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February 4, 1899.]
to explain that the power of making and negotiating treaties rests in the hands of the President and of the Senate, the upper house of our National Congress. The President through his duly appointed representatives can draw up the document and sign it, but it is always subject to the approval of the Senate. But even then the road to ratification is not smooth. A two-thirds majority is re quired to pass the treaty. At present there are 88 Senators, or two each for the 44 States. If then 30 only of these 88 vote against ratification the treaty is sent back to the President and must be revised on lines usually recommended by the Senate. 1 am hopeful of the result on Monday, when the final vote will be taken, nocording to Reuter, but there is danger of defeat with the opposition straining every nerve to secure the necessary 0 votes. You will re- member that when the proposed Arbitration Treaty between the United States and Great Britain failed of ratification a few years ago a large majority of the Senate was actually in its favour. Lest it might seem that it is a serious de fect in the American system of Government that treaties can so easily fail of ratification, I would add that on the other hand it is an effectual safegard against the hasty passing or rushing through of treaties that might eventually be most harmful or disgraceful or promoted by some party that at the moment was in control. If you should ask what will happen in the event the treaty is not ratified it could be answered that the negotiations, as just intimated, would be re-opened with Spain on lines which it was known would be approved by the necessary two- thirds majority. Although this situation first concerna America, as it deeply affects her future history and the policy of her Government, it is of grave importance to Great Britain, Germany, France, Russia, Japan, and other nations pos- sessing large commercial or political interests in the Pacific and Far East.
HONGKONG'S INTERESTS.
Right here in Hongkong you have every rea- son to be discussing what will be the outcome. First, as the leading commercial entrepot of the Far East, second, as the great outpost of the British empire beyond India, and, third, as the principal port of communication with the Phi- lippines and as their nearest important neigh- bour with only 600 miles and two days' steaming intervening, and doing a busines with Manila that is counted in the millions of dollars, Hong- kong assuredly can claim that she is vitally con- cerned. What, moreover, with the Philippines controlling the main route to the north after the passing of the Straits of Malacca, with their extended position along the east side of the South China Sea for over 700 miles from Borneo north and directly opposite the French possessions of Indo-China, with their location athwart, as it were, the direct routes to Australia from China, and with their general situation in easy steaming radius of all important points from Yokohama to Batavia- what, I say, with this remarkable position of Manila on the map of Asia, Hongkong as an integral part of the British empire has interests st stake second only to those of the United States. Were it not that possibly the whole future foreign policy of the United States de- pends on her solution of the Philippine question I should say that the interests of Great Britain in the disposal or government of the islands was greater than that of all other nations combined. If in addition to the strategic position of the Philippines in relation to the different parts of the British empire it is remembered that the major portion of the foreign trade of Manila, Iloilo, Cebu, and other lesser ports of the islands is owned and controlled by British firms, the meaning of what I say may be more readily appreciated. To fasten this thought in your mind let me call your passing attention to the fact that the twe leading English houses in Manils during the sixteen months from January, 1897, to April, 1898, paid more in Customs duties than the fourteen Swiss, and German houses combined. To be more specific, nine German Arms paid duties amounting approximately to $547.000, five Swiss $736,000, d mine British $3,365,000, while one British firm paid $752,000, or greater than the nine German firms combined. These figures are not given for the purpose of belittling German and Swiss interesta, but simply sa
THE STRATEGICAL and COMMERCIAL POSITION OF MANILA,
93
CHINA OVERLAND TRADE REPORT.
statement of fact. In the same connection I there might be mentioned the general enlarge- am compelled to admit that the business ofment of the American navy with the important American houses out little or no figure, specific increase of the Asiatic Squadron, which The future returus we hope will show has its obvious influence, the possible presence that they have successfully entered the field. in Asiatic lands of a strong American land Along with the figures -just quoted, if you bear force, and the consequent readiness of the United in mind that in a total foreign trade of over States to act in any great emergency that may $60,000,000 two-thirds of it, or $40,000,000, are arise in the future evolution of Asiatic politics. owned by British houses, you will see that you Not to be forgotten, however, are the many cannot afford to forget that in the present crisis signs of interest which Germany hus and is it is not only the United States which must manifesting in the disposition of the Philip- have care for the future. By owning the trade pines which, following on her enterprising step I do not necessarily mean that the imports and at Kiaochau, has its significance and shows a exports are directly to and fro Great Britain, natural desire on her part to participate but simply that they are handled and controlled in the development of the Far East. Japan by British houses.
also looks on with anxious gaze and deems herself affected by the results of the war, for it is almost hailing distance from southern home to you with sufficient strength the sible that in the Philippines may grow up a But lest even yet I may not have brought Formosa to northern Luzon. And is it not pos- concern which Great Britain as a nation nation in the south that will rival Japan in the and Hongkong as part of that nation must north? To realize the meaning of America's have in the disposition of the Philippines, and gigantic step let us look back twelve months. realising that in addressing an audience largely Had you then asked the average American British I must remember that you are chiefly whether his country bad interests in the Pacific interested in considering how your country and beyond his own Pacific coast, the Klondike, your commerce are affected by the late war, I
and Honolulu, he would have shown ignorance; must emphasise the geographical situation of
had the American people been asked to take Manila in its relation to the chief points of the the Philippines as a gift free of all mortgages, Far East and both the Northern and Southern Spanish, native, or, if we go into history, British, Pacific in comparison with Hongkong. Manila 95 per cent. would have voted nay had you is 150 miles nearer Singapore, and hence all asked the ordinary member of Congress to vote points beyond in Barmah, India, and Europe;
for Hawaiian annexation, the c Construction of 200 miles nearer Bangkok and points in the the Nicaraguan Canal, the subsidizing of a Gulf of Siam; 500 miles nearer Java; 630 miles cable line, the support of a firm policy for the nearear Australia; 250 miles nearer Honolulu and protection of trade in China, he would have the United States; equi-distant to Yokohama; quibbled over technicalities or trivialities; had nearly the same to Vladivostock, and not you told a true story of the possibilities of much farther to Shanghai, Kiaochau, Port American trade in the Pacific and Far East, Arthur, Chefoo, and other northern ports. especially China, and exhorted the manufac In other words, within a circle drawn in a
turers, exporters, and all concerned to an active radius of 1,800 miles with the centre half-exploitation of the field, you would have been way between Hongkong and Manila there listened to by a very few, laughed at by many, would be more important commercial points and doubted by the majority. Now all nearer Manila than Hongkong. Now all this ohanged. Every newspaper and every magaz does not prove that Manila has any great ad in the land contains articles on the Far East. vantages over Hongkong, or that she will ever and the Philippines; there the school children furpass her in commercial and political value, are studying the map of the Far East as if it tor there are numerous other considerations outlined their own state; manufacturers and ex- that go to determine the importance of locali-porters are seeking all the information obtain. sy, but it does prove that she occupies an undeniably strong place for both trade and strategic purposes; that under the progres- sive administration of the United States, or some other enterprising Power, or of native autonomy or independence she has a brilliant opportunity which cannot be hidden, and that she may yet prove a worthy rival of Singapore, Hongkong, Shanghai, and Yoko- hama in the vast commercial exchange of the Far East. It is only since the war enlightened the world in regard to the location and resources of the Philippines that it has appreciated their splendid position, value, and bearing on the commercial and political balance of power in the Pacific.
THE UNITED STATES AND THE TRADE
AND POLITICS OF THE PACIFIC.
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Literally translated my subject might be made to read, The situation in the Far East as affected by the American occupation of the Philippines," for whether such ocon- pation is permanent on temporary it will have accomplished two great results that have a vital bearing in the Far East first, America's full appreciation of and active interest in the politics and commerce of the East; secoud the opening up of the Philip pines and the development of their resources. These are certainly results worthy of careful consideration and which either directly or indirectly affect nearly every portion of the Orient. As corollaries to the main proposition we have first the annexation of the Hawaiian Islands, already accomplished through the influence of war conditions; second, the determination of the United States to construct without further delay the Nicaragua Canal; third, the movement to lay a cable across the Pacific from the United States to the Philip pines, Japan, and Crina; fourth, the putting on the trans-Pacific route new lines of passenger and freight steamers and the extension of old lines; and fifth, but not the least, a great awakening of interest not only throughout the United States but throughout the best part of the world in the trade and politics of the Pacific. Still more
able, and our consular representatives, in- cluding the able energetic Consal-General at this port, are flooded with enquiries
of
all kinds; Congressmen without hesitation an- nex Hawaii, rote millions for the navy, cable, and canal, and even the President recommends
the maintenance of the "open door" and suggests sending a special commission to China to investigate commercial conditions aud pos- sibilities; while we find a large majority of the Senate. if not quite the two-thirds, ready to ratify a treaty that comprehends occupation of the Philippines. After thisawakening, this apprecia tion of what the Far East affords, there can be no retreat from a greater participation in its trade and politics, whether the United States shall hold the Philippines entirely or in part. The powerful interests of awakened commerce will insist on a forward movement and the following of such a policy as will best subserve American interests in the vast field concerned.
AMERICA'S POLICY IN CHINA. This, as I outlined before, is perhaps the chief result of the late war, and leads up to a statement of what should be the specific policy of the United States towards China, where lies Am- erica's greatest interest and where she has and always will have more at stake in the great matter of markets for her exports than she has now or ever can have in the Philippines under any conditions. Enumerated under special heads that policy should include, first, uniting with the other Powers or those chiefly concerned with a friendly spirit towards China and the promotion of her own good as well as that of foreign nations, in compelling her to institute reforms in her Government, including, second, capable direction or control of her finances and reorganisation and improvement of her army and essential forces of order; third, maintaining freedom of trade with equal rights to all nations and special favours to none in all the territory comprehended in the treaties; fourth, support- ing the integrity of the Empire and opposing the alienation of large areas of such dominion: and fifth, in the event of unavoidable dell mitation of spheres of influence, such tation as will not close the growing markets
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