Sessional_Paper_1946 — Page 18

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It is evident that the shortage of foreign type accommodation is proportionately much more acute than that of Chinese type. As regards Offices, Factories and Stores, the Units partially and completely destroyed only amount to roughly 7% of the housing accommodation damaged and destroyed.

5. If the figures of buildings under requisition by the Services, given in Lt. Col. J. D. Milne's report, are taken into consideration, it is evident that the foreign community are even harder hit. Roughly 7,000 of them are displaced by damage and a further 2,000 by Services requisitioning. We

e are warned by both Lt. Col. Milne's and Colonel Whitcombe's reports that the prospect of appreciable de-requisitioning is remote under the present programme.

6.

Materials for Civilian Buildings. In Table IV are set forth estimated quantities of the chief materials which will be needed for the reconstruction. Owing to the short time available the figures must be regarded as very rough. It is felt, however, that they may form a useful guide to the Committee in considering sub-para. (v) of the Terms of Reference. In summarising the data it has been assumed that most of the repairs to buildings in Condition "A" have already been done or can be completed from local stocks. The Committee may decide to recommend that the least damaged buildings should be tackled first, so separate figures are given for "B" and "C" and for "E* Quantities have also been roughly estimated for the houses needed to rehouse the villagers displaced by Stage "A" of the Ping Shan Airfield construction in the New Territories.

The estimated shipping space is of the order of 70,000 tons, not counting cement, which, if imported, will require an additional 56,000 tons. This would probably be spread over two or more years.

7. Interim Deductions and Recommendations. Time has not yet been adequate for full analysis and discussion of the data collected, but the following points are put forward for the consideration of the Committee:

Most

(a) The future of the Colony is largely dependent on the rapid re-establishment

of commerce and industry, both under foreign and Chinese control. of the key Chinese are already in the Colony and are not, in the circumstances, unreasonably housed; the foreign element is still largely absent, and roughly 75% of its normal accommodation is at present unusable. Unless quarters can be made available for some 7,000 or 8,000 foreigners in the next six months a very grave situation will arise.

The repair of living accommodation for foreigners should therefore be given the highest priority. Consideration should also be given to repairs to buildings for hospital and medical services, police, public health, education and industry, for which relative priorities must be worked out in order to use materials in short supply to best advantage.

(b) Among the bottlenecks to progress are: —

(i) Inadequate qualified technical staff in the Department of Government responsible for controlling and carrying out reconstruction of buildings.

(ii) Lack of all kinds of building materials.

(iii) Insufficient skilled building labour and consequent high wages being

paid.

(iv) Lack of transport.

(c) The solution of these bottlenecks lies in:—

(i) Placing before the Colonial Office the gravity of the staff situation and the need for the immediate return to Hong Kong of as many regular technical P.W.D. employees as possible. They may be given an assurance that they will not lose the leave to which they are entitled and that passage facilities will be given to enjoy it later.

No stone should be left unturned to obtain additional qualified staff from other sources, e.g., Shanghai, Australia, India, the Services, England, and sufficiently attractive terms should be offered them. (A really capable engineer or architect from outside the Colony is unlikely to accept employment on a month to month basis.)

C.A.S.,

The existing War Establishment of the Works Branch, should be increased, and preparations made now for temporarily augmenting the size of the technical staff of the Public Works Department of the Civil Government for a period of, say, 2 or 3 years, till the situation returns to normal.