercial waterways, not only in China, but in the world, for a thousand years. That importance was due primarily to the weather systems of the South China Sea. From April to October a reliable south-west wind provides easy passage for ships coming from the west, while from November to April reciprocal north-easterlies facilitate the return voyage. To vessels making the dangerous passage from the west the Pearl River is the first safe haven in the Chinese Empire.
The first Europeans to visit the region, the Portuguese, in the six-teenth century, found an immediately available anchorage in the lee of the Macao peninsula, where they had been allowed to settle. No suggestion was made of a permanent alienation of Chinese territory; the Portuguese were confined within a strong wall, through which
12 A HISTORY OF HONG KONG
provisions were allowed to trickle, in quantities calculated from day to day. Some seventy miles upstream from Macao is the great commercial city of Canton, the-sea-gateway to China and capital of the twin prov-inces of Kwangtung and Kwangsi (Guangdong and Guangxi), which stretch for eight hundred miles across the south of China. The physical geography of rivers sometimes has profound effects �Pon history -the expansion of London is largely due to its position as the lowest bridge point on the Thames, at the head of an estuary which narrows at Tilbury to an easily defensible point. Canton occupies a similar position, on an estuary notably easy of access. The Admiralty Pilot for 1864, the first published for those waters, described the approach as 'probably more safe than that of any other large river in tl1e world'. Sheltered harbours abound near the islands of Lantao, Lamma, and, further upriver, Lintin. Dangers other than navi-gational, however, existed: the islands in the estuary, extending the coastline to hundreds of miles, gave shelter to a populationwhich existed by fishing, piracy and smuggling. Piracy continued until well into modem times, but is now rare; fishing and smuggling still flourish.
In theory the Pearl River is as easily defensible as the Thames. About thirty miles above Macao the channel narrows to a few hundred yards into the strait kno\\n as the Bocca Tigris, the aptly named Tiger's Mouth, commonly known as the Bogue, or Humen, where the passage is commanded by the guns of the Ch'uen-pi and Ty-tok-to forts. Between Ch'uen-pi and the Second Bar, for rather less than twenty miles, a ship has to stick to the channel, never out of range of the shore. At the Bar a sea-going vessel has to wait for a tide to help it over the shallows: the First Bar, just below Whampoa, is even more restrictive. Whampoa, some seven miles below Canton, is therefore the limit for ocean-going ships of any size. Captain Richard Alsager1 reported in 1829 that while six-hundred-ton ships could make Whampoa with ease it would not be prudent for a 1200-tonner, there not being more than twenty-five feet of water at best on the First Bar. Canton itself is accessible only by shallow-draught vessels. A hostile man-of-war, if it braved the gauntlet of the forts in the Tiger's Mouth, would in most conditions find herself stuck at Whampoa, unable to bring Canton within the range of her guns, with only the ship's boats able to penetrate further upriver.
Kwangtung is an odd region, regarded by the rest of China with suspicion and disdain. The Sung emperors, who ruled China from

THE TWO EMPIRES
960 to 12 79, were worried by reports of the great number of wizards and sorcerers in the city, and issued special edicts forbidding human sacrifices to be mad.e to demons. In part this distrust is due to its remoteness, the better part of two thousand kilometres from Peking, and separated from the older capitals of China by mountain ranges crossed only by difficult and infrequent passes. The language spoken by the inhabitants is unintelligible to northern Chinese; their customs are looked upon with distaste. It seems Cantonese will eat anything -and it is not all that easy to find food unacceptable to Chinese cookery -bats, tortoises, raw monkey's brains and new-born rats, for example. This appearance of strangeness and remoteness was to be of some importance �Pin the events that led to the establishment of Hong Kong. A Peking government would expect nothing but diffi-culties from the province, which after all was a very long way off; when in the eighth century A.O. Canton was sacked by Arab raiders Peking viewed the event with some equanimity. Little that went on in the remote and dubious south was likely to fret Peking unduly, but when barbarian warships showed up in the Bay of Chihli, as theydid in the nineteenth century, alarm signals flashed in the Imperial palace.
Canton, in spite of its peculiarities, was acknowledged to be a great city, known throughout the Empire as 'the Provincial City'. At the beginning of the eighteenth century, when the East India Company eventually settled there to trade, a French visitor to Canton wrote: 'This city is larger than Paris, and almost as populous. The streets are narrow and paved ... with large, level and very hard stones ... The finest quarters are very like the rue de la Foire St Germain in Paris ... there are many fine squares and magnificent triumphal arches'.2 To this great centre the Portuguese settlement of Macao was nothingbut an appendage, although at that time one of strategic commercial importance.
On Chinese maps of the Ch'ing period (1644-1911) Hong Kong is either omitted or unrecognizable; its first appearance is on a chart published in 1760, which shows only the west coast of the island. A slightly later chart prepared by Captain George Hayter of the East India Company's ship York is an eccentric production which, although giving soundings in what is now Victoria Harbour, indicates the anchor-age as south of the Soko Islands, a very exposed spot. Incredibly, Hong Kong is depicted as two separate islands; clearly a botched job, but at least Captain Hayter recorded the now famous name. The
A HISTORY OF HONG KONG
larger of his two fictitious islands is named 'An-chin-cheo' or 'He-ong-Kong'.3
Like so much of the British Empire, Hong Kong was acquiredalmost by accident. The Emperor Tao-kuang (Daoguang) became, on his accession in 1820, the sixth emperor of the ninth dynasty to rule China over a period of two thousand years. He was the favourite grandson of the great Ch'ien-lung (Qianlong} Emperor (1736-96),4 in whose long reign China had expanded to its greatest extent ever, and he inherited supreme control of six million square miles of terri-tory, from the Karakorum mountains to the sea, and from the steppes of Siberia to the borders of Inda-China.
The Emperor was not himself Chinese, but a Tungu, Manchu or Tar.ar, a race of different language, customs and traditions, from the region between Korea and Russia. Many of his Chinese subjects were bitterly antagonistic to Manchu rule, and movements to restore a purely Chinese dynasty were endemic. His forebears inhabited Manchuria, the region beyond the Great Wall and north of Korea, towards the Amur River and the present Russian frontier. They were hunters and fishers, using reindeer and canoes, growing crops when it suited, but relying mainly on their considerable skills as horse-and bow-men. In 1607 the Tungu prince Nurhaci succeeded in forcibly uniting Man-churia and proclaimed himself as Great Khan. He reinforced his mili-tary victories by generous rewards to those prominent Chinese, Mongols and Koreans who surrendered, and was therefore able to create in Manchuria a state on a Chinese model, but one which remained characteristically Manchu. The royal family was in command of the field armies, organized in eight Banners or divisions of some eight thousand men each. The very names of the first Manchus -Dorgan, Jirgalang, and Manggultai, give a flavour of the un-Chineseness of them all.
Nurhaci turned his united Manchu state against Ming China in 1618, capturing Peking in 1644. When Nurhaci's son Abahai made the transition from Khan of Manchuria to Emperor of China, he took the reign name of T'ai-tsung and declared that his dynasty should be known as the Ch'ing. In his proclamation T'ai-tsung made a brutallyfrank statement of Manchu aims: 'By keeping peace inside and grab-bing outside a great empire is rising.'5 The dynastic tradition of the Ch'ing continued to be military: princes were brought up not only with a modest classical learning, but to excel in such warlike skills as archery and horsemanship. The Manchu standing army of bannermen was an
THE TWO EMPIRES
impressive force, which in the eighteenth century proved itself capable of extended hard fighting as well as holding down enormous tracts of newly-conqueredgterritory. The moral shock experienced by the
.dynasty in the following century when Manchu armies later crumbled under the assault of numerically much inferior Western forces was therefore great, in fact nearly terminal.
The pure Han Chinese found their new masters crude. Dutch traders were taken aback when they met in Peking one of the highest early Manchu officials, the President of the Board of Rites, guardian of the most sacred traditions, who 'sent for a piece of Pork to satisfy his appetite, which was half-raw, whereof he did eat most heartily, fo a slovenly manner, that he looked more like a Butcher than a Prince'. They found Manchu ladies equally lacking in Chinese formality -one'geat Tartar Lady ... was very debonair and free ... she took the
gr
Embassador's hat, and put it on her own Head, and unbuttoned his doublet almost down to his Waste'.6 In time the Manchus adapted more closely to Chinese manners, but they made sure that their indi-viduality was retained by legislative measures. Intermarriage with Chinese was banned; the Manchu heartland was forbidden to Chinese, a willow pale marking the limit beyond which Chinese emigration was not allowed. An Imperial Clan court closely supervised the activities of all members of the Imperial family, largely distancing them from any real share in power, but ensuring their education, comforts and generally good behaviour.
The perspicacious Lord Macartney, who had ample opportunities for observing Chinese and Manchus during his embassy in 1793, recorded that: 'A series of two hundred years in the succession of eight or ten monarchs did not change the Mogul into a Hindu, nor has a century and a half made Ch'ien-lung [the Emperor] a Chinese. He remains, at this hour, in all his maxims of policy, as true a Tartar as any of his ancestors.'7 A firm hold was kept by the Ch'ing on the army. All military communications, down to field orders, were written in Manchu, and therefore unintelligible even to an educated Chinese. Although the standing army, the bannermen, brigaded Manchus with Chinese and Mongols, the Manchus were considerably better paid (seven ounces of silver per month for a Tartar horseman, 3.3 ounces for a Chinese trooper: fifty mou of land for a Manchu, thirty-five for a Mongol, and twenty-five for a Chinese).
A HISTORY OF HONG KONO
Scholars and gentlemen
While maintaining ,the Manchu character of the court and army, the Ch'ing dynasty wisely made use of the established Chinese administrat-ive machine. The Chinese civil service had survived many changes of dynasty since it took its original shape during that of the Tang, who ruled from the seventh to the tenth century. Unlike that of other great empires, where administrators came usually from the ranks of the clergy, the army, or court favourites, the Chinese civil service was based upon recruitment through strictly controlled examinations. In assessing merit polished style was paramount: learning counted for something, but originality was positively discouraged. Examinations centred around the 'eight-legged' essay, of between 360 and 720 words, in prose and in verse, which had to be elegantly phrased and written in the finest calligraphy. The set topics were all from Confucian classics, and impeccable Confucian orthodoxy was expected. Three sets of preliminary examinations were needed before the successful candidate gained admission to the lowest rank of the 'gentry', that of sheng-yuan, at an average age of twenty-four. It took another ten years of dedicated study to reach the top, the chin-shih degree, the examin-ations for which were held under the personal aegis of the Emperor himself, and to which only an elite handful of scholars were admitted each year.
A chin-shih graduate would be typically about thirty-five, and would therefore have spent over twenty years treading and retreading the same intellectual mill. It is hardly surprising that successful candidates were 'stunned into submissiveness, and became cautious and meek officials of the court'. Undeniably, those who survived the rigours of unremitting competition had qualities of resilience and toughness, but the suppression of original thought often led to a crippling incapacity to react to new circumstances, which was to have serious effects. When faced with the baffling new problems imposed by the nineteenth-century barbarians demanding entrance to the Celestial Kingdom, even men of great personal ability such as Lin Tse-hsii could do little more than repeat previously successful responses and fall back on platitudes. It was more often t'1e Manchu officials, less attached to intellectual formulae than were the Chinese scholar-governors, who showed signs of readiness to adapt to changing circumstances.
The chin-shih graduate was assured of a senior position: others had to take their chance, and chances could be improved, quite legitimately,

THE TWO EMPIRES
by buying a step, but only at the lower en_d of the scale. Those who had passed intermediate examinations or were able to buy promotion joined the ranks of the 'gentry' or 'literati'. Gentry were allowed privi-leges which included the right to wear distinctive costumes and ex-emption from many legal requirements, taxes and services. Since examinations were open to all (all males, at least), a young man from the humblest of backgrounds, if talented and dedicated enough, could in theory reach the highest position in the administration. In practice, the odds were weighted in favour of those whose families could support them during the long apprenticeship, and who, having gained an official position, could then consolidate and perpetuate family fortunes. Such intimate links between gentry families and office holders ensured that there was always a large body of unofficial support available to sup-plement the efforts of the numerically very restricted official class. In this way their function was parallel to that of Justices of the Peace in English shires, assisting Lord Lieutenants in raising militia, settling local disputes, and encouraging accepted morality. Although Manchus, very much a minority -there being only two million of them -took a share in these tasks, they were more often found among the military or at court. The tradition of their race was one of military prowess rather than literary or administrative skills, and they retained a less formal and more open attitude to many subjects than the classically educated Chinese.
The Manchus' most lasting influence is seen on the present map of China: the boundaries of the People's Republic follow the limits established by the Ch'ing Empire, with the important exceptions of Formosa and Mongolia, now independent. It was the Emperor Ch'ien-lung who made the most imposing additions to the Empire, settling the western borders in a series of vigorous expeditions that brought Chinese Turkestan, now the autonomous region of Sinkiang, within it. Successful campaigns also forced the Gurkhas of Nepal, the Bur-mese, and most of Indo-China to acknowledge the Emperor as over-lord. The conquest of Sink.iang had proved extremely expensive, and the costs of retaining the huge territory continued to deplete the Imperial treasury, but for much of his long reign Ch'ien-lung could rely upon the resources amassed by his predecessors, and China con-tinued to enjoy tranquillity and prosperity. The population doubled, to something like three hundred million at the end of the eighteenth century, an expansion which was matched by a similar increase in agricultural production.
A HISTORY OF HONG KONG
By the time Ch'ien-lung's successor came to the throne, however, the treasury had been further emptied by the depredations of the old Emperor's favourite, Ho-shen, who had amassed a huge fortune at public expense. The new Emperor, who took the reign name Chia-ch'ing Uiaqin), was forced to cut expenses and raise income wherever possible. Although Chia-ch'ing was a man of sober, even frugal personal habits, dedicated to reform and retrenchment, his reign (1796-1820) was plagued by difficulties: the Yellow River overflowed its banks seventeen times, causing widespread famine; serious rebellions erupted and pirates devastated the coasts; and the Western barbarians, having insinuated themselves uncomfortably close to the boundaries of the Middle Kingdom, were beginning to be troublesome.
An empire acquired in a fit of absent-mindedness
The question of who owned the world, or at least that portion of itwhich had not as yet come to the attention of the Pope, should have been settled once and for all on 4 and 5 May 1493. Pope Alexander VI, who had, of course, divine authority to dispose of all lands inhabited only by the heathen, devoted those two days to adjudicating the division of all new discoveries equably between Spain and Portugal. All lands to the west of a line from the North to South Poles, at a distance of one hundred leagues west of the Azores and the Cape Verde Islands, were to become the property of Spain: the remainder was to be Portu-guese. One of the Pope's reasons for wishing to oblige Spain was that the Vicar of Christ, after betrothing his daughter Lucrezia to two Spaniards in succession, was finally about to marry her to an Italian, Giovanni Sforza. If any problems remained as to who was entitled to what, they should have been clarified in 1580, when the crowns of Spain and Portugal were united.
This arrangement did not commend itself to the other European nations, especially those who had adopted the reformed faith, but during the sixteenth century their energies were occupied elsewhere. England, apart from an unsuccessful attempt to colonize Virginia, restricted herself to looting Spanish possessions and capturing Spanish ships; France was occupied with religious civil wars; Holland was just emerging as a nation, free from Spanish oppression. By 1600 things had changed, at least in England and Holland, although it was some years before France joined in the quest for new territories and foreign
THE TWO EMPIRES
trade. Territorial expansion was confined to the New World, the British concentrating on North American settlements and the West Indian islands, and the Dutch on building a Brazilian empire. America, apart from the already conquered Spanish and Portuguese lands, was inhabited by aborigin'als who could be driven out, absorbed or simplyexterminated, but the East was partitioned between two great empires, the Moghul in India and the Chinese, with many other organized states forming powerful obstacles to would-be colonizers. The Dutch and English therefore confined their attention to expanding trade in the East rather than in attempts at conquest. At first the Dutch expended a much greater effort. Thefr United East India Company was founded in 1602 with a capital equivalent to over half a million pounds sterling; their British competitors; the Honorable East India Company, estab-lished two years earlier, had only a little over thirty thousand pounds; in the first decade the Dutch sent out sixty ships, the English seventeen.
Subsequent British voyages prospered, and the Company, although driven almost to extinction by the policies of Charles I, was placed on its feet again by a Cromwellian reorganization. Shortly afterwards its position in India was consolidated when Bombay was presented to the Crown as part of Charles II's wedding settlement with the Portuguese Princess Catherine of Braganza. When Bombay was then granted by the King to the Honorable East India Company a legally unquestioned and secure British base was for the first time established in the East, matching those already held by the Portuguese and Dutch, and event-ual diversification into the China trade became again a possibility. By 1711, with the Ch'ing emperors firmly in control and willing to relax the restrictions on foreign trade, the Company was able to establish a trading post in Canton itself.
At this time the Indian subcontinent was still peripheral to European affairs, with British, French, Portuguese and Danish traders relying on the goodwill of native rulers. The Company was operating from three Indian centres; Bombay, a British possession, Madras and Cal-cutta, both leased from Indian princes. Its Indian trading concessions and permissions were granted by the Moghul Emperor in Delhi and by his at least nominally-subject rulers, a state of affairs all concerned found satisfactory. Two separate factors changed this; the MoghulEmpire crumbled with astonishing speed under attacks by Persians, Afghans and Maharata Hindus, creating a power vacuum in north India, and the British and French became embroiled in the first wars to be fought on a global scale, between 1740 and 1758.
A HISTORY OF HONG KONG
The upshot of this was that, after some extraordinary adventures, the Honorable East India Company emerged as undisputed masters of the richest province of India, Bengal, and the unchallenged European trading power. As holders of the diwani, or tax farm, the Company was entitled to collect all the revenues of Bengal, which before had been paid to the Moghul Emperor. They had, it was observed, 'acquired an empire in a fit of absence of mind'. Having thus become effectively a corporate Indian princely power, a trading company exercising sovereign rights over tens of millions of subjects, and dispos-ing of considerable armed strength, the directors were driven into defending their interests against the dozens of other Indian rulers scrabbling to profit from the disintegrating Moghul Empire. This pro�P,ed a costly business. Dividends suffered and the Company teetered on the brink of bankruptcy, forcing the British government to step in to assist.
In doing so ministers were motivated by pressing economic reasons.
It was not only that the India merchants and stockholders were a rich source of patronage, which all eighteenth-century governments kept a lively eye upon, but that British governments, by the latter part of the century, were dependent upon the activities of the East India Company for a substantial part of their revenue. Or, more accurately, upon the Company's trade in China tea, which had become its most important source of profit as the British settled into their national addiction. Peter Mundy, who was probably the first Englishman to taste the stuff, had not been overimpressed by 'a certain Drinke called Chaa ...cwhich is only water with a kind of herbe boyled in itt. It must bee Drancke warme and is accompted wholesome,'8 but his descendants took to it with alacrity. In 1664 2lb 2oz of tea was imported into England. By 1783 this had risen to over 2600 tons. And this was the amount landed officially -tea was smuggled in great quantities (thought to have amounted to three times the amount legally imported) in order to avoid the high duties levied upon it. Even so, and after substantial reductions in the rate of duty the revenue on tea represented something like I o per cent of the total British government income; and all the tea, lawful or illicit, came from a single source, Canton, for the cultivation of Thea sinensis outside China did not begin until 1832, in Assam. Such a valuable trade had to be safeguarded, and the East India Company was proving incapable of so doing.
By 1772 the Company was in dire trouble: it had increased its trade much beyond what was prudent, and outstripped its banking facilities
THE TWO EMPIRES
so far as to be unable to meet debts falling due to the Bank of England and to t.he Customs and Excise. Proving for what was probably the first time in commercial history that if you owe enough money someone will be forced to bail you out, Lord North's government produced a loan of �Gi ,400,000 for what would otherwise have been a bankruptEast India Company and insisted, in return for its money, on the passage of a Regulating Act (1773) which tightened controls on the Company.
Feelings ran so high that two successive governments fell on Indian reform issues before William Pitt the Younger was able, after fighting a general election on his policy, to bring in a definitive India Bill (1784) which settled the future pattern of Indian administration. Commercial conuol and the power of appointing to all political and military posts -subject to a government veto -remained in the hands of the Courtmof Directors of the Honorable East India Company, themselves electedby the Court of Proprietors -the stockholders. The government itselftook 'the power of directing what political objects the Company's ser-vants were to pursue, and recalling such as did not pay obedience tomsuch directions'. Policy was to be defined by the Board of Control, amgovernment body, the President of which afterwards became a Cabinetminister. Matters were settled for a limited term only, subject to themrenewals of the Company's charter at regular intervals, the next reviewof which was due in 1793. It was the third of these reviews, in 1833,mthat led to the events which caused the first Chinese War and themcession of Hong Kong.
The oddity, to put it mildly, of vesting a commercial joint-stockcompany with powers to run what was then the equivalent of the largest European state, can be explained by English pragmatism -it worked, so leave it more or less alone, subject to keeping an eye on it -but also by the government's worries about patronage. There were so many lucrative offices within the gift of the rulers of India that no British government, however happy it would have been to use these to reward its own devoted supporters, would be willing to let them slip into the hands of the opposition when their turn came. The first President of the Board of Control, Henry Dundas, acknowledged this: 'No person wishing well to the interests of this country and the freedom of its constitution can soberly wish to see the patronage concentrated in the hands of any Administration. '9
The India Act of 1784 centralized power in India in the office of the Governor General, nominated by the Crown, and resident in
A HISTORY OF HONG KONG
Calcutta, two Governors being responsible for the other Presidenciesof Madras and Bombay. The first Governor-General appointed underthe new Act, George, Lord Cornwallis (1786-94), effectively foundedmodem India. Under�Phis rule Bengal was given a civil service, a systemofglaw and a judiciary; merchants and administrators were clearly separ-ated -administrators were salaried, forbidden to engage in trade, whichwas how their predecessors had made their fortunes, and their 'relaxedhabits' tightened up. Bengal became the most modem and powerfulIndian state, but was still only one among dozens disputing for terri-tories and hegemony. The customs and practices of the people wereleft undisturbed, as they had been by the previous rulers, the IslamicPersian-speaking Moghuls, who would have seemed to a HinduBengali to be no less foreign than the British, and a good deal less
efficient.
Cornwallis -who in 1781 had surrendered the British forces to theAmericans at Yorktown -was a civilized and pleasant man who,although an able General, was pledged to non-aggression. LordWellesley, elder brother of the Duke of Wellington, initiated a verydifferent policy on his appointment in 1797. This had the effect ofbringing, within the following twenty years, the greater part of thesubcontinent under the sway of what remained a trading company,even if one subject to the control of British governments.
The 1793 review took place without stimulating any but the most
feeble interest in a House of Commons much more occupied with the
war that had just begun with France. Few alterations were made to theCompany's monopoly, which was, however, beginning to be seriouslyeroded from other quarters. Any British subject -including, of course,Indians themselves -was allowed to trade from India to anywhere inthe world except Britain. This trade was generally known as thetrade, and the ships engaged in it, often built in the East, as 'country'ships. Their operations were subject to licences from the Company,but these were freely issued. What concerned the government morewas that a foreign clandestine trade, estimated at the equivalent of tenthousand tons of various merchandise a year, a considerable proportionof the total, had grown up, as nationals of other countries muscledin. And India was proving increasingly costly; the expansionist policyinitiated by Lord Wellesley, and the resulting wars, were expensive,sending the po.itical budget {that concerned with administration, thecommercial affairs being accounted for separately) shooting up. Athome, financing the titanic struggle against Napoleon was draining the
THE TWO EMPIRES
Treasury. Demand for Indian produce slumped; profits fell from 1799, moving into loss from 1809; by 1824 raw�PsiJk imports were altogether halted. Only the China trade remained profitable, thanks to the insatiable British thirst for tea, and it remained a Company monopoly, protected not only by the British government but by the Chinese insist-ence that all trade be carried out in Canton under strictly regulated control.
Not that the British government was much concerned with such ma:ters after the final defeat of Napoleon in 181 5. Britain came out of that period of turmoil having lost the most populous of its North American colonies, but gained a portfolio of formerly French and Dutch possessions sca.ered across the globe. Restoring, as far as pos:,,ible, the status quo at home was the object of government, and anything suggesting change was deeply distrusted. Tory governments remained ln power for fifteen years, although they became more liberal in attitude as younger men came to the fore. On most subjects the views of such politicians as Robert Peel, George Canning and William Huskisson would have been considered dangerously advanced by Con-tinental administrations, and were at least as liberal as those of the Whig opposition. If anything the Whig leaders were more personallyaristocratic than their Tory counterparts, from whom they differed most sharply on the subject of Parliamentary reform. The Whig Prime
..linister Lord Grey, who forced through the 1832 ParliamentaryReform Bill, was a great landowning Earl, 'an aristocrat both by pos-ition and by nature' as he described himself: only four of his Cabinet were not with him in the House of Lords, and all of these were substantial landowners, with handles to their names; the sole exception was the President of the Board of Control of the East India Company, plain Charles Grant (and even he rapidly became a peer as Lord Glenelg).
What distinguished Whigs from Tories were the pressures to which they responded. Whigs were more ready to listen to Irish grievances, and usually enjoyed the support of most Irish M.P .s. Tories remained sensitive to the prejudices of the established Protestant Churches in England and Ireland, and fiercely protective of what they believed to be the interests of landowners. The Whigs, although their leaders shared such concerns, were much more subject to the influence of the increasingly important and prosperous classes of merchants and manufacturers. Their Reform Bill was much more a measure to trans-fer power from the countryside to the new industrial towns, than one
A HISTORY OF HONG KONG
to extend the right to vote. Whig ministers might not dine with Lanca-shire mill owners, but they were conscious of their economic power and their importance to the wealth of the nation in a way the Tories were not. This readiness of the Whigs to listen to manufacturers,traders and merchants was to have an important effect on affairs in China.
Listening did not imply personal regard. C.H. Philips, in his history of the East India Company, remarked: 'The ruling class in England in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries seldom praised the Board without at the same time censuring the Directors -perhapsbecause the latter were closely associated with commerce and with the upstart Nabobs.' To the aristocratic politicians, Whig or Tory, the Directors of the Honorable East India Company were but 'those worthy cheesemongers', those 'mean-spirited men', those 'paltry shab-roons'.10 Neither Whigs nor Tories encouraged colonial expansion. Indeed, Whig statesmen were quite prepared to rid themselves of possessions which seemed to be a nuisance, of which Canada was deemed the 'most dangerous'. And colonists themselves were remark-ably troublesome: West Indian planters mounted a rearguard action against the emancipation of slaves, which succeeded in driving up their own compensation to the staggering figre of �G20 million, equivalent
gu
to a full year's government expenditure; Australia was proving not entirely satisfactory as a penal colony, and the free settlers there con-stantly agitated for political rights well in advance of any they might have expected in the home country; the South African Boers were perennially recalcitrant, and frequently rebellious.
India was a special case, a source of mingled pride and anxiety, but neither Indian nor colonial affairs attracted any attention outside specialist circles: debates were poorly attended, and, except when a dramatic war seized attention, public opinion voted all colonies a bore (colonial affairs are almost totally absent, for example, from Anthony Trollope's political novels).
In addition to the various points of view affecting British attitudes towards China, there was one man who for many years exercised the greatest influence. For thirty-five years British foreign policy was domi-nated by the opinionated, adventurous, highly conservative Liberal, Henry Temple, Lord Palmerston. Although he had held office since 1807, when, as a Tory, he became a Lord of the Admiralty straight from Cambridge, Palmerston first attained real power in 1830, as Foreign Secretary in the Whig government of Lord Grey. Even had
THE TWO EMPIRES
he been a less powerful and effective politician his span of office would have given him enormous influence: between 1830 and 1865, while Britain was at her peak as the world power, there were only a few years when he was not occupying one of the highest offices of state, as Foreign Secretary, Home Secretary, or Prime Minister.
A cross and costly voyage
The two empires, British and Chinese, had their first confrontation in the seventeenth century, during the last days of the Ming dynasty. Sir William Courten, a rich London merchant, who had already to all intents and purposes acquired Barbados, persuaded King Charles I to give permission for a trading enterprise towards China, with the added intention of, if possible, discovering a north-east passage 'by California, on the backeside of America'. It was hoped that the enterprise would be assisted by the Portuguese, ancient allies of England, who were the only European nation to enjoy even a limited trade with China. It was therefore at the Portuguese settlement of Macao that Courten's expedition, under the command of an aggressive Yorkshireman, Cap-tain John Weddell, first called in June 1637.
Although Weddell and his ships were civilly enough received by the Portuguese, they were only moderately successful. In fact, the Portuguese had no intention of allowing the British to muscle in, and ensured that the Chinese authorities in Canton extended only a cool welcome. Weddell made matters worse by bluster and an attempt to use force. Six British merchants were detained by the Chinese in Canton, treated reasonably well, but only released when Weddell formally agreed to leave; a friendly Chinese admiral, Tsung-ping, admitted to one of his involuntary guests, Nathaniel Mountney, that 'he was sorry he could do noe more for them, beinge the plaine truth that the Portugalls had outbribed them'.11
Eventually, after 'a cross and costly voyage', Weddell's ships were able to collect a reasonable cargo, six hundred tons, mainly of sugar ('very good, smelling like roses'), but also green ginger, cloves, gold and porcelain, which was as much as he might have expected. To ensure continuing !J"ade persistent negotiation over a number of seasons, accompanied by diligent, accurate and adequate bribery com-bined with a willingness to make a fuss if cheated too badly, would have been essential, and might have resulted in a compromise being
A HISTORY OF HONG KONG
reached with both Portuguese and Chinese. Such a long-term effort could only have been made if the British had been able to operate from a secure base�P somewhere conveniently near: it was certainly not possible to do so from England, half a world away. Even had the East India Company been willing to co-operate with what was a rival con-cern, their own first settlement in India, Fort St George (Madras), was only established in 1640, and remained for some time precarious.
Nor were the Chinese then able to take a long-term view; a change of policy towards trade with the foreign barbarians was out of the question, since a violent change of dynasty, with all the civil turmoil that portended, was imminent. Whole provinces were already in revolt: Szechuan, and the ancient heartland of Honan and Shensi, were in Manchu hands. Only four years after Weddell's departure the last Ming emperor hanged himself in Peking. The imposition of the Ch'ing dynasty's control over the whole of China took another generation, and the process brought an end to prospects of trade for many years: the East India factor at Surat reported: 'The Tartars overrun and waste all the inland country without.settling any Government in the places which they overcome . . . nor is there any certainty of trade in any part of China under the Tartar; who is an enemy to trade and hath depopulated all the vast quantityes of islands on the coaste of all mari-time parts of Chyna and 8 leagues from the sea merely not to have a trade with any.'12
By 17 II, when the East India Company were permitted to establish a post in Canton, they no longer needed to rely upon Portuguese goodwill. Macao had a bad time of it in the seventeenth century, after its trade to Japan had been cut off when that country dosed its boundaries to foreigners in 1639. The population, 'mostly mongrels', was described in 1759 as being 'kept under servile Awe by the Chinese',13 and at the end of the century Lord Macartney was no more complimentary: 'The Portuguese ... as a nation, have long been really exanimated and dead in this part of the world.'14 The residual impor-tance of Macao lay in its proximity to Canton, which soon became the only outlet for Western enterprise in China, as foreign trade was organized by the Manchu emperors. A series of edicts issued between 1685 and 1752 established the conditions under which this might be allowed. Traders could come orJy to Canton (in the early years some were allowed to visit Ningpo, and one or two other ports, but Canton was always much the most important, and, after a while, the only, centre). Tribute-bearing missions from foreign states were to proceed
THE TWO EMPIRES
to Peking, but otherwise no access was �Pallowed to the capital by foreigners (excepting the Russians, who, coming from overland, were not regarded in the same suspicious light).
For the greater part of the eighteenth century Canton acted much as does the venue for a modern trade fair, as an outlet for Chinese goods. Sugar was no longer in such demand, since nearer alternative sources had been established, of which the most important to Britain, oddly enough, was William Courten's island of Barbados. Silks, nan-keen cottons, porcelain, paper, medical products such as rhubarb (sov-ereign against constipation) and spices were all in demand. Imports developed only slowly, and payment remained, as it had been for Weddell, strictly cash. Business was allowed on a strictly regulated basi.;. Private enterprise was banned: only a restricted range of goods could be bought or sold, and only by duly authorized persons, at the appointed season, and in accordance with multifarious rules. Authority was vested in the Hoppo (Cantonese hoi poi, an abbreviation of the Mandarinyueh hai kuan pu), superintendent of the South Sea Customs, an office which had existed since the eleventh century, but was now reformed and extended in power. The Hoppo was a medium-ranking official, now always a Manchu, appointed for three years and socially much inferior to the Viceroy or Governor-General (tsung-tu) of Kwangtung and Kwangsi, one of the highest officials of the Chinese Empire, or even to the Governor of Canton City. But these distin-guished gentlemen, usually traditional Chinese scholar-administrators, were only paid modest salaries (a contemporary calculation was that the ratio between the official remuneration of a Governor and that obtained -to put it politely -irregularly, was 7 per cent: 93 per cent) and therefore depended for their comfort on the exertions of the Hoppo. These were always forthcoming, for the Hoppo had paid a great deal for his appointment, and had to recoup it within the term of his office: his first year's emoluments paid off the purchase price, the second provided the wherewithal to satisfy the 'squeezes' demanded by superiors, leaving only the third year's income for himself.15 In theory, Chinese customs duties were clearly specified: in practice as much as possible was collected, and as little as prudent remitted to Peking.
Under the Hoppo's aegis was the merchants' guild, the Kung-hang, or Cohong, which was progressively more tightly organized into the 'instrument by which he fthe Hoppo] tapped the foreign trade to an extent ... unparalleled since the palmy days of the Roman Empire' .16 Only members of the Cohong were allowed to sell to foreigners, and
28 A HISTORY OF HONG KONG
every foreign ship coming to Canton was obliged to conduct its business through a guild member, who became the recognized sponsor for ship and crew, responsible for ensuring that all requirements were duly fulfilled by the 'captain and owners, and that crews behaved with propriety. In spite of the base position usually accorded to merchants in the Chinese hierarchy, the head of each Hong, or firm, was given official rank as mandarin of the lowest, ninth, degree,�Pand entitled to append the honorific 'kuan' to his name. It was an honour sometimes dearly bought, for given the enormous volume of trade that developed and their monopolistic position, the Cohong houses assumed great responsibilities. Eventually they 'not only settled prices, sold goods,guaranteed duties, restrained the foreigners, negotiated with them, controlled smuggling, and leased premises to them; they also had to manage all the aspects of a banking business, act as interpreting agen-cies, support the militia and educational institutions, and make all manner of presents and contributions to the authorities far and near' .
71Some of these nineteenth-century Hong merchants did extremely well for themselves; Howqua, the best known, estimated his net worth at $26 million, which would probably have made him the richest businessman in the world. But others, as is the way when business presents great opportunities and demands great risks, did badly, with both commercial and official repercussions. As failed merchants they were bankrupt, and as their failure entailed a loss -often a considerable one -to the Imperial exchequer, they were liable to exile to remote and uncomfortable parts. Some took their own lives rather than face the consequences.
Foreign traders were similarly regimented, not too unwillingly, into a comparably tight organization, under the supervision of the Honorable East India Company. 'Country traders' were allowed to ply between India and other eastern ports, but all other British ships were prevented by the Company's monopoly from making the passage to the East, while the emergent British sea-power ensured that Dutch, Spanish, Swedish, and later American merchants were content to accept the Company's hegemony. France made a great effort to obtain a share of the Eastern trade, but the Compagnie des lodes (which had a whole new city, L'Orient, provided for them as a base on the coast of Brittany) never made much cf a showing in China. There was no question of foreign diplomatic representation at Canton, and accord-ingly it was the East India Company's officials who acted as consuls would otherwise have done in representing the foreign community to
THE TWO EMPIRES
the Chinese. While each captain dealt with his own Hong guarantor, more serious difficulties could be sorted out by Company representa-tives, who themselves became formally organized into the Select Com-mittee of Supra Cargoes, commonly known as the 'Select', and headed by a President. Originally 'Supra Cargo' -and always so, as far as the East India Company Was concerned -the supercargo was a representa-tive of the owners of the cargo, responsible for disposing of it profitably and buying whatever return merchandise he could find. In earlier days he was appointed, like the ship's officers, for a single voyage, but as trade became more regular supercargoes tended to become more permanent residents in Macao and Canton.
The most serious difficulties between the foreign community and the Ch'ing authorities arose from the coexistence of their different and incompatible ideas of justice. This clash became apparent in the famous case of the gunner of the Lady Hughes in 1784, when an unfortunate seaman accidentally caused the death of two Chinese while firing a salute. The Chinese insisted he be put on trial, and reinforced their demand by kidnapping one of the ship's officers. The Committee of Supra Cargoes, on the understanding that he would be given a fair trial and a lenient sentence, instructed the captain to surrender the accused man. This he did, writing a touching letter to the President: 'Pray Dear Smith take care of the Old Man, you had better leave something with Muqua [the Hong merchant] for the Old Man's main-tenance, I hope the Chinese will not do harm to the poor Old Man as it was only a misfortune.'18 It was not an unreasonable expectation, since Chinese law allowed for commutation in cases of accidental death; a previous incident in 1722 had been settled by a payment of 2000 taels. The captain's hopes were vain, however; the unhappygunner was secretly executed, without anyone being present to put his case, and the supercargoes received a severe lecture from the Chinese Viceroy for having refused to hand him over in the first place. The question of 'extra-territoriality' -the right of foreigners to be tried by their own rather by than local laws -was at the root of many subsequent clashes, including the first Anglo-Chinese war of 1840-42.
Such grave events were rare, trouble usually being avoided by mutual consent and forbearance. Both sides relied upon the same pressure to avoid confrontations and to bring the other into line -the threat of suspending the mutually profitable trade, which was almost as serious to the Chinese as to the English. When in 1727 the supercargoesthreatened to transfer their activities up the coast to the port of Amoy
A HISTORY OF HONG KONG
and to abandon Canton, the mandarins quickly conceded the point at issue. The remaining constraints, although irritating, were tolerated. Trade was allowed in Canton only during the summer; at the end of the season all business must be wound up, all debts settled, and all foreigners must leave Canton, either for home, or to spend the winter with the Portuguese at Macao. When in Canton they were restricted to a small area outside the city walls, but on the waterfront. Here 'factories' were built (the word signifies a place occupied by factors, or agents, from the Portuguese 'feitoria'), crammed close together in the limited space allowed, each occupied by merchants of a single nation. The English factory was naturally the largest, a combination of warehouse, where goods were stored before being either sold or shipped, counting house and Oxbridge college, in which a small number of Britons lived in some style, attended by numerous Chinese servitors. Foreigners' movements outside the factory area were closely restricted: the authorities were anxious to avoid possible disturbances, and the populace of Canton was known to be hostile to and suspicious of foreigners. For the same reason such signs of ostentation as the use of sedan chairs (a prerogative of high Chinese officials) was banned. Above all, no foreign women were allowed at any time.
As always happens, the official regulations were modified by informal understandings. As long as the 'Select' managed matters without fuss, the Chinese were content to wink at minor infringements. Since all the merchants were in Canton with but one idea -to make as much money as quickly as possible before retiring to their own countries -they were willing to accept the restrictions. They were only in Canton for a few months every year, and in the intervals Macao could supply all the comforts of home, although in the first half of the eighteenth century, when communications were difficult, wives and families did not venture on the voyage east. If such enormous fortunes as had been made in eighteenth-century India were no longer available, it did not take long to amass a reasonable competence. Salaries were high, and the grant of free cargo space on the Company's ships was, as long a'> the monopoly continued, a valuable privilege.
In spite of occasional contretemps the system worked well through-out the eighteenth century and for some time thereafter. Michael Greenberg, its historian, wrote: 'The honesty and commercial integrity of the distant Hong merchants were a byword in the alleys of the City of London as in the bazaars of Bombay.'19 An American merchant praised 'the facility of all dealings with the Chinese who were assigned
THE TWO EMPIRES
to transact business with us, together with their proverbial honesty, combined with a sense of perfect security�P to person and property ...mIn no part of the world could the authorities have exercised a more vigilant care over the personal safety of strangers, who ... came to live in the midst of a population whose customs and prejudices were so opposed to everything foreign. '20
2
A STREAM OF SILVE.R
The plant of joy
Many circumstances combined to make the East India Company wish to liberate its Canton trade from some of the restrictions placed upon it -the rising costs of Indian administration, increasing competition,
and a desire to find a market for British exports combined with a growing intolerance of extortion. In order to effect this, diplomatic contact was needed, along the well-tried lines of previous negotiations with Russians, Turks and Moghuls.
The first British embassy arrived in Peking in 1793, headed by a former Governor of Madras, George, Lord Macartney. Although carefully planned, plentifully staffed, and conveyed in a 64-gun man-of-war, all presenting a convincing picture of British power and wealth, the embassy was a failure, and a failure because of complete mutual misunderstanding. The old Emperor Ch'ien-Lung was perfectly prepared to be affable and welcoming to this latest consignment of barbarians, and ready to stretch a number of points in order to accom-modate their peculiar prejudices, but had no idea of altering what seemed to be an entirely satisfactory system. Macartney was an ideal ambassador, an accomplished and agreeable man who had earlier headed a successful diplomatic mission to Russia and dealt amicably with that difficult lady, Catherine the Great; but he could not impress Ch'ien-lung.1
British requests for relaxation of the restrictions on trade were not even considered: the Emperor could hardly believe that they had been made seriously even by the princeling of a barbarian state. 'It may be,
A STREAM OF SILVER .
0 King,' he said in a letter to King George III, putting the blame for so gross a breach of decorum on Macartney, 'that your proposals have wantonly been made by your ambassador on his own responsibility.'Perhaps the most horrifying of these impertinences was the suggestion that the British were thinking of acquiring a little Chinese real estate. Macartney had been instructed to ask for 'a small unfortified island near Chusan for the residence of English traders, storage of goods, and outfitting of ships'. This was a subject that, in spite of the initial negative response, was not to be allowed to drop by the British.
What the Macartney embassy did achieve on its return was to quicken British interest in China and to extend knowledge of that country. Two members of the embassy, John Barrow, later famous as Secretary to the Admiralty, and Sir George Staunton, publisheddetailed accounts which impressed 'the grandeur and extent of the Chinese Empire' on the British consciousness (and Sir George's ten-year-old-son, George Thomas, who accompanied his father, left a record of his painstaking Chinese characters in the Historical Archives of Peking) . ..i For its part the Chinese Empire chose to stay completely uninterested in the affairs of the world outside its borders. The Emperor himself made this abundantly dear in the politely dismissive letter that Macartney bore back to George III; his 'genuine respect and friendliness' was appreciated, but as to his request 'to send one of your nationals to stay at the Celestial Court to take care of your country's trade with China', the King was told that 'this is not in harmony with the state system of our dynasty and will definitely not be pennitted'.3 Lord Macartney in his journal made an uncomplimen-tary but accurate assessment:
The Empire of China is an old, crazy, first rate man-of-war, which a fortunate succession of able and vigilant officers has contrived to keep afloat these one hundred and fifty years past, and to overawe their neighbours by her bulk and appearance, but whenever an insufficient man happens to have the command upon deck, adieu to the discipline and safety of the ship. She may perhaps not sink outright; she may drift some time as a wreck, and will then be dashed to pieces on the shore; but she can never be rebuilt on the old bottom.
Even while Macartney was in Peking, however, one development was obtruding itself. The new British administration in Bengal, bent on
A HISTORY OF HONG KONG
optimizing the revenues now accruing to the East India Company, recognized that the most profitable cash crop offered by their farmers was that useful drug, opium. Growers and processors were organized with brisk efficiency; and the finest and best opium began to reach the auctions of Calcutta. Something had appeared that could be offered to the Chinese in exchange for their tea.
Opium is the oldest recorded and best-documented of drugs.4 Fourth millennium Sumerians called the poppy 'the plant of joy'; Egyp-tians prescribed opium in the sixteenth century B.C.; the Minoans had a poppy goddess; Homer knew it as nepenthe. When medicine was systematized by the Romans, opium took its place as the principal soporific. Dioscorides, an army surgeon under Nero, lists it in his Materium Medica; Galen, who set Western medicine and psychology in a mould which was not broken until the seventeenth century, relied upon it; Avicenna ofHamadan, centuries ahead of European physicians and philosophers in medical knowledge, is reputed to have died of an overdose in 1039. John Arderne, the fourteenth-century English physician, who left a detailed record of many of his prescriptions, used it at least locally, applying some compound so that the patient 'schal slepe so that he schal fele no kuttyng', but its main utility was as a soporific, to permit sleep to encourage natural healing.
In eighteenth-century Britain there was no feeling of disapproval towards opium; the popular demon remained for a long time alcohol. It was the time of Hogarth's Gin Lane -'Drunk for a penny, dead drunk for tuppence.' Opium, on the other hand, had the blessing of no less respectable an institution than the Royal Society of Arts,which instituted an award of fifty guineas or a gold medal to anyone who could successfully cultivate the drug in Britain. Naturally enough many of the winners were medical men. Dr Crawley of Buckinghamshire produced over ten stones of opium from eleven acres of land. Even more surprisingly, Dr Howson and Mr Young, a surgeon, received gold medals for producing opium in Scotland, Mr Young producing a remarkable profit of �G117 6s. an acre, which must have been a record for any crop. 5 These results were obtained not only from opium poppies, but from common white and garden red plants; Mr Young also collected opium in quantity from lettuces. If such results could be obtained in bleak North Britain, how much more could be expected in fertile Bengal? And so it proved: using the abundant labour resources of the province opium of great purity could be produced in quantities far too large for available outlets.
A STREAM OF SILVER
There was, to be sure, a steady medical demand, since alcoholic tincture of opium -laudanum -was the�P preferred drug for a wide range of conditions, not only as a narcotic but in reducing fevers. It was also used, most.famously by De Quincey and Coleridge, as what would nowadays be called a recreational drug, and widely among the poor as a tranquillizer and an alternative to alcohol. Since opiumremained legal in Britain until the twentieth century, and was subjectfor most of that time to only the loosest of controls, it is hardly surpris-ing that the British-Indian authorities chose to see nothing morally indefensible in expanding opium production and organizing it as a Company monopoly.
China was an immedi.tely attractive market, since smoking opium, sometimes mixed with tobacco, was already common. Edicts against both had indeed been issued since the early seventeenth century, with tobacco being considerably the more strictly condemned. Sales of opium for medicinal purposes had always been legal, and opium was regularly imported, and duty paid on it, throughout the eighteenthcentury; but decapitation was made the penalty in the 1630s for selling tobacco. Little attention had been paid to any of these prohibitions until an Imperial edict of 1729, which inveighed against young people being introduced to drugs, was taken seriously at least by the East India Company. Instructions were given to their captains that, since the penalty for being found with opium on board was confiscation of ship and cargo, 'Upon no consideration whatsoever, you are neither to carry, nor suffer any of it to be carry'd in your Ship to China, as you will answer the contrary to the Honorable Company on your peril.'6 In other quarters the edict was largely ignored and opium continued to be consumed in considerable quantities; in the 1770s a French visitor noted that the Chinese had suddenly developed 'an unbelievable passion for this narcotic'.7
After the Company assumed responsibility for organizing production in 1781 they continued to avoid shipping the drug to China. Opium was sold in the Calcutta market by the Company to speculators,who shipped it to Canton for disposal through the private 'country' traders. In this way the Company was able to wash its collective hands and deny any responsibility for the drug reaching China. Before 1781 country ships had brought up to a thousand chests a year from India (a chest contained between 135 and 160 pounds of opium), but within nine years, by 1790, over four thousand chests were being imported. This was a large enough increase to attract
A HISTORY OF HONG KONG
attention, and resulted in an edict absolutely prohibiting all imports of opium, after which the trade became illegal and contraband. But only officially: 'There was no pretence of enforcing them [the pro-hibitory edicts] in the spirit, and the restrictions of their letter had only the effect of covering the traffic with a veil of decency ... The irregular dues levied over and above the official traffic were already heavy, but when it became necessary to pay for connivance in addition to ... complaisance, they became heavier; and they were distributed between the officials, Hoppo, Viceroy, Governor, Treasurer, and so on down the list.'8
The only visible difference was that instead of being offered openly for sale in Canton, the opium was kept on board ship at Whampoa. The Select Committee at Canton continued to ensure that the left hand remained in ignorance of the activities of the right: 'It was judged more advisable to avoid any public communication [with the private English] and merely advising the Traders ... that we perceived no impropriety in their bringing the Article to Market' (Opium Commit-tee, 1804). At that time, and for thirty years after, the volume of opium sales remained static, and the matter was not regarded as one of strategic importance to British India. Among the instructions given to Lord Macartney had been the undertaking that the opium trade would, if the Chinese insisted, be given up: 'Useful as the opium revenue was to India, it was less to be desired than the China trade monopoly.'9
As it happened, this point was never raised, since the Chinese auth-orities refused to enter into negotiations with Macartney; it might therefore be said that the responsibility for subsequent eve'nts lay with the Chinese. Had they been willing to talk things out with Macartney, as the accredited representative of a foreign power, the opium trade could have been suppressed, and war avoided. Closing the trade would not have been unduly damaging to the Indian government; the revenue from Calcutta opium sales was a welcome, but hardly crucial, part of the Company's income. It was comforting to be able to rely upon opium sales: 'You will have observed with peculiar pleasure,' wrote Lord Mornington, the Governor-General, to Henry Dundas at the Board of Control, on 2 1 March 1799, 'that the revenue arising from the sale of opium has been completely restored ... the public is greatly indebted to Mr Fleming, second member of the medical board, for his careful inspection of the opium.'10 Ten years later, when the excel-lent Mr Fleming's work had borne fruit, opium still accounted for

A STREAM OF SILVER
only 6 per cent of the revenues of Bengal, ranking sixth in order of importance.11
Item Cu"ent Rupees
Land taxes 3,32,85,671
Salt sales 1,82,69,505
Oude revenues 1,79,22,320
Conquered provinces
revenues 1,22,68,014
Benares (pilgrim)
revenues 61,55,472
Opium sales 59,56,354
The total revenue for the province was 9,83,83,516 Current Rupees. After allowing for the cost of collection (CRs 9,67,278), the net opium revenue was the equivalent of �G498,908; a respectable sum, but hardly a casus be/Ii, especially when the rerenue from Fort St George (Madras) is added in to the total of the Indian income. This amounted to nearly half the Bengal income, and had no contribution from opium; nor did the relatively small Bombay income. Taking the provinces together, and ignoring the costs of collection, opium might account for 4 per cent of the gross revenue of the Company in India. All these figures relate only to internal Indian receipts, and do not include the Com-' pany's trading income, which is what enabled the dividends to be paid, at that time �G875,000 annually. Nor had matters materially altered in the year 1817-18, when, in sterling terms, opium sales accounted for �G873,599 of an Indian revenue of �G18,322,547, still under 5 per cent. (Sources: East India Company annual accounts.)
For the first two decades of the nineteenth century there was little increase in production: the five-yearly averages during that period were:
Period Chests sold
1797-1801 4,009
1802-06 1807-11
1812-17
4,718
Officials worried that perhaps they were failing the Chinese consumers in not providing more of the article, since 'altho' the sudden deprivation
A HISTORY OF HONG KONG
of the drug would almost certainly occasion great distress to those accustomed to the use ofgit, there is no moral obligation on Government to extend the manufacture'.
Profits from Indian opium during the first two decades of the nine-teenth century can therefore hardly be said to have been a major concern of the East India Company, nor, in spite of future growth, were they ever to assume dimensions critical to Indian prosperity. But it was in everyone's interest that the Canton trade continued uninter-rupted: the prosperity of Canton, the comforts of Peking, the livelihood of thousands of officials, and, through the duties levied on tea a sub-stantial part of the revenue of the British government, all depended on it.
Insolent, capricious, and vexatious procedures
Canton's contribution was particularly useful to the Chinese exchequer, since it concentrated extra burdens on a few merchants rather than irritating the populace. It was hardly surprising that, given a system 'beautifully suited to systematic exploitation', desperate officials had recourse to the easiest source of income by increasing the 'squeeze' on the Canton merchants. In 1807, for example, the unfortunate Cohong merchants were forced to pay, among other exac-tions, 127,500 taels for suppression of piracy and river control works, and 200,000 taels for 'sing-songs' (imported watches, clocks and mechanical toys). The danger of a Cohong merchant failing was meant to be covered by the existence of the Consoo fund, a sum accrued from annual percentages of profits and held, in theory, to cover insolvent debts, but official extortions began to eat voraciously into its assets. 12
Strains appeared in the system as the foreigners in Canton objected. The British in particular were beginning to feel conscious of belonging to what was now a major world power rather than a company of mer-chants, and were no longer contented to accept so many undignified restrictions. Napoleon, who had only three years previously bound almost all Europe from Warsaw to the Pyrenees under French domi-nation, was defeated at Waterloo and exiled to a remote Atlantic island, the prisoner of none other than the East India Company, for St Helena was one of the Company's chain of victualling stations.
The contrast between the Company's position in India and in China
A STREAM OF SILVER
was now vivid. An Indian griffin (cadet) could expect to be given, in a short time, an executive post in which he would act as the heir to the Moghul Empire, travelling with an imposing retinue, surrounded by deferential Indian .servants and assistants, supported by well-trained soldiers who had repeatedly proved themselves masters of any other force the subcontinent could produce. He was the undisputed great man in his own territory, even if this was officially an independentprincedom. He was required to speak the language of the country, and may well have learnt it at the Company's Hailebury College. Admit-tedly, now that he was barred from private trading the Company officer could not hope to amass the fortunes of previous nabobs, of whom Jos Sedley in Thackeray's Vanity Fair is a vivid portrait. He did, however, enjoy a very respectable standard of living, usually within reach of a centre of English ci.ilization, with such amenities as pianos, ladies, billiard rooms and circulating libraries. Not least among his comforts was the constant availability of Himalayan ice, to cool his Bass's beer
and soda water.
The young man posted to Canton as a 'writer' in the Company's factory was in a much less pleasant situation. Unlike his Indian cousin, he was no Imperial administrator, but a trader, the lowest form of Chinese life. He lived for more than half the year in the hot and soggy Cantonese climate, cramped in a narrow factory, his quarters a single modest room. He was not allowed even to walk outside the tiny Euro-pean sector except on specified occasions. The populace was clearlyhostile, even though relations with the Hong merchants might be civil, even sometimes friendly. Holidays in Macao were better, but the decid-edly mixed society there, in which English women were rare, could not bear comparison with that of Calcutta, Madras or Bombay. The intellectual or studious writer could, with great difficulty, master enough Chinese to interest himself in the traditions and culture of the country, but few were inclined to make the effort.
The compensation should have been the prospect of making money by trade; this was indeed still possible in Canton, but becoming increas-ingly more difficult for the Company's staff when, in 1813, the mon-opoly of trade to India was revoked. The Court protested, but without avail, for the Company had become widely unpopular; one observer mentioned that 'If an additional article was proposed to cut off the heads of one or more of the Directors, the House would have voted it by a very great majority.'13 And in Canton real money was demonstrably beginning to be made by the private traders, regarded by respectable
A HISTORY OF HONG KONG
Company servants as quasi-piratical nobodies from nowhere, opium smugglers to a man, and not at all comme iifoul.
After the 1793 revision of the Company's charter, which allowed outsiders to participate legally (they had been doing so unlawfully for some time) in the 'country' trade between India and China, British merchants established themselves in the Indian imp.rt-export trade, usually in Calcutta. This was not easy, as newcomers had to find a niche in the existing pattern. Raw cotton, the principal Indian export and one of the few to attract Chinese buyers, was kept in Company hands, and in Canton the Select Committee used its licensing powers to restrain interlopers from the staple trades, powers also reinforced by the Chinese, who restricted trade in the more important exports to the Company and to the Hong merchants.
One potential import was spring-driven products, one of the few fields in which Europe had been ahead of China since medieval times: watches, clocks, mechanical singing birds, cascading waterfalls, danc-ing figures, musical boxes and the like became eagerly sought after. The Chinese lust for such toys which, according to the President of the Select Committee in 1811 had 'now 1:iecome the established vehicle of corruption between the officer [the Hoppo] and his superior at the Capital'14 caused a number of squabbles. In an attempt to avoid these the Company limited their own imports of these aggravating articles, which gave such enterprising outsiders as James Cox of Cheapside the opportunity to muscle in. The firm that he founded, after many vicissitudes, eventually became that greatest of all China houses, Jar-dine Matheson. Cox also tested the market for other potential imports, of which sea-oner and seal skins from the 'backeside' of America were the most successful, an immensely lucrative trade later taken over byJohn Jacob Astor. Other merchants employed their ingenuity in locat-ing imports that might appeal to Chinese tastes and be substitutes for cash payment; metals, dyestuffs, ginseng, sandalwood, ivory, coral and amber, and such delicacies as sharks' fins and bird nests. Markets abroad for Chinese goods were similarly investigated; a London 'Drug Concern' was formed to import Chinese rhubarb, cassia and camphor.
The Company's directors did not take kindly to such competition, and made eve[Y effort to harass those unlicensed traders who were making their own fortunes at the Company's expense. The interlopers soon hit on a device to protect themselves; they became honoraryconsuls of foreign powers, legally foreign subjects to whom therefore,
A STREAM OF SILVER
albeit regretfully, the Select found it 'i_mproper to give anymolestation'. Cockneys and Scots, poorly disguised as loyal Austrians, Prussians, Swedes, Poles, Hanoverians, Neapolitans and Genoese, were able legitimately to carry out their business at Canton under the disapproving gaze of the Select. For their part the Chinese officials made no objection, scarcely differentiating between different tribes of red-haired barbarians, as long as they behaved themselves, and con-tributed the usual 'squeezes'.
The private merchants found that the easiest and most profitablearticle to dispose ofmin Canton was, increasingly, opium. The Company had excluded itself from that trade, but remained anxious to disposeof the excellent opium it was now producing for the Calcutta markets. China was considerably the largest purchaser, and for sales there the Company had to rely on private merchants, thereby considerably reduc-ing any disciplinary powers the Select Committee of Supra Cargoes might have. Their authority was further impaired by the growing weak-ness of their counterparts, the Cohong merchants, subject to ever more rapacious demands from Peking's representatives.
In 1816, in an attempt to find a remedy, the East India Company sent William Pitt Amherst, Lord Amherst, to Peking to try to persuade the Emperor to relax his restrictions and open more ports to trade: 'The CAUSES which in the opinion of the Company's Administration in China, of the Court of Directors, and of the Prince Regent's Govern-ment, have rendered a Mission from this country expedient are the insolent, capricious, vexatious procedures ..m. by which they [the local government of Canton] have obstructed trade.' Lord Amherst was even less successful than Macartney had been in 1793, but the British government was in no mood to press the Company's case, being much more concerned with events at home and in Europe.15
I never saw a chest of opium in my life
The only colonial issue of the time to raise political temperatures in Britain was slavery. Abolition of slavery, the future of the freed slaves, compensation for their owners and the suppression of the trade engaged successive governments. Apart from the stockholders of the East India Company no one concerned themselves with events in China. The trade to Canton continued satisfactorily, surviving both the appointment of a distinguished and incorrupt civil Governor-
A HISTORY OF HON_G KONG
42
General, Juan Yuan, and the succession, in 1820, of an energetic and conscientious Emperor. 16
Tao-kuang (Daoguang), an active thirty-eight-year-old, had as a boy been close to 'the old Emperor Ch'ien-lung, and inherited his grandfather's view of the world: the Middle Kingdom might have its difficulties, but it was the only civilized society, surrounded byobstreperous and unpleasing barbarians, whose concerns were matters of little importance. In his policies Tao-kuang followed his father Chia-ch'ing's frugal example, to the point of wearing old and patched garments and eating simple food. On his death thirty years later he ordered that no laudatory tablets be placed on his tomb, therebyacknowledging his personal shortcomings and his failure to succour the empire.
It is impossible to read the Emperor's comments on the communi-cations he received from his mandarins without being impressed by his personal decency and dedication to his arduous duty. Many of the corrupt mandarins had died or retired, and Tao-kuang was well served by some men of high character and ability, both Chinese and Manchu. The senior counsellor, Mu-chang-a, a close relative, attracted a perma-nent following, scattered all over the country. Having fewer of the ideological prejudices that hampered the more craditionalist Chinese, when disagreements with the foreigners arose Mu-chang-a's sup-porters advocated a policy of compromise, and were fiercely opposed by the advocates of resistance to foreign influence. All, however, Manchu and Chinese, and none more so than the Emperor himself, were dangerously restricted by their almost complete ignorance of the world outside.
When Juan Yuan's attention was drawn to the opium trade he immediately banned the drug from Whampoa or Macao, decreed severe penalties, and arrested a number of dealers and users in Canton. The trade responded, not by abandoning or even restricting the traffic, which was unthinkable, but by providing it with a more decent cover. The drug would be brought from India not to Whampoa, but only as far as Lintin island, a convenient anchorage in the estuary, where it would be transferred to permanently-moored receiving ships, owned and staffed by the private merchants. These would then negotiate with prospective Chinese buyers in Canton, and when a deal was reached, would arrange for the merchandise to be collected from the receiving ships. The 'drop' was made to small, fast galleys, owned and crewed by Chinese, picturesquely known as 'fast crabs' or 'scrambling dragons'.

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Chinese coastal defence forces -there was nothing that could
realistically be described as a navy -contented themselves with occasionally chasing these galleys and, once a year at the end of the trading season, pursuing the departing opium ships. This was done at a respectful distance and at the most deliberate pace, but with the maximum discharge of ordnance. Peking was then informed. 'A few days after this farce has been performed, a proclamation is issued to the whole nation, stating that "His Celestial Majesty's Imperial fleet, after a desperate conflict, has made the Fan-quis run before it." '17 Upsets, of course, sometimes happened; in the 1820s a fire destroyed valuable stocks in the factories; an American seaman was delivered up to the Chinese authorities for strangulation (the Ter-ranovia case); British seamen accused after a fight at Lintin were not (the Topaze case}. But these untoward occurrences were swiftly put to rights, since all concerned were acutely aware that maintain-ing the system intact meant substantial profits. All goods taken to or from Lintin were free of duty, and even cargoes of perfectly legal merchandise soon switched from Whampoa to the estuary, the extra cost of carriage being more than compensated for by the saving of duty.
The opium trade continued to burgeon: imports rose steadily in quantity, although prices did not; the 4,770 chests bought in 1821 fetched $8,400,800, the 9,621 chests of the 1826 season only $7,608,205. Vigorous efforts to extend the market were begun, so effectively that by 1830 imports had nearly doubled again, to 18,760 chests, a far cry from the four thousand or so that had been the norm for the thirty years to 1820. By divorcing the legal trade from the smuggled business the British officials in Canton were able to disclaim all responsibility, and even any knowledge of it. A former President of the Select,John Francis Davis, who had served in Canton for seventeen years, was able to assert, when asked by a Committee of the House of Commons in 1829 whether the opium was stamped with the Com-pany's mark, 'I never saw a chest of opium in my life; and therefore I cannot speak to it.' Davis was an honourable man, and this otherwise quite unbelievable statement has to be taken seriously, even with the
reflection that he must have known very well where not to look, since almost every European in Canton, excepting the members of the Com-pany's staff, was busily engaged in linle else than in selling as much opium as possible to the Chinese. But Davis's claim is supported by the testimony given to the same committee by Dent's bookkeeper at
A HISTORY OF HONG KONG
Canton, Mr Henry, that he too 'had nev.r seen a chest of opium in his life'.18
Useful though the income from opium sales was to the Indian government, it did ,little for British exporters of other goods, whose chances to make sales in China were limited both by the superior attractions of the drug and the continuing East India Company mon-opoly there. Pressure from the merchants to be allowed to export direct from England was first manifested on IO July 1820 in a petition presented to Parliament from 'several Merchants, Manufacturers and other Inhabitants of the Towns of Manchester and Salford, and the surrounding neighbourhood . . . requesting that general freedom of trade with the port of Canton in China may be granted ... and that the Sovereignty of Sincapore may be retained, if not inconsistent with the good faith and honour of our country'. The Tory government of Lord Liverpool was at the time far too occupied with such matters as Queen Caroline's divorce from George IV and the aftermath of the Peterloo massacre, at which demonstrators protesting against agrarian hardship were fired upon by representatives of the law, to debate the Manchester men's petition, which was merely 'left on the table of the House'. Singapore did indeed become a British colony in 1824, but that decision was taken by the Governor General oflndia, who, realiz-ing the vital commercial importance of a station nearer to China, con-firmed Stamford Raffles' purchase of the island five years earlier from the Sultan of Johore.
The 1 820 petition was the earliest example of a delusion that was to persist for the rest of the century, and to have important effects on the future of China. As the industrialization of Britain speeded up, with the general application of steam power and the organization of factory production, the need for new markets became pressing. The process was headed by the Lancashire cotton industry, the harbinger of the Industrial Revolution. In 1 820 the industry was still dominated by the hand-loom workers, but power looms were beginning rapidly to oust the individual workers; in 1813 there were only 2,400 power looms in England, a number which had risen to 55,000 by the end of the 1820s and a quarter of a million by 1850, producing one half of all British exports. The voracious demand for new markets was soon reinforced by the spread of factory production methods to other indus-tries. As Europe and America began to catch up with Britain, and later to overtake it, British e:xporters became more agitated. The very size of China, by far the largest untapped source of demand available,
A STREA2M OF SILVER
excited them. If only, they urged at first, the Canton trade regulations were relaxed and the Company's monopoly ended; if only, then, other ports were opened; if only Britain had a port in her own possession; if only opium were legalized; if only navigation on the rivers were permitted; if only �Pcustoms duties were lowered, then the Chinese masses would rejoice at being able to buy Staffordshire mugs, Birming-ham trays and Lancashire frocks, all brought to them cheaply by British-built railways. British officials, sniffily distrustful of anything pertaining to trade, were reluctant to accede to these demands (rightly enough, as it turned out, for the Chinese market never developed as it was expected to, a disappointment that only served to prompt the industrialists to press for more concessions). These attitudes, already implicit in the I 820s, later became a source of constant disagreement between traders, often backed by the Hong Kong authorities, and the British government.
By the end of the decade the foreign residents at Canton had coalesced into a prototype of what became the first Hong Kong com-munity. The Company men metamorphosed into colonial administra-tors, the private traders continued the impetus that put the new colony on its feet, and the missionaries assisted in establishing contact with the Chinese. Already by 1830 a future Governor of the colony, John Davis, had made a first career as a supercargo; the Morrisons, father and son, who were to be essential in bringing some measure of com-munication between British and Chinese negotiators, had established their credentials as interpreters; and the two British houses that formed the nucleus of the Hong Kong commercial world had become pre-eminent in Canton. These were Magniac & Co. (already Jardine Matheson in everything except name) and their implacable rivals Thomas Dent's. 19 Eighteen of the fifty-two-strong British community were employed by these two firms, which, since the Company staff accounted for another twenty, gives an indication of their relative importance.
Of the remainder of the Western community, the most colourful was the short and portly Rev. Charles Gutzlaff, something of a cross between missionary and merchant. Gutzlaff, formerly a staymaker's apprentice from Pyritz in Prussia, spoke several languages fluently if imperfectly, and was much sought after by the opium traders as an interpreter -'I would give a thousand dollars for three days of Gutzlaff,' the independent merchant James Innes once wrote. Thrice married, Gutzlaff became one of the liveliest inhabitants of early Hong
A HISTORY OF HONG KONG
Kong, playing an important part in the colony's affairs until his death in 1851. The score or so of Americans-New Englanders for the most part -included two missionaries, the Rev. E.C. Bridgman and Dr James Bradford, and one William Hunter, a merchant whose book of reminiscences, The Fan Kwae in Canton, is a lively record of daily life in the factories and at Macao. Between them the tiny community supported two periodicals, the Chinese Repository, edited-by Bridgman, and the Canton Miscellany, put together mainly by Company staff, and two newspapers, the Canton Register, owned by Matheson, and the Canton Press, which took a strongly pro-Dent line.20
Apart from the missionaries and their pupils all the Europeans -and all Chinese without exception, for it was some time before any Chinese mastered English -could only communicate in pidgin. This lingua franca comprises a vocabulary of English, Chinese, Portuguese and Anglo-Indian words arranged according to Cantonese syntax; it uses, for example, measure words or classifiers such as the Chinese 'ge', translated as 'piece', as in 'three piece newspaper' (meaning three newspapers). Some pidgin words have passed into common usage,particularly in Hong Kong: for example 'shroff', originally assayer and money changer, 'chop', seal or permit, and 'godown', warehouse, are Anglo-Indian from the sixteenth century; 'joss', god or luck, and 'amah', nurse, are Portuguese; 'hong', factory or firm, 'taipan', 'junk' and 'chow' are Chinese. Pidgin was easily learnt and adequate for commercial purposes but formed an impenetrable barrier to any more than the most superficial understanding between Chinese and English-speakers. It became something of a joke to translate well-known pieces into pidgin:
One yqung man walkee; no can stop.
Maskee de snow; maskee de ice!
He carry flag with chop so nice -
Topside galow!21
Both Anglo-Saxons and Chinese, always prone to consider foreigners as difficult children, were confirmed in their prejudices by such baby-language being their only means of communication. The Rev. Mr Bridgman recorded the dangers: 'Hardly a foreigner devotes an hour to learn the language of the Chinese. The effect of an intercourse so circumscribed can never be otherwise than to keep the two parties
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totally separated from each other in all those offices of kindness, sym-pathy, regard, and friendship.'22
A set of popinjays
The trade shared between the Company and private traders, British and American, was of the first importance -nothing less than the largest long-distance trade in the world, amounting to nearly $50 mil-lion a year. Raw cotton, woollens, and, of course, opium, were the main elements of the import trade, with tea and silk being exported. Of these opium and tea were by far the most important:
Canton Trade 183 I ($ thousand)
Imports Exports Woollens 2,496 Tea 12,188 Cotton Goods 984 Silk (raw & piece) 4,611 Raw cotton 4,933 Other (including c.$4 mil-6,968
lionin silver bullion)
Opium 13,029
Other (mainly metals and3,653 Eastern products)
Total 25,095
By 1831 the lion's share of this was no longer in Company, but in private hands, British and American -$20 million of the imports, mainly opium, and $14 million of the exports. The Company's share was respectively $3.7 million and $9 million -almost all the latter being tea, of which the Company still retained the British monopoly (the remainders being other-flag trade and port and other expenses). At the same time that the opium trade edged out the other Indian imports, the days of the Company's undoubted hegemony were draw-ing to a close, and the splendid self-confidence of the Select Commit-tee of Supracargoes was declining, to be replaced by a nervous aggressiveness. The nervousness was exacerbated by the increasingly precarious situation of the Hong merchants as the legal trade, which provided them with an income, was driven out by the smuggled trade, which did not. The Select Committee reported to the Company's
A HISTORY OF HONG KONG
headquarters in Leadenhall Street that only three substantial Hong merchants remained, 'The Chinese Government by exactions and impositions {having] driven nearly all the foreign traders to resort to illicit traffic, by whid'l public revenue was diminished, the trade of the Honorable Company was left to support almost unassisted, the heavy
23
demands of the port. 'g
In 1829 power on the Select passed into the hands ofa more radical group, led by Supercargo William Baynes, who began an attempt to force new privileges from the Chinese, as Macartney and Amherst had failed to do. They were consistently but unsuccessfully opposed by the more conservative President of the Committee, William Plowden, a man steeped in Company traditions, who now found himself perma-nently in a minority. The activists presented a list of peremptory demands to the Viceroy and, in an endeavour to force his hand, ordered British ships to stay away from Canton, thereby avoiding payment of port and customs dues. In choosing alternative anchorages where business could still be transacted in security, it emerged that the favour-ite haven was 'the anchorage within the North-West Point of the Island of Hong-kong proceeding in an easterly direction towards the Lyee-moon Passage' -or just about where the Star Ferries now cross to Kowloon. When the news of the Committee's proceedings reached Leadenhall Street, together with Plowden's record of his unavailing remonstrances, the Court of Directors was furious. The adventurous Baynes and his colleagues were summarily recalled, and what it was hoped would prove a more conservative committee appointed. But before these decisions could be transmitted to Canton, Baynes had embarked upon another, more personal, indiscretion, by inviting his wife to join him in Canton.
It was clearly understood that European women were not allowed to go to Canton, and in the century and more of trade there this prohibition had never been contravened. Baynes, in addition to stop-ping the trade at Canton for six months, brought Mrs Baynes there not once, but twice, and in the company of other ladies. William Hunter recorded that she produced a sensation: 'She is the beauty of the party ... dressed in fine London style ... much admired by us.' Not all the foreigners approved: 'Three from number 2 Suy-Yong called on the ladies. Coats, gloves and cravats -such cravats! I heard one say when he returned "Thank God that is over!" and then call for a jacket and black neck-ribbon. He next lighted a cheroot, and looked as if a great burthen was off his mind.' When the Chinese officials objected
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ANCHORAGES IN THE CANTON DELTA 1840
A HISTORY OF HON.G KONG
to Mrs Baynes's first visit, she returned 'escorted by a train of ships' boats, each of the sailors being armed as if for combat. Some cannon from the Indiamen were mounted upon the roof of the factories.' And, in defiance of all custom the women had the effrontery to be carried about in sedan chairs.24
The Governor fulminated: 'How can the chief Baynes resist the prohibition and orders, and bring with him a barbarian woman to Canton! . . . The said foreigners, ignorant of how to be excited to gratitude, turn round, and because of the proclamation disallowing them to bring barbarian women to Canton, and sit in Sedan chairs, bring whining petitions ... Exceedingly does it display refractory stu-pidity . . . if again, any dare to oppose or transgress . . . a severe scrutiny will be made, and punishment inflicted ... tremble at this! Intensely are these commands given!' It was impolitic to do more than inveigh against the English, but the unfortunate Hing-tai, the Hong merchant who had sponsored Mrs Baynes's ship, was thrown into prison and heavily fined.25
Baynes's superiors were less dramatic, but were decisive: the Court of Directors, in recalling him, wrote: 'The commerce between Great Britain and China is too important to be put at hazard without the most urgent and imperious necessity, and on no account upon considerations of a personal nature.' The aristocratic interest was confirmed in its instinctive distrust of these socially deplorable trades-men. Lord William Bentinck, Governor-General of Bengal, wrote to Lord Ellenborough at the India Office on 22 March 1830: 'We con-sider the proceedings of that Committee to be in the highest degree injudicious and hazardous . . . the possible effects of this state of things ... cannot be contemplated without the utmost dismay.' Lord Ellenborough replied (23 September 1830): 'The wretched mis-management at Canton (a set of popinjays) ... have endangered the existence of the trade instead of being its protectors.'26
A snug business
In spite of disapproval in London and Calcutta, the 'popinjays' enjoyed the active support of many of the private traders of Canton, who, although they were up to their necks in an illegal traffic, wanted the laws amended in their own favour, and who were even more vehement in their demands. This was evinced in their petition of Christmas Eve
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1830, probably drafted by James Mathesoh, who possessed a highlycharacteristic prose style, which reached Parliament on 28 July 1831. The petition complained of 'the authorities of Canton, a venal and corrupt class of persons, who, having purchased their appointments, study only the means of amassing wealth by extortion and injustice'. For 'British Subjects resorting to this Empire, Trade has been the sole object', as a result of which they had been subjected to 'privations and treatment to which it would be difficult to find a parallel in any part of the world'. Among these privations Matheson complained that: 'even the sacred ties of domestic life are disregarded, in the separation of husband and wife, p.rent and child; rendered unavoidable by a capricious prohibition against foreign ladies residing in Canton, for which there appears to be no known law, and no other authority than the plea of usage'.
At the very end of this prolix document, a remedy was suggested:
If unattainable by the course suggested, Your Petitioners indulge a hope that the Government of Great Britain, with the sanction of the Legislature, will adopt a resolution worthy of the Nation, and, by the acquisition of an insular possession near the coast of China, place British Commerce in this remote quarter of the globe beyond the reach of future despotism and oppression.
Although few had the bleak island in mind at the time, Hong Kong was to become that 'insular possession'.
Far from complying with the request for armed intervention and the taking of an island or two as its signatories conjured the government to do, Parliament did not react sympathetically. Lord Ellenborough, then in opposition, the Tories having split on the issue of treating Roman Catholics as second-class citizens and being replaced by the Whigs under Earl Grey, returned to the attack on the East India Company. The Directors ('those persons who . . . have placed our interests in peril') 'should order the British merchants to obey the laws of the country in which they resided'. Chinese restrictions 'might be very absurd, but they were all imposed by the law of the country'. The emotional language employed by the merchants baffled some sympathizers in Britain, who could not see that they had much to complain about. The Chinese Repository attempted to explain: 'We have heard some of our most intelligent visitors inquire, -what are the grievances and oppressions of which we have heard so much, and seen
A HISTORY OF HONG KONG
and felt nothing? ... We reply, that we are discontented, because better acquainted than our remote predecessors with the rights and duties of man ... we feel our confinement to be a prison, and long to be set at liberty.'27 The most awkward of the foreigners in Canton was certainly James Innes, who was always ready to contest Chinese laws or the Company's regulations, often successfully. On one occasion he made a rocket attack on the house of a mandarin who had off ended him, and received an apology. 'The Viceroy and the Hoppo,' reported Innes, 'wrote very proper answers to me.'
The most famous of the private traders was Dr William Jardine, the 'Iron-Headed Old Rat', 28 founder with James Matheson of the greatest of all the European Hongs, Jardine Matheson. Jardine had first come East as the surgeon's mate of a Company vessel in 1802, and made enough in 'privilege' trade to set up on his own, first in London, and then in Bombay, before moving to Canton in 1822, when he established a House of Agency. Agencies, which required little in the way of capital, were the standard form of private business in Canton, and continued to be so for the first years of the new colony of Hong Kong. Canton agents confined themselves to acting for principals, usually well-established private merchants in Calcutta and Bombay, buying, selling and administering their affairs in China. Their services included acting as executors, managing estates, collecting rents and debts, freighting and chartering, but most importantly the sale and purchase of goods. Remuneration was by a fixed scale of fees -5 per cent commission on everything except opium and precious stones, which, being more easily disposed of, attracted only 3 per cent. Stc,:ady though this business was, there were more tempting opportunities. At an early date the Canton agencies developed banking and insurance facilities, the earliest example of the latter, and one of the most striking examples of initiative, being the establishment in 1805 of the Canton Insurance Society. Run along the lines of the Corporation of Lloyds, with unlimi-ted liability attaching to each of the members, this concern was man-aged alternately by the two great English houses of Davidson, which became Dent's, and Magniac, which developed into Jardine Matheson. The British firms had begun colloquially to be known also as bongs,and their partners as 'taipans'; Jardine's were the Ewo Hong -the upright and harmonious, Dent's the Pao-shun Hong -the precious and compliant.
Banking was less co-operatively organized, each house making its own arrangements with correspondents in India and in London. This
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was made necessary by the length of tiJ?'.le involved in transmitting cargo and remittances between Canton, India and London; up to twelve months had to be allowed for the round voyage. Remittances were a particular problem. The East India Company in Canton could be relied upon to sell bills to merchants wanting easily negotiated paper only to the amount needed for its own purchases. As private business burgeoned and the Company's share decreased this became totally inadequate. Recourse had to be m.de to a number of expedients,including American bills, but in the end it was often only by shipping bullion out of China that the merchants could effect transfers. This was totally illegal under Chinese law, and was a contributory factor in
the anti-opium campaign dealt with in Chapter 3.
Fuelling the demand for money were the difficulties of the Cohong merchants. The constant raiding of the Consoo fund, which was intended to underwrite the Hongs' debts, had led in 1815 to the Com-pany advancing the threatened Hongs a quarter of a million taels to enable them to pay the imperial duties (like debts to the Inland Rev-enue, these always took priority, and could not be postponed), while Cohong debts to private traders were placed in the hands of three foreign merchants as administrators. In this way the management of Chinese official merchants actually passed into European hands, with the full approval of all. Since the Hong merchants, even when solvent, were always ready to pay high interest rates -15 per cent was regarded as very reasonable, at a time when half that was thought extortionate in Europe -it became common for investors to leave their money with the agencies in Canton rather than repatriate it.
Modest men might be content to remain as agencies, earning high fees with little risk from this 'snug business' (as James Matheson called it), but most sought to maximize profits by diversifying. In a small community where few rules were generally enforced, this called for high standards of commercial conduct: dog could not eat hungry dog. As a result, in spite of the fiercest rivalry, the word of a Canton mer-chant was his bond, and the Agency houses went to considerable lengths not to let down their principals. Jardine himself, a cynicalventurer, given to sailing as close to the wind as any, never had his personal probity called into question. 'The vast commercial operations of Mr Jardine seemed to be conducted with sagacity and judgment,' wrote Dr C.T. Downing in The Fan-Qui in China. 'He was a gentleman of great strength of character and ofmunbounded generosity.'29Jardine's letters show a rather gruff person -he only kept one chair in his office,
A HISTORY OF HON.G KONG
discouraging visitors from staying, which is odd behaviour in an agent; not too well-educated -he seems never, for example, to have read Byron, since he rarely managed to spell the name of his own schooner Hellas aright, and his handwriting is laboured; and personally frugal -his order to 'Mr Scacht, fashioner', in London was for but 'one blue coat, one black coat, and one cashmere, of a dark colou.'. 30 His younger partner Matheson was more fashionable and cultivated -a gentleman of great suavity of manner and the impersonation of benevolence, according to Downing -but had a somewhat chequered history.
Matheson, who was not the son of a baronet, as stated in some histories,31 although from an old Highland family, came to India as a young man in 1819, after a brief stay at Edinburgh University and an apprenticeship in London. More sociably inclined than Jardine, as well as better connected, he joined the counting house of his uncle's firm in Calcutta, Macintosh & Co., one of the great India Houses (it was to fail a little later for two and a half million pounds, an enormous sum at the time), but soon left for Canton to establish an opium-dealing business with one Robert Taylor. On Taylor's death in 1820 the business folded, and Matheson was left in Canton, at the age of twenty-six, looking for something to do. The answer came through Macln-tosh' s, who had many contacts throughout southern Asia. One of these was with a Spanish firm, originally from Manila, who had established a Calcutta agency: a partner in this agency, Xavier Yrissari, decided to move to Canton and joined Matheson in the new firm of Yrissari and Co. Matheson was delighted: Yrissari would bring business of 'an unexampled magnitude ... with which he will enable us to commence our Establishment far exceeding the most sanguine hopes I could have formed'. After five years' adventurous speculations in opium, which included unprecedented sales voyages up the Chinese coast and an attempt to comer the market, Yrissari died, and left Matheson once more responsible for winding up a venture.
He bounced back remarkably quickly, coming out of the partnership with at least a quarter of a million dollars, while claiming that Yrissari's share was only $17,000. Dr John Cheong, in his study of the firm, found this 'incredibly small', and the tone of Matheson's letter to the joint executor of his partner's Estate in Spain certainly sounds 'outrageously fierce': 'Yrissari did not put a single dollar of capital in the house of his name with me, apart from his share of the property gained, less the costs arising from liberal living during the period of some five years during which our association lasted, and that is the
A STREAM OF SILVER
only good thing I can report to his sister.' After a flirtation with the rival firm of Dent, probably never meant to be taken seriously, but more for the purpose of placating his uncle's firm, who were engaged with Dent's through their London bank, Matheson took the money he had amassed through his association with Yrissari to Jardine, with whom he had already established friendly relations. 32
The Jardine-Dent rivalry might well have been exacerbated by the fact that the Dents were English Borderers, from Westmorland, who have traditionally had unfriendly views about the Scots. The two com-panies' house flags reflected this division, that of the J ardines incorpor-ating the St Andrew cross, Dent's that of St George. The initial cause of their rivalry is suggested by Dr Cheong to have been the Dents' using their influence in London to have a Jardine bill dishonoured. Matters cannot have been improved when a confidence trickster, one Nisbett, having failed to deceive Dent's, succeeded in extracting money from Matheson.33
The Dent generation contemporary with Matheson, the brothers Lancelot and Wilkinson, lacked the panache of the Scots, but were regarded as perhaps more respectable and worthy: Lancelot was an almost painfully correct and precise man. In a letter detailing in his meticulously clear hand the disposal of articles acquired at a bank-ruptcy sale -many of which he gave away -he concluded: 'do not think I have a single sin of omission or commission in this matter -unless there may be some Dollars -more than 2 or 3 but under 10 ... if so they must be claimed and paid for on my ac. Yet again -the small lamp in Beale's dressing room I gave away, and I purchased and am debited for a Watercloset purchased from Mr Aquino.'34 Certainlythe Select Committee, who were hot against the conduct of Jardine Matheson ('So great has been the desire of Messrs.Jardine, Matheson & Co., and of Captain Grant as commanding their Opium Ships, to erect themselves into an authority independent of the Committee .. .' and ref erring to a letter from the firm as being 'as objectionable in its tone as devoid of truth in its statements'35) went out of their way to make it clear that there were no grounds for complaints against the Dents or their ships; and Robert Inglis, writer of the Company's fac-tory, left them to join Dent's. Sir John Davis, President of the Select, Chief Superintendent of Trade, and Governor of Hong Kong, who despised most private traders, described the Dents as the 'more respectable' part of the British community, at a time when he was contrasting them with the Jardine faction, and equally complaints of
A HISTORY OF HONG KONG
aggressions against the Chinese were less frequently levied against the Dent employees. It is also noteworthy that the former senior partner of the Davidson-De:nt form, W.S. Davidson, had forecast to the 1829 Select Committee of the House that the withdrawal of the East India Company's power would lead 'sooner or later, to a war ... accom-panied by widespread ruin', 36 a view contrasting strongly with the belli-cose sentiments of the Jardine supporters.
But Thomas Dent, at any rate, was not liked, and Matheson was. One reason for this was surely his generosity of spirit, as revealed in a letter from him to one John White, whose deceased brother had been one of Matheson's customers, and who had left in Macao a 'female pensioner' unprovided for. Matheson suggested that White should 'continue some allowance to her, the want of which would reduce her to a state of misery that would be extremely distressing to the deceased's friends who respect his memory. She is of a superior class of women in her situation, being educated and having become a Christian at Macao, she is, of co.rse, an outcast from her people.'37 Taking such trouble for someone else's Chinese mistress shows remarkable thoughtfulness on the part of a very busy man.
Jardine and Matheson usually took the initiative in developing new business, as in 1832 when the Canton market for opium appeared to be saturated. In that year they dispatched two expeditions up the coast as far north as Tientsin, an unprecedented extension of their usual market area, but which produced encouraging results. From then onwards opium sales were regularly made at convenient points all along the coast with little interference from the authorities.
Among the more notorious of the Jardine Matheson masters working up the coast were Captains Parry and Grant. Parry, Captain of the Hercules, was sometimes too much even for the liberal Matheson, who had to report to Jardine, then in England, 'news of an unfortunate nature ... Parry had a jollification on the Queen's birthday, and noth-ing would satisfy him after dinner' but to fire off one of his guns, to test its range, and in doing so hitting a Chinese official junk, which caused a 'ggreat sensation'. Charles Grant, who had also commanded Hercules and the previously, was officially described as having 'rendered himself Hercules notorious for acts of aggr
ession and violence against the Chinese . . . from beginning to end, there has been pursued by Captain Grant a series of unjustifiable acts, amounting we might almost say to piratical conduct, which render him altogether unworthy of the command of any British vessel.'38
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Who can desire a war with China?
A few years previously the Select Committee of Supracargoes would have cracked down on such enterprises, which were directly contraryto all previously understood usages. But the Select had changed with the times, and become restless in their tum. Charles Marjoribanks,
who had replaced the disgraced Baynes as Chairman in 1829, soon
proved equally independent, ordering an illegal expedition up the coast to explore the market potential. The conscientious captain of the Lady Amherst refused to obey Marjoribanks' orders, as 'at Variance with my instructions, and the Regulations of the Service, and equally illegal in the eyes of the Law',39 but the voyage went ahead with a more com-pliant commander. The Court of Directors deplored the enterprise, and the following year Marjoribanks was in tum recalled, although the private traders regretted such 'cruel and inconsiderate measures', and felt that the Chairman's action had been 'very judicious'.40 Marjori-banks cannot have been much worried by his demotion, since all the East India Company officials knew that their time as traders was approaching an end; the current charter under which they operated was due for review in 1833, and a decision on their future would be made by an unsympathetic government. After strikes and agrarian uprisings-nine hanged, 250 transportedm-riots in Nottingham, Derby and Bristol, the Mansion House sacked, cavalry charges in London, cholera epidemics, financial crises, and a constitutional crisis lasting over a year, the Great Reform Bill had been forced through a reluctant House of Lords and passed by a disapproving William IV in December 1832. The new reformed Whig government of Lord Grey had then to cope with agitation for factory legislation, a new Poor Law, the emancipation of slaves and the usual troubles with Ireland. Had it been possible to postpone consideration of the East India Company's charter the hard-pressed administration would doubtless have been grateful: but it was not. The charter had been renewed for only twenty
years in 1813, and legislation was inevitable.
There was little doubt what this should be: the East India Company must effectively be wound up as a commercial concern. It had developed into an imperial power in its own right, ruling over a popu-lation much greater than that of the home country, and deploying a standing army and navy that made it the equal of many great states: such a role was quite incompatible with that of a trading company, and one or the other must be terminated. The alternative would have
A HISTORY OF HONG KONG
58
been for the British government to assume responsibility for ruling its Indian territories directly. Any other European country would have done this with alacrity, but Whigs were not empire-builders, and did not even regard India as a permanent possession. Macaulay thought the British Raj would not end in his lifetime (he died in 1853): Ram Mohun Roy, the Brahmin scholar and reformer, believed (in 1830) it would continue 'for at least forty or fifty years'.41 In die meantime the Company was doing a reasonable job of looking after the place, and even the politicians were conscious of the temptations for corruption and place-seeking if 'an absolute despotism, the British Parliament' was allowed to get its hands on the wealth of India. (Not that the party in power, whichever one that might be, would countenance such a thing; nevertheless, could one ever be entirely sure of the intentions of one's opponents?)
The real questions at issue resolved themselves into the future of the Canton trade, and the great point of how stockholders might be compensated for giving up their commercial activities. Whatever the Court of Directors might plead, there was never any real possibility of the Company being allowed to retain an unfettered monopoly of the China trade. Monopolies had been out of fashion for years. As early as 1820 a Committee of the House of Commons had reported that 'The time when monopolies could be successfully supported, or would be patiently endured ... seems to have passed away.' Thirteen years later even the arch-Tory Quarterly Review had to admit that 'From the moment, indeed, that the FREETRADE mania became the order of the day, the China monopoly received its death-blow.'42
The free-traders had indeed made themselves felt: the previous Prime Minister, the Duke of Wellington, had been overwhelmed by petitions from such sources as the merchants of Plymouth, Sunderland, Leeds, Kidderminster, Cockermouth, Lancaster, Limerick, the Cor-poration of Cutlers and the Corporation of Traffickers of Leith. The most vociferous of all the anti-Company propaganda came from the merchants of Canton, conscious of the opportunity to rid themselves of the restrictions imposed by the Select, and give themselves a free hand to exploit the Chinese. J. Crawford, parliamentary agent for the Canton private traders in their carefully planned and well-funded campaign, published a pamphlet in 1830 which began with a quotation from Edward (jibbon: 'The Spirit of Monopolists is narrow, lazy, and oppressive,' and rumbustiously attacked arguments 'replete with error, or foolery, or bad reasoning'.43

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Many Company stockholders, and some of the Court of Directors, were not minded to take the attacks lying down, and argued for the retention, if not of the monopoly, at least of a share of the China trade, and the continuance of the Select Committee's supervision. Some powerful arguments could be advanced for this: the idea of free trade was unintelligible to Chinese imperial officials; the private traders were a disreputable and unruly bunch, certain to upset the even tenor of commerce if left to themselves; and any interruptions to trade would cost the British Exchequer some �G3 million of annual duties on tea. A spirited defence along these lines was advanced by Sir Charles Forbes, formerly chairman of the largest private traders in Bombay and M.P. for Malmesbury. Forbes was a die-hard Tory who stigmatized the Reform Bill as 'the vile Reform Bill, that hideous monster, the most frightful that ever showed its face in the House'.+4 Less crusty Tories advanced the more reasonable argument that, after all, things had not gone too badly under the supercargoes' aegis: 'The facility and quietness with which the whole commerce of the port [Canton] is now conducted is admirable.' But the private traders would have none ofit: they wanted the East India Company and their too-gentlemanly supercargoes out, and replaced by someone prepared to take a firm line.
If this was the voice of a new economic imperialism there were others advocating a milder policy. The former Governor of Bombay Sir John Malcolm, speaking in the stockholders' debate, pointed out that however arrogant the Chinese might be, 'there was no other nation which assumed pretensions to be above the laws and usages of other countries in a greater degree than the English' (Hear, hear, and laugh-ter). Malcolm was, of course, Scottish. Besides, he asked, how were the Chinese to be persuaded to change their ways? The Whig govern-ment might argue, as good Benthamites, that the inexorable laws of the market economy, once allowed free play, would inevitably ensure the best and most profitable solution, but he remained sceptical. 'Politi-cal economists treated a question of human rule like one of arithmetic: and he would no more expect success from the application of their general principles ... than he would find from the application of the wonderful machine of the ingenious Mr Babbage.' The Chinese were likely to be difficult to convince, and should they remain obdurate the alternative was war, which 'would be a war waged for mere interest. But who can desire a war with China, for the sake of forcing the
trade?'45
Malcolm was outspokenly against any idea of coercion, which he
A HISTORY OF HONG KONG
saw as the inflated fantasy of civilians: 'It was a fine thing to talk of the insulted honour of England; but if assistance was to be given by this country to the .merchants trading to China in every little quarrel . . . consequences of the most serious nature would be produced.'Even Sir Charles Forbes agreed: 'so wild an idea as the conquest of China, never could have entered the mind of any persQn in that Court, or in the British dominions; although it appeared to have been enter-tained by some of the wise men in Canton.' But at that point in Sir Charles's speech 'a show of impatience' was noted: the new men were losing patience with the outmoded decencies of the old.
To some extent the discussion was academic. Charles Grant, Presi-dent of the Board of Control, made his intentions unequivocally clear: 'Whatever may be the decision of the Company, I must repeat, that it is not the intention of the government to recommend to Parliament the renewal of the Company's exclusive trade to China.' He spelt out what would happen if the Company did not agree: their property would simply be confiscated, subject to litigation; and then, where, 'it may be asked, are the East India stock-holders? From what funds are the dividends to be paid?'46 With a little oiling of wheels -Grant had some personal ambitions for posts in India which would not have been helped by a public quarrel with the Court of Directors -an agreement was reached. All the Company's commercial activities were to cease, in India and in China, 'with all convenient speed'; all 'merchandise, stores and effects, at home and abroad', were to be sold. In return the stock-holders were to receive an annuity of �G630,000 redeemable at a rate of 5 per cent.
The debate in the House of Commons on 26July 1833 was perfunc-tory, but two members combined to make the same significant point. Sir Robert Inglis, a staunch old-fashioned Tory, feared that 'the con-tinuance of the trade itself might be risked by the want of a justauthority over the Europeans'. From the other side of the House he was supported by Sir George Staunton, Member for South Hampshire, and that same George Thomas who had as a boy accompanied his father on the Macartney embassy, and chatted to the old Emperor Ch'ien-lung in Chinese. He forecast inevitable conflict between with the Chinese authorities and the foreign merchants 'unless some higher power -some public representative -were sent there to control both parties'. In this he was absolutely right, but his warning fell on deaf ears; only a handful of Members came to listen, and in the absence of a quorum his speech was forced to conclude.
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Charles Grant impatiently agreed: 'I need hardly state that ... it would be necessary that there should be stationed at Canton by the appoinnnent of the Crown, some officer or officers invested by law with adequate powe'r over supervision over all British subjects', and the Bill was duly passed by a lethargic House of Commons. Macaulay commented: 'The House had neither the time, nor the knowledge, nor the inclination ... several of the members present were asleep, or appeared to be so.'
Even the Canton traders, inspired by Matheson's ebullient prose, agreed on the need for a British representative -not in order to control their own activities, but to force the Chinese away from their restrictive practices into methods more in keeping with modem ways. 'We must,' insisted Jardine, 'have a commercial code with these celestial bar-barians ... We have the right to demand an equitable commercial treaty.'47 This was not how they saw things in Whitehall, which led the exasperated Jardine, hearing that a naval officer had been arrested by the Chinese and put in irons, to 'wish most sincerely H. M. Minis-ters were in irons with him'.48 .
3
THE HUMILIATION OF LORD NAPIER
The epitaph drear: i4 fool lies here Who tried to hustle the East. '
Rudyard Kipling, 'NaulahkaO'
While negotiations were being pursued in London, the situation in Canton was developing. There had been a brawl at Lintin between the crews of the merchant ships and the inhabitants, blamed by the Vice-roy on 'the stationary demon Magniac' (Matheson), but on 16 June 1833 James Matheson was able to record: 'We have nothing new hereg-every-thing going on quietly and the viceroy appears to have made up his mind to keep Foreigners in a good humour if possible. 'g1 The Chinese authori-ties at Canton were aware that changes were taking place among the foreign traders. Through a process unfathomable to the Chinese mind, it was clear that political vicissitudes at home were occasioning personnel changes in the traders' camp. Who might be chosen to represent the foreigners was a matter of absolute indifference to the mandarins; but itmust be clearly understood that negotiations with any such persons could only be on the existing, established basis.
Even though the ebullient and often aggressive Lord Palmerston was Foreign Secretary and responsible for the new mission, there was no question of any attempt being made to coerce China as the Canton merchants demanded. The mission that was appointed, in December 1833, to take over from the Select Committee was instructed in the most emollient of terms; the members, who were to be known as Superintendents of Trade, were 'to cautiously abstain from all un-
THE HUMILIATION OF LORD NAPIER
necessary use of menacing language . . . to study by all practicable methods to maintain the good and friendly understanding, and to ensure that all British subjects understood their duty to obey the laws and usages of the Chinese empire'.2 Anything less imperialistic could hardly be imagined. They were to 'avoid any conduct, language, or demeanour, which should excite jealousy or distrust among the Chinese people or government or to revolt their opinions or preju-dices'. They were to proceed to Canton, and to stick to the established and customary methods of communication. Critics of British policy towards China in the nineteenth century might acknowledge that at least it began with the best of intentions.
Good intentions, how.ver, sometimes lead to proverbially undesir-able destinations. One of the more important tasks of the Superinten-dents was to monitor the activities of British traders, and in order to do this they were vested with_ the power to hold a court having both criminal and Admiralty jurisdiction, either at Canton, or on board any British ship. Two unlikely assumptions were made: that the Chinese would tolerate such an assumption of jurisdiction within their own country, and that the recalcitrant British subjects there would accept it. The Duke of Wellington disapproved: it would be 'a mistake if they supposed they had any right to appoint commissioners', and Sir Charles Forbes was scathing; 'He was very much mistaken if his cel-estial majesty would submit to this presumptuous conduct on the part of the BARBARIANS,' and ridiculed the appointment of Superinten-dents of trade, 'to be invested with unheard-of powers ... to punish every offence (EXCEPT SMUGGLING, OF COURSE!)'.3 Attemptingto have his cake and eat it, Palmerston had the power to establish courts published by Orders in Council (which were public), but in his private instructions warned the Chief Superintendent that he should not act upon these Orders in Council 'until he had given the matter
4
his most serious consideration'.
The two years of dissension and unrest needed to force through the Reform Bill of 1832 left the Whigs with many obligations to their supporters in both Houses of Parliament, and especially to those in the Lords, with its substantial and vociferous Tory majority. Once the Bill became law, the markers began to be called in, and one of these was that of William John, the eighth Lord Napier, previously best known as author of'A Treatise on Practical Store farming as applicable to the Mountainous Region of Etterick Forest and the Pastoral District of Scotland in General'.
A HISTORY OF HONG KONG
Napier had rendered good service in the House of Lords all through the difficult passage of the Reform Bill, but did not hold a permanent seat there through hereditary right. He was not a peer of the United Kingdom, but only of Scotland, and subject therefore to election by the other Scottish noblemen as one of their representatives, since peers of Scotland and Ireland had only the right to select sixteen representatives from each kingdom to every Parliament. Peers not so selected were able to contest seats in the lower House.5 Lord Palmerston, for example, was a peer only of Ireland, and was therefore able to sit in the Commons for some sixty years. Napier had been a Scottish representative peer since 1824, providing a reliable Whig vote, but in 1832 the Scottish peers -mostly Tories -decided not to re-elect him for the following Parliament. Propriety demanded that the party Lord Napier had supported found an adequately rewarding position for him.
To an unprejudiced observer Napier's previous career had not marked him very clearly as suitable for a diplomatic posting. Before devoting himself to oviculture he had been a naval officer, serving at Trafalgar as a midshipman and as Liei:tenant under the adventurous Thomas Cochrane, Lord Dundonald, whose exploits served as a model for those of the fictional heroes Hornblower and Jack Aubrey, and into whose family Napier later married. This continuing influence was a poor preparation for diplomacy, since Cochrane, although a splendid fighting sailor, was a most difficult, awkward, opinionated individual. Lord Napier was also brusque in manner and reputedly devoutly Pres-byterian, neither desirable qualities in dealing with the worldly and sophisticated Chinese; he certainly had no experience of trade, diplo-macy or Asiatic affairs, but was confident that a few broadsides were the best possible argument that could be brought to bear in any negoti-ation. To cap it all Lord Napier was red-headed, and red hair was to Chinese 'a particular and diabolical abomination', according to Dr Downing, who was present at the time of the mission to Canton.6
But to one person at least there was no doubt that Lord Napier had all the qualities necessary for the post of His Majesty's Chief Superintendent of Trade in China, at a salary of �G6,000 a year, and that was the gentleman himself. This was made clear in a speech he gave in the House of Lords on the Navy Bill on 23 May 1832, in which he advanced the claim that officers of the armed services, no matter what their lack of experience, were especially suitable for any public post, of whatever description: 'Men of that character formed
�Pt
THE HUMILIATION OF LORD NAPIER
much more able and effective men of business than others, and would do more in ten minutes than any noble Lord, who had been brought up in public offices, would do as in as many hours ... the regard to personal character was quite sufficient to ensure the proper discharge of the duties of any office.'7 Not everyone agreed, the Tory Morning Post being particularly vitriolic about his appointment: Lord Napier, it felt, 'can know as much of the port of Canton, and the very difficult duties to be performed there, as does an orang outang'. His appoint-ment was 'an insult and a gross injustice to the experienced and highly respectable gentlemen over whose head this popinjay lord has been so shamefully placed'.
In order to provide the tedious command of detail needed by the mission Lord Napier was given two colleagues, John Francis Davis and Sir George Best Robinson, as Second and Third Superintendents. Davis was already in post at Canton, as the about-to-be superseded President of the Select Committee of Supracargoes. Later to play an important part, as Chief Superintendent and Governor of the new colony of Hong Kong, he had advanced rapidly, aided by his familyconnections in the Company's service -'deeply connected with the Court of Directors' -and with Lord Palmerston, who had known him as a boy.8 After serving on the Amherst mission to Peking he became a member of the Select Committee in I 827, and in 1832 its Chairman. A proficient linguist, and with a rare first-hand knowledge of Chinese Imperial diplomacy, as well as twenty years of commercial experience, Davis had impressed the 1829 Select Committee of the House of Commons on the China Trade. His evidence to this body had empha-sized the important role played by the supercargoes in maintaining stability and the need to ensure an effective replacement, with qualities very like those that he himself possessed, including a command of Chinese, a point which he stressed. The Chinese, who considered 'all nations wearing hats and coats to belong to the general class, of which they certainly acknowledge the English to be the head', would look to the British government to send a mission led by some person of auth-ority experienced in sorting out any difficulties that might arise, and capable of dealing with mandarins in their own language.9
With his appointment as Second Superintendent (at a salary of �G3,000, which he considered inadequate), Davis must have felt that his was to be the real guiding hand of the mission, for the Third Superintendent was a lightweight. Sir George Robinson had admittedly been a supercargo, although a junior one, and only for a short time,
A HISTORY OF HONG KONG
but had done little in Canton except to annoy his superiors. But although both timid and bumptious, Robinson was a Baronet, and grandson (even if on the wrong side of the blanket) of an Earl, neither negligible qualifications in England of the 1830s. Furthermore, his father had also been a Director of the East India Company, and the family connection with the East dated back to the. foundation of Calcutta.
The Superintendents were provided with a considerable staff, including a Secretary, a Chinese Secretary, chaplain and surgeons. Very few of the other selections had been made without an eye to patronage. The Secretary, J.H. Astell, twenty-seven at the time, was the son of William Astell, who had been a Director of the East India Company for the record period of forty-seven years. At first Astell senior had opposed the government's proposals in the charter renewal debate, but eventually he changed his mind: some reward was therefore in order. Alexander Johnston, a cousin of the Chief Superintendent, became Napier's private secretary.Johnston (later known as Campbell-Johnston) was also the modestly talented offspring of a distinguishedand influential father, who constantly exercised himself on his son's behalf. Sir Alexander Johnston had been a steady supporter of the Whigs, who made him a Privy Councillor in 1832. Sir Alexander badg-ered Palmerston on such matters as the ceremonial uniform young Alexander was entitled to wear, and sent the Duke of Wellingtonhimself some 'Heads of Instruction for the Guidance of the Chinese Superintendent'.
The most blatantly nepotistic of the mission's appointments might have seemed that of Captain Charles Elliot R.N., as Master Attendant, the naval officer in charge of shipping, a comparatively junior post commanding a salary higher than that of the 'Clerk of a superior class' but the same as the assistant surgeon. The Elliots were in financial straits at the time, and Charles only accepted the appointment since it was made clear that it was the only post on offer: 'If I did not choose to go to China as Master Attendant, a category acknowledged inadequate, I am to expect their [the Admiralty's] displeasure.'10 Elliot had hoped for something better, both because of his previously success-ful record and the fact that he came from a very influential familyindeed, and one higher in the pecking order of British society than the Napiers. Preparing for the voyage out, Clara Elliot, who accom-panied her husband, was annoyed at being condescended to by Lady Napier's 'Canton etiquette'. On 25 March 1834 she wrote to her sister,
THE HUMILIATION OF LORD NAPIER
Lady Hislop, complaining, but pulled herself up: 'I mustn't go on, or you'll say that I am angry and to be angry at such a wherefore, would assuredly be somewhat vulgar.' And Elliots were too aristocratic to be vulgar; but they were�P also known to be good at looking after their own. Charles's cousin, Lord Minto, was a staunch Whig peer whose career as First Lord of the Admiralty was distinguished, as one commentator put it, 'only by the outcry raised at the number of Elliots who found places in the naval service' .11 When, later, a naval task force was sent to Canton, it was commanded by another of Charles's cousins, Admiral Sir George Elliot. Charles's father, Hugh, brother of the first Lord Minto, had been educated in France by the rationalist philosopher David Hume and had become a friend of the revolutionary Mirabeau. After a promising st(l'1 in the diplomatic service he blotted his copy-book when Ambassador to Naples, and had to be found another re-munerative job. He was accordingly made Governor first of the Leeward Islands in the West Indies, and then of Madras;12 and, which came in useful later, the Elliots were kinsmen of Lord Auckland, Governor-General of India when the first war with China began in 1840.
Family influence had protected young Charles by securing a posting to the West Indies squadron, where he had work any young naval officer would have dreamed of, in command of schooners and sloops of war engaged in anti-slavery missions. A post-captain at the early age of twenty-seven, he was then given the position of Protector of Slaves in British Guinea. His experiences there did nothing to develop his admiration for the British expatriate commercials, but did win him praise in London. Lord Howick (later Earl Grey, at that time Under Secretary of State for the Colonies) wrote on 2 March 1833 that 'His Majesty's Government are indebted to him [for services] far beyond what the functions of his office required of him . . . not only for a zealous and effective execution of the duties of his office, but for communications of peculiar value and importance.'13 Howick was attempting to persuade the Treasury to authorize a payment to Elliot, but in spite of both merit and influence this was not forthcoming, and the Elliots perforce had to accept what work was available. That better things might be in store was however hinted at by Davis's commen-dation of Elliot to the.Foreign Office: 'The talents, information, and temper of that gentleman would render him eminently suited to the chief station in this country.'
A HISTORY OF HONG KONG
A matter of national prestige
Admirable though tpe instructions given to the Napier mission were, its success was fatally compromised, not only by the irresponsibility of its chief, but by a single paragraph of his brief. Palmerston's otherwise correct and conciliatory letter of instruction containe. one sentence which would lead to disaster: 'Your Lordship will announce your arrival at Canton by letter to the viceroy.' Those few words were to cause two wars and much travail.
The Foreign Office had correctly appreciated that commercial relations must be picked up where they were to be left off, at Canton, where there should be no risk of a rebuff such as had been given to Macartney and Amherst at Peking. And it was surely no more than common courtesy that a visiting officer of His Majesty, and a peer, should present his respects to the local representative of the Emperor? But the Chinese did not see it like that; their protocol permitted only two possibilities. Either Napier came as a tribute-bearing envoy, in which case he should present himse!f with due formalities at Peking, or he was a taipan, in which case he must seek admission to Canton and discuss matters in the usual way with Hong merchants and Hoppo, communicating only in the form of a petition. No merchant, however senior and dignified he might claim to be, could presume to approach the Viceroy ofKwangtung and Kwangsi, Mandarin of the First Grade, Junior Guardian of the Heir Apparent, entitled to wear the double-eyed peacock feather: but that was exactly what Napier had been instructed to do.
The Napier mission arrived at Macao on 15 July 1834 in the frigate Andromache, a suitable form of transport for an ambassador, but hardly for a taipan: the Chinese took note. Any impressive effect was however marred by the fact that Andromache drew too much water to proceed to Canton, and the deputation, when it left, had to make its slow journey upstream in small boats. But before that could be done there were important questions to be settled at Macao, where the mission was joined by Davis, who had been in post at Canton as last President of the Select Committee. His successor there as the Company's representative (the Company was retaining an office in Canton, to assist with finance for the trade) was to be paid �G5,000 a year: as some compensation, could Davis's own salary start from the time the Andromache sailed, as though he had been on board? And there was the Company's furniture to be valued, and their cutter Louisa,
THE HUMILIATION OF LORD NAPIER
which was to become famous in the river, bought into the royal service.
These matters being speedily arranged, Lord Napier lost not a minute in Macao before taking himself off to Canton, in spite of Chinese protests, and leaving his 'minder' Davis, with Robinson, in Macao. This was shockingly precipitate: the correct action would have been to notify the Hong merchants, from Macao, that the new headman had arrived. They would then, in suitably humble terms, petition the Viceroy to allow the barbarians access. Until such permission had been issued, the mission must wait at Macao. Arriving in Canton on 25 July 1834, only ten days after he reached Macao, Napier took up residence at a house offered to him by William Jardine. A worried Hoppo reported to the Viceroy the 'arrival of a ship's boat at Canton, about midnight, bringing four English devils, who went into the English factories to reside ... We think that such coming as this is manifestly clandestine stealing into Canton.'14 The next day the two Scots dined together, and found they had much in common. Jardine had growled to Matheson when he found that two of the three Superintendents were old Company men: 'You will, no doubt, be surprised to find the 2nd and 3rd superintendents nominated from the factory. I believe that Canton community are unanimous in condemning the mix of King and Company ... I disapprove, but am silent, from a feeling that the arrangement is only a temporary one,'15 but he hoped that the Chief Superintendent at least, with the prestige and force of the Royal Navy behind him, would browbeat the Chinese into altering their ierms of trade.
This was a role that Napier proved happy to accept, in spite of the clear instructions he had received from the British government. With-out consulting his colleagues Davis and Robinson, whom he had left cooling their heels in Macao, and within two days of his arrival in Canton, Napier 'had transgressed the Chinese regulations in six ways: he had proceeded to Canton without a pass, taken up residence there without a permit, attempted to communicate with the governor-general by letter instead of by petition, used Chinese instead of English, had his letter presented by more than two persons, and tried to communi-cate directly with a mandarin instead of through the medium of the Hong merchants'.16
The Viceroy, Lu K'un, was a tough old soldier who had acquired a formidable reputation during the Sinkiang wars of the 1820s. He was puzzled rather than angry, and wrote to the Emperor: 'Whether
A HISTORY OF HONG.KONG
the foreign chief Napier has any official title we are not in a position to find out. Even if he is an official of his country, he cannot claim equality with an impiJrtant guardian of the territory of the Celestial Dynasty. This is a matter of national prestige.' In spite of his belief that 'it is clear that his aim is to challenge us and violate our laws', the Viceroy was prepared to be conciliatory: 'althoug. the English barbarians are beyond the bounds of civilization, yet having come to the inner country to trade, they should immediately give implicit obedi-ence to the established laws. If even England has laws, how much more the Celestial Empire . . . But, in tender consideration of his being a newcomer strict investigation will not be made.'17
Tender consideration was wasted on Lord Napier, who continued to add insults to the original offences of riding roughshod through the Chinese regulations. When the Viceroy sent representatives to a conf ere nee he met them with a 'severe reprimand' for not having arrived at the appointed time, their delay being characterized as an 'insult to His Britannic Majesty', and made it clear that he was perfectly prepared for war if necessary. The one man who might have saved the situation was the missionary Robert Morrison, who had accepted the responsible position of Chinese Secretary to the Superintendency, at the salary of �G1,300. For such a restrained man, Morrison showed considerable excitement about his new post: 'I am to wear a Vice-Consul's coat with King's buttons ... A Vice-Consul's uniform insteadsof a preaching gown!,i8 But he did not live long to enjoy the coat.sAfter only two days' work with Napier, Morrison was taken mortally ill, and within the week was dead. Napier thus lost the only man in Canton who had enough knowledge, influence and prestige possibly to have diverted him from his headstrong course of action.
In accordance with his original remit, Napier had been given no force to bolster his intendedly pacific mission, but as accident had it the Andromache, which was still lying at Macao, had been joined by another frigate, Imogene, part of the regular patrolling force of the East India squadron. Thrashing about for some way of impressing the Chinese, while sending angry dispatches to London demanding armed intervention, the Chief Superintendent persuaded the senior naval officer, Captain Blackwood, to bring his vessels upriver to Whampoa, 'and if their presence there was not sufficient protection, to anchor under the walls of the town' -which, in fact, they could not reach. It should have been impossible for two sailing ships to force their way, against the current, up a narrow channel under the hundreds of fortress
THE HUMILIATION OF LORD NAPIER
guns, but the frigates managed this with.ut much difficulty, although they took casualties. The action -the Battle of the Bogue, as the English press called it -was the only creditable-sounding piece of news to emerge from Napier's mission, and was made much of in the British newspapers.
The Viceroy's answer to this ill-advised adventure was simply to announce a boycott of the British, suspending all trade with the rebel-lious barbarians. This was almost immediately effective. Soldiers were sent to see that no Chinese servant approached the English factory, and Chinese were forbidden on pain of death to sell provisions to the British. Dispatched at great expense to secure the China trade, Lord Napier had succeeded only in having it stopped; the other foreignmerchants, who had been suspicious of the Jardine-Napier axis, rebelled and petitioned the Hoppo to allow trade to be resumed.
Napier found himself completely powerless. He could not even further disregard his instructions and attempt to force his way back to Macao through the Chinese lines, as the frigates had returned to Macao, and the river between Whar1poa and Canton was now com-pletely blocked even to small boats. Within three weeks Napier and his staff, having had to beg for permission to leave Canton, were jostled off downriver to Macao, running a gauntlet of jeering Chinese; inside five weeks, on 11 October, Napier was dead of a fever. The trade at Canton, this irritant having been removed, was peacefully resumed.
Although Lord Napier failed in his mission, he should be given the credit for having first suggested taking possession of Hong Kong, at least on a temporary basis (although someone else, probably Jardine, must have told him of it, since the Superintendent had no opportunity of visiting the harbour himself). In a dispatch of 14 August Napier recommended the occupation of 'the island of Hong Kong, in the entrance of the Canton River, which is admirably adapted for every purpose'.
Not to lose the enjoyment of what we have got
Nothing could have been more deplorably ineffectual than the 'Napier Fizzle', as it speedily became known, but when the news of it reached England there was little of the righteous indignation that might have been expected at hearing that a diplomatic mission had been shamefully rebuffed. To some extent this was due to the fact that Palmerston,
A HISTORY OF HONG KONG
who would have been furious at the debacle, was temporarily out of office, as a result of an odd constitutional interlude.
The diarist Charles Grcville reported that, on 16 November 1834,'the town was electrified by the news that Melboume's Government was at an end. Nobody had the slightest suspidon of such an impending catastrophe.'19 William IV, who hated the Whigs, had seized upon a trivial excuse to accept Melboume's resignation, and, instead of appointing another man from the same party, as constitutional conven-tion demanded, had summoned the Tory Robert Peel. It was therefore the Duke of Wellington, acting as Foreign Secretary, rather than Palmerston, who received the news of Napier's failure from China, and reacted to it in his inimitable manner: he expressed not a word of regret for Napier, who had disobeyed orders, but enjoyed the oppor-tunity to put much of the blame on the Whigs: 'it is quite obvious that the attempt made to force upon the Chinese authorities at Canton, an unaccustomed mode of communication ... had completely failed ...it is obvious that such an attempt must invariably fail, and lead again to national disgrace'. He tersely analysed what was wrong with Palmerston's brief to the Superintendents, and how it should be amended:
They are instructed to proceed to and reside at the port of Canton.
The port of Canton is described as being in the Bocca Tigris,
to which point it is stated that H.M.'s ships are not to go.
The Superintendents are therefore required to go to, and reside
at, the place to which the Chinese authorities will not allow them
to go, and at which they will not allow them to reside.
This and other matters require alteration ...
The Duke summed up future policy in a particularly pragmatic one-liner. 'That which we require now is, not to lose the enjoyment of what we have got.' To this there was general agreement: only King William remained 'mightily indignant at Lord Napier's affair at Canton, and wants to go to war with China. He writes in this strain to the Duke, who is obliged to write long answers, very respectfully telling him what an old fool he is.'20
The Chinese government was equally content to let the matter rest, having some cause for satisfaction in the outcome. True, the forcing of the Bogue by Imogene and Andromache was reprehensible: Viceroy Lu was accordingly stripped of his honorific button and peacock
THE HUMILIATION OF LORD NAPIER
feather, and required to remain in post, but when the presumptuous headman had been humiliatingly banished Lu's decorations were restored. There were also more pressing items on the Peking agenda, which although thousands of miles from Canton, were to have their effects on the problems there. Troubles on the western frontier of China were as endemic as those of the north-west frontier of India, and for the same reasons. The restless Moslem tribesmen of that region were just as foreign in race, religion and language to the Chinese raj as were Pathans and Ghazis to the British. The pacification of southern Sink.iang by Tao-kuang's grandfather had been secured by a chain of forts protecting the trade routes over the Pamirs to what is now Afghanistan, Pakistan (Gilgit) and to Kokand, on the old silk road to Tashkent, Samarkand and Bokhara. Just as the British bought off the Pathan tribesmen after the war with Afghanistan in the 1840s, the Chinese had stabilized their border by subsidies to the Khan of Kokand for keeping the border quiet. The Khan however stepped up his demands, and fomented an insurr.ction in Chinese Kashgar followed by an invasion. It took five years before that was settled by a treaty in 1835, which provided that the Khan should have a political agent at Kashgar, and commercial representation in five other cities, his officials to have extra-territorial powers, both judicial and police, over foreignresidents, and a favourable tax regime.21 These conditions were similar to those embodied only seven years later in the British Treaty of Nanking, which is still regarded by the Chinese as an unequal treaty forced upon China by foreign aggression, rather than as something for which ample and recent precedent existed in Ch'ing diplomacy.
It is difficult to imagine a less aggressive, more pacific response to what could be interpreted as a national disgrace (and was, especially by the Jardine faction) than that offered by the Tory government to the result of Lord Napier's mission, but this was also to be the policy of the Whigs when in April 1835 Lord Palmerston got back his old desk in the Foreign Office.
John Davis, whose views had been ignored by Napier, was content to let things in Canton continue quietly as they had done when he had been President of the Select. In his dispatch telling the Foreign Secre-tary of Napier's death, Davis recommended that 'a state of absolute silence and quiescence on our part seems the most eligible course'. The new Chief Superintendent did however make one decision of future importance. On Napier's death, Johnston, bereft of his protec-tor, applied to be appointed as Secretary to the Superintendency. Davis
74 A HISTORY OF HONG�PKONG
had already taken Johnston's measure, and was reluctant to agree to the promotion; he examined Johnston's personal file, and found that the experience he claimed did not quite match the records. In due course, when Davis resigned, Johnston was to get his promotion, but now Charles Elliot was given the post, and began his rise up the Superintendency. For the rest, Davis was relieved at ,being able to revert to Palmerston's original instructions, and urged the British mer-chants to 'avoid giving the Chinese any just cause for complaint'.
This was optimistic of him. 'Absolute silence and quiescence' could never recommend themselves to so enterprising a group. They resented the fact that Davis, whom they regarded as a left-over of the Company's, was now in charge ('one brought up in the late School of Monopoly can never therefore be a fit Representative and Controller of free traders', objected the Canton Register). Jardine took himself off to England to stir things up at home, escorting the widowed Lady Napier, while the Canton Chamber of Commerce sent a strongly-worded petition to the King, which advocated sending another rep-resentative, accompanied by an armed force, who was to be allowed no discretion 'to swerve in the smallest degree from a direct course of calm and dispassionate, but determined, maintenance of the true rank of your Majesty's empire'. Above all, the new envoy should be in no way connected, or tainted by association with, the distrusted East India Company.
Davis found all this very trying: the petition, he reported, was 'crude and ill-digested', from only 'a portion of the English traders at Canton (for some of the most reputable houses declined signing it)' -he meant the Dents -and is said to have been drawn up by a casual visitor from India, totally unacquainted with the country'.22 In effect Davis's ground had been cut from under him by the failure of the mission, and there was nothing to keep him in a community most members of which he despised with true John Company hauteur. He therefore resigned the Superintendency and returned to England in January 1835, presum-ably never thinking to see the Pearl River again. But nine years later he was back, not only as Superintendent, but Governor of Hong Kong, Plenipotentiary, and Baronet.
Davis was replaced by the former Third Superintendent, Sir George Robinson. As Davis's resignation was followed by that of the Secretary, Astell, the posts of Second and Third Superintendents were allotted to Elliot and Johnston respectively. Robinson adopted the supine pos-ition with enthusiasm, refusing to stir an inch in any direction; literally

THE HUMILIATION OF LORD NAPIER
so, for he took up his headquarters on the little cutter Louisa, anchored at Lintin, safely out of everyone's way. Safely, but uncomfortably, his staff being terribly cramped on the eighty-ton boat, which was nothing more than an armed yacht. Immune to their dissatisfaction, Robinson remained on board for two years, maintaining the lowest of profiles, but sending a steady stream of self-abasing dispatches to Palmerston: 'I trust it is not necessary for me to add anything like an assurance of the most profound deference and respect with which I shall implicitly obey and execute the very spirit of such instructions as I may have the honour to receive, on this or any other point. Strict undeviating obedi-ence to the orders and directions of which I may be in possession ... is the foundation on which I build .. .'
Charles Elliot had distrusted Robinson from the beginning.
Although he was delighted by his own promotion, which, he wrote to his wife on 19 January 1835, would clear their debts if he could hold it for only six months, 'on the whole I would rather he [Davis] had not gone for he leaves a sad foolish fellow to replace him'.23 Robinson's performance in office fortified Elliot's misgivings; he could not stomach Robinson's weak-kneed attitude to what Elliot perceived as flagrant violations by the private merchants. In particular he deprecated the ineffable James Innes (a madman, who ought to be caught and hanged, said the American trader Bennett Forbes, who had every opportunity of observing him), who had announced his intention of personally starting an individual war against China unless the customs officers surrendered some goods they had confiscated. Robinson crir.ged and wrung his hands, but avoided taking firm action either with Innes or the Chinese. This was too much for Captain Elliot, who as Second Superintendent was permitted to correspond with Whitehall indepen-dently of Robinson. Elliot persuaded Johnston to join him in a remon-strance to Palmerston, in which they condemned 'the mode of proceeding on the part of Sir G.B. Robinson; and concur in the opinion that steps should be taken to compel Mr Innes to forgo his hostile intentions'. It was also too much for Palmerston, who wrote back saying that what Innes proposed constituted nothing less than piracy, and that if he went ahead the Royal Navy would deal with him, but that if he had right on his side the Superintendents should take up his case with the authorities. That was the end of the road for Robinson, who was curtly dismissed, to be succeeded by Elliot.
A HISTORY OF HON"G KONG
Your most humble and obedient seroant
Hong Kong has no Stamford Raffies, no single undisputed founder commemorated in place names, monuments or even hotels. The man who should be so remembered, Charles Elliot, is ignored. In December 1836, two years after coming to Canton in the relatively junior post of Master Attendant, Elliot found himself in charge (although at a salaryconsiderably less than that of his predecessors) of Great Britain's relations with the Chinese Empire, with only young Alexander John-ston having any share in the responsibilities. It was not an enviable position, since Elliot's powers, either to control the British merchants or to communicate with the Chinese authorities, were lamentably ill-defined, and Palmerston failed to give him any decisive lead. The Foreign Secretary certainly wrote vigorously condemning such 'pirati-cal' actions as Innes's, but at the same time warned Elliot against any attempt to exert his authority. There was 'no effective power to the Superintendent to remove or punish anyone', Palmerston wrote on 8 November 183624 -this in spite of the Order in Council setting up a court. The Superintendent had to be 'very careful not to assume a greater degree of authority over British subjects in China than that which you in reality possess' (22 July 183625): at the same time he was to 'do all that lies in your power to avoid giving just cause of offence to the Chinese authorities'. Since the behaviour of the British mer-chants itself formed 'the chief cause of offence' this was difficult. Elliot attempted to explain that Canton was now 'filled ... with a class of people who can never be left to their own devices among�P the natives of this country'; he went on to note 'evidence of a growing dislike upon the part of the common people to our countrymen. It is the fashion of the young men particularly to treat the Chinese with the ubnost wanton insult and contumely.'
James Matheson followed Jardine to England in 1836, in order to commission a monument to Lord Napier and to encourage another, stronger approach to China, which he attempted to do in a vituperative book, The Present Position and Prospeas of the British Trade with China. God Himself is not immune from blame: 'It has pleased Providence to assign to the Chinese -a people characterized by a marvellous degree of imbecility, avarice, conceit and obstinacy -the possession of a vast portion .f the most desirable parts of the earth, and a population estimated as amounting to nearly one-third of the human race.' These creatures subjected innocent foreigners to 'injuries and insults not
THE HUMILIATION OF LORD NAPIER
merely of a harassing, but even of a horrible, description'; 'the laws of nature were outraged' (by not allowing Mrs Baynes to come to Canton!), making British merchants in China 'worse off than even our West Indian slaves'. The East India Company had been shamefully weak; their policy was that 'the Chinese are a great, powerful and peculiar people with whom it is purely optional to continue or refuse permission for us to continue our intercourse, since they are not, nor ever will be, bound by any treaty; that, in the absence of any treaty, the law of nations prohibits any attempt to enforce our supposed claims upon the Chinese'. That this statement pretty accurately reflected the views of the Duke of Wellington, Lord Palmerston, and almost every other politician or administrator was of no significance; the matter would be corrected by 'those "princes of the earth" -the MER-CHANTS' who would 'overcome this feeling of indifference and repug-nance. A spirit of noble and persevering enterprise led them to dare all dangers, to despise all difficulties.'
The way forward was made clear in Matl-.eson's breathless prose: 'We must resolve upon vindicating our insulted honour as a nation, and protecting the injured interests of our commerce -or ... humble ourselves ... in ignominious submission, at the feet of the most insol-ent, the most ungrateful, the most pusillanimous people upon earth.' If the Chinese did not immediately accede, the remedy of taking a spot of their territory was availabk Not Macao, however easy that might be, because of its poor harbour and unfavourable location: 'If any island is taken possession of, it should be in a central part of China -Chusan, for example'. Hong Kong was still far from people's minds.cOthers, led by the Dents, took a less belligerent view. Elliot wrote:c'There are "two houses" here, and they i.re so desperately angry withceach other that their feuds colour their opinions on every subject undercthe sun . . . I wish I could add that the moderate party were thecstronger, but ... the ardent gentlemen have it hollow in point ofcnumbers.'26
Notwithstanding all Matheson's expressions of discontent, free trade at Canton continued to be only moderately successful. In the years following the Company's withdrawal raw cotton imports doubled, as did silk exports: tea exports increased, but quality declined -as the Company had forecast -and markets became both saturated and frac-tious, making for difficult sales. Optimistic newcomers, hoping for a free-for-all expansion of trade, rushed to Canton, but it was only that staple, opium, for which demand remained strong. From the modest
A HISTORY OF HONG KONG
four to five thousand chests of the early years of the century, annual imports of the drug had risen to about twelve thousand chests in the late twenties. By 1834 this had shot up to twenty thousand, and from then on the rise was�Psteep, to over thirty thousand in 1835, and forty thousand in 1838.
So sharp an increase began to cause alarm; since all opium was imported illegally, no duties were paid, all exactions going to the middlemen and mandarins' private accounts. As smuggling opium was so widespread, traders saw little reason to import even legitimate car-goes through the Canton customs; they might just as well also be offloaded in the estuary and the customs duty saved. And since all illegal imports had to be paid for in bullion, the strain on China's reserves was considerable.
It is difficult to use the term 'smuggling', with its connotations of surreptitiousness, to describe so very blatant an operation on so large a scale. Elliot regretted his lack of power to control his fellow-countryrnen, and pressed 'for active intervention on the part of Her Majesty's Government', which 'cannot be deferred without great haz-ard' .27 Elliot's difficulties were exacerbated by Palmerston's insistence
.at his communications should be direct to the Viceroy and not through the established medium of the Hong merchants. In particular the Foreign Secretary objected to such letters being styled 'petitions', a matter of essential good form to the Chinese (although Palmerston saw nothing odd in himself signing a stiff reprimand as 'your most humble and obedient servant', he had little patience for other countries' protocol). Doing his best to follow what he called Palmerston's 'tight-rope instructions', the Chief Superintendent did succeed in estab-lishing reasonable relations with the new Viceroy, Teng T'ing-chen.
In default of a coherent and workable British policy it was the Chinese who took the initiative. If the opium trade was becoming intolerable, there were two possibilities: either legalize it or suppressit, and a debate on the subject was formally initiated at Peking early in 1836. There was much to be said for legitimizing the trade; while this would cut off their illicit income, the mandarins and their subordi-nates could still squeeze the Hong merchants for a percentage of greater official profits; better than nothing. The public revenue could be greatly increased, and the retail price fixed at a level that would discourage abuse. The Canton officials were unanimous that the trade should be legalized. Hsii Nai-tsi, who had been senior judge there, took this line; his supporters, from Viceroy Teng down to the Hong
THE HUMILIATION OF LORD NAPIER
merchants, made the natural proviso that opium imports should be strictly restricted to Canton, and the vile �Ptrade up the coast severely prohibited! The policy was supported by the venerable scholar Juan Yuan and, it was reported, by the Empress. Hsii's memorial was trans-lated and published in the Canton Register of 12 July 1836, and both Europeans and Chinese there took legalization pretty much for granted. Elliot reported on 27 July: 'The formal and final orders [for legalization] will probably be here in the course of a month or six weeks,' and on 6 August he described the expected move as 'undoubtedly the most remarkable measure . . . in respect of the Foreign Trade since the accession of the dynasty'. Matheson was not happy, writing on 12 July: 'I do not think well of the plan as far as our interests are concerned -tho' it has already enhanced prices. '28 Six months later, in February 1837, nothing had happened, but Jardine was still writing: 'sooner or later this article will be admitted and when admitted the consumption will be increased'.29 In October that year his partner was of the opposite opinion: 'The legalization of the trade is no longer to be thought of and the government is evidently making a strong effort for its entire suppression. In this, of course, they will be unable to succeed.'30
Matheson was proved right; as early as August 183 7 a crackdown was taking place. The Jardine Matheson day-book clerk recorded on the thirteenth: 'The smuggling boats are again prevented from running and the brokers have absconded. There is consequently no inquiryafter the drug.'31 It soon became inescapably clear in Canton that, far from legalizing the drug, the Chinese authorities had resolved on its absolute and final suppression, and that in the most rigorous form. The Emperor had made his decision that the drug was not to be allowed, and that the only question was how best to put an end to the trade.
The War of Lancelot Dent's Collar
Was the first Anglo-Chinese war (1840-42), which led to the founda-tion of the colony of Hong Kong, really caused by the unscrupulous British flooding China with illicit opium, as the conventional view has it? Opinions differed at the time: The Times was the first, on 25 April 1840, to give the conflict the name of an 'Opium War'; Gladstone, then a member of the Tory opposition, had no doubts, but Gladstone
So A HISTORY OF HONG KONG
rarely harboured doubt: 'A war more unjust in its origins, a war more calculated in its progress to cover this country with permanent disgrace, I do not know, and bave not read of.' Macaulay, as Secretary of War, took an exactly opposite view: 'The liberties and lives of Englishmen are at stake ... there will be, as respects China, no change of measures ... I ... have only to express my fervent hope that this .most righteous quarrel may be prosecuted to a speedy and triumphant close.'32 The former US President John Quincy Adams, in the New York Herald, took an unexpected stand: 'Who has the righteous cause? You will be surprised to hear me answer -Britain! The opium question is not the cause of the war ... the cause of the war is the Kotou [kowtow]! The arrogant and unacceptable pretensions of the Chinese', 33 the Chinese seizure of the opium held at Canton being 'a mere incident in the dispute';34 the French were, as ever, sure that perfidious Albion was to blame.
Distance has hardly lent clarity to the view; writers from the People's Republic of China have no doubts on the subject: 'To protect her lucrative opium trade, England had been preparing for war againstChina for some time before 1840 ... Despite the courageous resist-ance of the people and the patriotic officers and men, the war ended with defeat for China because of the .ng court's domestic policy of hostility to the people and its foreign policy of compromise with and capitulation to the invaders'35; 'marauding capitalist aggressors,exploiting the trade in opium began to invade China'.36 Western scholars are not so sure of the case: 'Historians have repeatedly laid to rest the ghost of fighting a war to force opium on the Chinese, but with singular persistence it appears in anti-opium pamphlets and undergraduate text books ... Palmerston ... made it amply clear that to the government the opium question was incidental';37 'It would be called an opium war because opium was the article of commerce that had caused it. But the war would not be fought over opium; it would be fought over trade, the urgent desire of a capitalist, industrial, pro-gressive country to force a Confucian, agricultural and stagnant one to trade with it'.38 The doyen of historians of the period, John King Fairbank, is scathing: 'The opium war of 1839-42, all agree, was a classic iniquity ... What's wrong with this picture? Only that it is the afterthought of slightly guilt-ridden individuals ... or of Marxist-minded patriots (who have to live with the fact that the Chinese were the opium distributors within China and soon became the principal producers).'39 Chinese writing in the West often agree: 'In retrospect,
THE HUMILIATION OF LORD NAPIER 81
it is apparent that opium was the immedia_te, but not the ultimate cause of the war';40 'In the broad sense the Opium War was a clash between two cultures ... But the vital force that brought on the cultural conflict was Britain's commercial expansion ... The opium trade was an indis-pensable vehicle for facilitating this expansion and the two could not be separated. Had there been an effective alternative to opium, say molasses or rice, the conflict might have been called the Molasses War, or the Rice War. The only difference would have been a matter of time.'41 Given these widely differing opinions, and since the legiti-macy of Britain's occupation of Hong Kong is still challenged on moral grounds, the remainder of this chapter attempts a clarification of the 'Opium War' debate.
When suppression of the opium trade was decided upon, suggestions on how this might be done were submitted to the Emperor. Huang Chueh-tzu, from the Board of Rites, wanted extreme measures: 'I understand that according to Red Hair country's law, smokers are hung on high poles for public exhibition and then shot into the sea by cannon. China should do better than these foreign barbarians.'Ch'i-shan and Mu-chang-a, both sensible Manchus, preferred to cut 42 off supplies by a blockade of Canton, and wisely pointed out that severe laws were useless unless they commanded general respect. They were supported by the majority of the respondents, but the arguments that swept the board were those of Lin Tse-hsii (Lin Zexu), who proposed a programme for the rehabilitation of addicts combined with increasingly severe punishments for suppliers, leading to a total interdiction of the drug. The Emperor wholeheartedly agreed, adding many vermilion endorsements to the manuscript.
In accord with bureaucratic tradition everywhere, the man who had submitted the best memorandum was given the job of putting it intopractice. Lin seemed more suited for the role than most civil servants might have been. Aged fifty-three, and a native ofgFoochow, in Fukien, he was brought up in a coastal trading community. His career had been remarkably swift and unblemished, earning him the nickname of Lin Ch'ing-t'ien -Lin the Clear Sky, the incorruptible. Not only was Lin trustworthy, methodical and intellectually brilliant, but he enjoyed a 'hands-on' method of dealing with problems, even in risky situations. He is today perceived, and with some justification, as a hero of the Chinese people, a scholar-statesman in the finest Confucian tradition, courageous in his resistance to foreign encroachments.
Lin much resembled that seventeenth-century Englishman, Samuel
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Pepys. Both were renowned administrators who kept diaries and were curious and analytical observers of all they saw: both were amateurs of the arts, both had a close circle of friends that included the greatest scholars of their day; and both also took an interest in more fleshly pleasures. Like Lin, Pepys enjoyed the absolute trust of his sovereignand, by the standards of the day, Pepys was similarly honourable. Even s;the descriptions of Lin sound not unlike those of Pepys: 'Lin is short, but of a compact make ... with a fine intelligent forehead and a rather pleasing expression of countenance, enlivened by small dark piercing eyes, and possessing a voice strong, clear and sonorous. In dress he is plain [perhaps not a Pepysian characteristic], while in his manners he can be courteous, but is more generally rather abrupt'; 'a dignifiedair ... a bland and vivacious character without a trace of the fanatics
43
... rather stout, with a full round face ... and a keen black eye'.
Where Pepys and Lin differed was in their knowledge of the world outside. Pepys had visited Europe and North Africa, and was in daily contact with mariners who had touched in all quarters of the globe including China; the affairs of Bombay became just as much part of his routine as those of Portsmouth. Lin, although he took a lively inteller.tual interest in what was known of the barbarian world, remained in almost total igorance ofglife outside the Middle Kingdom.
gn
The British, he believed, could not exist without regular supplies of rhubarb and tea: 'If China cuts off these benefits with no sympathy for those who are to suffer what can the barbarians rely upon to keep themselves alive?'44 There was, he felt, no real possibility of conflict -how could the barbarians hope to challenge the might of the Celestial Dynasty? Their troops could never fight on shore, since their legs were too tightly bound to permit them to box or wrestle. Their ships might be large, but were helpless in shallow waters. Above all, Lin was con-vinced that Britain came to China as a suppliant, as did all barbarians: 'The kings of your honourable country', he wrote to Queen Victoria, 'have always been noted for their politeness and submissiveness'; andtherefore remonstrated with them in the reasonable tones of a superior civilization.
If it was difficult for Lin to evaluate the capabilities of barbarians, it was not much easier for his counterpart Charles Elliot to comprehend Lin's strategy. He had the advantage of having passed five years in China, but without learning the language or having anything but the most superficial contact with the people, and none at all with the administrator-scholars who held the reins of power. In spite of these
THE HUMILIATION OF LORD NAPIER
obstacles it should have been possible for two such reasonable men as Lin and Elliot, both of whom were antipathetic to the whole idea of opium smuggling, to have managed things between them. What Lin was proposing was after all nothing except the effectual administration of his country's own laws, laws which Elliot was both in duty and inclination ready to support. 'No man,' he wrote in a despatch of 16 November 1839, 'entertains a deeper detestation of the disgrace and sin of this forced traffic.' The responsibility for the situation developing into open war has to be shared between the British government, who refused to allow Elliot proper powers, and the conscientious Lin, led into a blunder by his ignorance of the West.
Even before Lin's appointment, measures against Chinese opium dealers had been intensified. On 3 December 1838 the Jardine Mathe-son clerk recorded: ' ... many idle reports are afloat -such as the Viceroy having made up his mind to strangle one of the offenders in front of the foreign factories, as an example to the others -and to seize . . . all the Chinese comparadores, servants and coolies in the service of foreign merchants -such reports we do not believe.'45
He was wrong not to believe the rumours; an attempt was indeed made to execute a Chinese opium dealer in front of the factories, which so enraged the Westerners as to lead to a riot. Although this hanging was prevented, many others followed: 'The Governor Gen-eral,' Jardine wrote, 'has been seizing, trying, and strangling poor devils without mercy ... We have never seen so serious a persecution, nor one so general.'46 Superintendent Elliot issued more stem admonitions to the recalcitrant British, warning 'owners of such ... craft engaged in the said illicit opium traffic ... that Her Majesty's Government will in no way interpose if the Chinese Government shall think fit to seize [them)'. And if any smuggler caused the death of a Chinese in the course of his activities, he must expect to be liable to capital punish-ment himself. Elliot's energetic approach was rewarded by the reopening of trade, a circumstance in which he took great satisfaction.
In an effort to add weight to his already severe warning, Elliot asked Governor-General Teng for his support, even, as he afterwards told his wife Clara, offering to bring the little cutter Louisa, a Queen's vessel, to assist in rounding up any offenders, a remarkable gesture from a Royal Navy officer: 'I had already offered the Louisa to do the will of the Emperor and was perfectly ready to have ordered officers of our own establishment to accompany their officers on board any of the ships that he saw fit.' The American traders saw the writing on
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the wall; Russell's, the largest house, decided to 'discontinue all con-nection with the opium trade in China', a business that was fast becom-ing 'as dangerous as it was disreputable'. The British traders, with more at stake, and with a residual expectation that if the worst came to the worst they would be bailed out by the Royal Navy, awaited the coming of Commissioner Lin with only moderate unease.
Armed with full authority from the Emperor as Imperial Com-missioner, the incorruptible Lin set out from Peking on 8January 1839. The news of his appointment left the cynical Jardine unmoved. Writing from Macao on his way back to England on the twenty-ninth of that month he reported: 'A special envoy has been appointed, and is soon expected to enforce the prohibitory laws, with authority entirely indepen-dent of the Viceroy, who was so alarmed at learning the intelligence that he fell into a swoon of an hour's duration ... In order to make a parade of zeal he and the Foo Yuen [the Governor] have just issued a longproc-lamation.'47 But as a precaution, Jardine suggested that deliveries ofopium and piece goods should be diverted to Hong Kong and up the coast, which would indicate that some trade was already taking place in the island's waters. Some months later Jardine's partner Matheson claimed that he had considered sending the opium ships away, but that the project had been aborted owing to 'Mr Dent's usual dilatoriness'.Lin did not arrive in Canton until 10 March 1839, when Elliot was 48g
in Macao, leaving Johnston in charge in Canton. Instructions had been sent ahead by Lin for the Canton authorities to arrest nearly sixty Chinese identified as active in the opium trade, who were to be tried over the next few months; at least four of these were sentenced to death. Information had also been laid before the Commissioner as to the identity of the chief foreign smugglers; inJardine's absence Lance-lot Dent was, correctly, named as their head. But Lin made it clear that his targets were the Chinese. As long as the foreigners obeyed the law, and refrained from smuggling, they would not be harmed but, on the contrary, benevolently treated as they had been in the past: the legitimate trade was important, and must be protected. On 18 March the Commissioner laid down his conditions: all opium stocks must be surrendered and the foreigners must pledge themselves never again to deal in the drug. If these conditions were not met, the Hong mer-chants would suffer imprisonment, expropriation and decapitation. Nor would the foreigners be spared: if they refused or reneged on their undertakings 'it will become requisite to include you also in the severe punishment prescribed by the new law' .49 Three days were given forg
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compliance, and in the meantime the foreigners were to be confined to their factories.
The foreigners, who had heard all this sort of thing before in the periodic purges, were not unduly perturbed, and at a meeting of the Chamber of Commerce on 2 I March contented themselves with bland assurances that they too greatly deplored the opium traffic and, as a gesture, agreed to surrender a small quantity, just over a thousand chests. This was a grave misjudgement of Lin, who was furious at what he recognized as blatant procrastination, and immediately issued an order for Lancelot Dent's arrest. To lend weight to this, on 23 March he sent the two senior Hong merchants, Howqua and Mowqua, to the factories in chains, with a warning that if Dent did not present himself they would be decapitated that very night. Dent, relying on his good relations w.th the Chinese, was willing to surrender himself,and the other merchants were content to let him, until Matheson intervened. He considered the whole thing to be 'the most complete exhibition of humbug'. It was 'almost amusing to witness the forced gravity which Howqua and the younger Mowqua tried to assume in their chains, which, however, did not prevent them from occasionally chatting about business or news with any friend who happened to be near'. He was able to dissuade Dent from complying 'which was of course a matter of no great difficulty',50 as Matheson, always willing to be sarcastic about the Dents, remarked.
Whether Dent stood in real peril or not has been the subject of some debate. In a memorial to the Emperor of 2 May 1839 Lin sug-gested that 'the said barbarians are from a far-off country' and should therefore be treated leniently, and that 'our policy is to be rigorous without resorting to any offensive action'. Opinions differed among the British as to Lin's seriousness. Dent's partner, Robert Inglis, did not believe him to be in grave danger when the following year he described the incident to a Select Committee of the House of Com-mons: 'Mr Dent was probably the most popular man amongst all the foreigners with the Chinese. It was not from any enmity to him that he was selected; quite the contrary ... it was hoped to work upon his feelings.' Lancelot's brother Wilkinson was not so sure, and 'was in a great state of excitement ... if he went to the city he was sure he would be put to death'. Jardine pooh-poohed the whole business: 'if there had been more resistance, the measures would have been less severe than they were';51 but Jardine was not present at the time.
Help however was at hand, and in a dramatic fashion. The American
A HISTORY OF HONG KO!'l:G
resident Gideon Nye recorded: 'nor were visions of the "Black Hole" wholly dispelled until the conciliatory but intrepid Elliot, sword in hand, made his way in his cutter from Macao, and by dint of great exertions reached the British factory.'52Mrs Elliot described how when the news of the threat to Dent reached Macao, 'Charles, much to my horror, dashed off to Canton in a most gallant style. He had to push his way through hundreds of war junks in a small boat "(his four-oared gig). Happily he had on his uniform coat which probably saved him ... he landed in safety among the chaos of his countrymen.' Even the cynical Matheson was affected by the scene: 'It was an arresting sight about 6 p.m. [on 24 March] to descry from our terrace a small foreignboat with a sitter in a cocked hat, pulling up -crowds of Chinese boats in chase. It proved to be Charles Elliot who managed to effect a landing as a barrier of boats was closing in to intercept. In a moment the flag was hoisted.'53 It was only the small boat's flag, the official Union flag having been mislaid, but its flying over the Superintendent's residence indicated that the foreign community was under British pro-tection and that the confrontation was now an official dispute between the British and Chinese governments.
Not that the British were able to offer any but moral protection, the only force available being the four-man crew of Elliot's gig. Lin, from a position of considerable strength, having a good proportion of the foreigners in China cooped up inside the few acres of the Canton factories, but completely unaware of the furore he had started, was insisting on three demands: 1) The surrender of all the opium in the port and on the river; 2) The agreement of all merchants t(? an under-taking not to deal in opium in the future; 3) The surrender of Lancelot Dent. Until at least the first of these conditions was fulfilled, the factories would be blockaded, all trade would cease, and all Chinese would leave the factories. Once the opium was delivered conditions would be relaxed and the question of Dent's arrest would fall away.
Agreeing not to import more opium presented little problem: being made under duress, it could be argued that such promises were not binding. Certainly Matheson expressed himself very ready to sign: 'As far as regards JM & Co we had resolutely determined to abide by the cession made', but at the same time he wrote to his correspondents that they should send their opium to Alexander Matheson at Macao, who would be happy to continue to dispose of it:54 the distinction between the company and one of its staff acting as an individual was not likely to commend itself to the Commissioner. It is also probable
THE HUMILIATION OF LORD NAPIER
that the merchants might have been persuaded to surrender all their opium -for Lin had accurately calculated the quantity in hand -hoping that the Chinese might later be cajoled or coerced into paying for it. But Elliot solved any difficulty by 'enjoining and instructing', on behalf of the British government, the surrender of the drug. Since this clear order meant that opium which had looked to be unsaleable was now, at least in theory, replaced by a British government obligation to compensate them, the traders were delighted. Even Matheson was brought to admit: 'Though at the time and long after I had doubts as to the judiciousness of what Captain Elliot has done, now that I am able to view its progress ... I am inclined to regard it as a large and statesmanlike measure more especially since the Chinese have fallen into the snare of rendering themselves directly liable to the British Crown ... Captain t!liot is desirous to make his receipts as complete as they can possibly be rendered ... the only point left for adjustment is the rate of compensation. '55
The receipts were as complete as could be wished, since the mer-chants scoured out every ounce of opium they could find, even sending to the ships up the coast and on their way from India for whatever they had to supply. The astonishing quantity of 2,613,879 pounds of opium was delivered -more than one thousand tons, making it surely the largest drug haul ever collected -and burned in Lin's presence at a specially constructed site by the banks of the Pearl River.
IfLin had left off at this point matters would probably have arranged themselves. There would certainly have been controversy about who was to pay for the surrendered opium, valued at over �G2 million. Elliot would have found himselfin deep trouble with the Treasury, and years of painful negotiations would have ensued, but an expensive war might have been avoided. It was not as if the Chinese government could not easily afford to make such a sum available. The much larger amount -more than three times the original sum -finally agreed three yearsclater was paid on the nail, and (as cynics in Britain pointed out) couldcbe recovered whenever the Chinese wished by putting a modest taxcon exports of tea, of which China still had a monopoly, and makingcthe British consumer thereby foot the bill.c
The plausibility of this theory is reinforced by events then taking place in Britain. Things were not going well for the government: on 21 March, as the Canton Chamber of Commerce was worrying over Lin's ultimatum, Lord Melboume's Whig administration had suffered a Parliamentary defeat-over, as so often at the time, the Irish question.
A HISTORY OF HONG KONG
Since the vote had been only in the House of Lords the government was not immediately threatened, but two months later, as the collection and destruction of the opium at Canton was in full swing, the govern-ment came within five votes of losing a motion in the House of Com-mons and felt obliged to resign. This came as a great shock to the nineteen-year-old Queen, who had succeeded her uncle William IV two years previously. Victoria was distraught at the idea of losing the guidance of Lord Melbourne, for whom she felt the tenderest affection. She gave full vent to her distress in a letter to him: 'The Queen thinks Lord Melbourne may possibly wish to know how she is this morning ... she was in a wretched state till nine o'clock last night, when she tried to occupy herself and try to think less gloomily of this dreadful change ... she couldn't touch a morsel of food last night, nor can she this morning.'56 The Opposition leader, Sir Robert Peel, had to be sent for to form a government, but the young Queen was spoiling for a fight. Peel was not in a strong position -he might well have been defeated in the House on the first vote -and a constitutional crisis ensued which ended up with Melbourne and the Whigs back in office, and Palmerston continuing, although precariously, as Foreign Secretary.
It was not until August that reports of the Canton troubles reached London. Communications were improving, but the service from Canton to London was still unreliable, and took up to four months. Elliot's news was another burden to a wretchedly harassed government. At home Chartist riots, demanding an extension to the franchise and electoral reform, were beginning; abroad the French were being diffi-cult in the Middle East, where their protege Mehemet Ali was enthusi-astically dismembering the Turkish Empire: and here was Minto's nephew demanding an expensive expedition -'a swiftunprefaced by one word of written communication' -and him already and heavy blow �Gz million sterling in hock to British merchants.
To Clausewitz, war was diplomacy by other means: to British governments it seemed more a department of accountancy. There could be -although the suggestion was canvassed -no question of repaying the merchants out of public funds for the opium surrendered at Elliot's behest. There simply was not the money, for the expense of the new Penny Post was adding to an already unbalanced budget, and increased taxation would practically ensure a Tory victory. Theor-etically, it would have been possible to repudiate Elliot and the debt together, but this would have been equally certain political suicide for
THE HUMILIATION OF LORD NAPIER
the government, given the notoriety of the Elliot family as furious Whigs -two cousins of Captain Charles, Minto and Auckland, in the Cabinet, and the Home Secretary, Lord John Russell, in love with Minto's daughter Fanny. Probably the most sensible course would have been to let the merchants stew in their own juice until the government's finances were stronger, and then make a negotiated settlement at well under the initial figure. (As it turned out, within a couple of years trading profits had more than recouped the loss.)
But at the time this looked impossible, since all trade at Canton was reported as stopped, and Palmerston had some powerful figures at his elbow urging the merchants' case. One suggestion tendered to the Foreign Secretary is vital to an understanding of British aims. The London East India and China Association were asked for their advice, which they gave in a long letter of 2 November 1839. It was essential, they considered, that any British representative be allowed direct access to the Chinese authorities, upon equal terms, and specified ports in addition to Canton must be opened for trade. If this was not allowed, then 'the cession, by purchase or otherwise, of an island [should] be obtained'.57 The Association was ready to accept that British subjects in China be subject to Chinese laws, but on the principle 'each man for his own -the innocent not being confounded with the guilty',which would have been tantamount to leaving the opium trade to the adventurous fringe. An appendix was attached detailing precisely what forces would be needed to bring the Chinese Empire to the negotiating table: two line-of-battle ships, two large and two small frigates, some smaller vessels, including steamers, with 2,540 sailors and marines.
Perhaps the most important part of the Association's memorandum was that dealing with opium. Quite simply it accepted that if the Chinese government seriously wished to suppress the trade, this decision must be complied with: 'we have no desire that it should for one instant be supposed, that we are advocating the continuance of a trade against which the Chinese Government formally protest. We are quite prepared to admit, should the Chinese persist in prohibiting the import of opium that henceforth the British merchants trading to China, must obey the laws of that country in respect to that article, and that the Crown of Great Britain cannot be called upon to interfere in any manner in support of its subjects who violate them.' The sugges-tions of the Association were adopted in their entirety by Lord Palmerston -clear proof that continuation of the opium trade was not
a part of British policy.
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This memorandum was supplemented by a delegation from the Association led by John Abel Smith, Whig M.P. and banker, who acted for Jardine Matheson. Its most important member was the Iron-Headed Old Rat himself, William Jardine, shortly to become Whig Member for Ashburton. He was accompanied by Alexander Matheson and Hugh Lindsay, who had been Supercargo on the Lady Amherst's voyage, sent out from China to second their cause. Although the depu-tation could not persuade Lord Palmcrston to yield an inch on the question of the government's paying, then and there, for the surren-dered opium, he was brought to accept that the Chinese could be forced, without too much difficulty, to pay up instead. They added practical advice on how this should be done. Jardine gave a detailed account of the background to the current situation, and added some very specific recommendations, to which the Foreign Secretary paid close attention. Three years later, on the successful conclusion of peace, Palmerston acknowledged the debt in a letter to John Abel Smith (28 November 1842): 'for to the assistance and information which you and Mr Jardine so handsomely afforded to us, it was mainly owing to them we were able to give to our affairs, Naval, Military, and Diplomatic, in China those detailed instructions which have led to these satisfactory results ... There is no doubt that this event, which will form an epoch in the progress of the civilization of the human races, must be attended with most important advantages to the com-mercial interests of England.'58
Palmerston experienced linle difficulty in convincing the rest of the Cabinet of the need to dispatch an expedition to China, to be organized by the government of India and the Admiralty, although they took their time -after all it was the summer, when no business was allowed to be too pressing. At the crucial meeting Russell, the Home Secretary, appeared to be dozing, and Melbourne, by that time a very tired man, left things to Palmerston and Macaulay, newly appointed as Secretary of War. John Cam Hobhouse, in charge of India as President of the Board of Control, commented: 'The charges made against us of idle-ness could hardly be maintained: for at the first Cabinet which he [Macaulay] had attended we had resolved on a war with the master of Syria and Egypt [Mehemet Ali] backed by France, and also on a war with the master of one-third of the human race.'59a
Hobhouse was making a wry joke, since it was hardly a war that was envisaged either with Mehemet Ali or with China. Britain simply did not have the resources to carry out such an intention. The Royal Navy,
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which had to be the key to success in a coastal blockade half the world away, was reduced to less than thirty thousand officers and men, compared with four times that number during the Napoleonic wars twenty-five years before. Some three thousand soldiers were initially considered sufficient to subdue a third of the human race; they, being provided by the government of India, consisted for the most part of Indian sepoys, with units from three British regiments. Such a force, operating three thousand miles from its Indian base, could be intended for nothing more than an armed demonstration designed to bring some realism into the negotiations with the Chinese. The news of this expeditionary force's formation -carried by a Jardine Matheson clipper rather than a ship of the Royal Navy -was not to reach Elliot until February 1840, nearly a year after the troubles at Canton had begun: and by then events had reached the point where something more like a full-scale war was inevitable.
Flushed with pride at his great victory over the barbarians, Lin proceeded to work through his list of demands. As promised, the foreigners were released from their confinement and allowed to resume trading, providing always that they. had fulfilled his first requirement by signing the undertaking that their ships did not contain opium. This Elliot refused to allow British ships to do, not out of any sympathy with the trade, but because Lin's bond was a singularly unsatisfactory document that might allow any interpretation. It was drafted in the primitive English that was the best that Lin's linguists could manage:
A Truly and Willing Bond
... I, with my officer, and the whole crew are all dreadfully obey
the new laws of the Chinese Majesty, t.'iat they dare not bring
any opium; if one little bit of opium was found out in any part of
my ship by examination, I am willingly deliver up the transgressor,
and he shall be punish to death according to the correctness law
of the Government of Heavenly Dynasty ... 60
The Pandora's box of troubles that this document might cause with the Chinese was one that Elliot could not permit to be opened. The possibilities included mistaken identity, which had already happened (the wrong ship was seized by the Chinese, which action then formed another item in British demands for reparation); squeezing on the part of officials who had made sure that opium would be found on a ship
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by previously depositing it there; as well as sheer intransigence, could all result in British subjects, whom Elliot was in duty bound to protect, being delivered into very uncertain Chinese jurisdiction. For his part Lin was persistent; the barbarians, he explained to the Emperor, attached much importance to promises, which, once given, were strictly adhered to: 'They never break an agreement, or even fail to keep an appointment.' The general undertaking they had given in March -andwhich might, just, have been honoured -was not enough, but if theforeigners could be coerced into signing a formal bond ('a very serious matter ..g.
16as they look at it'), they could be trusted not to break it.Elliot took the only action he believed possible: he issued an instruc-tion banning any British vessel from trading with the Chinese, and withdrew the community from Canton to Macao, leaving the Ameri-cans to look after affairs at the factories. At Macao, considering that they had been released from their undertaking to cease trading by Lin's insistence on a bond, the opium merchants took their business in hand once more. Although it was prosecuted with even more than usual vigour, a degree of surreptitiousness was now needed. Code words were used, disguising grades of opium as cotton piece-goods; ships had their names changed; deliveries were made not to the estuary but to Manila, and transhipped to the east coast of China in the usual fashion. On IO June Matheson wrote to a client in Bombay 'We have, under the rose, sent the Hayes back to her former situation,' and to Jardine, on the same date, 'The coast trade promises fair. Rees and his gang are at work as before.' By the twenty-seventh Matheson informed his partner, 'in all my commercial experience I have never been so severely fagged as in the month since our arrival at Macao ... Your friends [Captains] Rees, Jauncey, Baylis, Strachan and Hall are now at their old work again ... Jauncey on his way to surrender to Elliot made a few sales .. .' The Dents were again actively compet-ing: when he learned that Lancelot, freed from captivity, had already bought a house in Manila, intending to use that port as an alternative centre for his opium distribution, Matheson warned Jardine 'we should take care not to be behindhand in this respect'.62
When that letter was written, on 24 August, it was not from the comfortable Jardine Matheson office in Macao, but from the firm's schooner Maria at anchor off the port. Putting pressure on the Portu-guese Governor, Lin had succeeded in driving the English from Macao, as he had from Canton. His determination to harry the British into submission was no longer, however, based upon the anti-opium
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campaign, but on what was to be the most important cause of the war, the old question of extra-territoriality -who should have jurisdiction over crimes committed by foreigners. On 7 July a party of drunken sailors, certainly British, probably with some Americans among them, got into a fight on shore at Tsim-sha-tsui, in what is now the commer-cial centre of Kowloon. One Chinese, Lin Wei-hsi, died as a result of his injuries. Elliot, who was furious at this new provocation to the Chinese, immediately started an inquiry, offered rewards and paid compensation to the family of Lin, who then ;... as they were expected to do -acknowledged that the death had been accidental, and therefore was properly settled by a money payment.63 As a result of the inqu_iry it was found, as might have been thought highly likely under the cir-cumstances, impossible to discover which man had struck the blow which proved to be fatal, but five suspect sailors were arraigned before a court constituted under the 1833 regulations, the first court to be so summoned; by doing so Elliot was certainly going beyond the limits of his authority, but this was the only action open to him. The Super-intendent could not accede to Lin's demand to have a culprit brought to Chinese trial, but he did his best to ensure that justice could be seen to be done. 'I can deliver no man into their hands, which they have required me to do; but I have invited their officers to be present at as impartial a trial (according to our own forms of law) for the grave offences charged against British subjects, as if those offences had been committed upon our own countrymen, upon our own shores.'
The charge of murder was dismissed by the jury -it is hard to see how they could have done otherwise, in the absence of any proof as to who struck the fatal blow, and in what circumstances -but the men were found guilty of 'riotously, unlawfully, and injuriously entering certain dwelling houses ... and there riotously assaulting the inhabi-tants, men and women, cutting, beating, and otherwise dangerously ill-using them'. For this they were sentenced to fines and short terms of imprisonment, subsequently suspended.
The result went no way towards satisfying the Commissioner. In accordance with Chinese practice he demanded the surrender of a culprit -it did not matter much which culprit, but one had to be provided. Elliot could not possibly do so, but Lin attempted to coerce him by having the British expelled from their refuge in Macao. In a letter which unconsciously reveals how closely the foreign community had been united by Lin's pressure, Clara Elliot wrote home that: 'Because Charles could not either prove the murder or give anyone of
A HISTORY OF HONG. KONG
us up we were on the 15 August turned out of our houses.' The whole British community, several hundred in number, including women and children, transferred .to ships which anchored in the harbour of Hong Kong, and all settled down on board as best they might. Lin reported to the Emperor that although the British refugees must have some dried food, 'they will very soon find themselves without the heavy, greasy meat dishes for which they have such a passion'.64 The final step was to make sure, therefore, that fresh food and water should be denied them, and edicts were sent to the villagers around Kowloon to inform them of this. Elliot, always ready to take a personal hand, went on shore in an attempt to persuade the Kowloon authorities to relent. In this he was partly successful: some provision boats loaded and set off towards the British, only to be intercepted by Chinese war-junks. This was too much for Elliot, who opened fire on the junks with the little guns of the Louisa, supported by an armed schooner and a small
boat.
These, the first shots of what eventually turned into a war, were fired on 4 September 1839, but further conflict was by no means then inevitable. Elliot had chosen, at considerable risk, to confine the action against the junks to his own small boats. He had the alternative, for the first time since the dispute began, of calling up heavier metal, for a few days before a British man-of-war, the twenty-six-gun frigate Vo/age, had arrived and was standing by. Her Captain Smith was itching to teach the Chinese a lesson, and could have sunk the junks and disabled the shore batteries with the greatest of ease. Elliot restrained him, although with some difficulty. His dispatch of the following day indicates what was to be his constant policy of restraint, carried usually to the point of greatly irritating his subordinates.
I conferred with Captain Smith, and he acceded to my recommen-dation not to proceed in the morning and destroy the three junks, and above all not to land men for the purpose of attack upon the battery, a measure which would probably lead to the destruction of the village and great injury and irritation to the inhabitants ... it did not appear to me to be judicious, or indeed, becoming to recommend the employment of Her Majesty's ship in the destruc-tion of three junks, already checked by my own smaller vessel.
The Superintendent had by no means given up hope of a negotiatedsettlement with Lin. The affair at Kowloon, which Lin proudly
THE HUMILIATION OF LORD NAPIER
reported to the Emperor as a Chinese victory, was allowed to pass, and the supply of provisions resumed. Elliot was ready to agree that those foreigners nominated as undesirable by the Chinese should be removed, including Donald Matheson, but stood firm against the demand to surrender a culprit in the Lin Wei-hsi matter. It looked at one point as if the opportunity to comply, and to save face all round, was presented to him on a plate. A convenient drowned corpse had been found, which the Commissioner would have been happy to accept as a veritable murderer, drowned in a fit of remorse. Elliot, incon-veniently standing by the law as he understood it, refused to accept this inviting opportunity, and the chance slipped away. In spite of this stubborn conscience, by 20 October it seemed as though peace was in sight. Lin had written politely to Elliot: 'Captain Elliot has stated that he must await his sovereign's commands. It is enquired when the dispatch left, and when a reply may be expected? And then a modified arrangement will not be difficult to determine upon, if Captain Elliot acts obediently .. .' Captain Elliot was ready to do much, and more than his instructions permitted him to do: he agreed to ban all ships containing opium from the fleet at Hong Kong, to allow the Chinese to search any suspected vessel, and to obtain from every British firm an undertaking not to deal in the drug: he would even mount another investigation, jointly with the Chinese, into the death of Lin Wei-hsi; but he would never be prepared either to surrender a pos,;ibly innocent man or to allow any British subject to sign a bond making them subject to Chinese jurisdiction in capital matters.
haveNo Chinese corroboration has been found, but Elliot claimed to
'an agreement under the signets of the High Commissioner and Governor', and Commissioner Lin seemed at least tacitly to have accepted the conditions. On 20 October, more than three months after the death of Lin Wei-hsi, Elliot felt able to issue a public notice announcing that trade could be resumed with China. It would not be at Canton, but at Ch'uen-pi, although upon the terms and conditions that had formerly applied at Whampoa; and it appeared that all might yet be well. The English began to go back to their homes in Macao, and the Hong merchants, who had taken refuge there, to return to Canton.
Then the unexpected happened. Clara Elliot described it thus:
On the 19th October I was in high spirits for Charles had just
achieved a triumph in gaining the Commissioner's consent that
A HISTORY OF HONG. KONG
pending orders from home the trade should once more be opened, and carried on 'Outside' instead of 'Inside' the Bogue as had been customary -:-'.fhis was an immense object gained as Outside there was no danger of being locked up, as on a former occasion . . . After securing this promise ... Charles recommended the return of the English community to Macao to their homes ... You will not believe me when I tell you the Commissioner has again broken faith -A wretched merchant vessel Thomas Couttslately arriving from England had in defiance of Charles' injunc-tions gone 'Inside' the Bogue ... the Commissioner has declared that if one ship can go in all must do likewise. His promise is whistled to the wind. Charles with Captain Smith of the Vo/age (26 guns) and Captain Warren of the Hyacinth (18 guns) went up
26
THE HUMILIATION OF LORD NAPIER
Saxon, which was emulating the Thomas Coutts, and the Chinese ships then attempting to protect her. The junks advanced, and Vo/age openedfire. In less than an hour four war-junks were destroyed, at the cost of a single British sailor wounded. On 3 November 1839, after months of negotiations which had seemed to be finally successful, the war was on.
Not that anything very dramatic happened, or even that the British government accepted that a state of war existed. Lin announced a scale of rewards for capturing British ships and taking British servicemen, dead or alive, but preferably the latter; nobody grew rich on this. Potentially more damagingly, the Commissioner banned 'forever' the British from Canton, with the result that the Americans, who had remained in the factories, simply took the trade over on their cousins' behalf. The vital tea exports continued, and legitimate British imports went through as nonnal. Even opium continued to be sold through the ports up the coast, and Jardine Matheson rapidly began to recover the profits they had lost on the confiscated drug. Lord Palmerston wrote to Elliot informing him that a naval force, and probably a small anny detachment, would arrive about the end of March the following year and occupy some suitable island -probably Chusan, off the mouth of the Yangtse, 'to serve as a rendezvous and a basis for operations for our expedition, and afterwards as a secure basis for our commercial establishment -it being our intention to retain personal possession of some such station'. This force was to be in the command of Elliot's cousin, Admiral George Elliot, as Commander-in-Chief and Joint Plenipotentiary, acting with, but senior to, the Captain.
Opium and whisky
But did subsequent events constitute an 'opium war'? As far as the immediate events that led up to Vo/age's broadsides are concerned there can be little dispute. The immediate cause of the hostilities was an attempt by Elliot to enforce his legitimate demands on British ship-ping by stopping the Royal Saxon; this had been preceded by his refusal to surrender a British subject to the processes of Chinese law, especi-ally as it had not been possible to identify a guilty party; the British community had been forced into living on board ship, and the Chinese had threatened the destruction of these vessels, a threat which was interpreted by the British commander as imminent. This situation had
A HISTORY OF HONG KONG
arisen since the Chinese were insisting upon a bond so extreme in character that it was impossible for the British authorities to accept.
Both Lin and Elliot were doing their utmost to interpret the wishes of their governments ano to manage things in a reasonable and equitable manner, although each according to his own, substantially different, standards. Elliot was in a particularly difficult situation owing to the procrastination of his masters in London, who would have much pre-ferred to forget all about China. When the Whigs returned after the short-lived Peel government of 1834-5 the Napier debacle must have caused Palmerston considerable embarrassment: an inquiry into his conduct of Chinese affairs, when all the facts had come to light, very nearly brought down his government. All the official documents origin-ating in Britain on the matter -and there are not too many of them -breathe a strong desire that sleeping dogs should be left to lie. Theremwere also more pressing matters to be dealt with in Europe and themNear East, so that the emerging problems in China were simply notmaddressed by the British government.
Inevitably, the Chinese stepped into the power gap. And by the 1830s China was no longer the force it had been under Ch'ien-lung two generations earlier; a consciousness of decline was beginning to be expressed. A contemporary Chinese scholar, Kung Tzu-chen, lamented: 'There are no talented chief ministers nor talented historians to assist the ruler. There are no talented generals in the army; there are no talented scholars in the schools ... what is more, there are no talented petty thieves roaming the alleyways, no talented scoundrels in the markets, and no talented bandits in the marshes.'65 Most Chinese, though, continued to see their country as it had once been, but was no longer. Lord Amherst had been turned away with contumely; the misguided Napier had received the dusty answers he provoked, and the more patient Elliot's efforts to establish reasonable communications ran into exactly the same bland refusal to accept anything like equality.
But opium was surely the root cause of the trouble? Lin might have based his policy upon a mistaken idea of barbarian power, but he would not have been charged with his task had not the illegal import of opium existed. This is undeniable, but the responsibility for allowing the trade to continue for thirty years, with the minimum of molestation, has to be shared between the rapacious merchants, who saw nothing indefen-sible in disregarding completely the laws of the country in which they chose to live, and the irresponsible officials, who protected the trade while taking huge sums of money from it. Certainly the British
THE HUMILIATION OF LORD l',APIER
government at that time was not concerned to insist on the opium trade, as Palmerston made clear in his letter of 20 February 1840 to 'The Minister of the Emperor of China':
... the British Government would not have complained, if the Government of China, after giving due notice of its altered inten-tions [to enforce the laws against opium, instead of allowing them to continue 'a dead letter'.) had proceeded to execute the Law of the Empire, and had seized and confiscated all the opium which they could find within the Chinese territory . . . The Chinese Government had a right to do so, by means of its own officers, and within its own territory. But for some reason or other known only to the Government of China, the Government did not think proper to do this. But it determined to seize peaceable British Merchants, instead of seizing the contraband opium ...
What politicians say in public is perhaps an unreliable source of infor-mation on their real intentions, but in his private instructions to Elliot of the same date Palmerston makes it clear that he has no objection to the Chinese enforcing their own laws: the treaty Elliot is to negotiate should stipulate that 'if any British Subject shall introduce into China, Commodities which are prohibited by the Law of China, such Com-modities may be seized and confiscated by the Officers of the Chinese Government'. But he must insist that 'in no case shall the Persons of British Subjects be molested on account of the importation or the exportation of Goods'. The Chinese must leave it to the British Super-intendent's own court to adjudicate on any charges brought against British Subjects: that remained, as it had since the Lady Hughes casein 1784, the bitterest cause of dissension.
A year later, on 26 February 1841, Palmerston had changed his ground, and wanted Elliot to point out that life would be much simpler if opium was legalized: 'You will state that the admission of opium into China as an article of legal trade, is not one of the demands which you have been instructed to make upon the Chinese Government ...But you will point out that it is scarcely possible that a permanent good understanding can be maintained if the opium trade be allowed to
66
remain upon its present footing. 'g
The best proof that the trade in opium was not a primary concern of the British is to be found in the Parliamentary debates on the war, held between April and July 1840, after all the dispatches and papers
A HISTORY OF HONG KONG
were produced. The Tories had scented blood, knowing that the Whig government could barely summon a majority in the House of Com-mons, that Ministers had lost control, and that Melbourne himself was anxious only for retirement. A 'cry' that looked likely to 'dish the Whigs' was to be welcomed, and the conduct of affairs in China seemed to offer a real opportunity for winning a vote of censure. 'God, if it's carried they will go!' exclaimed the Duke of Wellington at a meeting of the party leaders on 18 March. 67 Anything that would contribute to this most important of ends would suffice; the near-victory that had precipitated the previous year's crisis had been over the suspension of the Jamaican constitution -'Jamaica had been a good hare to start,' was Peel's comment when the votes were counted. The new opportu-nity was seized with equal cynicism, few Tories caring any more about the rights of China than those ofJamaica. lfthere had existed a general feeling against opium the Tories would have doubtless used it, but their attack was instead, and with a sound political instinct, based upon the mishandling by Palmerston of affairs in China, and in particular his failure to give adequate instructions to his man on the spot. The vote was a near thing, but the Whigs were able to fight off the motion with a majority, albeit of only nine votes. In so doing the 'War of Jenkins' Ear' of the previous century was referred to; in the same strain this conflict, begun by an attempt to arrest a British merchant, might
have been named the 'War of Lancelot Dent's Collar'.
But whatever the immediate causes of the conflict, the awkward moral question arose of whether it was right for Britain to insist on forcing its view of how nations ought to conduct their affairs on China. The Times of 6 November 1840 put the case clearly: 'The fact is, that these overbearing pretences, by which we would summarily justify our interference, really mean . . . that civilized nations are so far higher in the scale of being than their uninstructed fellow-creatures, that they are privileged to make these latter mere instruments for the production of tea and crockery, and to cannonade them if they begin to slacken in their work.'
4
UNJUST TREATIES?
A proteaing joss
The first stage of the conflict which, unintentionally and to generaldisappointment, culminated in the British acquisition of Hong Kong was supervised by Charles Elliot, as the representative of the British government with plenipotentiary powers. Officially, he had been joined with his cousin Admiral George -'a good fellow, but I have no notion of his capacity ... frightened to death of responsibility', Charles told his wife Clara -but Admiral George, constantly ill, left everything to young Charles, who was convinced that peace must be achieved as soon as possible, and on terms that would secure the future, with the use of the minimum possible force. Since he had undertaken to ensure that the merchants were paid for the opium they had surrendered, Elliot had to obtain an indemnity for at least that sum from the Chinese, but he was not willing to trade more lives for more money. And he was well aware that lost income could soon be recovered by the resump-tion of trade, which was therefore always a prime objective.
By his instructions to Elliot on 20 February 1840 Lord Palmerston had made it clear that he was thinking of a naval show of strength sufficient to impress the Chinese rather than anything in the nature of war. The small number -not much more than three thousand -of troops initially allocated would have been impossibly inadequate for anything more. These modest forces were in practice commanded by Commodore Sir Gordon Bremer, who had at his disposal three seventy-four-gun third rates, useful for engaging shore batteries, but unwieldy in narrow waters (two of them were quickly put out of action
l02 A HISTORY OF HONG KONG
by a grounding at Chusan), two big frigates and a number of smaller vessels including some of the East India Company's armed steamers. There was no army officer of higher rank than Colonel Oglander, of the Cameronians, who died en route, and was replaced by an incompetent, Burrel of the 18th Foot (the Royal Irish), described by Jardine's interpreter Robert Thom as a 'haverel'.
Palmerston had ordered the expedition first to blockade the Pearl River, then 'to occupy the Tchusan Islands, and to blockade the Estu-ary opposite to those Islands; the Mouth of the Yang-Tse river, and the Mouth of the Yellow River' -which amounted to nothing less than a blockade of all China':;; major rivers. Finally, they were to go north to the Peiho River, at the approaches to Peking, and wait for an answer to Palmerston's demands. Since this programme could well be attempted without much in the way of bloodshed, which Elliot knew would prejudice future relations with China, the orders were faithfully obeyed. In June, leaving one frigate and some sloops to watch Canton, the rest of the force moved to Chusan. Here the fort which commanded Tinghai, the main town, surrendered after a preliminary bombardment of exactly nine minutes, the town itself being taken the next day without casualties on either side.
After securing Chusan, leaving the administration of justice in the dubious hands of Gutzlaff -'a perfect farce' -the expedition sailed to the mouth of the Peiho river, or, to be more exact, as near to its mouth as it could get, which was some miles off. Palmerston had not appreciated that the Bay of Chihli, a shallow, muddy bight, is hardly a suitable place for a demonstration of naval power. Deep water is found only six miles out to sea from the estuary, at which distance the low-lying land is scarcely visible. The river is protected by a bar, and is navigable only by shallow-draft vessels. Elliot reconnoitred the entrance himself,Company's steamer in a ship's boat, and found that only the East India Madagascar, drawing twelve feet, could be used,
as nothing larger could cross the bar. The naval squadron might have made a fine spectacle, but there was no one on land who could see it, and nothing for the guns to shoot at. Peking itself was over a hundred miles away, near enough to be irritated, but too far away to feel over-awed, by a small and invisible fleet.
In spite of the disadvantages, this demonstration was not without success, as a comparison of the dates of events and Imperial marginalia reveal. On 8 August Emperor Tao-kuang was issuing instructions to prosecute vigorously actions on all fronts against the British; from the

UNJUST TREATIES?
ninth, when the British fleet appeared in the bay, a different tone appears. An Imperial kinsman of the highest rank, Ch'i-san (Kishen), a hereditary Marquis, Governor of Chihli province, was appointed to soothe the barbarians. When Palmerston's note was handed to Ch'i-san on the fifteenth the Emperor had already instructed him to receive it, in spite of any discourtesies the communication might contain. On the twenty-first, when the Emperor had received at least a sanitized ver-sion, he dashed off a furious reprimand to Lin in Canton: 'You are just making excuses with empty words -nothing has been accomplished but many troubles have been created. Thinking of these things I cannot contain my rage. What do you have to say now?'1 Hitherto the Emperor had believed in Lin's reports of a succession of victories, and had supported his aggressive plans. Now, it seemed, all he had done was to irritate these incomeniently-close-at-hand barbarians. For the time being, to allow Peking to collect its thoughts, Ch'i-san was instructed to persuade Elliot to leave the sensitive north, and to return to Canton for further negotiations. Lin was to be replaced by Ch'i-san, who would take over in Canton in order to finalize an agreement. Since there was clearly little point in staying in Chihli, Elliot was prepared to comply. At Canton the forces he had would be in one place, apart from those left to garrison Chusan, of whom a worrying number had fallen ill, and could be deployed to the maximum advantage.
The four months' absence in Chihli had seen a rearrangement of the players on the Canton scene. Lin, although dismissed, was ordered to stay on at Canton to assist Ch'i-san. Admiral Elliot's health had finally failed, and he was forced to resign, leaving cousin Charles in command of the expedition and all British interests in China as sole Plenipotentiary. Bremer was temporarily absent in Calcutta, the naval command devolving on Captain Sir Humphrey le Fleming Senhouse. For the first time a competent general officer, Sir Hugh Gough, was appointed, but he would not arrive until February. When Ch'i-san reached Canton, ostensibly to conclude the negotiations he had begun at Chihli, it was clear that he had been told to play for time, and had been given little authority to negotiate. Neither, for that matter, had Elliot, but he did not intend that to impede a peaceful solution: he admitted to Lord Auckland, Governor-General of India and another ofElliot's cousins, that he proposed stopping 'far short of the demands of the government', but by doing so would avoid disrupting the trade, and the 'protraction of hostilities, with its certain consequence of deep hatred'.
A HISTORY OF HONG KONG
104
By November the expeditionary force was regrouped on the Pearl River, without some hundreds who had succumbed to malaria while in Chusan, but with six hundred sepoys of the 37th Madras Native Infantry and the steamer Nemesis added to their strength. Nemesis was the predecessor of the gunboats that were to follow, and a remarkable vessel. Designed to draw only six feet of water, she could penetrate the previously inaccessible shallow waterways, and carried a reasonable armament -two thirty-two-pounders and a rocket launcher, together with several lighter pieces. While this was only a fraction of the fire-power of the smallest man-of-war, Nemesis could sail anywhere a junk might go, and offer close support to landing parties. It is useful to remember that no senior Chinese official had yet seen at first hand what the Royal Navy could do. Deliberately or not, Lin had misreported the previous year's engagement at Ch'uen-pi as a Chinese victory; the restricted cannonade at Chusan had been a local affair; and no one had seen more than the topmasts of the fleet at the Peiho. Even the peaceable Elliot realized that unmistakable proof of British power had to be given if Ch'i-san was to be persuaded to a settlement. He there-fore proposed to force the entrance to the Bogue, blocked by a massive chain, and destroy the forts that guarded it.
The operation took exactly one day, 7 January 1841, with no British killed, but 700 Chinese dead in what Elliot called a 'melancholy slaugh-ter'. It was made possible by a rapid flanking attack on the forts, with three field guns being manhandled into position, and a simultaneous bombardment from the river, in which Nemesis played a crucial part. Delighted by the easy success over what should have been a strong position, and eager to go on to the forts next upstream; the sailors were disconcerted when Elliot -'full of compunctious feelings, perhaps not unnatural'2 -announced that that was to be as far as things wouldago. Ch'i-san appeared willing to settle, and Elliot was anxious to stop the one-sided fight as soon as possible. On 28January 1841 the Pleni-potentiary felt able to announce the terms of preliminary arrangements, which became known as the Convention of Ch'uen-pi. As Elliot was well aware, the terms fell far short of those he had been instructed to demand. The first item was 'the cession of the island and harbour of Hong Kong to the British crown', but with a provision that duties should continue to be paid to the Chinese authorities. This was to be followed by arrangements for the payment of a $6 million indemnity, in six annual instalments, and 'direct official intercourse to be upon equal footing and the port of Canton opened'. There was no mention

UNJUST TREATIES?
of opening other ports for trade, and, a point that later formed a serious charge against Elliot, the British were to evacuate Chusan.
Losing no time about at least making sure of Hong Kong, the British flag was hoisted there at 8.15 a.m. on 26 January 1841 by Captain Edward Belcher, R.N., of the Sulphur, and the Queen's health drunk with three hearty cheers. Elliot, from on board H.M.S. Wellesley, pro-claimed that Hong Kong was now part of Her Majesty's dominions, and that he himself was exercising for the time being the government of the island.
Why did Captain Elliot, who was fully aware of Palmerston's likely hostile reaction to the Convention of Ch'uen-pi, specify that Hong Kong, of all places, should be ceded to the British? Certainly an 'insular station' of some sort had been considered a useful acquisition: it had to be, it was agreed, ,m island, which would present no problems of frontier pressures and inevitable further entanglements, and would be capable of protection by the Navy. No one cared to dispute Lord Macartney's judgement that 'The prospect of territory on the Conti-nent of China ... is too wild to be seriously mentioned.' One Indian empire was quite enough for a British government to have to worry about.
But what island was open to debate. Formosa was a favoured candi-date, not only ,vith British merchants, but later with the Americans, who cast covetous eyes upon it; and Captain Elliot expressed some enthusiasm for the Bonin Islands, more than a thousand miles away, between Japan and the Mariannas, but already, since 1827, a British possession. Palmerston had in mind Chusan or Ningpo, both well known and considerable ports at a time when the only community on Hong Kong was an insignificant fishing village. William Jardine advised the Foreign Secretary that possession should be taken of 'three or four islands, say Formosa, Quemoy and Amoy ... also the great Chusan island', in order to force China into a treaty. It was the treaty, which would open ports other than Canton -Jardine suggested 'Ningpo, Shanghai and also Kiachow if we can get it' -that was important; the islands were only to be used for the purposes of negotiation.3 Never a mention of Hong Kong, nor a suggestion that any captured territory should be permanently retained.Jardine and his fellow merchants were businessmen, not empire builders.
Only in the context of warlike operations on the Pearl River did Hong Kong become relevant: 'Should it be deemed necessary to pos-sess ourselves of an island or harbour near Canton, the island of
106
A HISTORY OF HONG KONG
Hongkong might be taken,' but Jardine suggested that Formosa was really to be preferred. Even then Hong Kong was only one of many possibilities mentioned by Jardine; a spot nearer Canton might be better-Ch'uen-pi or Lintin. Other commercial opinion differed, being against, often vehemently against, territorial expansion. 'In a political or commercial point of view,' pontificated the Chinese Repository, 'no advantage would be gained from it whatever ... Puerile indeed does appear the idea of influencing a great empire by the seizure of one of their petty islands: it has been fledged under leaden wings, and scarcely rises above the atmosphere of Boetian dullness.'4
Elliot, a career naval officer, saw things in a different perspective; it was the magnificent harbour, in which he had sheltered from the Chinese, that attracted him, as it had attracted Sir John Barrow, now Secretary to the Admiralty, on his voyage with Macartney. Barrow had available to him a recent survey which reported that 'Lycemoon [Lei Yu Mun, or Lyeemon, properly only the eastern entrance to Hong Kong harbour, but at that time used to describe the whole harbour] was . . . an excellent harbour for ships of any size, which might be defended against a superior force in time of war.'5 Accordingly, in November 1839 Barrow set out the reasons why Hong Kong was selected as a naval centre: 'It would be prudent, in the first instance, to confine the operation to Canton, to take possession of the island of Hong Kong, which is outside the Bocca Tigris, has a good road-stead for the anchorage of a multitude of ships, and plenty of fresh water. Here a few guns mounted, and men to work them, with a ship of war, would afford protection to merchant shipping.' Barrow also rather acidly pointed out that, should the Foreign Office not have noticed, 'Formosa was rather larger than Ireland', and might therefore be some-what troublesome to take and hold.6
But in his instructions to Elliot of 20 February 1840 Palmerston sketched a draft treaty which made it clear that the cession of an island was not essential: if the Chinese were willing to guarantee 'security and freedom of commerce to Her Majesty's subjects resident in China' and nominate ports where British subjects could live and trade without molestation, the British government would 'forgo the permanent pos-session of any Island'. The open ports should probably include 'Canton, Amoy, Fou-Tchow-Foo, Shang-Hae-Heen [Shanghai] and Ningpo'. A commercial treaty with China, which settled those points on which complaints had been raised, and opened more ports to trade, would be all that was needed. A colonial possession was a bother to

UNJUST TREATIES?
look after, always likely to be seized in times of trouble by the jealous French or Americans, and would need expensively defending.
A year later, Palmerston was beginning to appreciate the merits of Barrow's advice, since his envoys, after having occupied Chusan, bombarded Amoy, and penetrated to the mouth of the Peiho, had been persuaded to return to Canton: in his letter to Elliot of 3 February 1841 he first mentions the suggestion that 'an Island at the Mouth of the Canton River, such as might serve as a depot and base for further operations . . . should be declared to be permanently annexed to the British Dominion, and placed under the protection of the British Crown'.
But Palmerston mentioned the suggestion only to disagree with it. If there had to be an 'Insular Station', 'it seems to Her Majesty's Government that an Island, somewhere on the Eastern Coast, and either in the Chusan Group, or not far from it, would, for all commer-cial purposes, be by far the best, because it would afford to British traders an opening to the wealthy and populous cities of the central part of the East Coast of China, and would give to British Commodities an easy access to the interior of the Chinese Empire'. Therefore, 'although it might be convenient also to have some secure Station at the Mouth of the Canton River, the main point to be gained is a position off the East Coast'. But it was up to the envoys themselves to choose whatever island they wished, and not to be fobbed off with what the Chinese chose to give them.
When Captain Elliot, after all these insistent demands for Chusan, or some other island off the east coast, came up with Hong Kong, Palmerston was furious, and the government thrown into confusion. Lord Ellenborough, for the opposition, took advantage. Did the government really intend to ratify the Ch'uen-pi agreement? Lord Melbourne said not. But had Hong Kong 'been taken possession of under the Treaty'? Lord Melbourne believed it had. And had Chusan been evacuated? Lord Melbourne did not know.7 The Foreign Secre-tary took it out on Elliot; his angry report on the Plenipotentiary's misdeeds made to the Queen on 10 April 1841 stated: 'Viscount Palmerston has felt greatly mortified and disappointed at this result of the expedition to China . . . Captain Elliot seems to have wholly disregarded the instructions which had been sent to him, and even when, by the entire success of the operations of the Fleet, he was in a condition to dictate his own terms, he seems to have agreed to very
inadequate conditions.'
108 A HISTORY OF HONG KONG
The Queen transmitted Palmerston's feelings, with her usual pro-fusion of emphases, to Uncle Leopold, King of the Belgians: 'The Chinese business vexes us much, and Palmerston is deeply mortified at it. All we wanted might have been got, if it had not been for the unaccountably strange conduct of Charles Elliot (not Admiral Elliot,for he was obliged to come away from ill-health), who completely disobeyed his instructions and tn'ed to get the lowest terms he could.' But there was a brighter side: 'The attack and storming of the Chor-empee [Ch'uen-pi] Forts ... was very gallantly done by the Marines, and immense destruction of the Chinese took place ... Albert is so much amused at my having got the island of Hong Kong, and we think Victoria ought to be called Princess of Hong Kong in addition to
8
Princess Royal. 'g
Elliot had to go, and in a stiff letter of 21 April 1841 announcinghis supersession, Palmerston was ironically dismissive about Hong Kong: 'You have obtained the Cession of Hong Kong, a barren island with hardly a house on it ... Now it seems obvious that Hong Kong will not be a Mart of Trade ... our Commercial Transactions, will be carried on as heretofore at Canton; but they [the British residents] will be able to go and build Houses to retire to, in the desert island of Hong Kong.'9
Both Palmerston in London and Elliot on the Pearl River had reasonable cases. The British government, in the delicate condition in which it found itself, needed both a visible success and its expenses reimbursed. With his long experience of negotiations the Foreign Secretary knew that in holding so large and �P strategic an island as Chusan he had a trump card to play in forcing an agreement out of the Chinese. By discarding his trump, Elliot had lost his chance of getting the money and the concessions; all he had to show for it was Hong Kong. Two years later, having recovered his equanimity, Lord Palmerston made this clear to Elliot. In a revealing document, pre-viously unpublished, Elliot gave his account of the interview. Palmerston spoke in the most civil of terms: 'he spontaneously assured me of the deep regret it had occasioned him to recall me ... He told me that he certainly should not have done so if I had not consented to restore to the Chinese, the island of Chusan which, according to his judgement, should have been held as a guarantee ... I observedthat I had not given up Chusan without taking a much more sufficient material guarantee in the steady possession of the Island of Hong Kong and the completely prostrate position of the City of Canton .. .'g

UNJUST TREATIES?
In the same interview Elliot explained why he, no politician but an experienced naval officer, had not wished to hold on to Chusan: 'Per-sonal experience of Chusan had convinced me contrary to my previous predilections that it was a totally unsuitable position for our objects in China. The navigation ... was perilous, and indeed almost impossible by any other than powerful steam vessels with reliability.' On the con-trary, as he told Palmerston's successor at the Foreign Office, Lord Aberdeen, in his long report of 25 January 1842, a port such as Hong Kong had 'the advantages of a large and safe harbour, abundance of fresh water, ease of protection by Maritime ascendancy, and no more extent of Territory or Population than may be necessary for our con-venience'.11
If Elliot could push ahead and establish a community there, satisfy the military and naval commanders that the island would make a suit-able base, in the face of their preference for one nearer the Yangtse, and above all convince the merchants to invest there, the wisdom of his choice would be proved. But there was very little time left. Some-thing like six months would be needed before London reacted -almost certainly angrily -to the news of his agreement with Ch'i-san at Ch'uen-pi. This was, therefore, the period the Plenipotentiary had available to establish a colony, during which he must also continue action against the Chinese. One precaution he took was to enlist the support of his kinsman Lord Auckland in India, writing from Macao a full explanation of his policy on 21 June 1841:
I take the liberty to record my opinion, that a treaty which consigns British Merchants and Ships to the Ports of Amoy, Ning Po and Shang Hai Heen, will do no more than place very valuable hostages in the hands of an irritated Government, with what may be taken to be a certainty, that the impatience of our own Merchants, and the perfidy of the Chinese, will rapidly produce new troubles ... It seems very plain to me ... that Her Majesty's Government must keep the island of Hong Kong ... and the im-mediate organization of the settlement upon a very firm and comprehensive footing, is not a question but in strictest terms a necessity ...
But before the reaction from London arrived there was more fighting to be done. If the British government was likely to be annoyed with the Ch'uen-pi arrangements, the Chinese were certain to repudiate
110
A HH:TORY OF HONG KO1':G
them, as Elliot later explained: 'Fully sensible of the possibility, not to say the probability, that Kishen would be disavowed by his court, I had taken good care to collect the whole force at Canton.' It quickly became apparent that the Chinese were going to renew hostilities as soon as possible. Forts were being manned, new batteries built, and barricades across the river prepared. By the end of February Elliot accepted that Ch'i-san was not going to be able to deliver his part of the Ch'uen-pi agreement, and that further encouragement would be needed. Chusan had been evacuated as promised (a move that much puzzled the Chinese, who could only see it as an enforced retreat), but the British forces available were still, allowing for those sick and in garrison, not many more than two thousand, supported now by two ships of the line, deadly against any enemy they could reach but incapable of penetrating to Canton. This would have to be done by the smaller craft, including the redoubtable Nemesis. The initial stages were straightforward; once more the Bogue was forced, and within thirty-six hours, in spite of the fortifications, the smaller warships had reached Whampoa. This must have been something of a shock for Lin, who was still at Canton, and had just written complacently in his diary that the English had been beaten off.
After a delay of some days, waiting unavailingly for the arrival of someone with whom to negotiate -Ch'i-san had been, as Elliot had expected, packed off to Peking in chains -the expedition pushed on, with the small craft, to Canton itself. There the English flag was raised once more over the factories and, yet again, the trade was opened. For three months business flourished, with the willing co-operation of the local authorities, and much to Elliot's satisfaction. Tea, in enormous quantities -more than half a million pounds a day -was loaded, the duties on which would in due course bring considerable income to the British Treasury, a consideration which Elliot kept always very much in mind. Little could be done to further negotiations since Ch'i-san's replacement, Yang-fang, 'did nothing but refer back to Peking the questions which had been referred from Peking for settlement at Canton'.
With legitimate trade, opium made its reappearance. Elliot made a vain effort to stop the inflow of the drug, asking the senior naval officer for help in so doing. This Sir Humphrey Senhouse indignantly refused. It was asking him 'to act as head of the Chinese revenue and river police', he complained to his absent colleague Bremer. Senhouse was justified in this by Palmerston's doctrine that the Navy had no authority

UNJUST TREATIES?
to interfere with a perfectly legitimate -in British law -item of com-merce, and if the Chinese wanted to stop it, that was their business. British forces would not protect the smugglers, but neither would they interfere with them.
This state of affairs could not last for long, since Chinese reinforce-ments were on their way with instructions to attack the foreigners now so conveniently assembled within the Tiger's Mouth, and to 'cut off their rear, close in all sides, and recover Hong Kong'; the Emperor awaited 'the news of victory with the greatest impatience'. The attack came on 21 May, and very nearly succeeded, as fireships descended on the moored warships and masked batteries opened fire. Once again Nemesis, with her mobility and firepower, was invaluable in saving the situation; the few casualties included the New York harbourmaster's son, captured and murdered near the factories. A swift advance on the city itself was then ordered.
It is worth noting that with a force of 2,395 -sepoys, soldiers, Marines and bluejackets -the army commander, Major-General Sir Hugh Gough, who had during forty-six years' service fought his way right through the Peninsular War and therefore knew what he was about, was confident of being able to subdue a city of a million or so inhabitants, defended by at least twenty thousand troops and a militia numbering tens of thousands. He had already -it took only a few minutes and cost the British one man killed and the Chinese, who left precipitately, very few more -stormed the outlying forts, and was in position on the city wall itself when, to the absolute fury of the British commanders, the action was suddenly brought to an end. 'At dawn, the ominous white flag was again displayed, and for some hours there had been repeated cries of "Elliot, Elliot" as if he had been their protecting joss.'12 Once again Captain Elliot had, or thought he had, reached a settlement.
This time Elliot's terms were rather more onerous, but still well below those he had been instructed to obtain: the $6 million was to be paid on the nail, plus compensation for further damages. Elliot's motives at this critical time were complex. Uppermost, with the human-ity he always showed, was the desire to avoid bloodshed. This he made clear in his instructions to his exasperated and uncomprehending commanders: 'the _protection of the people of Canton, and the encour-agement of their goodwill towards us, are perhaps our chief political duties in this country'. He may also have been, as Gough certainly was not, apprehensive about holding a presumably rebellious city against a
A HISTORY OF HONG KONG
turbulent countryside and an advancing Imperial army. Chinese writers have made much of the only occasion when armed villagers attacked a British force, and the battle of San-yuan-li is found in all Chinese textbooks. In fact; all that happened was that on 29 May 1841 a com-pany of some sixty Indian sepoys with three British officers was cut off outside Canton and surrounded. For some time they fought off several hundred attackers, losing one killed and some wounded, until they were rescued by two companies of Royal Marines. General Gough commended the sepoys, and remained confident that there would be no serious trouble from the Chinese, regulars or irregulars.13
The crucial factor limiting Elliot's choices may well have been �gie depth of the Pearl River. It took the powerful threat of a battleship'sguns trained on Nanking to force a settlement in the following year, but a ship of the line could not get near Canton. In 1841, with only small craft able to offer support, an occupying army in Canton would have been perhaps dangerously exposed; by 1857, with the new gun-boats able to steam right up to the city and all around the West River channels, the situation had changed.
Captain Elliot has been much criticized by military historians for his readiness to call a halt to offensive actions, but whatever the merits of his policies in the spring and summer of 1841, his recall had already been decided upon. Lord Auckland's sister, Emily Eden, had observed to her brother that cousin Charles 'means to show the world &c. how right he has been. I foresee a long life of pamphlets don't you?'14 But Captain Elliot was no pamphleteer. He left Hong Kong on the S.S. Clyde on 10 August, with a cordial message from James Matheson, enclosing an official address of thanks from the Chamber of Com-merce: 'It is, however, a satisfaction to us, to give vent to the feelings at the moment of your departure . . . I still intend seeing you off [from Macao].'15 And at Bombay another testimonial was waiting from Jeejeebhoy, which showed how Elliot's qualities of restraint and con-sideration had been appreciated in some quarters: 'How greatly does it redound to your Honour that you have always been on the side of Mercy, and have sought rather to lead and reason with the Chinese people, than crush and overwhelm them by the Power of British Arms.'16
Once back in London the Captain set about establishing his case with the new government; Lord Melboume's Whigs had been replaced by the Tories under Peel. Elliot's conscience was clear, public opinion was largely on his side, and he appeared quite relaxed. Greville's
UNJUST TREATIES?
description of him does not sound like that of a man seeking to justify his actions; he was 'animated, energetic, and vivacious, clever, eager, high-spirited and gay'. The diarist recorded that Elliot 'was very amus-ing with his accounts of China ... I am inclined to think that he will
be able to vindicate his latest exploit at Canton ... He puts as much
blame on the Admiral and General as they on him ... he treats them,
and their notions ... with great contempt. He also disapproves of the course we are meditating and says that we are wrong to think of waging war with China in any way but by our ships, and, above all, should wish to establish diplomatic .relations with her.'17
It was to be expected that the Tories would back Elliot; they had, after all, made the point that it was Palmerston who had let down his man on the spot, who had himself behaved with admirable firmness. Sir Robert Peel stated m Parliament that he 'reposed the highest con-fidence in [Elliot's] integrity and reliability'. Even the defeated Whigs were understanding; George Villiers Oater Lord Clarendon) wrote: 'Melbourne praised Elliot in a very becoming manner.' Sir John Barrow approved, and the Directors of the East India Company awarded a nomination to one of Elliot's sons. Elliot thought of also enlisting the help of Lord Ripon, then President of the Board of Control, 'but he would just grin like a seal, and bob about from leg to leg, and dismiss the whole matter'. Such support was hardly needed, for Villiers went on to record the award to Captain Elliot of the ultimate accolade: 'the Duke of Wellington upheld his character and conduct, and took a review of his difficulties in a far higher and more masterly tone than has yet been done either in or out of Parliament. Upon such matters he is the authority of the country and Elliot may henceforth laugh at his detractors. '18
Elliot was obliged to stay in London in order to tidy up his opium accounts with the Treasury. That department, never famous for speed, did eventually -in 1846 -agree that Elliot had properly, even admir-ably, prepared his accounts. Even if opinions differed on his actions in China, Elliot's record during his next position, as charge d'affaires in the Republic of Texas, indicates his engaging combination of personal charm and courage. He quickly won the respect of both Samuel Hous-ton and AnsonJones, Presidents of the Republic.19 After Texas Elliot dropped out of public attention. He was given a series of second-rank colonial appointments, as Governor of Bermuda, Trinidad and St Helena before retiring in modest glory, an admiral and a knight.
Shortly before he died, Elliot dictated a long letter to his friend Sir
114 A HISTORY OF HONG KONG
Henry Taylor, recalling his annexation of Hong Kong and a conv'!r-sation he had enjoyed with Lord Elgin after diplomatic relations with China had been established. He wrote prophetically, singling out the French and the Russians as the most ambitious among those 'foreign diplomats, the most ingenious of mortals' active in Peking, all industri-ously extracting concessions and likely to involve the British in 'very despicable complications'. We were much better off under our own roof in Hong Kong, which was worth 'ten times more in cyphers than our imposing ceremonial attitude at Peking plus all the other ports.'
The last word could be left to his old antagonist Ch'i-san, who had also survived the wrath of his employers, and had likewise been posted to the most distant part of the Chinese empire. A French traveller, the Abbe Hue, came across Ch'i-san in Lhasa, in Tibet. They talked of the war; Ch'i-san supposed the British had cut off Elliot's head: 'A dreadful fate that of poor Elut; he was a good man.'20
Guns at the Porcelain Tower
Breatliing flames of wrath at Elliot, Palmerston looked for a man less troubled by a tender conscience or undue regard for Chinese suscepti-bilities, who could be relied upon briskly to finish the job. He found Sir Henry Pottinger, formerly political agent of the East India Company in Sind, ready to hand in London. Pottinger was an Ulsterman, ener-getic, handsome, amorous, with a thick Irish brogue, fond of having his own way and not suffering much in the way of disagreement. He was quick to make friends and enemies; his affection for the Manchu negotiator Ch'i-ying, and his distaste for the British trading com-munity, both became noteworthy. The commanders who had to work with him, although they appreciated his combativeness after Elliot's humanitarian hesitations, had occasion to complain about his fondness for 'extraordinary powers and salutes'. Neither Gough nor Admiral Parker, who commanded the naval force after Senhouse's death, were particularly difficult to work with, and their complaints were tactfully worded, but revealing. Parker recorded: 'Sir Henry Pottinger is an able diplomat, whose decision and firmness has been well calculated for his functions here, but from his long services in India, he has possibly acquired the habit of exercising his authority in a manner to which we are unaccustomed in Europe.'21 Pottinger had been in the Company's army since 1804, but since 1825 had been in the political

UNJUST TREATIES?
service, first as Resident and later as Agent in Sind, the region of the lower Indus Valley, not then part of British �P1ndia. As Political Agent Pottinger had forcefully represented British interests, and had been particularly successful .in browbeating the native rulers into allowing passage to a British army en route for an invasion of Afghanistan. For these services he was rewarded with a baronetcy on his retirement from India in 1840.
Lord Melbourne, telling Queen Victoria of Elliot's recall and Pottin-ger's appointment on 3 May 1841, described Pottinger as being 'distin-guished in the recent operations in Afghanistan',22 a country where Sir Henry had never set foot, although his nephew, Eldred Pottinger, had recently made himself famous there. In spite of that, Henry was probably the right Pottinger -since it was Palmerston, advised by Lord Auckland, rather than the Prime Minister who had made the choice, it was probable that the confusion existed only in Melbourne's mind, never noted for its grasp of detail. For the purposes of speedily finishing off the war Palmerston had found the right man. In 1834 Lord William Bentinck had been taken aback by Pottinger's fiery dispatches from Sind, as he bullied the Princes into submission, and exhorted the Indian government to 'carry Fire and Sword throughout Afghanistan' -a task easier to recommend than to achieve. Bentinck felt that acwarning note was required, and recommended 'the natural fitness atcall times, when a strong and enlightened power has to do with a weakcand ignorant one, to forbear rather to a fault and only to put forth theceffective argument of your strength as the very last resource'.23
As far as China was concerned Pottinger had no intention of accepting this advice -although he might well have thought that an expeditionary force, even if one now increased to eight thousand effec-tives, was hardly excessive to subdue a nation of some three hundred millions. Putting forth 'the effective argument' of whatever strength was available right from the start was, however, just what Palmerston wanted, and Pottinger did not disappoint him.
This time there was to be no shilly-shallying, no tender-hearted avoidance of casualties. Emily Eden commented that 'The Chinese news is already bener since Charles [Elliot] and Sir Gordon [Bremer] came away. Sir H. Pottinger began in the right way ... The Chinese by their proclamations seem thoroughly frightened. The General and all the Navy people seem to be in ecstasies at having somebody who will not stop all their fighting, and I should not be surprised if Sir H. Pottinger finished it all in six months, by merely making war in a
A HISTORY OF HONG KONG
common straightforward manner.'24 It took ten rather than six months, but otherwise Miss Eden's forecasts were correct. But, even before Pottinger reached Hong Kong on his first visit, on 2 1 August 1841, pausing only for �Pa�P few hours on his way to attend to affairs in the north, a new government had taken office in London. Twelve years of Whig rule, broken only by the Wellington-Peel entr'acte of 1835, had been brought to an end by a general election in June decisively won by the Tories.
Melbourne's Cabinet had been showing symptoms of terminal decay -'so melancholy a picture of indecision, weakness and pusillanimity',mGreville called it -and finances were getting worse, the 1841 -2mbudget calling for a million and a half pounds more in expenditurethan for the previous year. After several defeats on minor matters themgovernment lost on a motion of confidence, and was forced to go tomthe country. Its subsequent defeat was something of a relief to LordmMelbourne, who had by then almost given up any pretence of leadinghis party. Sir Robert Peel was asked to take over, and this time theremwere no difficulties with the Queen, who now had Prince Albert tomgive her a new confidence.m
Lortl Aberdeen, the new Foreign Secretary, was not one of the more scintillating figures of nineteenth-century politics, and is today remembered mainly for the mismanagement of the Crimean War that took place under his premiership in the following decade. Gladstone was deeply attached to Aberdeen, but others were less generous. He was said to have 'a sneering tone' in debate; Palmerston referred to the 'antiquated imbecility of his principles'; Disraeli, never the most charitable of men, wrote of him that 'his temper, naturally morose, has become licentiously peevish . . . with the crabbed malice of a maundering witch'. 25 If that description was ever accurate, it was not so in 1841, but it has to be admitted that Aberdeen lacked many of the qualities possessed by his predecessor. He was almost a direct opposite of Palmerston -reserved, studious, conciliatory to the point of dithering: being preoccupied with the usual troubles with France, he adopted a policy of judicious inaction towards China, leaving the conduct of affairs there to the Indian authorities. The new Secretaryfor War and the Colonies, Lord Stanley, had the qualities of easycharm that Aberdeen lacked, but remained chiefly interested in Ire-land, bothering himself little about Chinese affairs.
Since it took some months for Pottinger to learn of the change of government, he proceeded energetically to ensure that Lord
UNJUST TREATIES?
Palmerston's demands were unequivocally enforced. The new Pleni-potentiary's wholehearted acceptance of these instructions is shown in his report to the Foreign Office before the final move on Nanking in April 1842. Potting.r wrote in full-blown imperial style: 'The time strikes me to be fast approaching when the Chinese must bend or break. In the latter case it will rest with the Queen of England to pronounce what ports, or portion of the sea coast of China shall be added to Her Majesty's dominions.'26
From the military point of view the 1841-2 expedition was impec-cable, a textbook example of how a small expeditionary force, backed by sea-power, can subjugate an empire. And this time there was no compassionate Plenipotentiary to call a halt to operations just as they were about to become decisive: in fact the military had to restrain the fiery Sir Henry from giving the order to loot the town ofNingpo, when it seemed that some resistance might be offered: 'The most annoying thing you could do,' advised the sagacious Gough, 'is to prove to the people by our moderation and our justice that our characters are foully belied.' Parker sided with Pottinger, and wrote privately to Lord Aber-deen on 5 February 1842: 'It causes me great regret to have to allude to any difference of opinion with either of my colleagues ... but H.G. disagrees with H.P. and myself on seizing Private Merchandise as Ransom or Impost . . . I suspect that the General is disinclined to force payment from individuals.'27
The details of the campaign are peripheral to the history of Hong Kong, although the treaties that ended it are of the first importance. The fighting was generally much fiercer than that under Elliot, but while the Manchu forces fought desperately, they were badly led, and never committed in sufficient numbers. Perhaps twenty thousand regu-lars, and many more militia, were available, but only a few thousand were ever deployed in an action: they inevitably took heavy casualties, and their clef eat was a grave blow to Chinese confidence. The critical factor was the arrival of the Cornwallis, towed with great effort up the Yangtse, which moored in the river offNanking on 4 August 1842. Only a third-rate, and obsolescent at that, her firepower was nevertheless, by the standards of any land army in the world at that time, tremendous; unassailably blocking the great river, and the Grand Canal to Peking, she cut off the most important communications of the Empire.
The lessons of this conflict were then, and have always since been, misunderstood by the Chinese. Seeking for an explanation of British successes, spies gathered information from some unlikely sources. One
II8 A HISTORY OF HONG KONG
of the first reports was that of an agent to Ch'i-san's agents, who had been told by an English lady that the British ships were strongly constructed of hard woods such as oak or teak, and the guns they carried were made bf brass, weighed eight thousand pounds and fired thirty-two-pound shot. He added that apparently the British were ruled by a woman, that twenty families were related to her, that women found their own husbands, and that the barbarians were completely lacking in ritual or discipline. Emperor Tao-kuang was impressed, and noted approvingly 'Very clear and detailed.'28 Since that time it has been almost invariably assumed that the Western victories were simply due to superior hardware, and that once China had mastered these specific techniques that temporary disadvantage would disappear. This is only true in part, and misunderstanding the facts led to much wasted effort and recriminations by later Chinese governments.
In naval matters British superiority was undeniable, although it should be realized that, with the exception of the little steamers, which were used mainly as tugs, transports and army support vessels, neither British warships nor their guns had changed much since Charles Ibuilt the 1oo-gun Srrvereign of the Seas in 163 7. But they had developed in a specifically Atlantic shipbuilding tradition, very different from those of the China seas. Chinese shipbuilding techniques had evolved to suit local factors, of which the most limiting was the scarcity of timber.gJunks were therefore constructed, although along sophisticated and highly developed lines, but without the very strong scantlings needed to support a battery of heavy guns (not, as it happened, of brass, but of iron). It should have been possible however for Chinese shore batteries to inflict devastating damage on unarmoured wooden vessels, as indeed they were to do on one occasion (the action off the Taku fo. in I 859, when a squadron of steam gunboats was decisively repulsed). Chinese gun manufacture was well established, and capable of producing excellent weapons of great size, such as the nine-ton, twenty-seven-inch brass mortar brought to Woolwich in 1845. Thesefortress pieces were smooth-bore muzzle-loaders operating on exactly the same principles as Western weapons. cavalOn land the superiority was not so evident. In 1842 the opposing ry
and infantry fought with similar weapons, which would in a few years be obsolete. Most of the British infantry were armed with the flintlock smooth-bore muzzle-loading musket of .753 bore, essen-tially the same weapon as that used at the Battle of Blenheim in 1704. A minority -the Marines and some of the British regiments -had
UNJUST TREATIES?
the same weapon fitted with percussion ignition, which made for ea.ier use in wet weather, although the rate of fire and the range (at best two hundred yards) were unchanged. Chinese infantry relied on match-locks, as had Cromwell's, but their greatest deficiency was in mobile artillery, their field-pieces, the gingalls, being considerably smaller than the British six-pounders. Even so, much of the fighting was done with the simplest of weapons on both sides -bayonets, swords and pikes.
The most important differences between the armies lay in training, discipline and communications. It might well be said that the most significant items of British military hardware were not weapons, but such items as the signal flag, the pocket watch and the level. Whereas British operations were planned in some detail, and accurately synch-ronized, only the most senior Chinese carried a watch, and their tim-ings were of the vaguest. Wherever a British ship or an Engineer officer went accurate maps and charts were made: Chinese commanders had to rely on local opinion. But training and discipline, which in spite of reports to the contrary the barbarians possessed in abundance, were decisive. In emergencies junior British officers and NCOs knew where they were expected to be and what they were expected to do; difficulties were contained, and not allowed to develop into disasters.
An example of how devastating simple disciplined action could be is given by Lieutenant Ouchterlony, describing how the Chinese attack on Ningpo on 9 March 1842 was repelled after an artil!ery piece had been brought into action:
It had only been fired three times . . . the infantry party had resumed their platoon fire, the front rank, after discharging their pieces, filing off to the rear right and left to load and form again in the rear, their places being filled by the next rank, and so on; by which means ... in a short time the street was chocked up, and when, for want of a living mark, the men were ordered to advance, their steps fell upon a closely packed mass of dead and dying of fully fifteen yards.29
Even had the discrepancies in arms (which must have been countered to some extent by the superior Chinese numbers) been evened out, it is highly probable that similar results would have been obtained; the troops of Oliver Cromwell or Gustavus Adolphus, armed only with the weapons of their time, but well-trained and disciplined, would have been, in similar circumstances, equally successful.
120
A HISTORY OF HON_G KONG
A further error made by the Chinese was to assume that peasant levies might do better than regular forces, and the legend of San-yuan-li was invented to justify this belief. Since the Red Army, which developed into the�P People's Liberation Army, was originally itself a peasant-based force, and was successful against the more profession-ally led Kuomintang armies, the legend has become part of accepted orthodoxy, although it has repeatedly proved to be a dangerous illusion -most recently by the heavy casualties sustained during the unsuccess-ful border war with Vietnam in 1979.m
The Poppy War is ended
H.M.S. Cornwallis never needed to fire her guns, for, faced with whatwould have been the certain destruction of Nanking, the Chinese weremobliged to negotiate. 'How completely abominable!' the Emperor hadexclaimed when Pottinger's demands for an envoy with plenipotentiarympowers was received on 9 July 1842, but on consideration Tao-kuangmagreed to send two mandarins of high rank to Nanking, empoweredmto agree on compensation, diplomatic equality, and the opening ofmfurther ports to trade. Yilipu (I-li-pu) was the senior of the two, butmwas in such poor health and spirits that most of the work was left tomhis colleague. Ch'i-ying (Keying in contemporary British documents,
.ying in pinyin) was a close friend and near relative of the Emperor,ma descendant of Nurhaci, a hereditary Marquis and a central figure inmnineteenth-century Chinese history. He has been reviled by genera-tions of Chinese writers as one who sold out to the British in themselfish interests of the dynasty, but in fact the realistic and personableManchu ably negotiated a settlement, or more accurately a series ofmsettlements, which might well have lasted for longer than it did, andmwas nothing like the one-sided arrangement so often portrayed. Fromhis first appearance Ch'i-ying impressed th. foreigners: 'mgraceful, dig-nified in carriage ... a stout, hale, good-humoured looking old gentle-man with a firm step and an upright carriage'.30
At Nanking, with the British forces having demonstrated their power to occupy the two greatest cities in the Empire after Peking, there was little choice for the Chinese negotiators but to accede to Pottinger's demands. Ch'i-ying explained the situation to the Emperor: 'We are governed at every hand by the inevitable ..m. what we have been doing is to choose between danger and safety, not between right and wrong

UNJUST TREATIES?
... But the spirit of the invaders is running high. They occupy our important cities.'31 The British terms were�P those set out originally by Palmerston: the cession of Hong Kong (this on Sir Henry's own initiat-ive, and against his latest orders from Lord Aberdeen) and the opening of five ports to foreign trade -Amoy, Foochow, Ningpo and Shanghai, as well as Canton, where consuls were to be appointed, responsible for controlling trade and their own citizens, who would be subject to consular rather than Chinese law. All future correspondence was to be as between equal powers, and a much larger sum of compensation than the $6 million required by Elliot was demanded -$2s1 million, an amount far exceeding the costs of the expeditions, the Hong debts, and the surrendered opium put together. It had been decided in White-hall that the $6 million already collected by Elliot was a ransom for Canton, and accordingly accrued as a windfall to the British Treasury.
Whether the final assessment could be calculated in quite such clear accountancy terms is less clear. Elliot had obtained $6 million and Hong Kong at the cost of a dozen or so British lives -not counting those who died of cholera or malaria -and perhaps two thousand Chinese. The extra $15 million was purchased at the cost of hundreds of British and many more thousands of Chinese dead, the result of Pottinger's obedience to Palmerston's instructions, and left a legacy of resentment that has not yet been dissipated. Of the vexed opium ques-tion there was not the slightest mention in the treaty agreement: 'Such omission may perhaps provoke the trite remark of its resemblance to performing the Tragedy of Hamlet and leaving out the part of the Prince', the Friend of China tartly commented.
When the Nanking agreement is taken in conjunction with the sup-plementary treaty negotiated the following year between Pottinger and Ch'i-ying the facts seem not to support the terms as particularly unjust or exorbitant. The British commanders were concerned not to appear in the light of an invading army; they had not only not been obstructed by the populace during the move to Nanking, but had found it easy to recruit assistance. When souvenir-hunting servicemen chipped pieces off Nanking's famous Porcelain Tower 'a fine row was made' about 'the serious public effect that must result from these outrages, to say nothing of the regret that all reflecting persons must feel at the wanton destruction of a building of such celebrity'.32 An armed guard was set, and compensation of $4,000 paid.33 (Fifteen years later the tower was indeed 'wantonly destroyed', but by the Chinese in the course of the Taiping rebellion.) The discussions themselves struck a
A HISTORY OF HONG KONG
.
cheerful note;34 Hope Grant, Lord Saltoun's Brigade Major, observed that the 'high and mighty Chinese commissioners seemed to relish the maraschino, noyau and cherry brandy wonderfully -so much that one of them took Mr Gutzlaff our interpreter, a great broad-faced Pole, and with drunken endearment kissed him heartily.'35 A naval observer recorded that 'Old K [Ch'i-ying) must have taken fifty large glasses of wine at least', and sang a song. 'What do you think of that, the Emperor's uncle singing a song?' But when Pottinger expressed a desire to visit Nanking 'the Chinese refused, and Sir Henry Pottinger naturally yielded'.
The final ceremony that took place on 29 August 1842, in the great cabin on the Cornwallis, was amicable enough, as observed by the young Harry Parkes -who was in fourteen years' time to be responsible, with John Bowring, for starting another, more damaging, war. Having been given Sir Hugh Gough's 'terrible large cocked hat and feathers' to look after, the fourteen-year-old Parkes described how Ilipu, the aged and ailing Chinese negotiator 'was met at the gangway by Sir Henry, the Admiral, and the General, who partly carried and partly supported him into the after cabin, where he was laid on a sofa'. When the Treaty was signed, 'they all sat down to tiffin ... Each party seemed satisfied and pleased with each other.'36 Surgeon Edward Cree admired the Tartar guard, 'fine, dark, weatherbeaten men with foxes' or squirrels' tails in their caps and every fifth man an officer with a banner'.37
News of the Treaty was received without much enthusiasm in Eng-land. It suffered by arriving, on 22 November, in the same mail as reports from Afghanistan that the Khyber Pass had been forced, Kabul taken and its Great Bazaar burnt. Nanking was much less exciting, and Lord Stanley, forwarding the dispatches to the Queen, although getting in a dig at the Whigs for having started the war, was forced into bathos: 'In China a termination has been put to the effusion of blood by the signature of a treaty ... which has opened to British enterprise the commerce of China to an extent which it is almost impossible to anticipate. It may interest your Majesty to hear that already enquiries are made in the city for superintendents of ships to trade to Ningpo direct. 'g38 Punch observed, wryly and prophetically:
The poppy war is ended ... The war, 'bequeathed by the Whigs' to Sir ROBERT PEEL, returns to the minister ... a very handsome profit on the ball and powder expended in this great moral lesson on the uneducated Chinese ... The dollars, however, are a minor
llNJUST TREATIES?
advantage. John BULL, having expended so much powder and ball, and applied so much cold iron, to the Chinese, is in future to be treated like a gentleman. He has washed out the 'barbarian' in the blood of two or three thousand bipeds . . . Besides the dollars and civility, we are tc have five Chinese ports open to English commerce. Politicians and bagmen may exult at this, and in the anticipative eye of profit, already see the Emperor of China clothed in a Manchester shirt, and his wives in Manchester cotton, and the whole of his court handling Sheffield knives and forks.39
Peel's new government had been reluctant to decide what might be done about Hong Kong until the war was settled. Pressed on the subject in the House of Commons by Mr R. J. Blewitt, Whig Member for Monmouth, the Prime Minister tetchily answered: 'Really, during the progress of hostilities in China, I must decline to answer such a question' (15 March 1842). Lord Aberdeen blew hot and cold over the future of the island: in his letter to Pottinger of 4 November 1841 the Foreign Secretary had envisaged Hong Kong, as well as Chusan, only as temporary bases, the surrender of which might be used to gain concessions from the Chinese:
Her Majesty's Government do not feel disposed to regard any such acquisitions in the light of a permanent conque'it. It would rather be their desire that the commercial intercourse of Her Majesty's subjects with the Chinese Empire should be secured by means of a Treaty granting permission to trade with four or five of the principal towns on the East Coast of China ...
In addition to the Island of Hong Kong, it is probable that Chusan will again have been occupied by Her Majesty's forces ... But the permanent retention of these possessions under the dominion of the Crown, would be attended with great and certain expense ... It would also tend to bring us more in contact politi-cally with the Chinese than is at all desirable; and might ultimately lead, perhaps unavoidably, to our taking part in the contest and changes which at no distant period may occur among this singular people, and in the Government of the Empire.
Lord Aberdeen went on to establish a principle which subsequent British governments continued to observe: 'A secure and well regulated trade is all we desire; and you will constantly bear in mind that we
124 A HISTORY OF HONG KONG
seek for no exclusive advantages, and demand nothing that we shall not willingly see enjoyed by the Subjects of all other States.' The corollary of this was that Britain would expect to share equally in any advantages offered to other countries -the 'most-favoured nation' clause that became a feature of all such treaties.40
This was neither pure altruism nor economic imperialism, but an example of the almost religious fervour with which most British poli-ticians of either party believed in the doctrine of free trade. Unfettered international commerce, it was believed, would advantage all countries alike, lead to universal prosperity and better understanding and go far to abolish disputes and war. Since Britain was by some way the largest trading nation it might benefit most, but only as long as it could hold its own in fair competition. Later British administrations only deviated from this doctrine in the 1890s, when it became apparent that other nations were not playing the game by the same set of rules, and when, British industries being overtaken by others, the advantages of protec-tion were clearer.
Aberdeen's instructions were amplified in January 1842. Hong Kong was not to be thought of as a permanent British possession, but only as a bargaining counter, 'a place militarily occupied, and liable to be restored to the Chinese Government on the attainment of the objects which Her Majesty's Government seek from China'. Therefore the island 'should be considered a mere military position and ... all build-ings and constructions not required in that light should be immediately discontinued'. Aberdeen was nervous lest the Chinese should find a settlement at Hong Kong a cause for future aggression, since 'not only commercial establishments, but the necessary permanent garrison, would be a constant provocation and temptation'. If trade, which was the important point, could be secured without the expense and trouble of a colony, so much the better.
At this stage Hong Kong might well have been allowed to revert to China, but Pottinger had been converted to Elliot's point of view: 'The retention of Hong Kong is the only single point in which I intentionallyexceeded my modified instructions [those of 4 November 1841) but every hour I passed in this superb country has convinced me of the necessity and desirability of our possessing such a settlement.'41 Some,both Chinese and British, found this inexplicable. Sir James Urmston, former President of the Select and later Chairman of the Court, con-tinued to press the case for Chusan, and complained that Hong Kong 'has been most unaccountably ... praised and puffed-up ... it is not
UNJUST TREATIES?
only, in its present state and condition, an utterly useless island to us, in a commercial point of view, but it is hopeless lo imagine or expect, that it can ever be rendered capable ofbecoming an emporium' .42The Chinese were indeed in no position to object to the cession of a more desirable spot; when the British demands were presented the Chinese negotiators merely remarked -and not ironically -'Is that all?'
It was not until 4January 1843 that the British government decided to keep Hong Kong. In his letter to Pottinger of that date acknowledg-ing the receipt of the Treaty of Nanking, Aberdeen conceded that, 'as soon after the exchange of the Ratifications as may be convenient, you will assume the Government of the Island of Hong Kong, then become a Possession of the British Crown ... You will thenceforward adminis-ter the Government of the Island and make all arrangements for its defence against foreign aggression.' The ratification did not reach Hong Kong until June, and the formal exchange took place on the twenty-sixth of that month.
An umpire between the empires
Before Sir Henry's diplomatic task was over all the loose ends left in the Treaty of Nanking needed to be tidied up. There were no fewer than four supplementary instruments in the peace settlement: a declar-ation on transit duties, amplifying Article II; on Free Trade, amplifying Article X; the General Regulations of Trade; and the Supplementary Treaty. It took many months for these to be completed; negotiations started in the New Year of 1843 and continued until 8 October, when the Supplementary Treaty, commonly known as the Treaty of the Bogue, was signed. Chinese opinion, deeply resentful of later humili-ations imposed by foreigners, has classed the Treaty of Nanking together with other agreements as an 'unequal treaty', unjust and unap-proved ofby the people, and with no validity. The argument is doubtful in international law, and successive Chinese governments, while main-taining this stand, have in practice conscientiously fulfilled treaty obli-gations. Foreign governments, the beneficiaries of these agreements, have gradually renegotiated their terms so that by the end of World War II all foreign leases and concessions had been revoked, apart from that of the Kowloon New Territories on the mainland.
Whatever might be said of the later (1860 and 1898) Conventions of Peking, which gave Kowloon and the New Territories to the British,
A HISTORY OF HONG KONG
it is not easy to argue that the Treaty of Nanking, when taken with the Supplementary Treaty, was unequal or unreasonable. Wang Tseng-tsai, writing from Taiwan in 1972, agreed that so far as treaty-making procedures were concerned, the Treaty of Nanking conformed well to present-day diplomatic practice.43 Nevertheless both Taiwan and Beijing maintain that all three sections that make up the territory of Hong Kong are rightfully integral parts of China, that happen to be administered by the British, and not a British colony.
The British government certainly wanted, in 1843, a secure and lasting settlement with China. Lord Brougham, for the opposition, had asked that 'every pain might be taken ... to restore not a nominal peace, but a real and cordial good understanding with that great and powerful empire', which Lord Haddington, First Lord of the Admir-alty, assured him would be the case.44 The agreements reached at the Bogue, which gave substance to the Nanking terms, were the result of serious and protracted discussions carried on in a cool and reasonable fashion, which brought benefits to both sides. The outburst of indig-nant criticism from British merchants is a good indication that the terms were not one-sided, and even a brief examination of the points at issue indicates that orderly discussions, which resulted in real compromises, were customary. Pottinger made his own position clear at the outset, on 10 December 1842: 'I consider myself to stand as it were in the light of an Umpire between the Empires ... all commercial arrangements shall be reciprocal as far as it is possible to make them'.
At Nanking Sir Henry had simply stood firm upon his instructions (except in the matter of Hong Kong) and refused any c.oncessions of substance, although he conceded in the interests of saving Chinese face some points which proved to be of greater significance than he appreciated. The most important of these was the failure to ensure representation in Peking, which taken in conjunction with the Chinese refusal to allow access to the city of Canton, was to cause the second Anglo-Chinese War in 1856. At the Bogue Sir Henry had a much more complex task, and was faced with a team headed by that accom-plished diplomat Ch'i-ying, assisted by the Chinese Treasurer of Canton, Huang En-t'ung (Huang Entong), who had a solid background of financial expertise, as well as the Viceroy Ch'i Kung (Qj. Gong) and the Hoppo, Wen Feng. Pottinger was perhaps not the right man to negotiate a technical agreement on trade with such able and sophisti-cated opposites. He had made his own ignorance of the subject mani-fest in a letter to John Morrison in December 1841: 'I must commence
UNJUST TREATIES?
by saying, that although I am Chief Superintendent ofit, I know noth-ing about Trade, or proper duties.'45 His conlributions were therefore those of a practical man with a military background, looking above all for a permanent and orderly structure.
This showed in his insistence that the collection of customs duties should be placed on a regular basis, and at a fair rate, ensuring a reasonable return to the Chinese government. British consuls in the treaty ports would see to it that 'the duties and other charges are regularly paid, that abuses do not creep in, and that smuggling be entirely prevented'.46 When they became aware of the consequences of this -Chinese customs cruisers and, later, unbribable officers -British merchants, who had looked for a much looser control, regarded it as a betrayal of their interests, and agitated for revision over the next two generations.
Any negotiations begin with a more-or-less clearly defined set of aims; in the progress of talks these are altered by the personal predilec-tions of the negotiators and their_ success or failure in gaining their objectives. Further complications set in when the various groups report to their principals, naturally putting the most favourable gloss on their results. When this process is further confused by misunderstandings in translation the outcome is bound to be unsatisfactory in some respects. This was certainly so in the Nanking-Bogue settlements, and on the most important point of the status of Heng Kong. At Nanking it was stated that:
It being obviously necessary and desirable that British subjects should have some port whereat they may careen and refit their ships when required and keep stores for the purpose, the Emperor of China cedes to the Queen of Great Britain &c. the island of Hong Kong to be possessed in perpetuity.
Nothing was said about naval bases or trade, which was specifically confined to the five treaty ports, although Pottinger made it clear that he intended to develop the island for both purposes. The drafting of the treaties had been done, with the tacit understanding of both sides, in such a way as to save the Emperor's face. Enlightenment had to be both tactful and gradual. By the time Ch'i-ying visited Hong Kong for the ratification of the Treaty ofNanking inJune 1843 the development of Hong Kong was obvious, and the Emperor was informed accor-dingly:
A HISTORY OF HONG KONG
In recent years ... these [British] baibarians have levelled hills and constructed roads, and at a place called Qundailu [Skirt Sash Road] more than a hundred foreign edifices have been built and gradually brought to completion. Moreover, destitute riff-raff and Tankas [boat-dwellers] from eastern Guangdong have erected shacks at the same place, and subsist by selling comestibles. The number of barbarian merchants is estimated at no more than a few hundred, but already several thousand Chinese are trading with or working for them ... For over three hundred years, since the former Ming Dynasty, all manner of barbarians have congre-gated in Macao, where they have peacefully engaged in trade without causing trouble, and there has been no significant evasion of transit dues. Hong Kong is in a comparable situation, and unless regulations are clearly defined and strictly enforced, smuggling and tax evasion will multiply a hundredfold, and collec-tion of the full duty may be prevented.47
This was a cause of some concern to the court; when the details of the Bogue settlement reached Peking it was discussed at the Grand Council. The critical point was not the fact that Hong Kong (a 'barren island comprising many rocky peaks ... isolated in the sea some one hundred Ii from the chief town of Xia'n County ... formerly a lair for pirates and almost uninhabited, save for a few dozen scattered families of poor fisher folk at a place known as Chizhuwan'48) had been given to Britain. What really concerned the court was future income, and Ch'i-ying was instructed accordingly:
The matter of opening Hong Kong to trade is of crucial impor-tance. If it were to become an important trading centre it could determine whether Our excise revenues are in surplus or deficit. If import and export certificates are only issued by the Deputy Magistrate of Kowloon Sub-District, who will carry out his checks in conjunction with a British official, the procedure is certain to be lax, and revenues will inevitably be lost through evasion and fraud. Let Q!ying and others once more fully apply their minds to the question of ensuring strict controls, and let them mem-orialize Us when they have devised a satisfactory solution. Let strict instructions be given to civil and military officials at all ports to conduct physical inspections of all vessels putting to sea. As to the five trading ports, let all provincial authorities in whose
UNJUST TREATIES?
jurisdiction they lie pay increased attention to defensive measures, and prevent merchant vessels from coming and going at will. Thus by preventing leaks and evasions shall Our revenues be augmented.49
This memorial, which was not received by Ch'i-ying until early December 1843, placed him in an uncomfortable dilemma, since he could not alter the agreements he had already reached. His explanation to the Emperor was long and involved, and gave a fictitious account of the reasons why the cession of Hong Kong had been demanded:
Barbarian merchants, arriving at Canton after a long voyage, are ignorant of the state of the market, but unlike Chinese merchants, are unable to avail themselves of the services of the 'establish-ments', and they have a limited time available to them before they must return. As the saying goes, their goods are 'dead on arrival',so they have no choice but to obey the instructions of the Hong merchants, sell their goods as soon as they can and buy whatever they can find. Chafing thus under manifold and egregious impo-sitions, they asked for Hong Kong island as somewhere they could reside, their sole purpose being to follow the state of the market in Canton so they can move their goods at a time of their choosing and do business with the 'establishments' like the Chinese mer-chants.
The fact of Hong Kong being a free port was neatly avoided.
However, it is by no means certain that Hong Kong will become a trading centre, or that our profits will suddenly vanish to the outside. Kowloon lies directly opposite the barbarian settlement and the anchorage for all ships arriving at or leaving Hong Kong. My investigations reveal that this place is ideally situated for our purposes. A ship bound for Hong Kong with goods for export must pay duty first at the point of export, and an export certificate will be issued. On arrival at Hong Kong, the certificate will be examined, and any ship importing goods into Hong Kong will have to pay duty at the point of import. These procedures are in conformity with the regulations laid down; their effectiveness depends not on the seniority of the inspectors but on the thoroughness with which the inspections are made. sog
A HISTORY OF HONG KONG
While such a system would work for exports, there was no possibilityof Britain allowing the Kowloon customs to examine British merchants' cargoes or to levy dues. But the pass system would secure payment of duty by Chinese ves"sels, since duplicated passes could be sent to the Hoppo at Canton. The Emperor professed himself satisfied with Ch'i-ying's explanation, and in his vermilion endorsement instructed the officials at the treaty ports to make the necessary arrangements.
More trouble lay ahead in Article XIII of the Treaty. In part this was due to incompetent translation. The invaluable John Morrison having died on 29 August, it was left to Robert Thom, at best a reasonable commercial interpreter, to collate the English and Chinese versions, which he signally failed to do. This had the effect, as far as the Chinese were concerned, of putting it within their power to cut off any trade between Hong Kong and any other Chinese port (the English version was not much better, as it made trade between Hong Kong and the treaty ports subject to Chinese permission). One omis-sion from the signed protocol was the question of jurisdiction over Chinese residents in Hong Kong. It was not accepted at the time; as it was later to be, that residents in Hong Kong might be British citizens (except when inconvenient to Britain, as in the 1981 Immigration Act). Pottinger's first, unworkable, proposal was that the British should be responsible for policing Hong Kong, but hand Chinese off enders over to a Chinese magistrate for trial under Chinese law. When Whitehall pointed out that this would prove, at the very least, extremely difficult, Sir Henry found himself in the embarrassing position of having already agreed it with Ch'i-ying: 'It seems,' dryly commented_ Sir James Stephen, Permanent Under-Secretary at the Colonial Office, 'that the Chinese High Commissioner has the best of the argument.' Since the matter could not be settled in time to allow the other items to be effected, it was allowed to drop.
What was to become the most significant privilege of Western nations in China, and the source of the fiercest resentment, that of extra-territorial jurisdiction, was originally conceived as a compromise. Extra-territoriality had been the direct cause of the war -first in Lin's attempt to arrest Dent, and then in his later demand for someone to be delivered to account for the murder of Lin Wei-hsi. The Annex concerning the General Regulations of Trade at the Treaty Ports stipulates that disputes between foreigners and Chinese should be 'arranged by arbitration and diplomacy', and that 'Regarding the pun-ishment of English criminals the English Government will enact the
UNJUST TREATIES? 131
laws necessary to attain that end, and the consul will be empowered to put them into force ... Chinese criminals�Pwill be tried and punished by their own laws.' This was primarily a concession to the Chinese, made in order to impose much-needed discipline on unruly British crews, who had previously caused such trouble in Canton. In their treaty of July 1844 the Americans went nearer to the point; 'Citizens of the US ... shall be subject to be tried and punished only by the consul.' The French expressed the principle most clearly in their Treaty of Whampoa (October 1844): 'In all circumstances ... the principle being that . . . the French shall be subject to the law of France.'
The narrative of those serious and intensive discussions, 'argued back and forth and considered ... time and time again, and having done all that seemed proper to do', the detailed reports of the negoti-ators to their principals, and the many compromises reached, make it clear that the Supplementary Treaty was a legitimate international instrument, doubtless with ambiguities and defects, but not with more than most such, and certainly not a simple dictation of terms by a victorious power to a suppliant. Ch'i-ying was a man of great personal charm, able to out-blarney Sir Henry, and won a good deal of genuine regard from his British counterparts. Pottinger might not have offici-ally, as requested by Ch'i-ying, christened his son Frederick Keying,51 but he did present the Commissioner with portraits of the child and his mother, and reported 'with a touch of awe' to Lord Aberdeen that his 'yin-te-me-t'e' (intimate) friend had 'thrown a perfectly new light on the character and habits' of the Chinese authorities.
It is also true that many of the Nanking provisions were fore-shadowed in the agreements made between China and the Khan of Khokand in the previous decade, which also allowed for fixed tariffs, and consular representation with judicial powers -agreements never regarded as unjust, unequal or one-sided, although equally forced upon the Ch'ing by outsiders. Subsequent efforts to ensure that the Treaty worked properly, and that remaining contentious items were arranged by mutual negotiation, reinforce this argument. Professor Fairbank's judgement is that although the arrangements were 'expressions of a new order imposed upon the Chinese by British power', they were also 'by and large, compromises. British desires had to be modified. Sir Henry Pottinger finally settled for what was
feasible.'52
5
A BARREN ISLAND.
A free and inexpensive asylum
The initial phase of Hong Kong's history was the uncertain and pro-visional period beginning with Elliot's proclamation that Hong Kong was part of Her Majesty's dominions on 26January 1841, and ending on 1 February 1842, when Sir Henry Pottinger returned from the first part of the Northern campaign to determine what should be done with the island. On his first visit the previous August, Pottinger, in a tearing hurry to get to the scene of action, had remained only a few hours which he spent in a tent on the foreshore, conferring with Elliot's former deputy Alexander Johnston, who had come out in the train of Lord Napier seven years before.Johnston now found himself, unexpec-tedly and not at all comfortably, at the head of things in Hong Kong while the Plenipotentiary was forcing the Chinese to a settlement on the Yangtse.
Left to his own devices by both Elliot and Pottinger, Johnston might have sat on his hands and done nothing beyond co-operating with the service chiefs. Instead of this he displayed great energy, pressing ahead with the infrastructure of the colony, and in doing so presented his superiors, when they came to consider what should be done about Hong Kong, with something of afait accompli. Johnston was perfectly happy to assume responsibility for running Hong Kong; indeed he liked the idea so much that he described himself in later life as 'some-time Deputy governor of Hong Kong', 1 and did not hesitate to take responsibility for decision-making upon himself.
Elliot had been kept busy with settling affairs in Canton until the
A BARREN ISLAND
beginning of June 1841, limiting the time he had to spend on HongKong. In fact, he never had much of an opportunity to inspect the 'insular station' he had acquired for the Queen: except for one tripround the island in the Nemesis, and some brief visits in April and July, he remained with his staff at Macao. Apart from Johnston, the only resident official was Captain William Caine, late of the 26th Regiment of Foot, the Cameronians, who had been appointed Chief Magistrate on 30 April. They were later joined by the First Lieutenant of the Nemesis, William Pedder, as Harbour Master, shortly before Elliot was superseded. Caine was a soldier of the old school. He had been in the service since 1 804, and was a firm believer in discipline reinforced by frequent floggings. As Chief Magistrate and later Lieutenant-Govemor, Caine was to be a key figure in the colony for the next eighteen years.
Local opinions about the future were reserved. Jardine, back in England, was all in favour of reviving the trade at Canton, a place he knew well and in which his firm had made substantial capital invest-ments, but he had not been pei:sonally subjected to the inconveniences -and dangers -to which the foreign community on the spot had inmthe course of the past two years been exposed. Similarly, the Ameri-cans, who had remained at Canton during the time when the Britishhad been expelled, were unwilling to give up their comfortable resi-dence there until matters were very much clearer. Even if Hong Kongmwas to be a permanent possession of the Crown, foreign businessesespecially would wish to be informed on the regulations, terms ofmlandtenure and suchlike before making investments.
But to the British, especially the opium traders, it seemed well worth while at least to run up some temporary stores for their products, which they had perforce left on their ships for two years: what was spent on property could speedily be saved on insurance and demurrage. Stocks were beginning to build up again, since the East India Company back in Bengal was producing its customary quantities of opium. Elliot explained this in a letter to Lord Auckland: 'It is the peculiar and prodigious difficulty of operations in China, that property of immense amount is constantly pouring in upon our hands ... At the very date of this dispatch a vast amount of tonnage is again accumulating, but the erection of Warehouses is commencing at Hong Kong, with a spirit which will I trust enable us to clear the Ships.'2
Jardine's and Dent's, responsible for millions of dollars' worth of opium and other goods, were anxious to get them landed and under
A HISTORY OF HONG KONG
guard. Deprived of their Canton base, and restricted in Macao, they also urgently needed office and domestic accommodation. With their customary energy they worked fast.
As early as February 1841 sites were being bought direct from their Chinese owners in order to erect temporary matshed godowns and labourers' huts. Lindsay's were said to have been the first house on the scene, but Jardine Matheson were certainly not far behind. And, of course, Chinese tradesmen immediately crossed from Kowloon ready to provide any form of service. Within weeks a rash of buildings gave Hong Kong the air of a Gold Rush town. Land was bought from Chinese owners with often the vaguest of legal titles, and transferred without much thought as to its final use.
Selection of appropriate sites was governed by the lie of the land and by the submarine contours. Deep-water moorings in Hong Kong harbour are found towards Kowloon, and off the northern shores of the island only to the west of the present site of the Macao Ferry Terminal. The forty-foot submarine contour lay as much as a mile off this coast, which prevented off-shore mooring for sea-going ships, but was to favour later land reclamation projects. The contours of the land follow similar patterns on the island, rising less sharply, especially towards Happy Valley. Possession Point, where the flag was raised by Captain Belcher on 26January 1841, has deep water inshore, but the first settlements were further to the east, taking advantage of the flatter ground to be found there.
Ships coming from the west were limited in draught by a bar in the approaches to the Sulphur Channel, which lies close inshore of Ken-nedy Town, deep-draught vessels usually making an approach from the east through the Lyeemoon (Lei Yue Mun) passage, a narrow entrance which, surrounded by steep hills, very effectively protects the harbour from the prevailing easterlies. North of Lyeemoon the bottom shelves rapidly, and much of this area is today occupied by the air-port's runways. For this reason deep-water berths are now found in the lee created by the Kowloon peninsula. Warehouses convenient for this deep-water traffic, and also away from the more expensive central area, were likely to be more economical, which is why Jardine's were content with their site at East Point. From East to West Point, which marked the boundaries of the first settlement, is a distance of nearly four miles, and the construction of a road was the first essen-tial. This was Queen's Road, which followeds. the high-water mark at a distance of some one hundred feet, leaving a reasonable space
A BARREN ISLAND 135
for the erection of buildings benefiting from both water and road
froom..
It could be argued, as later Johnston did argue, that at least a modi-cum of development at Hong Kong would have been needed even if possession was to be strictly temporary. Barracks, hospitals and storage facilities would be essential for the use of the expeditionary forces then in the north, batteries would be needed to protect the installations, and some attention to roads, waterfront and piers would have to be paid even if Hong Kong, like Chusan, were eventually to be handed back to the Chinese. But Elliot was anxious that Hong Kong should be much more than a mere military depot. Attempting to enlist the support of Lord Auckland in India, he again showed his concern for justice:
But, My Lord, if the preservation of Hong Kong is of such first-rate importance for our own trade and interests, it is to the full as much so, as an act of justice and protection to the Native population upon which we have been so long dependent for assist-ance and supply. Indescribably dreadful instances of the hostility between these people and the Government are within our certain knowledge; and they cannot be abandoned without the most fatal consequences.
If Captain Elliot's choice was to be justified his island must become a new Canton. He therefore pressed ahead with development, putting up for sale as much of the available land as possible. The strip, nearly two miles long, roughly between the present sites of the Central Market and the Ruttonjee Sanatorium, was divided into marine lots, each with a hundred feet of road and harbour frontage, the depths varying with the contours. It was intended that one hundred marine and the same number of 'suburban' sites, not having water fronmge, were to be offered, but Elliot was impatient to press ahead, and waited only until fifty of the sites were marked out before they were offered for sale by auction on 14 June 1841. The Superintendent's haste led to ambigu-ities which were to be the source of much future annoyance.
Plots were advertised for sale at a 'quit rent', on conditions which Elliot attempted to make clear to his old acquaintances Matheson and Dent, as the chief representatives of the British community, on 17 July:
A HISTORY OF HONG KONG
I am of opinion that I shall be consulting the interests of the establishment in making immediate public declaration of my pro-posal to move Her Majesty's government either to pass the lands in fee simple for one or two years purchase at the late rates, or to charge them in future with no more than a nominal quit rent. May I request you, gentlemen, to circulate this letter.
In other words, the land would be transferred freehold (fee simple) for the sum of at most two years' rent, or on long lease at a peppercorn.3
Prices obtained at the sale were regarded as satisfactory, averaging some ten shillings per foot of harbour frontage, �G20 per acre for town lots, and �G2 for 'suburban' lots. Sites in the bazaar area opposite the Central Market, which was set aside for Chinese, fetched the high rent of �Gr for a lot of forty by twenty feet. These were allocated first to 'those persons who against every obstacle settled down in Hong Kong, and have on various occasions supplied the Fleet when it could not otherwise obtain provisions'-the Chinese shopkeepers, without whose enthusiastic support the colony could never have survived. The most important waterfront site, a double lot, was snapped up by the Dents: Jardine Matheson had intended to buy an even larger site, but this was compulsorily acquired by the Services, and Jardine's were compensated with the land around East Point, a good deal further off. Government and the armed services naturally enjoyed the privilege of first choice, the Navy siring the Royal Navy dockyard off Harcourt Road, the Army preferring the higher ground away from the waterfront for both batteries and hospital. The Government Offices in Lower Albert Road, and the Anglican cathedral, are on the site of the Murray battery and guardhouse, while Flagstaff House opposite was originally chosen as the location for the General Officer Commanding's house by Lord Saltoun. For more than a century official Hong Kong was able to look down upon the commercial classes below, but the case has been altered since; a present-day Governor's guests taking their pleasure on his lawns are viewed from thousands of hotel and office windows.
Allowing the Services first choice led to the new town being nipped in two, as it still very nearly is, by government developments, a constric-tion that soon caused planning difficulties. For some time buildings were nothing more than matting or wood, perhaps on a stone base: the merchants had too much outstanding in the way of potential losses on Lin's opium and the Hong debts to be enthusiastic about sinking
A BARREN ISLAND
large sums in fixed resources. Certainly when Pottinger paid his brief visit in August 1841, the fact that he was received in a tent speaks for the paucity of accommodation. Later, Johnston, who was rather given to complaining, described conditions at the time in a letter pleading with the British government for more adequate recognition of his ser-vices: 'I received no instructions [from Elliot] as to what I was to do when I arrived and did take charge . . . There was no difference between Hong Kong and the numerous islands situated all along the coasts of China ... the only inhabitants were of a migratory character, and principally engaged in fishing ... to induce the first one hundred labourers to leave Macao and Canton cost me some trouble.' The 'respectable Chinese' were suspicious of the new administration: 'They viewed me in the light of an imitator of Commissioner Lin.' In spite of this Johnston claimed to have constructed six forts at Kowloon, each with accommodation for an officer and forty men, placed guns on Kellet's Island, built two barracks, a storehouse, three batteries and connecting roads, 'all with no reward and no increase in pay'.4
One of the first acts of Johnston's term of office was to make a census, and on 15 May 1841 the island's population was said to have been 4,350, with another two thousand fishermen living on their boats, eight hundred -presumably immigrant merchants -in the bazaar, and three hundred labourers from Kowloon. But, as Elliot had pointed out to Lord Auckland, the sparseness of the population, and its distri-bution, were exactly the reasons why the British could take over the island without objections being raised by the Chinese on the spot: had Hong Kong been as populous, thriving and well-known as Chusan this would certainly not have been so, and the British would have assumed the character of usurpers rather than virtual founders. The largestsettlement was Chek-chu (now Stanley), 'The Capital, a large town', with a population of two thousand according to the census. Chek-chu would not have much changed when a few months later it was described in the Canton Press as 'the resort of large fleets of fishing boats, and the site of a considerable town . . . having a very good bazaar, an extensive rope-walk, and shops well-stocked to supply the wants of the Chinese sea-faring people'.
Since almost the only attraction of the north coast of the island was the deep-water harbour, it is not surprising that there were few Chinese to be incommoded by the new developments. On 15 May 1841 the Canton Press had been ironic on the subject: 'The site of the principal town has been selected with the judgement which is characteristic of
A HISTORY OF HONG KONG
the English authorities in China: and we may mention in proof of this that l!very street will be perfectly sheltered from the south wind, which will be an immeQse comfort during the approaching hot season. There are abundant supplies of granite and cold water.' But by the following March the Friend of China was able to enthuse: 'It is a matter of astonishment that our neighbours of the sister settlement [Macao] continue to invest large sums in building ... Hong Kong has advanced with a rapidity of movement unexampled in the annals of colonization, and offers A FREE AND INEXPENSIVE ASYLUM, WITH AMPLE2PROTECTION, FOR PERSONS AND PROPERTY.'
Elliot's initial proclamation on 26 January 1841, together with a supplementary issued the following week, was made on his own initiat-ive, without much time for thought, and reflects his own concerns. There were to be two codes of law, English and Chinese; Chinese law and customs were to be interfered with as little as possible, except that 'all forms of torture' were banned; all were to be protected 'against all enemies whatsoever and they are further secured in the free exercise of their religious rites, ceremonies and social customs, and the enjoy-ment of their lawful property and interests.' This was followed, on 7 June, by a declaration that Hong Kong was to be a free port, with 'no charges ... payable to the British Government'. Apart from main-taining two separate codes oflaw, all Elliot's good intentions have been well fulfilled by his successors.
It took the eye of faith, when Captain Elliot left China in August 1841, to see the future 'vast emporium' in the few scattered sheds that lined the foreshore of the island. Matters had not been. improved by an outbreak of a fever, which was to be for some years a devastating annual visitant, followed by a typhoon which nearly claimed the lives of both Elliot and Sir Gordon Bremer, returned from his visit to India, since it struck while they were sailing Louisa across to Macao. Disease and tempest were succeeded by a devastating fire on 12 August which destroyed most of the temporary structures. In the face of these dis-couragements Hong Kong, had it become a permanent British pos-session, might well have remained only as a naval base and fortified camp, with the trade reverting to Canton and social life to Macao. The Chinese themselves ensured this did not occur by looting and destroying the Canton factories in December 1841. If rebuilding had to be done, then there was a good case for incurring the expense in the relative safety of Hong Kong rather than in Canton. The danger of the island being handed back to the Chinese, although it discouraged
A BARREN ISLAND
the Americans, does not seem to have disturb.d the British merchants, who could not conceive of 'the lion surrendering anything on which its paw had once been placed'.5
In spite of the fact that Pottinger, during his brief conference with Johnston, had ordered all land sales and civilian building to be stopped, he returned from the north in February 1842 to find that his instruc-tions had been disregarded and that, in place of matsheds and tents, there was at Victoria (as it was to be officially known from June 1843) a community of over fifteen thousand, of whom more than twelve thousand were Chinese. A wide metalled road, laid out by the Royal Engineers, ran nearly four miles along the shore, the initial publicbuilding plots had been developed with permanent structures -houses, godowns, land-, police-and post-offices, and a commodious jail, to say nothing of the naval and military installations. Some of the houses were of stone, and one of these belonged to Johnston himself. Manyothers were in course of building, their owners meanwhile roughing it in matshed or bamboo huts. It was however the less respectableinstitutions that struck 'the noble and distinguished author' of an article, 'Hong Kong and the Hong Kongians', published in the Canton Register on 14 January 1842. It appears that many of the facilities enjoyed in Hong Kong today were already available:
The shops on either side of the grand road present an animated scene of bustle and activity. On the brow of the hill stands the phlegmatic Sheik Modeen ... opposite is the smiling Chonqua, who is an English tailor of the first class, though of Chinese extraction. Here is the newly-built hotel 'The Victoria' ... the celebrated Chinese physician ... the cookshop ... and there is the abode of the fallen of the fair sex -beautiful, and full of wickedness ... In fine the scene is exhilarating, novel, and inter-esting . . . but the magnificence of the gambling house threw us into a labyrinth of amazement . . . built after the approvedHongkongian style of architecture, Venetian in its moist exterior -in the interior, decidedly Attic. On either side there are ten orma dozen well-lighted tables ... At the South extremity a speciesof banqueting room ... to the North is the abode of the owner,m
the Crockford of the place.m
Theatrical entertainment was also available; an Australian touring com-pany visited that year, followed by a programme staged by an Italian
A HISTORY OF HONG KONG
impresario; and there were rumours that actresses whose 'beauties and talents are only to be surpassed by their spotless virtues' were to be imported by a Mr Gaston Dutronquoy. A rather more credible attrac-tion was soon to be found at the Victoria Theatre (at that time nothing more than the upper floor of a two-storey godown in W anchai), where the 'Wonder of Wonders' could be seen daily 'from 12 o'clock to 1 o'clock, the great ORANG OUTANG named Gertrude ... taking her dinner, sitting on a chair at a table, using spoons, knives and forks, wiping her mouth with a towel, she will open a bottle of wine and drink to the health of the spectators, she will after smoke a cigar'.6
Hong Kong very early had a newspaper of its own. That lively institution, the Hong Kong press, started early with the publication of the Friend of China on 24 March 1842. The paper, edited by thes�P American Baptist minister Lewis Shuck and James White (who had been a City of London Alderman and came east to recover his fortune, which he apparently did), took an anti-opium stance ('that fascinating vice'). The Friend of China was joined in Hong Kong the following year by the Canton Register, which had been moved to Macao during the 1839 disturbances. Being funded by the Matheson family, the Register did not agree with the Friend on the subject of opium, and tended to be less on the side of the angels, often appearing to be anti-Chinese and critical of missionary endeavours. Since Dent's had interests in the China Mail (1845), the colony's three hundred English-speakers were thus provided with an interesting choice of reading.7 The Friend of China was enthusiastic about the new settlement's pros-pects; in one of its early issues (26 May 1842) Shuck pontificated: 'We believe that Hong Kong is destined, by the uncontrollable force of circumstances, to become the base of naval and military operations, which sooner or later, must revolutionize, or subvert, the existing state of things in China. Meanwhile we suppose we must be content with a policy, which Napoleon must have appreciated, when he called us a nation of shopkeepers.' One hundred and fifty years later the fear that Hong Kong may 'revolutionize, or subvert, the existing state of things in China' is still a powerful factor.
All this development had been sanctioned by Johnston in contravention of Pottinger's instructions that things should be left as they were until a policy directive was obtained. But Pottinger took it upon himself, as had Elliot, to decide that the settlement should be given its chance to
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survive. He therefore confirmed Johnston's actions and authorized arrangements for a land registry, announcing on 22 March 1842, 'pending the Queen's royal and gracious commands, that the pro-prietory of the soil is rested in and appertains solely to the Crown'. Not unnaturally, everyone on the spot took this to mean that it was settled that Hong Kong should permanently remain British.
Pottinger's bold action was taken within days of the indecisive debate in the House of Commons on the future of Hong Kong. Justifying himself later, Sir Henry wrote to Lord Ellenborough, who had suc-ceeded Auckland as Governor-General oflndia: 'I have done as much as I could to retard, without injuring this settlement, but the disposition to colonize under our protection is so strong that I behold a large and wealthy City springing up under my temporizing measures, and the chief difficulty I now have is the provision oflocations for the respect-able and opulent Chinese Traders who are flocking to this island.'8 The last clause was unfortunately a great exaggeration; the paucity of respectable and wealthy Chinese was to be for many years a source of considerable worry.
When, only a fortnight afterwards, just before he left to join the renewed campaign on the Yangtse, Pottinger received Aberdeen's dis-patch calling for all works 'of a permanent character' to be 'immediately discontinued', he found himself in a dilemma. On 20 May a long exculpatory and at times incoherent letter was sent to London. Quoting Elliot,Johnston and the General Officer Commanding, Lord Saltoun, Sir Henry enthused over
the extraordinary, and, as I believe, unequalled progress which this settlement has made ... aided by the subsequent proceedings which Mr Johnston has adopted ...
I found when I arrived in China that it was even then impossible supposing that it had accorded with my first impressions to set aside all that Captain Elliot had done regarding Hong Kong ...cthe General Commanding had pointed out and recommended extensive and still I think very judicious improvements on the Island ... including a Fort or Fixed Work and Barracks on the opposite Mainland ...
I will only add my solemn and unprejudiced opinion that ...cthe Settlement has already advanced too far to admit of its being restored to the authority of the Empire consistently with the Honour and advantages of Her Majesty's Crown and subjects.
A HISTORY OF HONG KONG
Sir Henry covered his rear by letting the Hong Kong public know that they should blame Johnston if anything went wrong. At the same time as sending his enthusiastic dispatch he issued a memorandum: 'A year has now elapsed since Captain Elliot made arrangements for establishing a Civil Government on this Island ... Measures ... taken subsequently adopted during my absence by Mr Johnston have tended to confirm the impression, that the Island would, in due time, become a British Colony.' These measures, and in particular the quite clear indications that Elliot had given regarding the tenure of land sold at auction, Pottinger refused to sanction. When approached by residents wanting to build a church, he replied that although he was willing to confirm the choice of site, and to undertake that any private subscrip-tions raised for the purchase would be matched from public funds, 'it is advisable to defer commencing the Building, or incurring any
expense about it'.
Such reservations were kept from Whitehall, and, faced with the enthusiasm manifested in Sir Henry's dispatches, the British govern-ment accepted the cession of Hong Kong with tolerably good grace. Pottinger was generously permitted to do most of the things -buildingbarracks, letting off parcels of land, and encouraging developments -that he had already authorized. Poor Johnston attempted to justify his actions in a formal memorandum to Sir Henry, complaining that he had been
left in charge of this Government with no instructions to guide me ... I considered that I was doing no more than carrying out the measures, in progress, of the late Plenipotentiary, which I understood, from Your Excellency's Notification of 12th August, you did not wish to interfere with until Her Majesty's gracious pleasure was known. I also felt that my situation here was one in which I was obliged to take upon myself great responsibilities for the good and welfare of the Society under my charge . . . the approach to some regularity and order in buildings, and the laying out of proper thoroughfares through them.9
He got few thanks for it, then or later, but it is largely due to Johnston's initiative that Hong Kong was allowed to develop.
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Methods of proceeding unknown in other Bn"tish colonies
Only when the settlement at the Bogue was finalized could Sir Henry turn his full attention to his other responsibilities. As Plenipotentiary he was responsible for diplomatic relations with China, in respect of which he reported to the Foreign Secretary. In his capacity as Superintendent of Trade the organization of a consular service and the functioning of consular courts was another set of tasks, overseen this time by the Secretary of Colonies and War, with the Board of Trade expecting to be kept informed, and the law officers of the Crown giving their views. For military or naval assistance he had to call upon the Governor General of India, but the commanders in the field, as well as taking the Plenipotentiary's instructions, reported to the Admir-alty and the Horse Guards. Only the governorship of Hong Kong was a relatively straightforward matter, and fell within the ambit of the Colonial Office.
Modern management theory would immediately identify such an arrangement as absurd: responsibilities so arbitrarily divided could never be expected to function even reasonably well. More importantly, the qualities required by the diverse posts were often mutually exclu-sive. A colonial governor _needs patience, tact, commonsense and charm; supervision of consular courts and the avoidance of clashes with the domestic authorities demand ready authority and a good working knowledge of local customs, language and trading practices; while diplomatic representation calls for cunning, histrionic gifts and the ability to scent the slightest whiff of a potential compromise, together with negotiating skills of the highest order. No single person could be expected to possess more than a fraction of these qualities. Deficiencies on the spot could not be repaired by skilful direction from London, as the communications gap meant that emergencies had to be dealt with through the Governor General of India, or the army and navy commanders on the spot. Since only the Cabinet in London could issue orders to the Plenipotentiary-Governor-Superintendent, which orders could not arrive for a considerable time (only gradually reduc-ing: by the 1850s the journey out was down to six weeks), the element of central control remained feeble. During the Peel government of 1841-46 this caused few difficulties, since their interest in China was minimal, but once Palmerston regained office sparks might be expected to fly.
Pottinger returned to Hong Kong from Nanking on 2 December
A HISTORY OF HON9 KONG
1842, to the acclamations of the Friend ofChina: 'We are nearly bewil-dered at the magnificence of the prosperous career which seems now before us' -an enthusiasm which was soon modified. Two weeks later the expeditionary force sailed back to India, leaving a garrison of only some seven hundred men. As the officers, who were a sociable lot and of good family for the most part, had contributed enormously to the general liveliness, their departure much reduced the attractions of Hong Kong society. This now consisted only of a few dozen merchants and a handful of officials, since non-commissioned officers, private soldiers, shopkeepers and those Portuguese who had come over from Macao did not, of course, exist for social purposes. The Chinese, respectable or not, were regarded as best left to their own devices.
It was a curiously mixed and top-heavy society. Most of the old Canton taipans were gone: James Innes was dead, William Jardine a respectable M.P. for Ashburton, Devon 10 (but not for long, as he died in 1843). Lancelot Dent and James Matheson soon left, James being succeeded by his nephew, the less a.eeable Alexander, a 'lonely and ill-tempered ... crabby' individual.11John Morrison, the able and diligent son of Robert, died in the 1843 outbreak ofgfever. By the end of 1844 all the relics of the earlier age had gone, either dead, or to set them-selves up in Britain as gentlemen. Lancelot and Wilkinson Dent, laden with tributes to their 'splendid hospitality ... unwavering integrity, charitable munificence and uniform kindness' rebuilt their unassuming ancestral home in Westmorland in a majestic Tuscan style replete with every modern convenience, including central heating and no fewer than two bathrooms, and added a chapel to the parish church. James Matheson did better, buying the island of Lewis and building a mag-nificent castle thereon. The profitability of the opium trade may be judged by the fact that he was able to spend over half a million pounds on buying and developing the island, and that Alexander Matheson, when he retired, was able to spend �G773,020 on buying a fair slice of the county of Inverness, as well as �G300,000 on acquisitions in Ross-shire.
Their successors were, in common vl'ith early Victorians at home, consumed by an awareness of social distinctions. This was the time when the English passion for class stratification took shape. The more relaxed society of Regency England, which had been faithfully reproduced in Canton and Macao, had given place to a self-conscious striving for gentility. A change can be seen in the character of Britain's statesmen; the uninhibitedly aristocratic manners of the Whigs (Melbourne
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habitually used language that would have scandalized any sub-sequent audience) had been succeeded by�P the respectability of Sir Robert Peel. Visitors to England were often astounded by 'the system of ranks, as absolute as an oriental caste . . . galling, clogging and unhealthy'.12 Thackeray, Dickens, Trollope and Surtees all accurately chronicle the obsession of the 1840s, when 'gentility is the death and destruction of social happiness among the middle classes in England' .13 So it was to be, and even more so, in Hong Kong. There the problem was exacerbated by the small numbers: the three hundred or so British residents were perhaps equivalent to the population of a large English village, but comprised the social distinctions of a county.
At first the unquestioned top dog was not the Governor, but the General Officer Commanding, Lord Saltoun, the sixteenth Baron, and a Major-General of the Grenadier Guards. Saltoun was a man of personal charm and cultivation, an accomplished musician and a remarkable soldier, once described by Wellington himself as 'a pattern to the army both as a man and . a soldier'. It was Saltoun who at Waterloo commanded the detachment of the Guards which held out in the garden of Hougoumont against everything the French could bring against them, and who personally received Cambronne's sword when he surrendered the Imperial Guard. The General was perma-nently in Hong Kong, whereas the Governor was obliged to move about on diplomatic business: and although Pottinger as Plenipotentiary was theoretically senior, in every other respect, whether of rank, record, or personal abilities, he was less distinguished than Saltoun.
Below Governor and Commander there were exactly forty-three residents who counted themselves as gentlemen. This figure can be accurately measured since it is the number of magistrates that Pottinger felt it necessary to appoint, with powers to sit in judgement on 'all British subjects resorting to the Dominions of the Emperor of China'. Such an excessive number was due to the fact that any of them would have been mortally offended at being excluded. To be a Justice of the Peace, to sit upon the local bench, was a privilege and responsibility of the squirearchy, conferring the right to be called 'Esquire', thus differentiating the Magistrate from the mere tradesman. Not to be a
J.P. in Hong Kong was therefore to stamp one as being of the 'polloi':
"E sells 'ams, and I sells 'ats, so what's the difference?' complained one aggrieved colonist. Much satirical indignation was aroused, especially among those not appointed: 'Will it be believed in England that the first act of our Governor was to create a body of Justices of the Peace (none of them, by the way ... of the slightest use in Hong Kong) exceeding in number by one-third the whole constabulary force?' read a letter printed in the Friend of China of I July 1843 (needless to say, journalists were not regarded as gentlemen). The ridiculous situation did not last, and the magistrates were soon quietly relieved of their posts.
Pottinger had little patience with such polite distinctions. He had spent his life in the East, dealing only with Indians, soldiers, and company officials, and had no experience of commercial gentlemen. Like Elliot, he found many of the merchants disagreeable and distaste-ful, but unlike Elliot he was irascible and impatient. Sir Henry was not pleased to be faced with an outbreak of the Jardine Matheson-Dent hostilities when, immediately on his return, he received a letter from Matheson asking him to intercede in an affair that had taken place five years before his appointment. The trouble had arisen over the settlement of the Hing-tai Hong debts. This Canton firm was one of the more dubious Hongs, formed in the 1820s: it been heavily and imprudently backed by Jardine's, to the extent of nearly $3 million. When it collapsed in 1835, a committee of Hong merchants had been established specifically 'to examine the claims of the Hing-tai Hong and Messrs Jardine Matheson'. With what seems like either great want of tact or positive malice, Lancelot Dent was appointed as chairman, 'arbitrarily selected', as he explained, 'to supply the requisite know-ledge of foreign languages and accounts'. Dent's committee had agreed that the principal was due to Jardine Matheson, but disallowed three years' interest, amounting to the considerable sum 0[$432,543. Mathe-son was furious, and wrote to Dent that his 'interference with the interest, or balance of that account, was an officious interference as unjust as the decision was absurd'. Dent was, in fact, acting reasonably and within his terms of reference, but the incident had added fuel to the rivalry that already existed. Now that the Treaty ofmNanking allowed for the payment of the insolvent Hong debts, Jardine's raised the question once more, and Pottinger was asked to intervene. He could get nothing from Dent beyond an explanation of how the committee had been established and a dignified refusal to reopen the now five-year-old question.14
On 8 March 1842 Pottinger, finding the whole business incompre-hensible, pushed the papers off to London. Although both Davis and Elliot had found Dent's the more acceptable house, Sir Henry had been close to Jardine in London, and made a point of visiting Alexander
A BARREN ISLAND
Matheson as soon as he arrived in Hong Kong. By now however he had been offended by both the great Hongs: Dent's made difficulties about honouring a bill drawn in favour of the administration, which led to a pained letter from the Governor ('I am sorry to express myself in these terms with regard to any British merchants, and especially those whom it has always been my wish and duty to uphold'15).Jardine'sinterfered with his mail: 'The Mor arrived at Hong Kong three days ago but I have not got our letters. She lay off and sent Mr Matheson's packets on shore which they got on the morning of the 2oth! This is an infamous and disgraceful system.' And now that he had settled compensation with the Chinese, all the traders were out for what-ever they could get from government: 'I understand that some of the honest British Merchants have been exulting at the idea of having more than they claimed, while others are inventing claims under the pleasing impression that $3,000,000 must be got rid of amongst them.'16
Pottinger had no intention of having such persons interfere with orderly government. Hong Kong became a Crown Colony, governed by a Charter, on 26 June 1843. It was a sparse document, drafted by London in some haste and without benefit of any consultation with the new Governor, who was accordingly given wide discretionary power. He was to appoint a Legislative Council, which was to have no effective powers, even though his appointees were dismissible by the Governor at any time. Any real powers -and there were very few -were vested in an Executive Council whose members were all to be Crown servants, meeting only when the Governor required them, and to discuss only those matters which the Governor tabled. The only redress available to the members if they feh the Governor was acting wrongly was the right to communicate directly with the Secretary of State, a right rendered considerably less valuable by the time that was needed to effect communications. Hong Kong, from the beginning, was fated to be anomalous, as James Stephen at the Colonial Office regretfully acknowledged: 'methods of proceeding unknown in other British Colonies must be followed in Hong Kong, and ... the Rules and Regulations ... must, in many regards, bend to exigencies beyond the contemplation of the framers of them'.
As things turned out Pottinger -who had come out to settle accounts with the Chinese Empire, not to act as Governor of a colony which he regarded as consisting of a couple of hundred Europeans, very few of whom he would wish to give the time of day to -contrived to avoid
A HISTORY OF HONG KONG
most of the gubernatorial work. He avoided the place altogether for as long as possible, occupying the old Superintendency House in Macao until late in 1843. When finally established in Hong Kong, Pottinger announced that he would hold himself available at specified times for interviews with gentlemen requiring them, but it does not seem that much advantage was taken of this offer, and it was his successor, Sir John Davis, who was responsible for running in the Constitution. Government was simplified by Pottinger appointing the same three individuals -the minimum -to each council. Ali three, naturally, were paid officials -Johnston, Caine and Morrison.
When, in August 1843,John Morrison died, his loss was irrepara.le. A man of cairn capacity, and the only senior member of the adminis-tration to speak Chinese, Pottinger had relied on him heavily, writing to him almost daily when absent from the colony: his death, said Pottinger, was 'nothing less than a national tragedy'. After Morrison died, and Johnston went on sick leave, Pottinger was able to do very much as he wished, issuing notifications which had the force of law, often without prior discussion. There could be no effective interference from the trading community, even though many of his actions were vehemently objected to by the merchants, who believed he was deliber-ately acting against their interests. This impression was reinforced by the high-handed attitude he took towards them. His letters were writ-ten in a tone that might have been accepted by a village grocer, but was regarded as intolerably insulting by the senior merchants, whose wealth entitled them, in their opinion, to a high degree of consider-ation, even from Plenipotentiaries. Take for example Pottinger's letter of December 1842 to the British merchants in Canton, who had asked for some force to be retained there, if only the steamer Proserpine. The Governor demanded of them
collectively and individually whether you, to whom this letter is particularly addressed ... have in any single iota or circumstance striven to aid me in my arrangements as the humble but zealous instrument of the Government whose protection has been extended to you in an unparalleled degree, and which, I may add, you are always ready to claim and expect . . . I may even ask whether you have not thrown serious difficulties and obstacles, if not positive risk, in the way of the very arrangements and measures which you so earnestly desire to see perfected?17
A BARREN ISLAND 1 49
The most important cause for dissension lay in the complex story of the land settlements. Elliot's original land di!iposal had not been wel-comed by the home government. Lord Aberdeen had begun by rejecting Hong Kong, and even when the Treaty of Nanking was accepted he still dithered about what should be done about land sales and tenure. His instructions to Pottinger on the subject, sent on 4 January 1843, are full of hesitant suggestions, and lack any clear guidelines:
The principal source from which revenue is to be looked for is the Land; and if by the liberality of the Commercial regulations enforced in the Island, foreigners as well as British Subjects are tempted to establish themselves on it, and thus to make it a greatmercantile Entrepot, with very limited dimensions, Her Majesty's Government conceive that they would be fully justified in securing to the Crown all the benefits to be expected from the increased value which such a state of things would confer upon the Land. Her Majesty's Government would therefore caution you against the permanent alienation of any portion of the land, and theywould prefer that Parties should hold land under Leases from the Crown, the terms of which might be sufficiently long to warrant the holders in building upon their several allotments.
Aberdeen concluded by dropping all responsibility back in Pottinger's lap:
It would probably be advantageous also that the portions of land should be let by auction; but of the expediency of resorting to this process you will of course be best able to judge on the spot.
In the two years between Elliot's sales of land and the receipt of Lord Aberdeen's cautious warnings, much development had taken place. The palm mat houses were being replaced by elegant stone structures, and prefabricated wooden houses brought from Singapore. Almost the whole of the waterfront from Wanchai to the market was faced either with naval and military installations or with substantial two-and three-storey stone warehouses, with offices and living accommodation over, near-replicas of the Canton factories. Jardine Matheson were developing their own independent fiefdom at East Point, and official buildings -the first and largest being the commodious jail built to
A HISTORY OF HONG KONG
house William (now promoted to Major) Caine's culprits -wereappearing on the lower slopes of the peak. Less essential structures -the theatre, churches and mosque -remained in temporary accommo-dation. One early �Pplanning error was made apparent as expansion westwards became limited by the thriving bazaar opposite the Central Market: this had to be dealt with, at the cost of infinite trouble, by rehousing the leaseholders further westward in what became the Chinese quarter of Tai-ping-shan.
Commercial development had been funded on the assumption that Elliot's original titles would be convertible to freehold. The leasehold-ers were very cross when Pottinger, subsequent to Lord Aberdeen's tentative instructions, limited their tenures to seventy-five-year leases. Enough confusion and uncertainty were generated to discourage any-one from investing in new projects when it might take years to establish whether they were going to be allowed to continue. The opium traders, in spite of the enormous profits they were making, were also angry that the payment of their compensation claims was delayed. Hugh Lindsay, formerly of the Select Committee in Canton, procured a debate in the House of Commons on the subject on 17 March 1842, in the course of which William Jardine made one of his rare speeches, demanding quick payment: 'nothing was clearer than that the mer-chants ought to be compensated before the expenses of the expedition were taken into consideration'.
Pottinger was finding Hong Kong a tedious place: his accommoda-tion, a newly built small bungalow, although grandly named as Govern-ment House, was absurdly mean beside the palace he could expect back in India; his task in bringing the Chinese to a settlement had been completed, and he had not the taste for the detailed task of organization, which once again devolved upon the industrious Johnston and the disciplinarian Caine. They were much helped by the non-functioning of the constitutional councils, which enabled government ordinances to be issued without debate, by simple notifications. In the absence of any professional assistance these were loosely drafted and elicited disapproving noises from the Colonial Office. Nor were they popular with the community, since this seemed much too authoritarian a procedure. The British traders demanded -as they were to continue to demand for the next century or so -an active part in the island's government: although of course they had no intention of allowing the much larger Chinese population any say in things whatsoever.
Just as soon, therefore, as Sir Henry was able to settle the terms of
A BARREN ISLAND
the Treaty of the Bogue, he sent off his resignation to Lord Aberdeen. But it was to be nearly a year before his replacement arrived. In the meantime Pottinger appears to have solaced himself with the company of 'pretty Mrs Morgan, fair, fat and forty'.18 Certainly during his sojourn at the Cape of Good Hope, after leaving Hong Kong in June 1845, Pottinger made a name for himself as one who 'enjoyed his glass and his lass, smoked his cigar, and took things easy'.19A less charitable writer claimed: 'No other governor of the [Cape] Colony ever lived in such open licentiousness as he. His amours would have been inexcus-able in a young man: in one approaching his sixtieth year they were scandalous. '20
By the time of his departure it was arguable whether the British in Hong Kong disliked Sir Henry more than Sir Henry disliked them, but the antipathy was mutual. What might serve as a valedictory was published in the Friend of China on 4 March 1844:
The many instances which the mercantile community has been annoyed and oppressed: we need not specially notice the spirit of liberality and generosity they have ever exhibited towards govern-ment . . . the ten extraordinary ordinances already passed by a military legislator . . . these documents contain more that is objectionable, illegal, and unconstitutional than all similar ordi-nances passed in our numerous colonies in the past twenty years ... If elderly Gentlemen will have their hobby horse we have no objection, so long as they ride quietly, and the animal is not vicious.
The missionary and scholar James Legge described Hong Kong in Pottinger's day. The few European houses were quickly enumerated:
Edger's, Gibb's, Livingston's, Johnston's, the 'small bungalow where Sir Henry Pottinger and after him Sir John Davis held court', Gem-mel's, Fletcher's, Lindsay's and of course the 'imposing flat-roofed house' of Dent's and the Jardine establishment at East Point. Although Legge was 'charmed by the general appearance of the place, and the energy that was manifest in laying out the ground and pushing on building', he found 'many of the residents oppressed with gloombecause of its unhealthiness. 1843 was, no doubt, a very sickly year ... the drains were for the time all open ... an atmosphere of disease, which only the strongest constitutions and prudent living were able to resist'.21
A HISTORY OF HONG KONG
Respectable and opulent Chinese
Once the initial reluctance which Johnston had described was over-come, Hong Kong' quickly proved popular with enterprising Chinese, especially those who had previous experience of dealing with the bar-barians. British settlements in Malacca and Singapore had already encouraged Chinese to learn the foreigners' language and adapt to their customs, and well over a century of trading to the Pearl River had produced merchants capable of satisfying their requirements. Such a one was Loo Aqui (also referred to as Lu Agui, Loo King and Sz-man-king), who had worked his way up through the hierarchy of pirates to make a fortune prO\�Eisioning the opium traders. This he invested in Hong Kong property, including a number of brothels and opium divans, a gambling hall, and Aqui's Theatre, where the first amateur production in the colony was staged in December 1845. Tam Achoy (Tan Acai or Tam A-tsoi) had been a foreman in the Singapore dockyards before setting up as a contractor and property speculator in Hong Kong. Together Loo and Tam founded, in 1847, the Man-Mo temple in Hollywood Road, dedicated to the Gods of Literature and War, which soon became a recognized centre among the immigrant Chinese. As leaders such as Loo and Tam were accepted by the Chinese community, an alternative to the incomprehensible forms of British administration emerged: the temple became a court of arbi-tration and communal deliberation, a substitute for the clan and gentry organization left behind in their native villages.22
The original inhabitants of Hong Kong, soon very ,nuch in the minority, were at a disadvantage by comparison with the newcomers, who brought to the colony the experience of generations of catering for barbarian tastes, and quickly became the most prominent among the Chinese community, acting as building contractors, shopkeepers and domestic servants, as well as supplying the essential manual labour. Some contemporary Hong Kong people can trace their ancestry before 1842, but those who were there when the British came were largely submerged among the newcomers, and probably continued with their original occupations as fishermen and gardeners.
Most of the newcomers were single men, recruited by labour con-tractors, who had no intention of settling in Hong Kong. The contrac-tors themselves were men of substance, capable of executing 'extensive works ... as well as they could be in England'.23 While the majority of their men were peaceable, anxiously avoiding contact with the
A BARREN ISLAND
foreigners, others -Triad organizers and pirates looking for new opportunities -who rapidly attracted the unfavourable attention of the British authorities, also flocked to the island. Less noticeably, a new class of English-speaking Chinese who had to some degree rejected their traditions and accepted Western values was emerging.
The most famous of these spent only a few years in Hong Kong, between 1842 and 1847. Yung Wing (Rong Hong or Yung Hong) had been a pupil at the Morrison Education Society's School in Macao before it moved to Hong Kong in 1842. Funded by local businessmen under the patronage of Lancelot Dent, the school did not long survive the departure of its headmaster, the Revd. Samuel Brown, a Yale man, in 1847. Brown took Yung back to America with him, where in due course he became the first Chinese to graduate from an American university. Returning to China, Yung was recruited by Tseng Kuo-fan (Zeng Guofan) to develop the Ch'ing government's armaments indus-try. The careers of the two men span the transition between scholar-gentry and modem methods, between the eighteenth and the twentieth centuries. Tseng was a respected Confucian scholar and senior official, who was to raise, train and equip armies to suppress the Taiping rebellion which devastated southern China in the 1850s, selecting and organizing his men on the best traditional lines. Yung married an American woman, sent his children to Yale, and was as much at home in English as in Chinese. He bought and equipped the new arsenals with the latest European and American machine tools, negotiating on equal terms with international companies.24
Others who were educated in Hong Kong remained in the colony and joined forces with the colonial authorities. This was a gradual process, and it took another generation before Hong Kong Chinese were equipped to participate in the complex game of colonial politics. Perhaps the most famous such family was that of the Revd. Ho Fuk Tong, the son of a Singapore government worker, whose own son became the redoubtable Sir Ch'i Ho-Ch'i;25 Ho Fuk's son-in-law, Ng Choy, was the first Chinese called to the British bar. Both Ho-Ch'i and Ng Choy became members of the Legislative Council in the 1880s. Only at that time, forty years on, was there any representation of Chinese opinion in government, and even then on most issues promi-nent Chinese tended to agree with the European businessmen.
Similarly developing in the early years of the colony was the power of the compradores, Chinese members of the European Hongs, who acted as a link between their principals and the Chinese business
A HISTORY OF HONG KONG
community, and as guides through the complex network of relation-ships within that community. Introducing European business practices and technical skills into China, the compradores' influence took, like that of their political brothers, a generation to come to maturity. Nor, for some time, was there any mechanism for the transmission of more traditional Chinese views. Until self-generated instit�gtions, originating in the temples and trade associations, began to act as a conduit for these, the earliest 'respectable' Chinese in Hong Kong had little alternative but to accept the colonial structure, and attempt to foster their own prosperity, keeping a prudent distance from both the authori-ties and the more raffish elements of society.
6
THE DAVIS RAID
A negro streaked with leprosy
The Chinese expedition safely out of the way, and a satisfactory treaty ratified, Sir Robert Peel's government had better things to do than worry about Hong Kong. Sir Charles Napier was taking another huge slice of India in the Sind campaign, France was being pugnacious in Tahiti, income taxes were causing trouble, repeal of the Corn Laws was being tackled, and the Irish were agitating for the restoration of their own parliament. When Whitehall finally got around to seeking a replacement for Pottinger, which they did much later than Sir Henry would have liked, they not unnaturally looked more for an experienced and peaceable administrator, and one who knew something of trade, than a forceful and belligerent personality. Being Tories, they shied away from consulting those private merchants who had clearly identi-fied themselves with the Whigs.
The choice of John Davis, veteran of the Amherst mission, sometime President of the Select Committee and, for a short time, Chief Super-intendent of Trade in succession to Lord Napier, was regarded as a party political appointment and a direct affront by a Tory government to the private merchants. They expected the worst from the return of Davis, a man 'altogether identified with the ideas of mingled senility, autocracy and monopoly as exemplified in the history of that Company', and were not disappointed. 'Governor Davis is, we must report, a delusion. He has neither dignity, nor temper ... he cannot get rid of his old John Company notions ... the sooner he is recalled the better for our prospects in China,' wrote the Friend of China: Alexander
A HISTORY OF HONG KONG
Matheson was slightly less damning: he found Davis 'very frank and affable, but his mind is most contracted'. Still, he felt the merchants would 'be able to. bully him into adopting their views'.2
Nor was Pottinger pleased at having been kept cooling his heels for the better part of a year in awaiting his replacement. 'Sir Henry Pot-tinger is much annoyed at being kept here against his will, that he has ceased to take any interest in Hong Kong,' Alexander Matheson wrote.3 When eventually he was relieved in May 1845, ten months after he had resigned, Sir Henry was not promoted to the governorship of Madras, as Palmerston had promised him, but shunted off to South Africa, as Governor of Cape Colony, to wait for the return of the Whigs before being given his reward. Furthermore, he was not awarded a peerage, even an Irish one, as might have been thought his due after negotiating the Treaty of Nanking, an event which even Peel thought. ought to be the occasion for 'fireworks and Feux de joie'. On the contrary, when, in 1843, it was suggested that a vote of the House of Commons be given thanking Sir Henry Pottinger for his services Peel coldly rejected it, a refusal which the Illustrated London News of 7 April1845 called 'one of the most singular ever broached'. Before Pottinger died, in Malta in 1856, he was visited by Lord Granville, the Leader of the House of Lords, who reported that he had 'just seen Sir H. Pottinger, living in retirement and bearing, in addition to a load of infirmities, the most painful burden of soreness and mortification at the neglect of his services'.4
Sir John Davis arrived in Hong Kong in May 1844, armed with what Lord Aberdeen described as 'a degree of authority more compre-hensive in extent and unusual in character than is ordinarily imparted to any servant of the Crown'.5 He had not only a new colony to govern, but as Superintendent of Trade he was required to visit each of the new treaty ports annually, and as Plenipotentiary to conduct negoti-ations with other powers. It was now accepted that discussions with China would not be through Peking, but via Canton, where Pottinger's old friend Ch'i-ying was established as both Governor-General and Imperial Commissioner. For the next twelve years Ch'i-ing and his successors acted virtually as Foreign Secretaries in negotiations with Western powers, reporting as required to the Emperor. The main item remaining on the Anglo-Chinese agenda was access to the city of Canton, which the British believed to be provided for in the Treaty of Nanking. The Chinese did not agree, and the subject was to be productive of much dissension.
THE DAVIS RAID 1 57
The new Governor was accompanied by . suite of colonial officials, intended to provide both an appropriate government for the colony and the means of administering the treaty port foreigners. It was an ill-assorted and poorly qualified team. Frederick Bruce, the younger brother of that Lord Elgin who was to take over as Plenipotentiarythirteen years later, came as Chief Secretary, the second-in-command of the colony. He was soon promoted away, but William Mercer, Davis's twenty-two-year-old nephew, a 'gentlemanly scholarly man', very much like Davis himself, remained for twenty-three years and became an essential prop of successive administrations. For a total period of three years Mercer was left in charge of the colony in the intervals between Governors, and did nothing worse than write some bad verse, as this, to a Chinese skull:
0 Chow, or Wong, or by whatever names
Men called thee, or the Gods do call thee now ...s
Charles Cleverly, who became Surveyor General and designedGovernment House, was another newcomer who stayed for more than twenty years, but the other new arrivals proved less satisfactory. A.E. Shelley, the Auditor General, was unfortunate in his business specu-lations and was accused of fraud. Five barristers had refused the post of Chief Justice before it was accepted by John Walter Hulme, who had the reputation of being reliable on law, but was without judicial experience. From the start it was apparent that his relations with the Governor were likely to be difficult -they quarrelled on the boat coming out -but it took three years for them to rupture completely.
The Colonial Treasurer, Robert Montgomery Martin, reacted more quickly, deciding within weeks of his arrival that Hong Kong was impossible, and should be abandoned. Martin's claim to a colonial appointment was based on no qualification or administrative experience (he had apparently taken a year or two of medical studies), but he had written a number of very long books, starting in 1840 with the History of the British Colonies, in five volumes. He was able to assert, in 1840, that he had 'printed and published fifty thousand volumes on India and the Colonies', which included such diverse topics as an 'Analysis of the Bible', a 'History of the Antiquities of Eastern India', and 'Ire-land as it was, is, and ought to be'. Perhaps predictably, once arrived in Hong Kong, he neglected his immediate responsibilities and settled
A HISTORY OF HONG KONG
down to justify in prolix and passionate prose his condemnation of the colony:
... the straggling town of Victoria, which stretches along the water's edge for nearly four miles, although only comprising about sixty European Houses, and several Chinese huts and bazaars ...cthe rugged, broken, and abrupt precipices, and deep rocky ravines, will ever effectually prevent the formation at Victoria of any con-centrated town adapted for mutual protection, cleanliness, and comfort ...
Nothing could be said for the landscape either:
... the hills assume somewhat of a greenish hue, like a decayed Stilton cheese ... [the mainland hills] presenting the appearance of a negro streaked with leprosy ... the granite is rotten and passing, like dead animal and vegetable substances, into a putrescent state ...
The effects of the sun were unparalleled:
Even at Macao, only forty miles west ... Europeans may walk about the whole day in the month ofJuly, when to do so at Hong Kong would be attended with almost certain death.
Nor was there any prospect of matters improving: