Sessional_Paper_1927 — Page 71

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The Commissioners identify themselves with that memorandum, and hold the view that patrols by the Navy over the whole of the actual danger zone are impossible to an extent justifying any reduction of the internal precautions on board ships, which they merely complement; but that it is necessary to press for the extension of assistance from the Navy, which already guards the rivers, in the direction of establishing patrols off the seaward approaches to known pirate strongholds, and in the last resort, failing the co- operation of the Chinese authorities, of destroying those strongholds by independent

action.

(b) Piracies from within.

Before considering in detail the question of piracy from within, it is pertinent to ask what action a British man of war could take if it found a ship already in control of pirates. The difficulties confronting the commander, and the extra risks to which all on board the pirated ship would be exposed are so obvious that they need no further elaboration. But the point emphasises again the supreme necessity for all possible action to prevent pirates gaining control, if only for long enough to send out signals to summon

assistance.

The Commissioners base their recommendations principally on a consideration of the proper incidence of responsibility for defensive action within any ship.

The possibi- lity of making an impregnable citadel of the bridge, with the probability that pirates will not attack a ship, where the conditions leave any doubt as to their chances of getting clear with the booty, has been discussed above under section V.

The whole of the existing Hong Kong Piracy Prevention Regulations form an extraordinary and unusual piece of legislation; it is indeed probably unique. Locally made regulations are imposed upon ships which are bound by bond to observe them far outside the limits of the Colony's jurisdiction. It is by no means clear that the Regula- tions can not conflict with Board of Trade Regulations common to the whole British Mer- cantile Marine. In any event other authorities presumably have equal power to impose regulations of their own making, so that the value of the Hong Kong bond may quite easily depend on something beyond the control of the bondsman. Further the choice given to a captain, outside Hong Kong waters, between observing the conditions of his bond or of ignoring them in favour of the commonly held view that they conflict with the Board of Trade Regulations often ends in the defeat of the bond. The choice is the more readily made in that some at least of the conditions of the bond tend to hamper the easy working of a ship and the Regulations therefore start with the handicap of being un- popular. One such opening for attack weakens the whole fabric, which is already none too strong with the difficulty concerning the discipline of the guards, and the doubts concerning the dangers of carrying revolvers near a compass. Very conflicting evidence on this last point was received, and the Commission can only conclude that it is possible that in certain circumstances the danger may be a real one.

But this criticism takes second place in importance to the consideration that the Regulations cause a misplaced incidence of responsibility. The Government assumes through them some responsibility for the internal defence of a ship, and the whole re- sponsibility for any possible conflict with the Board of Trade Regulations in emergency. The value of the scheme of defence, the satisfactory design and construction of the gril- les, the reliability of the Indian guards and their supply (or want of supply, as it has at times been necessary to detain ships for which no guards were immediately available)—-- these matters lie with the Government and they eat so deep into internal management, that those concerned are encouraged to go further and to consider that the whole anti- piracy question is a matter for Government alone. The fact of course is that at sea dis- cipline and determination alone will count; without them the best made "scheme of de- fence" will be worthless, and where they exist the scheme is best left to those who have to depend on it perhaps for their lives. Advice and assistance can be freely given: but the responsibility should lie directly on owners and officers. The companies at present pay all expenses for certain fittings and guards ordered or provided by the Government. They have little faith in their value, and in few cases do much to co-operate. The Government does nothing, beyond insisting that precautions are taken, that the companies could not do at least equally well themselves. The responsibility is however shifted to the Government. With that responsibility definitely put back on to the companies, it is to be hoped that self interest or public opinion will lead to precautions being taken with a better will, and therefore with more chance of being thorough. Whatever it was de-