350
THE PROGRESS OF THE WAR.
(Daily Press, 3rd May.) REUTER Some days ago informed us that, before leaving 8. Petersburg, General KUROPATKIN had stated that there were then 300,000 troops at the seat of war in Manchuria, which he considered enough for the conduct of the war, and he did not propose to demand any more. It is, of course, quite possible that REUTER may have misinter- preted what General KUROPATKIN really said, or intended to say; doubtless 300,000 effective men in the field would be able, under effective generalship, to resist any ad. vance of the Japanese, and secure the posses- sion of Manchuria, but there are several ifs which require to be taken into considera- tion. The first of these is as to the number of effective troops available. Judging by what we have already seen of Russian move ments the indications are decidedly that the Rus-ians are being hampered by an insuffi- ciency of men, else it is not easy to see why they should have abandoned the whole of North-western Corea, and apparently fallen back so far without venturing a battle. With a strong army at his disposal it is again not easy to conceive why an active general should not have occupied in force the north-eastern province of Ham- kiong, and threatened thus any advance of the Japanese from Geusan. What the Japanese plan of operations in their land campaign is likely to be is still a mystery,
flushed with
THE HONGKONG WEEKLY PRESS AND
[May 7, 1904. this would seem to be approximately correct. Russian fleet as to set the Japanese fleet There is another entirely independent free for operations elsewhere, can hardly be way of calculating the strength of the otherwise interpreted than as implying an Russian forces by taking into consideration intention to land a strong force from the Sea the capacity of the railway. There is a of Japan; as this has professedly been de concurrence here of opinion amongst laved pending the break-up of the ice at engineering experts. The greater portion | Vladivostock, evidently the objective is to of the line is over the vast Siberian plains be sought there or thereabouts. The various and this has minimised the difficulties and attacks at Port Arthur have indicated, if cost of construction. The whole line cost any proof were necessary, that fortifications £78,000,000 sterling, or at the rate of about cannot he attacked with any hope of sucees; £7,500 per mile, which may be looked upon by a fleet, so that plainly no such attack is - ns moderate for such a line, which had for meditated on the defences of Vladivostock ; the most part to be constructed with the harbour of Vladivostock is 'curiously unskilled labour, and where all the materials exposed to bombardment, so that it is likely had to be carried from Europe. As a con- enough that it is to be treated similarly to sequence the rails and rolling-stock are Port Arthur. Work of this nature cannot light, and the ballasting indifferent. The seriously advantage an attacking force, and line is, moreover, indifferently supplied with on the celerity and promptness of Japan's passing-places, and this greatly hampers its first operations on shore must depend her capacity. A capable expert well acquainted eventual success in the war with her big with the conditions of the line placed its antagonist. Now, as pointed out, Possiet capacity, taking into consideration the neces- Bay is well within striking distance from sary stores and ammunition to be carried, Japan, and with a fleet at an average of a thousand troops per day. success, and under an able admiral, He, however, added significantly, that as such as Admiral Tooo has proved him. the greater part of the stores and provisions self, ready to attack simultaneously required by the troops would need to be the Russian fleet at the moment locked transported by the railway, its capacity up in Vladivostock, there is nothing for carrying the troops would be con- in view to prevent an able' general from tinually reduced, 23 inore and more landing a force in Possiet Bay; the more so were landed at the end of the journey, as an admirable beach affords every natural so that in a comparatively short period facility for landing. The unknown factor the transport of troops would automatically in the affair is, of course, the personal one, cease. Now the Russian estimates of the but allowing that the capacity for active well have their counsels been kept, capacity of the line at no time exceeded operations of the Japanese generals is equal further than that the line of railway between forty-five thousand per month; and this on to that of their admirals there is a fair hope Newchwang and Harbin is evidently the the supposition that the line was in good of success; though the operation may be a first objective; but it is still an open ques- order. The line has, however, undoubtedly critical one, and will certainly need all the tion whether the attack is to be made from not been in good order; moreover, there pluck and readiness in danger which has the Gulf of Corea or from the head of the exists between Irkutsk and Selenginsk a hitherto distinguished the Japanese arms. Liaotung Bay. This uncertainty, of course, breach some two or three hundred miles Simultaneously with this, if indeed the compels the Russian forces about Liaoyang long which has to be traversed across a force have not already started, we may to bave two fronts, one directed towards mountainous tract over which everything expect a third advance from Gensan, Newchwang, the other towards Fenghwang- has to be carried on horse-back or on foot. towards which some steps seem to have cheng. There are many reasons why the From various sources of information we been already taken, which may account for Japanese should select the east coast of the gather that the serviceable troops at com. the recent reconnaissance of the Russians Liaotung Peninsula as a place of landing, maud in Manchuria in January did not towards Syongchin-what the objective of and this brings us to the consideration of much, if at all, exceed 70,000, and if we such an advance may be we are, of course, the very evident advantage which the Japa. | allow that 100,000 have since found their unable to say; it may be intended to act nese possess in the outline of the Corean way there, which considering that the in- in support of the Japanese advance across coast. The distances from Sasebo or Shi.terval, owing to the breaking-up of the ice the Yalu. For ourselves we are more dis- monoseki to Takushan or Gensan, or from
posed to judge that it is really intended to Tsuruga or Hakodate to Gensan or Possiet
cross the Changpei Shan, where the passes Bay are practically equal, in all cases about
are lowest, and advance along the upper five hundred miles, or say two days' steaming,
valley of the Sungari with Kirin as its so that they are in a position to keep the
objective. A force thus advancing would enemy in the dark till the last moment as
be able as soon as it got into practicable to their actual intention. Though of second-hardly place at less than 9,000, so that country to support an advance from either ary consideration, as an alternative line
Fenghwangcheng towards Moukden, or from Khabarofsk already exists, the railway
from Possiet Bay towards Ninguta, whilst from Harbin to Vladivostock also affords
menacing at its weakest point the line of vulnerable point, and the possibility of an
railway between Harbin and Vladivostock. attack on this, eithe from Gensan or from Possiet Bay, has to be taken into considera tion. The Japanese have thus every object in prolouging the present state of uncer- tainty as to the eventual landing-place, while judging from recent experience the Russian intelligence department is still unable to cope with that of their wily antagonists.
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Taking into consideration, however, all the difficulties that stand in the way of con- centration we do not think that the Russian Commander-in-Chief has given any indica- tion of an available force at all approaching 300,000 men; allowing for some 80,000 between Harbin and Liaoyang, exclusive of those engaged in guarding the line, which on account of the folly of the Russians in alienating the Chinese population, requires in itself a considerable force, and leaving 50,000 for garrisoning l'ort Arthur, Vladi vostock, and the other defensive posts, we arrive at some 160,000 men, and judging from the indications given from all quarters
|
in Siberia, is the most difficult period of the year for travelling, we shall arrive at a total of 170,000 men.
From this we must make a deduction for the necessary wear and ter from deaths and invaliding, which in view of the unusually severe winter we
can
practically we arrive at the same figures as before of 160,000 available troops. From this, as before stated, we must deduct some 80,000 as required for aecessary garrisons, preserving the railway track, and over- awing the unruly population of Manchuria, so that seemingly but some 80,000 are available for actual warfare. If we even increase this number by a
the advantage still would seem to rest with the Japanese, who will probably be able to place in the field not far short of 200,000
men.
third
This of course assuming that the Japanese land forces will be handled with the same vigour and ability as bas marked the conduct of the fleet. Now, as we pointed out on the 4th March, the Japanese have three possible lines of attack open, and of these they have as yet owing to the lateness of the season been able to indicate but one, and that is by way of the mouth of the Yalu, and against this the Russian generals have taken measures, by couceu- trating a large force, estimated as from thirty to forty thousand troops, in or about Liaoyang. The naval operations about Port Arthur undertaken with the plain object of so reducing the power of the
Altogether there is a strong indication that the curtain is about to rise on some decisive event, and that the Japanese, nt least, are prepared to take advantage of the first return of warm weather to commence the campaign in downright earnest, and force conclusions one way or the other.
(Daily Prese, 4th May.) Though the decisive action which we wrote of in yesterday's leading article as likely tɔ be witnessed when the Japanese take ad- vantage of the return of warm weather to commence the land campaign in real e irnest is still to come, there can be no doubt that the series of operations describal in General KUROKr's despatches is of the greatest importance. It is true that it has from the first heen said that the Russian plan of campaign is to fall back and draw the
apanese on into Manchuria. Nevertheless, although they offered little resistance in Corea to the Japanese advance from Seoul to Wiju, on the northern bank of the Yalu the Russians
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