Sessional_Paper_1926 — Page 90

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Owing to fighting in Canton which enabled the Government to destroy sundry rebel elements and to unify the province, the repe cussion of May 30 was not fully felt here before the middle of June, when the real significance and gravity of the occurrence began to be understood. In Peking and elsewhere there was already a realisation that an event had taken place which was of the order of acts that create epochs in history. As Canton is the greatest Nationalist centre in the country, it is not strange that May 30 should be en- visaged from an uncompromisingly Nationalist standpoint and seen to be a decisive expression of the struggle between the body of economic and political needs and ideas known as Chinese Nationalism, whose chief motive is the achievement of real Chinese independence, and the opposing system of ideas and forces which, deriving their sanction from the long series of treaties dating from the transaction of Nanking in 1842, is known as Foreign Imperialism..

This interpretation of May 30 would naturally find expression here in the form of patriotic demonstrations and other popular manifestations. And it was the driving neces- sity to express the Nationalist mind and feeling on a profoundly poignant act of tragedy that Canton organised the memorable demonstration of June 23. It is indisputable that the procession, which was the central feature of the demonstration, consisted largely of students and school children and was entirely unarmed save as to the Whampoa cadet section who were in ordinary parade attire.

The question as to which side fired the first shot is not a capital issue in view of the actual circumstances of the case and the grim results of the shooting. Never in its his- tory had Shameen been so completely and perfectly protected. Separated by its wide canal and sand-bagged, barbwired, equipped and garrisoned by forces armed to the teeth and supported and covered by the great guns of the foreign warships in the harbour, Shameen was impregnable and absolutely safe even on the incredible assumption that there was any real Chinese intention to capture it. There was no such intention and there could have been none, and the results of the shooting proved it. The British suffered hardly any casualties, but 50 dead and more than 100 wounded Chinese demons- trated afresh the meaning of a struggle between a fortress and a crowd. All the relevant facts of the case support the view that, even if the Shameen firing were done in the first instance in so-called self-defence (which is categorically denied), IT WAS EXCESSIVE AND THEREFORE LEGALLY UNJUSTIFIED That Shameen was, on June 23, 1925, in the mood and temper to act violently and excessively appears from the widely advertised letter written by the then British Consul-General on June 22, but actually received by Mr. Wu Chao-chu, former Minister for Foreign Affairs, about the hour of the actual shooting, on June 23. It was sent through the post, not delivered by messenger.

After referring to a fantastic story of certain students who had cast lots for the privilege of "posing as martyrs" (which he himself had to suggest "might be the figment of a fertile imagination"), the British Consul-General went on to declare that "if, on the other hand, it have any solid foundation in fact and should action of the kind be contem- plated and take place, I have the honour solemnly to warn the Government of Kuangtung through you as their Foreign Secretary that any attempt to penetrate on the Foreign Con- cession at Shameen will be resisted by force of arms, and that for the consequences the Government will be held individually and collectively responsible." And he added that "due precautions are, however, being taken to guard against acts of mob violence, such as have occurred at Chinkiang, Kiukiang and Hankow, and should unfortunately they occur here, the blood of those who call upon crowd psychology to commit deeds of violence will be on their own head." It is plain that this is the language of one who, having envisaged the possibility, if not the certainty, of shedding the blood of Chinese on June 23, 1925, would hardly be able to restrain armed and inflamed men under his orders from doing some bloodletting on the occasion. In other words we read the letter as a frank avowal of the British Consul-General's intention to do what Evanson had already done at Shanghai or (we say this in a purely historical sense) General Dyer at Amritsar, i.e., action based on the doctrine of the preventive massacre which specialists of strong and drastic action are wont to advise as a magical operation with "Oriental" crowds.

While there can be no doubt that June 23 is the direct and immediate cause of the anti-British boycott (and of the intensification and extension of the Hongkong strike), it is certain that the practical blockade which the Government of Hongkong instituted against Canton and the rest of the province was a powerful predisposing and, later, continuing factor in the maintenance and enforcement of the anti-British hoycott. The Hongkong Governor in Council, it will be recalled, prohibited the exportation of "rice, flour, tinned

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