RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊 | RAS-1976 https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/hq382988q 24 RICHARD J. SMITH 43 See Ono Giichi, War and Armament Expenditures of Japan (New York, 1922), 57-58, 70-71, 140-144, 273-277, and Ono's Expenditures of the Sino-Japanese War (New York, 1922), 120-126; also Oshima, 372-375, 376, note 18. 44 Smith, "Foreign-Training," 219-220; Yamagata, "The Army,” 107-108; British Public Record Office, W.O. 33/34, Captain Trotter, "Some Remarks on the Army of Li Hung-Chang;" Rawlinson, 190. 45 Smith, "Foreign-Training," 219, 221; see also Rawlinson, 202-203; Thomas William Ayers, Chang Chih-tung and Educational Reform in China (Cambridge, Mass., 1971), 164-189, 204-215. 46 Smith, "Foreign-Training," 218-219; Cavendish, 721. 47 Cavendish, 711, 713-715, 719-723. 48 Smith, "Chinese Military Institutions," 157, note 135. 49 See Fairbank, et. al., “Economic Change," 20-21; Hsü, The Rise of Modern China, 527-534. On the more positive side of the ledger, consult Ernest Young, "Nationalism, Reform and Republican Revolution: East Asia: Essays in Interpretation, 160-162; Hsü, The Rise of Modern China, 535. 50 See, for example, Hatano Yoshihiro, "The New Armies,” in Mary Wright, ed., China in Revolution: The First Phase, 1900-1913 (New Haven and London, 1968). 51 Paul Cohen, Between Tradition and Modernity: Wang T'ao and Reform in Late Ch'ing China (Cambridge, Mass., 1974), 4, 148-149. 52 See Kublin. 53 Smith, "Foreign-Training:" Ralph Powell, The Rise of Chinese Military Power, 1895-1912 (Princeton, 1955), 245-246, 262. An interesting question is whether the Manchus could have preserved their power, and even enhanced it, by undertaking meaningful military reform at the central government level. Although vested interests in the army were pervasive and solidly entrenched, one cannot assume that what happened to the dynasty in 1911 would necessarily have happened in the same way had the Ch'ing government initiated reforms in the 1860's and 1870's comparable to those undertaken by the dynasty in the early 1890's. By the beginning of the twentieth century, anti-Manchu sentiment was a powerful ideological weapon, at least in part because the Manchus had proven so totally incapable of protecting Chinese interests against foreign encroachments. But during the Tung-chih period, anti-Manchuism was no real issue at all. 54 Dwight Perkins, "Government as an Obstacle to Industrialization: The Case of Nineteenth-Century China,” Journal of Economic History (1967), esp. 486, 492. ================================================================================ RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊 | RAS-1978 https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/8g84t8593 MILITARY EDUCATION IN CHINA, 1842-1895 100 Powell, 56-59; Peake, 20-22; Wang, Huai-ch'in, 363; etc. 39 101 Wang Chia-chien, "Pei-yang wu-pei hsüeh-tang," 1, 8; Powell, 235-236. 102 Chinese Times, April 30, 1887; Ayers, 118. 103 See Ernest Young, "Nationalism, Reform and Republican Revolution," in James Crowley, ed., Modern East Asia: Essays in Interpretation (New York, etc., 1971), 160-162; Yoshihiro Hatano, "The New Armies,” in Mary Wright, ed., China in Revolution (New Haven and London, 1968), and Powell, passim. 104 For abundant documentation on the dilution of traditional values and loyalties at the Tientsin Military Academy, see Wang, "Pei-yang wu-pei hsüeh-tang," 9, 11-12, 19-20, and notes, Li Hung-chang had pointed out the need to study the Classics and History "in order to strengthen the root," but Wang claims that the students tended to adopt a foreign-worship mentality, ignored China's legendary heroes, and (in the words of a contemporary critic) neither discussed the virtues of integrity (chih) and duty (i), nor knew of honesty (lien) and shame (ch'ih). Cf. Chou Sheng-ch'uan's army song (Sheng-chün hsün-yung ko), CWCK, "supplement," 1: 50-52b. 105 The evidence, contained in CWCK, remains to be gathered systematically, but even a brief glance at Chou's nien-p'u and his extensive writings suggests these conflicts. 106 CWCK, 1.4: 30-47b, esp. 33b and 37. 107 Ibid., 1.1: 20a-b; 1.1.1: 10a-b; 1.1.2: 15b, 19b-20, 23b (on bullets and rations), 40b-41; etc. 108 CWCK, "introductory chuan (Chou's nien-p'u)" 31b-56 passim. Ironically, after Chou's death, the Sheng-chün was employed in work on the grounds of the Tientsin Military Academy. Chinese Times, May 28, 1887. 109 For Chou's concern with positive attitudes toward the military, see CWCK, "supplement," 1: 20b-21, 22b-23, 50-52b. For Chou's esteem for civil status, see CWCK, "introductory chuan," 57n. Cf. sources cited in note 72. 110 These tensions were not, of course, fully resolved — but neither were such tensions in the West. See Barnett, "The Education of Military Elites," esp. 21, 27, etc. On the emphasis on technical education at the Tientsin Military Academy, see the sources cited in note 104. 111 Ernest Young, The Presidency of Yuan Shih-k'ai (Ann Arbor, 1977), 58-59. 112 Ibid., 56. 113 Powell, 160. 114 Wang, "Pei-yang wu-pei hsüeh-tang," 8; Biggerstaff, 63. 115 Young, Yuan Shih-k'ai, 56-64; Powell, 79-81; Jerome Ch'en, "Defining Chinese Warlords and Their Factions," Bulletin of the London School of Oriental and African Studies, 31.3 (1966), and especially Wang, "Pei-yang wu-pei hsüeh-tang," 12-19, which discusses the careers of over 60 individuals from the academy. Young, 56, notes that of thirty "leading military participants" singled out by Liu Feng-han for "their subsequent prominence in the early republic," twenty-five had attended the Tientsin Military Academy before joining Yuan Shih-k'ai at Hsiao-chan (in the period 1895-1899). See Liu Feng-han, Hsin-chien lu-chün, 113-125. ================================================================================