}
April 18, 1904.]
14 Was
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CHINA OVERLAND TRADE REPORT. Admiral ALEXIEFF's revision we do not know; but we may imagine from the previ- ous course of negotiations how far it was likely to meet Japan's wishes. The Corres- pondence closes with Mr. KURINO's telegram of the 6th February, announcing that he bad presented the Japanese Notes to Count LAMSDORFF and was withdrawing from S. Petersburg on the 10th of the month.
Such is the Japanese case; the futt Russian case we need not expect ever to hear.
а
291
JAPAN'S OBJECT IN THE WAR. Deputies to an Italian journalist in Tokyo
(Daly Press 9th April.)
Tokyo. This rejected Japan's amendments, and stated that Russia was prepared to in- clude in the agreement an article of the following tenor:-" Recognition by Japan of Manchuria and her littoral as being out- side her sphere of interests, while Russia, within the limits of that province, will not impede Japan nor other Powers in the enjoyment of rights and privileges acquired by them under existing treaties with China, exclusive of the ostablishment of settle. ments." In a week's time Japan answered by proposing such modifications as to restate almost her original demands, bringing back in particular the integrity of China in Manchuria." On the 23rd January Mr. It is perhaps unprofitable, when only two KORINO was instructed to sound Count months are gone of a war which is con- LAMBDORFF OD the probable nature of fidently expected by many expert observers Russia's reply, and this he did next day, to last a long time (at least two years when the Count
not inclined to according to some), to speculate what will enter into details,"
expected to lay his happen in the event of the victory of one.of views before the Emperor on the 26th," the combatants. Nevertheless the consider- and hoped to be able to send an answer ation of the matter is not a little interesting. before long." On the 26th Baron KOMORA Not much guess-work has been devoted at telegraphed protesting against a further pro present to a forecast of what would follow longation of the present state of things aspon a Russian victory. This does not calculated to accentuate the gravity of the situation. Count LAMSDORFF then told Mr. KURINO that Admiral ALEXIEFF'S opinion would soon be received by tele- graph; and meanwhile he complained that, according to reports from official sources, Japan had sent a considerable number of troops, munitions, and war materials to Corea, an action which had caused a very bad impression." Baron KOMURA im- mediately telegraphed to his Minister at S. Petersburg, denying the allegation and asking whether the report of Russian con- centration on the Corean frontier was true. The same day (the 28th January) Count LAMSDORFF said that he did not believe the report in question was true, and remarked that "such newspaper reports are very regrettable." Japan's patience was DOW nearly at an end. On the 30th January Baron KOMURA instructed Mr. KURINO to state that the Japanese Government "wish- ed to know whether they would be honoured with the reply" [of Russia] "at the date mentioned by Count LAMSDORFF, namely, next Tuesday" [the 2nd February], or if it were not possible, what would be the exact date on which the reply would be given." Count LAMSDORFF WAS desirous to send an answer as quickly as possible; but the question was a very serious one and was not to be lightly dealt with." It was not possible to him to give the exact date, as it. entirely depended upon the decision of the Emperor." Japan waited four days, and then, on the 5th February last, sent through Mr. KURINO her memorable Note, in which she stated ber intention of seriously con- sidering what measures of self-defence she was called upon to take. "The Imperial Government," stated the Note, "have no other alternative than to terminate the present futile negotiations." A study of the Correspondence will certainly not lead the reader to condemn Japan's use of the word "futile." in the a.ternoon of the same day Baron KOMURA instructed Mr. KURINO to announce his withdrawal from S. Petersburg, while at 5.15 p.m. the Japa- nese Foreign Minister received a telegram from S. Petersburg, in which Mr. KURINO stated that he had been told by Count LAMSDORFF the previous night that the substance of the Russian answer had just been sent to Admiral ALEXIEFF to be trans- mitted to Baron ROSEN, that Admiral ALEXIEFT might happen (!) to introduce some changes so as to meet local circum- stances, but in all probability there would be no such changes. What was the sub- stance of Russia's answer before or after
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arise, we imagine, from the fact that no one considers such an occurrence impossible, for that it cannot well be said to be. Rather the speculators shrink from the contempla tion of the events consequent upon Russia gaining her ends in Manchuria and Corea. For any of the nations interested in the maintenance of the "Open Door" and the integrity of China, a Russia win in the present contest would mean either the extinction of their hopes or determined intervention to stay Russia's bands. At such a prospect anyone belonging to these natious must be aghast, for which reason he is loth to dwell upon it. A Japanese victory, ou the other hand, is not held to be fraught with disastrous circumstances to the other Powers interested in North China, and, guesses at the future, should such be the result of the war, are con- sequently more pleasing to those who care to make them. There are not wanting those who prophesy that the supremacy of Japan in Corea at least will mean the grafual driving out of Western commerce, though they cannot deny that in Manchuria at least Japan's success means the foreign mer- chants' gain. But there is an ultra-alarmist school, flourishing chiefly in Germany, less in France, but also to be traced in Britain and the United States, for which the cry of the " Yellow Peril" is still a terror. In some places perhaps Russian intrigue and Russian gold has something to do with the spread of the cry, but there must also be those who are sincerely terrified at it. such speculations, however, look far ahead. It is more interesting to see, if possible, what Japanese opinion itself has to say on the subject; and by Japanese opinion we mean, of course, uninspired opinion, for the Japanese Government naturally has nothing to say on the subject beyond that it is fighting for the maintenance of the inde- pendene and integrity of China and Corea.
All
condemned by the Heimin Shimbun) was loudly applauded at a meeting of his party when he declared that Japan, if victorious, should take possession of the Manchurian divisions bordering on the Amur River, and also the Liaotung Peninsula. If such a statement is admissible, the Socialist paper declared, war is nothing but robbery and statesmen are robbers. These two views are extremes. We find a more moderate forecast in some remarks of "a leading member" of the Japanese Chamber of
last month. The Japanese Deputy professed to be giving an outline of the terms of peace which he knew positively would be insisted upon by Japan, should she be successful. The principal points were as follows: In the first place, Russia must renounce all exceptional claims in Manchuria, which shall be administered for a period to be determined upon by China under the advice of representatives of Japan, Great Britain, and the United States. Secondly, during,^ this provisional period Japan will occupy the province, which will be opened up com- pletely to international commerce. Russia shall cede to Japan the island of Sakhalin ; Port Arthur, and the other ports of the Liaotung península being returned to China. Lastly, in consideration of the foregoing stipulation being accepted, Japan would be willing to reimburse Russia the full extent of her outlay in constructing the Chino- Manchurian Railway. It is impossible, of course, on the strength of this conversation of a "leading member" of the Chamber of Deputies with a foreign journalist to base any definite theories as to Japan's intended policy; but there is nothing inherently Improbable in the outline given, ex- cept for the reimbursement by Japan to Russia of her outlay on the Manchurian Railway. How could Japan do this after an exceedingly expensive, even if successful, war? As for the cession of Sakhalin, this. island was forcibly torn by Russia from. Japan (in exchaage for the worthless Kurile Islands), and it is only natural Japaa should claim it back again if she now defeats Russia. The suggestions with regard to Manchuria are not unreasonable; but other Powers too have concerns in the province, if small, beside the three mentioned, and might therefore be represented among China's advisers in the administration. The scheme, of course, is based on a complete victory for Japan, and as we have said, such specula- tions are more interesting than profitable
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for the moment.
PORT IMPROVEMENT IN CHINA.
(Daily Press 13th April.) Amongst the some important stipulations embodied in the Protocol of September, 1901, were understood to be those clauses which provided for the improvement of the navigation of the approaches to Chinese ports open to foreign trade. For many years the condition of these approaches had become a Even as to Japanese lay opinion indi- crying scandal, so serious in leed that not cations are scanty. We have already, only dil foreign interests suffer, but the published an article from the Japanese revenues of the Empire were injuriously Socialist journal, the Heimin Shimbun, affected. The school of statesmen to which which gives what may be presumed to be the belonged the late LI HUNG-CHANG SAW, view obtaining among the Socialist party in indeed, in these barriers a providential in- Japan. This view, briefly, was that Japan terference to pre erve the isolation from should, if she is fighting a righteous war, look foreign influences of China. The majority for no recompense in the shape of land in of Chinese statesmen merely looked on with Manchuria or Siberia. Japan is advised calm indifference. China had got on very to recognise China's authority over all Man- well with these impediments during the churia and to induce the other Powers to take thousands of years covered by her history; the responsibility of guarding the province surely this was self-evident proof that change against Russian interference. On the other was now superfluous. Meanwhile all the hand, a prominent leader of the Japanese rest of the world was advancing; harbours Progressist party (whose views are strongly | elsewhere were being formed and enlarged,
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