CHINA'S DEFEAT.
THE HONGKONG WEEKLY PRESS AND
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nor yet wholly incapable, but it must he confessed that he possessed none of the qualities that go to make a NELSON or BLAKE. Admiral Iro, on the other hand, has made for himself an enduring reputation. With a fleet inferior in tonnage and armament to that of the enemy he has succeeded in utterly destroying the naval power of China and in wiping out altogether her principal squadron. When it is remembered that this grand result has been achieved without the loss of a single vessel larger than a torpedo boat, and with a comparatively small loss of life, it must be conceded that the feat is extraordinary, more especially considering the immature age and condition of the Japanese navy.
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[February 28, 1893
peace comes, however, we believe, a little to late for the realization of its primary object. For the consummation of Japanese plans there is every reason to think the occupation of Peking will prove necessary. What they desire is that the Chinese may know that their Government has been vanquished by the wo-jen, aud compelled to accept the terms dictated by the rashly despised enemy. If the peace is to be last- ing the terms by which it is secured must | be heavy.
SECRET SOCIETIES AND THE WAR.
It was generally anticipated that sbould the present war go against China the oppor. tunity would be seized by the numerous secret societics in the country to attempt to over- throw the dynasty. The war has gode against China and thus far the secret societies have made no sign. The whole strength of the Empire is being taxed to withstand the advance of the invader and if the secret societies possess the power and the aims that have been ascribe to them it is difficult to interpret their quiescence at the present juncture. It cannot be sup posed that they think they will be able
(20th February.) The tale of Chinese disaster in Shantung is now tolerably complete, perhaps even -more so than iu Manchuria. The capture of Port Arthur was a great blow to China's naval power and when followed by the occupation of one city and fortified position in Shingking after another, proved most demoralising also to the landward defence, But there was at least something left in re- serve. The strong and well defended naval port of Weihaiwei remained, and the bulk of the Peiyang Squadron, if somewhat bat- tered, existed to fight again another day. Now "all is lost save honour," if such a thing ever existed in the Chinese army. While, however, the conduct of the naval The port of Weihaiwei, after a tougher de operations by Admiral Iro commands our fence than was attempted at Port Arthur, willing admiration it is impossible not to feel has fallen, most of the vessels of the Peiyang | some sympathy for those officers and men of Squadron have been destroyed, and the the Peiyang Squadron who fell at their posts tow remaining have been, presumably, seized bravely fighting to the last. That defence by the victorious Japanese. Of details of under the guns of the forts of Liukungtao the operations by land and water we have a was at best a forlorn hope; the Chinese good many, but they are decidedly conflict officers and seamen had little prospect of ing and some have been very Batly con- victory to animate them, Caught like rats tradicted. Admiral TING JU-CHANG was in a trap, they seem to have resolved to reported to have been killed in fight, and make a desperate stand, and fought with
with greater effect by waiting now he is said to have committed suicide the resolution of despair. Their fire apto act
more favourable! moment, for the apparently in company with the commandant pears, however, to have been more fierce for a of Weihaiwer. The Admiral was evidently than effective, and the Japanese loss, indications at present point in the direc determined not to survive the loss of his considering the protracted defence, has tion of the early conclusion of peace, and By this time doubtless when the Government has no longer a for- Squadron. He knew, probably, that there been slight. was a strong chance of his being vehemently | the whole of the Shantung Promontory eigu foe to deal with any attempt at re- denounced by the Censors as responsible for is in the hands of the Japanese, and bellion would be almost hopeless. It is true both that disaster and the fall of Weihaiwei, they are now making preparations for there is a strong party in Japan unfavourable and naturally he would prefer to put an end their next move in the deadly game. The to any cessation of the war until Peking has to his life by his own hands to being igno. way to Peking does not even yet lie open, been occupied, and it is possible their views miniously decapitated by the common and Shanhai-kwan will have to be taken be- may prevail, The occupation of Peking by CL cutioner.
fore the march on the capital commences. the Japanese would naturally give the anti- its best What will be the next step is still a dynastic movement in China matter of some speculation. The attack chance of success, but the leaders of the on Shantung was not undertaken in order movement must be absurdly sanguine men to open a way for the advance to Pe- if they are delaying action in expectation When the king. The army which is now in Shan of that event taking place. tung is not likely, we think, to undertake the Kolao-hui was making itself notorious three years ago and anti-foreign riots were overland march from Chefoo. The roads are badin Shantung, and there is the large marshy becoming a matter of almost every day occurrence in Central China, it was said that district through which that great river so well named “China's Sorrow" finds its way the immediate object of the Society was to to the sea, to cross the numerous emboucheres embroil the Peking Government with the of which would entail a good deal of labour Foreign Powers in the hope that an oppor- and delay. What is more probable is that tunity might thereby be opened up for a the troops now in Shantung will march successful rebellion. Whether this supposi southwards to seize the Grand. Canal and tion was well founded or not must now re thus stop the supplies of grain to the north main a matter of speculation, for the Chinese while another force is landed at Shanhai. Government took energetic steps to sup kwan and there engages the thousands of press the Society and on the other hand Chinese and Tartar soldiers collected at that the Powers evinced no inclination to be. post to bar the road to Peking. A good come embroiled but on the contrary were deal has been said and written as to the dif. found ready to allow every outrage to be ficulties that the Japanese will encounter in compounded for on easy terms. But now an overcoming these hordes, but we entertain embroilment has actually taken place, an no doubt of the issue of the conflict. These invasion of the Middle Kingdom is in pro- raw troops, however courageous, will stand gress, and a suspicion has even been enter- no chance when the Japanese artillery opens tained that the invader had counted on on to them and the trained victors in so internal disorder to weaken the resistance many fights press forward with fixed offered to him. Yet the secret societies no sign. It bayonets. The prestige that attaches to reinain quiet and make continuous victories will, too, assist the Ja- cannot be supposed that this quiescence panese materially The heart has been is a matter of policy and that the leaders are taken out of the Chinese troops by their un- under the impression they will find a more broken series of reverses, and they have favourable opportunity of carrying out their neither devotion to their leaders nor esprit designs. The only conclusion that can be de corpi to sustain them. Nor have the drawn, therefore, is that the strength of the Peking Government apparently much faith anti-dynastic movement has been vastly in their ability to stem the progress of the overrated and that the secret societies with which it was said Central China was honey- invader, or following so rapidly on the un- compromising rebuff administered to China combed do not constitute the political danger by the rejection of the Envoys CHANG and that has been supposed. There is one other SHAO, they would not have despatched the explanation, namely, that though the Chi. nese hate the dynasty they hate the Japanese Viceroy LI HUNCHANG to negotiate terms of peace with Japan. It is obvious that still more and are of set purpose refraining the Chinese Emperor and Government are from any action that might facilitate the deeply anxious to avert the crowning hu- operations of the latter; but this would be miliation of a Japanese occupation of the to credit them with a degree of patriotism they Imperial City. This newborn solicitude for have hitherto not been supposed to possess.
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So far we have litile data on which to form a judgment as to the merits of the de- fence made by Admiral TING at Weihai wei, or as to how he behaved during that critical time. Indeed all through the war there has not been much opportunity of arriving
-correct apprecia | tion of this officer's courage or ability, During the Franco-China hostilities the Peiyang Squadron skolked in hiding, with the obvious intention to avoid any collision with the fleet under Admiral Courbet. Nor was much disposition shown to meet the Japanese men-of-war at the commencement of the present war. The Emperor Kwao Su ostentatiously ordered the Chinese naval forces to harry the coasts of Japan, but they no more carried out the behest than did the Nanyang Squadron the repeated orders to proceed north to the assistance of the Peiyang Squadron. The naval engagement off the Yaloo River known the Battle of Haichang was the first real meeting between the opposing fleets, and this was entirely unsought by the Chinese. It is very doubtful indeed whether Admiral Ting would have fought then if there had been any
way of escape, and it may be doubted whether he would have escaped with the majority of his ships ou that occasion if he had not had the assistance of Herr VON HANNEKEN and some other Europeans, who saved the flagship from destruction by fire. Nor were the vessels Bandled with any skill, or the result of the #glit would have been very different. After that engagement the Squadron carefully kept out of the way of the energetic enemy. This may have been policy: TING may have felt that his ships were not equal in fighting power to the Japanese, and he may have thought that by keeping them afloat and ready for service be was baffling the foe by preventing his acquisition of that complete command of the sca he has now attained by the fall of Weihaiwei. The Chinese Ad- miral was, then, not necessarily a coward,
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