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Ombudsman (whose task is controlling the observance of Laws and Ordinances by all judges, Civil Servants, and military officers) about one-third prove at an early stage to be unfounded and for the rest only a very small proportion in fact show up justified grievances with the Ombudsman ordering redress (there are cases where complaints show that the laws or rules and regulations have been applied correctly but where there are moral justifications for leniency to be exercised, in which case, the Ombudsman requests rather than orders some redress to be given). So really the function of the Ombudsman is as much to protect the Government and the Civil Service against the citizens' unjustified complaints as it is to protect the citizen against unjustified action on the part of Governmental offices. Also, and most important, an independent Ombudsman will restore some of the credibility of the Police and the Civil Service. At the moment the result of an investigation carried out internally by a Department or by the Police is not believed by the public and immediately great shouts of cover-up can be heard throughout the land. This would no longer happen if grievances were handled by an independent Ombudsman.
Although the paper says that the systems being used in Sweden, the U.K., and New Zealand etc. are all slightly different, I see no reason why the Swedish system cannot be taken over here in its entirety (as an annex to this speech, I am distributing to members an information sheet on the Swedish Ombudsman system issued by the Swedish Government which I hope all members will read). As far as I am concerned, I have no doubt in my mind that we must have a real Ombudsman system in Hong Kong and not the sham which is suggested by the Green Paper. We should have had such a system years ago which would certainly have made members' lives very much easier. I believe an independent Ombudsman will become very important in the future when we will need a lot of checks and balances in our Governmental system to make Hong Kong stay on course for internal peace and prosperity.
I think the Swedish Parliamentary Ombudsman system could easily be taken over here in toto and would go a long long way to ensure justice for our citizens now, and in future.
THE SWEDISH OMBUDSMEN
Protecting the rights of the citizen in his contacts with authorities is fundamental to the process of law in Sweden. The Swedish Ombudsmen system is in this context a guarantee against oppressive measures and maladministration within the judicial and the civil administration systems. The Swedish Parliamentary Ombudsmen (JO) are appointed by the Riksdag (Parliament). The JO contributes to the creation of public confidence in the activities of courts and other authorities.
In a number of special areas there are other Ombudsmen who are appointed by the Government (and as such come under the supervision of the JO) but who have similar duties of surveillance, each in his own particular sphere. They are at present the Competition Ombudsman, the Consumer Ombudsman and the Equal Opportunities Ombudsman. There is also a Press Ombudsman who is not, however, a public institution, but is sponsored by media organizations.
THE PARLIAMENTARY OMBUDSMEN (JO)
The JO's Office dates back to 1809 and was originally established to provide the Riksdag with a means of controlling the observance of laws and ordinances by all judges, civil servants and military officers.
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As of 1976, there are four Ombudsmen (JO), elected for a four-year period. One of them is the Administrative Chief, who is responsible for the administration of the Office and decides the main orientation of its activities.
The Ombudsmen's supervision covers all state and municipal agencies and bodies as well as their personnel. Supervision also covers all persons not already mentioned who exercise public authority. Some exceptions are made. The Ombudsmen shall not supervise Cabinet Ministers or members of the Riksdag or of municipal councils. Each Ombudsman has a separate sphere of supervision.
Complaints from the public. Any citizen who feels he has been wronged may submit a written complaint to the JO. Some 3,500 such complaints are handled each year. About one-third of these usually prove at an early stage to be unfounded and can therefore be summarily dealt with. The JO concentrate on those which have importance in terms of striking a just balance between the claims of the community and the freedom of the individual. Many of the complaints come from people who have got caught in a bureaucratic merry-go-round.
The Riksdag has empowered the JO with full discretion to decide which cases should be investigated. The JO have also been authorized to refer to other agencies or government organs those cases which are of such a nature that they are more suitably investigated at first hand by the agency.
Inspections. It has always been the duty of the JO to inspect, from time to time, authorities under their supervision. In recent years, frequent inspections have been made of central government agencies, county administrations, courts, prisons, army posts, etc.
Investigations. The JO also pursue investigations on a long-term basis. These often entail reviews of laws and their enforcement. Suggestions for this form of control come to the JO from various sources, often issues raised by the press or complaints from the public. The JO need not show cause for undertaking an investigation.
The JO serve as special prosecutors in cases of breach of duty in the civil service and are also empowered to take disciplinary measures in such cases.
Supervision. The Parliamentary Ombudsmen's Office enjoys full autonomy in relation to its principal, the Riksdag, which does not have the right to issue directives. On the other hand, their official report is examined by one of the standing parliamentary committees. After examining the contents on a spot-check basis, the committee presents a statement of opinion to the Riksdag.
The mass media may also be said to function as bodies exercising control over the JO, since they often take up controversial cases for debate.
GOVERNMENT-APPOINTED OMBUDSMEN
The Competition Ombudsman (NO)
The Competition Ombudsman (NO) is appointed by the Government. The NO's Office was set up in 1954 and now has a staff of about 30 persons.
The NO's activities are based on the Competition Act of 1982. The purpose of this act is to promote such competition in the economy as is desirable in the public interest. Two types of restrictive business practices are prohibited under sanction of criminal penalties: resale price maintenance and collusive tendering, but exemptions may be granted under certain conditions.
Otherwise, Swedish antitrust legislation is not based on criminal sanctions. Instead, it has devised a method of negotiations for eliminating the harmful effects of restrictive business practices. Such a practice shall be deemed to have harmful effects if, contrary to the public interest, it unduly affects the formation of prices, restricts productivity in business, or impedes or prevents the trade of others. Many of the necessary investigations are carried out at the NO's Office by his own staff, but major inquiries are made at the request of the NO by the Price and Cartel Office, the Bank Inspection Board and the Private Insurance Supervisory Service, which all keep Cartel Registers.
The Information Act gives the NO and the other authorities far-reaching powers to collect all information necessary for investigations. The Price and Cartel Offices also keep a Market and a Merger Register.
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Ombudsman (whose task is controlling the observance of Laws and Ordinances by all judges, Civil Servants, and military officers) about one-third prove at an early stage to be unfounded and for the rest only a very small proportion in fact show up justified grievances with the Ombudsman ordering redress (there are cases where complaints show that the laws or rules and regulations have been applied correctly by where there are moral justificaions for leniency to be exercised, in which case, the Ombudsman requests rather than orders some redress to be given). So really the function of the Ombudsman is as much to PROTECT the Government and the Civil Service against the citizens unjustified complaints as it is to protect the citizen against unjustified action on the part of Governmental offices. Also, and most important, an independent Ombudsman will restore some of the credibility of the Police and the Civil Service. At the moment the result of an investigation carried out internally by a Department or by the Police is not believed by the public and immediately great shouts of cover up can be heard throughout the land. This would no longer happen if grievances were handled by an independent Ombudsman.
Although the paper says that the systems being used in Sweden, the U.K., and New Zealand etc. are all slightly different, I see no reason why the Swedish system cannot be taken over here in its entirety (as an annex to this speech, I am distributing to members an information sheet on the Swedish Ombudsman system issued by the Swedish Government which I hope all members will read). As far as I am concerned, I have no doubt in my mind that we must have a real Ombudsman system in Hong Kong and not the sham which is suggested by the Green Paper. We should have had such a system years ago which would certainly have made members lives very much easier. I believe an independent Ombudsman will become very important in the future when we will need a lot of checks and balances in our Governmental system to make Hong Kong stay on course for internal peace and prosperity.
I think the Swedish Parliamentary Ombudsman system could easily be taken over here in toto and would go a long long way to ensure justice for our citizens now, and in future.
THE SWEDISH OMBUDSMEN
Protecting the rights of the citizen in his contacts with authorities is fundamental to the process of law in Sweden. The Swedish Ombudsmen system is in this context a guarantee against oppressive measures and maladministration within the judicial and the civil administration systems. The Swedish Parliamentary Ombudsmen (JO) are appointed by the Riksdag (Parliament). The JO contributes to the creation of public confidence in the activities of courts and other authorities.
In a number of special areas there are other Ombudsmen who are appointed by the Government (and as such come under the supervision of the JO) but who have similar duties of surveillance, each in his own particular sphere. They are at present the Competition Ombudsman, the Consumer Ombudsman and the Equal Opportunities Ombudsman. There is also a Press Ombudsman who is not, however, a public institution, but is sponsored by media organizations.
THE PARLIAMENTARY OMBUDSMEN (JO)
The JO's Office dates back to 1809 and was originally established to provide the Riksdag with a means of controlling the observance of laws and ordinances by all judges, civil servants and military officers.
HONG KONG URBAN COUNCIL
Page 97 of 201
153
As of 1976, there are four Ombudsmen (JO), elected for a four-year period. One of them is the Administrative Chief, who is responsible for the administration of the Office and decides the main
orientation of its activities.
The Ombudsmen's supervision covers all state and municipal agencies and bodies as well as their personnel. Supervision also covers all persons not already mentioned who exercise public authority. Some exceptions are made. The Ombudsmen shall not supervise Cabinet Ministers or members of the Riksdag or of municipal councils. Each Ombudsman has a separate sphere of supervision.
Complaints from the public. Any citizen who feels he has been wronged may submit a written complaint to the JO. Some 3 500 such complaints are handled cach year. About one third of these usually prove at an early stage to be unfounded and can therefore be summarily dealt with. The JO concentrate on those which have importance in terms of striking a just balance between the claims of the community and the freedom of the individual. Many of the complaints come from people who have got caught in a bureaucratic merry-go-round.
The Riksdag has empowered the JO with full discretion to decide which cases should be investigated. The JO have also been authorized to refer to other agencies or government organs those cases which are of such nature that they are more suitably investigated at first hand by the agency.
Inspections. It has always been the duty of the JO to inspect, from time to time, authorities under their supervision. In recent years, frequent inspections have been made of central government agencies, county administrations, courts, prisons, army posts, etc.
Investigations. The JO also pursue investigations on a long-term basis. These often entail reviews of laws and their enforcement. Suggestions for this form of control come to the JO from various sources, often issues raised by the press or complaints from the public. The JO need not show cause for undertaking an investigation.
The JO serve as special prosecutors in cases of breach of duty in the civil service and are also empowered to take disciplinary measures in such cases.
Supervision. The Parliamentary Ombudsmen's Office enjoys full autonomy in relation to its principal, the Riksdag, which does not have the right to issue directives. On the other hand, their official report is examined by one of the standing parliamentary committees. After examining the contents on a spotcheck basis, the committee presents a statement of opinion to the Riksdag.
The mass media may also be said to function as bodies exercising control over the JO, since they often take up controversial cases for debate.
GOVERNMENT-APPOINTED OMBUDSMEN
The Competition Ombudsman (NO)
The Competition Ombudsman (NO) is appointed by the Government. The NO's Office was set up in 1954 and now has a staff of about 30 persons.
The NO's activities are based on the Competition Act of 1982. The purpose of this act is to promote such competition in the economy as is desirable in the public interest. Two types of restrictive business practices are prohibited under sanction of criminal penalties: resale price maintenance and collusive tendering, but exemptions may be granted under certain conditions.
Otherwise, Swedish antitrust legislation is not based on criminal sanctions. Instead, it has devised a method of negotiations for eliminating the harmful effects of restrictive business practices. Such a practice shall be deemed to have harmful effects if, contrary to the public interest, it unduly affects the formation of prices, restricts productivity in business, or impedes or prevents the trade of others. Many of the necessary investigations are carried out at the NO's Office by his own staff, but major inquiries are made at the request of the NO by the Price and Cartel Office, the Bank Inspection Board and the Private Insurance Supervisory Service, which all keep Cartel Registers.
The Information Act gives the NO and the other authorities far-reaching powers to collect all information necessary for investigations. The Price and Cartel Offices also keeps a Market and a Merger Register.
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