1939-11-24 — Page 14

Friday,

HONGKONG TELEG RAPH

November 24, 1939;

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The

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Friday, Novembar 24, 1939 Wyndham St., Hongkong Telephone: 26016

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Economic Strategy

THE GENTLE ART OF

PROFITEERING

What the nation wants

to know

T

“HERE hris now de- veloped in the public mind-and it is essen- tial In the national 10 should be interest that frankly stated-a growing bo- wilderment as to the course of the war.

There is bewilderment and there is considerable uneasiness—an un- easiness of, which it is essential the Government should be made aware.

FRANCIS

WILLIAMS

Nor will this war be decided by military effort alone, Victory will re- sult from the co-ordinated operation of That uneasiness does not mean any

political economic and military force. Blackening in the resolution of the

The great strength of the allied Brillab people. On the contrary, it forces lies not in man power-great arises out of an anxiety as to whether though that la-nor weight of arms on the Government is doing all that island and in the air heavy though it possible effectively to Implement that resolution.

What is the basis of this publio un- easiness and how far has it justifica- tion?

Though many of the conditions mini weupezes of war have been Trans- termed since Britain and Germany last came to the grapple, there is one- fundamental factor at least which has not changed; and that is the reczernic factor, It is that which determines in the long run the cap-

to maintain and acity of a nation exert effectively its ormed strength. It is

the to

national potential as fuci is to the engine; and realising this fact, the Germans made it one of their first cares to strike at our economic structure. They resumed at once. their sub- marine campaign against British shipping the campaign which was frustrated only just in time at the end of the 10st war. When that failed-as failed it un- doubtedly has-they resorted to the barbarism of sowing the seas with uncharted mines. Their calculation is that if the supplies from overscus, which are Britain's life-blood, can be interrupted successfully enough Bri- tain shall be forced to submission by sheer inanition. Britain shall, as it were, have sustained a decisive body- blow. The national machine will be a standstill. and the brought to people who man it will be faced with And thirdly, on the accumulating privations approaching even to im- evidence of lack of co-ordinated plan- minent starvation. That is the de- ning at home in dealing with the problems of supplies, and with the no sign which it is the exacting tasis of{ les vital problem of the organised the Royal Navy to defent, at the transition of industry from peace to same time that it delivers a counter- blow at the economie foundations of Germany by cutting off her external) supplies. That is not the least vital, If the less spectacular, element in this struggle. It is comparable to the conlest in the Roman arena of the gladiator with the, sword and the gladiator with the net and trident.

The task of the Navy in this matter is not only exacting as a naval operation; it also needs, in order to be effective, to conform to a strategy elaborated not by the Admirally but by a chosen body of experts in the economic, financial and industrial spheres. This body must know the vulnerable places in the enemy's economy and how best to reach them, and must also know where to go warily and where to lean with nil the weight available. That is the the Ministry of responsibility of Economic Warfare. Its staff has been drawn in part from the Civil Service and in part from, the leaders of commerce and industry most famillar with the main channels of interna- tional trade.

It is true that for a long me Germany has been laying in large stocks of foodstuffs and raw materials; but a protracted war would exhoust these and deprived of the means to renew them, and the ability to enforce a quick 'decision, the Carman wäre potential would decline in an increas- ingly, sharp curve. There the effect of sea-power sure as it may be slow, will manert Itself, un it did. In the Napoleonic Wars. That is how the gladiator with the net and trident prevails over the gladiator with the sword; and it is good "to know that the shapers of Brills strategy have so promptly and so thoroughly pre- pared the most potent weapon in the national armoury for Its purpose. As

It is based on three thingat

First, on what appears to the * slow ordinary person to be the start of the war and especially the comparative slightness of our effort on the Western front so far.

Becondly, on our failure to give ade quate aid to Poland and as a conse quence the virtual collapse of the war on the two fronts, with all its otrate- gical advantages.

war.

The public uneasiness in these matters cannot be concealed, and it would be no service to the nation to try and conceal it.

On the contrary, one of the great strengths of democracy is that it enables frank discussion of much matters, and thus provides a constant spur to the executive authority and a constant safeguard against weakness of purpose or inefficiency in that authority.

This is particularly necessary in war-time.

How far is this public concern about the speed and nature of our WAT effort justified?

Probably, so far as the first basis for uneasiness, hardly at all.

*

It is, nevertheless, natural ikat there should be such a feeling among people united-as-this nation is united-in the belief that an intolerabis domina- tion of the life of Europe by recurring aggression, can be onded only by the defeat of Hitlerism; a nation, more- over, which above all desired penco and which went into wax na a last resort anly because it was made clear that the integrity of no country was safe, and no reliance upon, negotiated settin ment of international problems pos- aible so long as Hillerian sprawled across Europa.

We were, on that Bunday morning on which war was declared, koyed up to a great and immediate Hort.

Inevitably the slow process of mod- em war between great Powern pro- vided an anti-climax to that moment.

Modern war between powerful-highly organised and highly industrialised nations facing each other as on the Western Front, behind immensely strong fortifications, la bound to move slowly, S

be.

But les in the combination of these with the immense ecendolia ro sources which we control, with our

ability both through naval blockade and by the exercise of our economic influchco to prevent the flow of cASEN- tial materials to Germany and with the immense political amsels we possess the International goodwill of neutral countries, who accept and ap- prove the motives which have sent us to war.

15

The combined effect of these politi- cal, economic and military forces can- not become operative 'for considerable time.

1

It would be foolish to weaken in any way the long range advantage they give us by precipitate military action having no Justincation other than the possible tonio effect upon the publla of the feeling that something was being dono-a tonto which would be soon dissipated an ekort taken without proper preparation proved up- successful

The collapse of the Eastern front is a different matter,

*

Here, the fact that Britain and France did so little beforehand to assist Poland, either by misterial aid or military advice, to withstand the German attack, is a legitiminto cause for concern, particularly if the failure is the symptom of a "one-front" mind an the part of the Government or tho military authorities, which may lead to the missing of other opportunities in the future.

Yet, in distributing responsibility, the crushing effect of the unexpected Rusalan intervention cannot be mini- mised.

But for this, a rallying of Polish forces in positions more dolenalblo than those from which they had re-. treated-and retreated, it has to bo VOTY heavy remembered, without casualties would have been possible.

And at that atage British and French assistance could have been made ayall- ablo to silen the resistance.

The Russian intervention made that impossible. Yet, even taking that into account, wo atili await an adequato explanation of the failure to send sup port to Poland earlier,

It is a grievous and tragic fallure, and one for which responsibility must when the evidence is available, de axed.

It would seem, too-though here It is impossible to form a complete judg ment since all the factors which havO to be taken into account cannot ret -bo generally known-that we have 80. for mado insuficient use of the air arm, not for heavy fighting for which

Their

and help to undermine the morals of the enemy--who cannot tell where the next ultack will come. cumulative effect is much greater than the sum of the effects of each indi- vidual blow.

Pariicularly is this the case when we know that within Germany there is grave weakness, and where there are, as in the gallant" revolutionaries" of Bohemia and Moravia, men and women who are enrolled with us in Ulic battle for freedom.

Their efforts would be enormously nsslated if a Government, having tô deal with internal revolt, had at the same time to withstand the paycho- logical effect upon the population generally of a series of daring surprise raids upon scattered military objec tives.

We must be careful lest the poten

tially immerse nasistance which could

LOST CHANCES

IN CHINA

By CLARK LEE

Tientsin, (By Mall)~The Union Jack, symbol of Great Britain's whnost unchallenged predominance in For Eastern shipping for nearly a century, is being rapidly replaced on China's sens and rivers by the Rising Sun of Japan's fast expanding mer- chant fleet.

Japanese shipping companies are cush lur in handsomely On their navy's conquest of Chinese seaports and waterways. With hundreds of miles of Inland rivers closed to all but Japanese vessels, operations ulong the entro · China coast aru being made so difficult for shipping that a complete Japanese monopoly appears to be only a question of time.

While British ships lie idle, Jupa-

out nese ship yards are turning Ismail vessel for the China trade at

the rate of 80,000 tons a month. come from internal revolta within

British shipping firms, which re- Germany is dissipated through lack of present one-fourth of Great Britain's supporting activities by

forces.

our own

What is at the moment the most

serious of all the factors making for public concern is the absence of any evidence of really effective co-ordin-

ated planning on the home front.

Thỏ criticism made by Mr. Arthur Greenwood of the weaknesses at the Ministry of Supply, provide grounds for the graveat public disquiet.

These weaknesses and comparable weakness in other sectors of Industrial and economic control are symptomatic of a deep-seated fallure on the part of members of the Government to under- stand the nature and scope of the problem which faces uL

that this fallure It may well bo comes from causes so congenital that It will not be remedied so long as the present men remain in control

The nation may before long have to ask itself whether they are the kind of people who are likely to prova capable of organising a national effort which necessarily involves & planning of economia resources and is centrai

control of great industries altogether allen to their political philosophy and

their thought.

Finally, failure in the vital task of bringing our case before the worki persists. It comes not only from an inemciency in the censorship and news departments of the Ministry of Infor. mation, so great that neutral countries which are crying out for British nowa Are forced through lack of it to fill their papers with German propaganda, but from a deeper cause.

There appears yet to be no agree ment upon the principles which should govern our propaganda. Yet the whole of propaganda experience de monstrates that a successful campaign must be based on the putting over of a number of ideas which need to be expressed over and over again.

Jnill these ideas are agreed and are mando the basis of nil propaganda work, effort must be dissipated.

That is happening now.

It is the more tragie because the ideas for which we fight, the molives which inspire our armis, are such, pro- perly expressed, as not only to sieci the resolution of our own people, but to win the sympathy and support of All men and women of goodwill throughout the world.

Fox Bites Man

And Dies

in

investment $2,000,000,000 gold China, are so hampered by restric tions and one-sided regulations that they can no longer maintain regular.. schedules. Revenue from passengers with and freight has fallen sharply Japanese companies getting the bust- ness which formerly went to the Bri- tish.

20 Por Cont Drop Noted

The British shipping business in Shanghai, for example, declined 20 per cent. during the month of Sep- tember, 1939, while Japanese ship- the same ping gained by exactly amount. In other ports, British ships handled but a fraction of the volume of even a your ago. While the European war has taken British ships away from the China service and thus contributed to this decline, British ofelais state the loss Is mostly the result ot Japanese restrictions,

Rome

A brief survey of Chinn's import-

commercial ports tells the story. Tientsin is closed to all occun lng ships as a result of sliting of the Taku Bar, at the mouth of the Hat river. The trip of 35 miles from Taku to Tientsin Lakes three days for passengers 02

on British ships, in- cluding a 48-hour walt in quarantine river launch. and one night on Meanwhile, Japanese ships maintain three day schedules between Tientsin and Shanghal via Dairen. After a series of menacing anti-British do- monstrations, the British pilots' as- soctollon operating on the Hal river Lighters to Japanese. was sold. cargoes from Tientsin's blockaded British concessions aro sometimes fired al in

the river. Japoneze blame "Chinese Irregulars" for these altacks.

Foar Retaliation Cheloo, long famous for its linen exports, is no longer; a profitable port of call for British ships., Japanese controlled lighterage companies re- fuse to unlond British" vessels, untit all Japanese ships in the harbour are landed and unloaded,, No. British

los can get export cargo.

At Tsingtao, no Brillsh' ships are allowed within the inner harbour. Chinese shippers, here and elsewhere. refused to send cargo by British vessels, stating that they fear rota- Intion by the Japanese against their business.

Shanghai is still open to ships of Inil nations, but through Japanesa control of the customs; and currenty manipulation, customs duties have hoon sharply increased. The Whang-, poo river, which was formerly drodz SAN, JOSE Science now knows ed at regular intervals by the Chincie government, is fast filing with allt.: what happens to a fox when it biten Unless the river is deadend withinfa the time has not yet come, but for the a policeman. Police Captain Charles year or so, experts report, such big Transpacific liners as the American A. Hertell was attempting to give President Coolitee and the Canadian some medicine to hla pot fox wher of Japan, will not be able

surprise attack.

we began weit. The air raid in Kiel, the leaflet raids over Ormany had this right quality of imaginative dail. But we have not followed them

· No early and decisive action on such front by the nature of the oppos ing forces and the strength of the tafensive pokition of each, possible,

To attempt it would be madness, We do not want the lives of our young up. Why? A precaution, Hertell underwent Pas-whan wood; already

Shanghal.: 50lling of the'";

i bit his hand. Just as a measure of Yangian bars at the mouth of the

long as the capacity to hold on resmen thronert · kway, this kima- on „eplo-Buch enterprises Bavaascual velja. Ja hon fundus infamia the fox died. Stimmung ERAJEŠTĚ oguliwis - Jarice:

mains, the 'end is not in doubt.

attacks foredoomed to failure. They serve to hearten one's chra people tour treatment,