The-Hong-Kong-Weekly-Press-1897-10-21 — Page 6

306

Thos. Hy. James, S.Q.M. Segt. Eliza James

C. J. Demée, Mail

Officer

were

At the Hongkong Hotel on Monday evening Captain Barcham, of the P. and Q. steamer Kaisar-i-Hind, three of the deck officers, the chief engineer, and the surgeon were enter- tained to dinner by the first-class saloon passengers, twelve of the latter being present. After dinner, which was splendidly served, the usual loyal and patriotic toasts honoured. Mr. C. Wrenn then proposed the health of Captain Barcham and the officers of the Kaisar-i-Hind and spoke warmly of the excellent seamanship displayed during the storm the vessel passed through on her way up from Singapore and the kindness exhibited by the captain and officers to the passengers. The toast was drunk with musical honours. and Captain Barcham having replied proposed the health of the passengers. Absent friends" was the last toast on the list and the company separated with the singing of Auld Lang Syne."

++

HONGKONG SANITARY BOARD.

A meeting of the Sanitary Board was held on the 14th October at the offices. Dr. Atkin- son (Principal Civil Medical Officer) presided, and there were also present-Hon. F. H. May (Captain Superintendent of Police), Hon. W. Chatham (Acting Director of Public Works). Dr. Clark (Medical Officer of Health), Mr. N. J. Ede, and Mr. H. McCallum (Secretary).

MINUTES.

The minutes of the previous meeting were read and confirmed.

PLAGUE IN BOMBAY.

From 31st August to the 14th September there were 84 cases of plague in the city of Bombay and 61 deaths.

VETERINARY OFFICER'S REPORT. The Secretary laid upon the table a report by Inspector William Fisher, the officer per forming the duties of Colonial Veterinary Surgeon, for the quarter ended 30th September last. During that period no cases of infectious or contagious disease had been brought to his notice. The animals imported were in fairly good condition and the supply was equal to the demand. The slaughter-houses and depôts were all in a good state of repair and in thoroughly good working order. The general routine business had been carried on without interruption. The markets were also in a good state of repair.

MORTALITY STATISTICS.

THE HONGKONG WEEKLY PRESS AND

This being conceded, disposes of the effective. I ness of an unassisted land patrol for giving notice of an approaching enemy.

[October 21, 1897.

that propose

patrol they should would in subdivisions consisting of two boats each, in order to support one another, and should be stationed somewhat as follows:-on the 15 mile limit, 8 boats; on the 7 mile limit, 8 boats; as many bases as possible, not less than two, would have to be provided by gunboats.

If snch an attack as I have assumed were contemplated by an enemy it would probably be made suddenly and without our having time for such preparation as I have alluded to above,

The subdivisions of the outside line of scouts and would be carried out by a squadron of the

would each patrol the area comprised in a circle enemy's fast cruisers bringing from some established base, not far distant, a body of having a radius of 5 miles, those of the inside line a circle of 24 miles radius; they should be troops to be angmented on arrival by the crews of the ships. This squadron would pass the the fastest boats obtainable, and their orders vicinity of Gap Rock say at 8 p.m.-thus their would be not to fight unless obliged, but on approach conld not be signalled even if inter-sighting the enemy to at once signal by rockets or other plan to the inside line, who, on getting national obligations did not preclude the tele- graph cable from being used for this purpose the information, would pass it on to the nearest seeing that the Gap Rock is Chinese (assumed land stations, all the boats falling back carry- neutral) territory. Within three hours the ing detailed information regarding the enemy squadron, if not observed, could be in a fav. and would be used perhaps later on in attack- ourable position for landing a force in one of ing the disembarkation, if the enemy still con- the bays on the South side of Hongkong, and, tinued.

The amount of notice that could be given by under cover of darkness, there would be a fair chance of their being able in say four hours this means it is difficult to determine. Asgtits more to land a sufficient force to occupying, however, that the enemy's ships were sight

at a distance from Hongkong of 15 miles, they positions from whence they could cover the

should be signalled through the scouts to the landling of the remainder.

land stations or batteries in half-an-hour, which, allowing for the enemy's approach at the rate of 10 miles an hour, would mean one hour's no- tice before the ships got to their destination. This I take to be a minimum, but it would be time enough to allow of preparation being made to receive them with an attack on the disembark- ing boats, or for preventing their establishing themselves in position for covering the dis- embarkation.

It will I think be admitted that war such as that on which the life of Hongkong may depend will break out suddenly, and it is even conceivable that war may be declared before we in Hongkong may be aware that it is im- minent, and if an attack on Hongkong such as I have imagined be determined on, the tele- graph cable inay be cut, and we may wake up one morning to find an enemy's squadron in the act of landing an invading force covered by troops already in position

I will now go back to my first postulate, viz.: that it is while they are still on the sea that the attacking force can be most effectively dealt with."

There are two ways in which this can be done :

1.-By the squadron being attacked by a squadron of our own ships.

2.-By the boats being attacked while disem. barking the invading force.

With the first of these it is not necessary for me to deal; the issue of such an attack can be awaited with confidence, but our Fleet may not be at hand, and then the second I think becomes important.

ATTACKING PLOTILLA,

With our exceptionally large resources in the shape of steam launches an armed flotilla could be organized capable of delivering a vigorous attack on the disembarking boats, which would probably be so crowded with men as to be For the week ended 2nd October the death powerless to offer more than a very feeble re- rate was 19.8, as against 21.8 for the correspond-sistance, while they could not be covered the by ing period of last year. The rate for the week ended 9th October was 17.8, the rate for the corresponding period of last year being 23.9.

ADJOURNMENT.

The Board adjourned until next Thursday.

HONGKONG DEFENCE.

WHAT CAN HONGKONG DO TOWARDS IT?

I will introduce my remarks on this subject with two postulates, which in my opinion might almost be considered as axioms, viz:

1-In the case of war. any attack on Hong- kong will almost surely come from sea- ward, and it is while they are still on the sea that the attacking force can be most effectively dealt with.

2. Whatever form our defence operations take, our main effort must have for its ob- ject the prevention of the enemy's landing. In preparation then of any possible war it would be advisable to provide at once some organ-

isation for resisting an attack from an invading

force on the South side of the island.

The probability of an invading force ap- proaching during daylight can, I think, be alto- gether dismissed, for, unless it was then made with such an overwhelming force as could not be prepared or dealt with without some know- -ledge of its preparation reaching us, thus en- abling us to make special preparation for meet- ing it such as I do not venture on in this paper, its chances of success would be too small, and the capture of Honkong would not be of such paramount importance as to tempt an enemy concentrate his forces and expend time and men on such a coup de main.

to

ships without being exposed to a fire not in- tended for them, and the necessity for utilizing every available boat of the squadron for dis- embarking purposes would not admit of their being escorted.

The question of who

of the personnel

this

a

somewhat open

would constitute is armed flotilla one; it would appear to be essentially a naval operation, but our naval force is limited, and it may be doubted if it would be undertaken entirely by the naval authorities for this reason, but the crews of the launches need not be large and an amalgamation of naval and military and possibly Volunteers for the purpose would not I think be impracticable.

My second postulate is that, "our main effort must have for its object the prevention of the enemy's landing." This is to some extent included in the first, which, however, does not entirely cover it.

SCOUTS.

Whatever means are adopted to prevent his landing. it is absolutely necessary that we should have the earliest notice of the enemy's approach, and this notice can only be given at night by an afloat patrol. For this purpose I consider that there would be required at least 16 steam launches-the fastest that we could get suitably manned and armed.

There are such a number of launches run- ning in this harbour that the supply would probably be equal to any demand that might be made on it; obtaining them would be merely a matter of expending so much money. -

Private firms or individuals having suitable launches might be invited to have them fitted at the Government expense for carrying the de- sired armament of machine or Q.F. guns (which would also have to be provided); the fittings could then be returned into store until required to be placed in the boats for drill or service. .

The conditions of invitation being that each launch will be available when called on for drill purposes (not oftener than once a month and 3 days' notice being previously given) the Gov- ernment to pay for the coal and stores nsed at each drill. Also that the launches will be at the disposal of the Government without reserve in case of threatened war, Government to pay all expenses, and in addition a sum per day to be fixed according to the tonnage, speed, and other qualifications of the respective launches.

The fighting crews of these boats would consist of a captain and 6 men, and possibly one or two spare in case of casualties; they would be armed with revolvers and cutlasses.

These 16 scout boats would thus require 112 fighting men, and from the nature of their duties, viz., constant vigilant watching every night, it would be necessary to have double crews working on alternate nights; this will make a total of 224 men required.

Service in these scout boats is, I think, eminently suited to a volunteer force, which, while it would be performing most important duty and contributing largely towards the successful defence of the colony, need not have imposed upon it those duties which must be considered the prerogative of the Regular Forces.

Ordinarily speaking the corps need not be numerically strong-50 would probably be sufficient as a nuclens. These would be trained with the object of rendering them capable of taking command of a scout boat, and in the use of their arms, signals, &c. On the emergency arising it is probable that a further supply of volunteers would be forthcoming who in a short time would acquire sufficient proficiency,

The conclusions come to are (1) that an afloat patrol is absolutely necessary in making provision against the landing of an invading force on the south side of Hongkong, which I believe would only be undertaken in the night time. (2) That the launches now in the harbour could furnish efficient vessels for this patrol as well as any further number that it might be use as an attacking considered desirable to flotilla. (3) That service in this patrol or is of the kind that would be well " scouts I'suited to a volunteer corps.

These, from the very first indication of war would be required every night to watch the various approaches to Hongkong in order to give timely notice by prearranged signal of the presence of an enemy's ships.

The distribution of these scouts would be matter for further consideration, but,

a