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MR. SAMUEL P. W. WONG (in English):-Article 3 Clause 2 of the Joint Declaration says that China shall be responsible for the defence of Hong Kong. It does not say Chinese troops may be permanently stationed in Hong Kong for that purpose. Section 3 Clause 11 says that the maintenance of public order will be the responsibility of the Hong Kong SAR Government.
Annexes 1 and 12 of the Joint Declaration are stated in similar terms, but specific reference is made to military forces, sent by the Central People's Government for the purpose of defence, not interfering in the internal affairs of Hong Kong.
Explanatory Note 42 on Article 12 of the Joint Declaration says the People's Republic of China will take over responsibility for the SAR's defence from the British garrison. It does not make it clear whether such replacement is a matter of presence or role. This could be open to interpretation.
The February 1989 draft of the Basic Law, Article 14, reflects these concepts, but adds that members of the military forces garrison, sent by the Central People's Government to be stationed in the Hong Kong SAR for defence, shall abide by the laws of the Hong Kong SAR.
In the introductions to both the Joint Declaration and the draft of the Basic Law, China has pledged to maintain the stability of Hong Kong.
Hence the freedom to interpret Note 42 is limited in that the PLA shall replace the British Garrison in such a way as to maintain the stability of Hong Kong and within the law of Hong Kong.
The role of the British Garrison today is twofold. First it is ceremonial-to demonstrate sovereignty. Second it provides defence. From a military point of view, it does not have to be in Hong Kong to defend it. In almost no other city in the world is this done. It only has to be within easy reach. In the case of Hong Kong, however, the British have nowhere else to put it.
To demonstrate sovereignty, however, the British garrison does have to be in Hong Kong. Indeed, there are plenty of examples, world-wide, of ceremonial troops stationed in big cities, London being a prime example. Though demonstration of sovereignty is not specifically referred to in either the Joint Declaration or the draft Basic Law, it would be reasonable to concede that the Central People's Government should have the right to such demonstration if they so wished.
Since the signing of the Joint Declaration, history has taught us two lessons: 1. Hong Kong people are capable of massive peaceful demonstrations. 2. The PLA can be provoked into firing live rounds into a crowd of civilians.
The demonstrations in Hong Kong so far were focused on the cenotaph and an unarmed news agency in Queen's Road East. Had they been focused against a military base, they might not have been so peaceful. In other parts of the world such demonstrations are often against military bases. Simply stationing PLA troops in Hong Kong is therefore going to threaten the stability of Hong Kong. The firing of one bullet would shatter it. Yet it is against the law in Hong Kong to fire a bullet, except for internal security and that will not be the role of the PLA.
To demonstrate sovereignty, however, it is not necessary for soldiers to be armed. Indeed, members of the Queen's Household Cavalry normally carry no weapon more lethal than a ceremonial sword. The PLA demonstrating sovereignty, therefore, would have no need of live ammunition.
My recommendation is, therefore, that the Basic Law should state that the PLA may only be stationed in Hong Kong for ceremonial purposes or for active defence, and that they be allowed no live ammunition in Hong Kong unless a state of war exists or is threatened.
Apart from the stationing of PLA troops in the SAR, another serious concern which has been raised recently is the need to make it clear that the SAR Government has exclusive power in dealing with possible emergency situations as a result of internal turmoil in the SAR. Since the Joint Declaration Article 3, Clause 11, clearly vests in the Government of the SAR the entire responsibility of maintaining public order in the SAR, it is important that the SAR Government should enjoy unfettered power in this respect. There is therefore a strong case to provide in the Basic Law that the SAR Government should handle such internal emergency on its own. The only circumstances under which the PLA might be involved should be when the Chief Executive determines that the turmoil in the SAR has become uncontrollable; he may then invite the PLA to assist in restoring law and order under the third paragraph of Article 14.
In my view, when the Chief Executive requests PLA's assistance under such circumstances, he should first obtain the consent of the SAR legislature. I must emphasize that under the Joint Declaration, even if the SAR is in a state of emergency because of internal unrest, the responsibility for public order remains for the SAR Government to administer. Any request for the PLA to give assistance should not constitute a ground for interference into the internal affairs of the SAR. Their role in such a situation should be strictly limited to that of assisting the SAR Government only to the extent as requested by the SAR Government, and no more.
With these few words, Mr. Chairman, I support the motion.
MR. MAN SAI-CHEONG (in Cantonese):—Mr. Chairman, the Basic Law has been under discussion for four full years from 1985 up to the present. In the case of an undergraduate, it should be the time for graduation from the 'Basic Law University'. However, it is a great pity that we have not yet reached a consensus here in Hong Kong on many important principles and some controversial articles in the draft Basic Law. The period of public consultation on the Basic Law is going to end soon. Deliberations on the political structure have also reached a new climax.
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MR. SAMUEL P. W. WONG (in English):-Article 3 Clause 2 of the Joint Declaration says that China shall be responsible for the defence of Hong Kong. It does not say Chinese troops may be permanently stationed in Hong Kong for that purpose. Section 3 Clause 11 says that the maintenance of public order will be the responsibility of the Hong Kong SAR Government.
Annexes 1 and 12 of the Joint Declaration are stated in similar terms, but specific reference is made to military forces, sent by the Central People's Government for the purpose of defence, not interfering in the internal affairs of Hong Kong.
Explanatory Note 42 on Article 12 of the Joint Declaration says the People's Republic of China will take over responsibility for the SAR's defence from the British garrison. It does not make it clear whether such replacement is a matter of presence or role. This could be open to interpretation.
The February 1989 draft of the Basic Law, Article 14, reflects these concepts, but adds that members of the military forces garrison, sent by the Central People's Government to be stationed in the Hong Kong SAR for defence, shall abide by the laws of the Hong Kong SAR.
In the introductions to both the Joint Declaration and the draft of the Basic Law, China has pledged to maintain the stability of Hong Kong.
Hence the freedom to interpret Note 42 is limited in that the PLA shall replace the British Garrison in such a way as to maintain the stability of Hong Kong and within the law of Hong Kong.
The role of the British Garrison today is twofold. First it is ceremonial-to demonstrate sovereignty. Second it provides defence. From a military point of view, it does not have to be in Hong Kong to defend it. In almost no other city in the world is this done. It only has to be within easy reach. In the case of Hong Kong, however, the British have nowhere else to put it.
To demonstrate sovereignty, however, the British garrison does have to be in Hong Kong. Indeed, there are plenty of examples, world-wide, of ceremonial troops stationed in big cities, London being a prime example. Though demonstration of sovereignty is not specifically referred to in either the Joint Declaration or the draft Basic Law, it would be reasonable to concede that the Central People's Government should have the right to such demonstration if they so wished.
Since the signing of the Joint Declaration, history has taught us two lessons: 1. Hong Kong people are capable of massive peaceful demonstrations. 2. The PLA can be provoked into firing live rounds into a crowd of
civilians.
The demonstrations in Hong Kong so far were focused on the cenotaph and an unarmed news agency in Queen's Road East. Had they been focused against a military base, they might not have been so peaceful. In other parts of the
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world such demonstrations are often against military bases. Simply stationing PLA troops in Hong Kong is therefore going to threaten the stability of Hong Kong. The firing of one bullet would shatter it. Yet it is against the law in Hong Kong to fire a bullet, except for internal security and that will not be the role of
the PLA.
To demonstrate sovereignty, however, it is not necessary for soldiers to be armed. Indeed, members of the Queen's Household Cavalry normally carry no weapon more lethal than a ceremonial sword. The PLA demonstrating sovereignty, therefore, would have no need of live ammunition.
My recommendation is, therefore, that the Basic Law should state that the PLA may only be stationed in Hong Kong for ceremonial purposes or for active defence, and that they be allowed no live ammunition in Hong Kong unless a state of war exists or is threatened.
Apart from the stationing of PLA troops in the SAR, another serious concern which has been raised recently is the need to make it clear that the SAR Government has exclusive power in dealing with possible emergency situations as a result of internal turmoil in the SAR. Since the Joint Declaration Article 3, Clause 11, clearly vests in the Government of the SAR the entire responsibility of maintaining public order in the SAR, it is important that the SAR Government should enjoy unfettered power in this respect. There is therefore a strong case to provide in the Basic Law that the SAR Government should handle such internal emergency on its own. The only circumstances under which the PLA might be involved should be when the Chief Executive determines that the turmoil in the SAR has become uncontrollable; he may then invite the PLA to assist in restoring law and order under the third paragraph of Article 14.
In my view, when the Chief Executive requests PLA's assistance under such circumstances, he should first obtain the consent of the SAR legislature. I must emphasize that under the Joint Declaration, even if the SAR is in a state of emergency because of internal unrest, the responsibility for public order remains for the SAR Government to administer. Any request for the PLA to give assistance should not constitute a ground for interference into the internal affairs of the SAR. Their role in such a situation should be strictly limited to that of assisting the SAR Government only to the extent as requested by the SAR Government, and no more.
With these few words, Mr. Chairman, I support the motion.
MR. MAN SAI-CHEONG (in Cantonese):—Mr. Chairman, the Basic Law has been under discussion for four full years from 1985 up to the present. In the case of an undergraduate, it should be the time for graduation from the 'Basic Law University'. However, it is a great pity that we have not yet reached a consensus here in Hong Kong on many important principles and some controversial articles in the draft Basic Law. The period of public consultation on the Basic Law is going to end soon. Deliberations on the political structure have also reached a new climax.
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