of medium magnitude during the remainder of the period under review, namely a fire at Li Cheng Uk on 9th January, 1955, which put 5,000 more persons on the streets of Shamshuipo. This fire, like the previous one in the same area, was held on a new fire lane.
31. The most significant of these unfortunate events had passed almost unnoticed, so far as its effect on the overall re- settlement programme was concerned. Most fires had happened in the wrong places, in that either they freed no land at all for immediate constructive development, or at best, as in the case of the Shek Kip Mei fire, they freed no more land than was needed to rehouse the persons affected. But the Tai Hang Tung fire had freed a level site on which perhaps 35% more persons than had previously lived there could be quickly rehoused in emergency multi-storey housing, so that the margin of accom- modation so necessary for an effective long-term programme could at last be produced. In the press of immediate crises the point was not at once fully understood, but the Tai Hang Tung fire had broken a vicious circle. The Shek Kip Mei fire had made it clear to the Government and to the community that the squatter problem must be faced and solved at any cost within reason; it had not however pointed to any simple solution of the basic dilemma, which was this:-land is needed, so squatters must be moved, but they cannot be moved until land is freed on which they can be resettled. As the next chapter will show, it was the Tai Hang Tung fire which cut the Gordian knot.
CHAPTER VI
THE OVERALL PROGRAMME
32. The temptation to concentrate entirely on the imme- diate problems already described had been resisted, and during this eventful summer-one of the driest in the Colony's history and the worst so far as squatter fires were concerned-the Urban Council had looked closely at every aspect of the overall
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