RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊 | RAS-1976 https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/hq382988q 18 RICHARD J. SMITH Western attire in Japan, although never complete, undoubtedly received some of its impetus from the military. Likewise, the wearing of Western-style military caps necessitated the cutting of top-knots, which quickly became a mark of "enlightenment" in Japanese society generally. As early as the 1870's, the emperor began wearing a military uniform in the fashion of European royalty.39 One can hardly imagine a Chinese emperor doing the same. Another socio-cultural effect of military modernization was the boost given to music, drama, art, literature, and even the use of the Japanese vernacular by the Sino-Japanese War. Donald Keene has brilliantly summarized the impact of the war on these areas of Japanese life, emphasizing also the change in Japanese attitudes toward China, the growth of Japanese national pride, and the altered perceptions of Westerners toward Japan as a result of the war and Japan's resounding victory.40 In economic terms, the modernizing effect of the military is more difficult to judge. Ogawa's study of conscription, for example, sees the military as a mixed blessing in nearly every sphere of economic life, including labor, productivity, and consumption.41 Yet on balance, military development seems to have benefited the economy. Even the most outspoken critics of the military and its costs, such as Ono Giichi and H. T. Oshima, concede that there were at least some economic advantages to the Meiji program of military modernization—especially in the creation of military and military-related industries, which served as model plants, and in the increased demand for products through inter-industry linkages.42 Military needs, in other words, generated a demand for modern products produced by modern means, and contributed to the growth of economies of scale. The Sino-Japanese War brought Japan numerous economic benefits and a huge indemnity (231 million taels; nearly 368 million yen), which was put to effective modernizing use, although war expenditures and the indemnity did contribute to economic problems such as business fluctuations and inflation.43 For China, much of the foregoing discussion can be stated in reverse. Although the lack of a centralized military did not appreciably impair the Ch'ing government's authority as long as "regional" leaders remained loyal to the throne, it did prevent China from contending effectively with foreign aggression, and eventually undermined support of the dynasty. Furthermore, the fragmentation ================================================================================ RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊 | RAS-1976 https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/hq382988q STUDY OF MODERNIZATION IN CHINA & JAPAN 23 23 See Umetani Noboru, "Foreign Nationals Employed in Japan during the Years of Modernization," East Asian Cultural Studies, 10.1 (March, 1971). 24 Ibid., 5-6. 25 See Roger Hackett, "The Meiji Leaders and Modernization: The Case of Yamagata Aritomo," in Marius Jansen, ed., Changing Japanese Attitudes toward Modernization (Princeton, 1965). 26 Yamagata Aritomo, "The Japanese Army," in Okuma Shigenobu, comp., Fifty Years of New Japan (New York, 1909), 206. 27 Ibid., 206. 28 Ibid., 206-208. 29 Presseisen, vii; also chapters 2 and 4. 30 Ibid., esp. 135-136. As a professor at the Army Staff College and an adviser to the General Staff, Meckel helped to reorganize the Army Ministry, refine the General Staff, improve the system and content of Japanese military education, and develop the Japanese system of logistics and medical services. In addition, he helped restructure the army into divisions and taught the Japanese "the demands of full-scale mobilization, which included a strategic railroad network, a new conscription act, and improved staff exercises." 31 Mary Wright, The Last Stand, 220-221; Rawlinson, 167-204; Presseisen, 139-143; Hsü, The Rise of Modern China (New York, etc., 1975), 418-420; Yamagata Ariyoshi, "The Army," in Albert Stead, ed., Japan by the Japanese (London, 1904), 107-109; etc. 32 Cited in Roger Hackett, "The Military: Japan," in Robert E. Ward and Dankwart Rustow, eds., Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey (Princeton, 1964), 328. 33 Ike Nobutaka, "War and Modernization," in Robert Ward, ed., Political Development in Modern Japan (Princeton, 1968), 209. 34 Hackett, "The Military," 346-348. 35 See, for example, Ike, 196; also Shibusawa Keizo, ed., Japanese Life and Culture in the Meiji Era (translated and adapted by Charles Terry; Tokyo, 1958), 303-309, esp. 308-309. 36 Hackett, "The Military," 335. 37 Ogawa Gotaro, The Conscription System in Japan (New York, 1921), chapter 3. 38 Shibusawa, 306-307. 39 H. Paul Varley, Japanese Culture: A Short History (New York, 1973), 163-164. 40 Donald Keene, "The Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95 and Its Cultural Effects in Japan," in Donald Shively, ed., Tradition and Modernization in Japanese Culture (Princeton, 1971). 41 Ogawa, part 2. 42 See Harry T. Oshima, "Meiji Fiscal Policy and Economic Progress," in William Lockwood, ed., The State and Economic Enterprise in Japan (Princeton, 1968), esp. 372. See also Shibusawa, 305, 315; Fairbank, et al., 199-200; Ike, 205. ================================================================================ RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊 | RAS-1991 https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/k356gt84j 85 Nonetheless, a large portion of the participants in U.S.-China arts exchanges believe that, since the two countries are major players in international relations, mutual understanding of the other's culture was crucial in making the world a better place to live in. To the people in whose mind this theme loomed large, it was important to have a friendly relationship with China and exchanges in the arts were a handy way to achieve this goal. The uniqueness of Chinese culture has also motivated some Americans who saw that exchanges could bring to American culture some diversity and therefore enrich it. The interest of Americans in Chinese culture was obvious, as can be seen by, for instance, the increasing number of Americans travelling to China each year. Finally, but by no means the least important factor in supporting arts exchanges with China by private sectors, there was a rejuvenation of the affinity which can be traced back to the 19th century "special relationship" between the United States and China which existed to the 1940s. To some, the special opportunity for the United States to transfer its culture and products to China on favourable terms re-emerged as a result of the drastically increased contacts between the two countries in the Carter years. "Recognition of the People's Republic set long suppressed dreams of a return to China swirling in the minds of educators (the legatees of the missionary impulse) and businessmen." This helps to explain the involvement, rather intensive, of the RBF and the Henry Luce Foundation, which maintained close ties with China in the 1940s, and the United Board For Christian Higher Education, in China's arts education. Affinity and crisis The highpoint of Sino-American arts relations was in 1970-1981. In his visit to the United States in January 1979, Deng Xiaoping personally signed a cultural agreement with President Carter in Washington D.C.. While in the United States, Deng extended to Seiji Ozawa, conductor of the Boston Symphony Orchestra, an invitation for the BSO to visit China. When the BSO arrived in Beijing in March 1979, Deng again paid his personal tribute to Sino-American arts exchanges by personally attending its performance and welcoming it as the first American performing art group to visit China since the elevation of relations to ambassadorial level. Page 105 Page 106 ================================================================================ RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊 | RAS-1991 https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/k356gt84j 86 Like the visit of the Philadelphia Orchestra in 1973, the significance of the BSO's tour lay more in political consequences than in artistic accomplishment. Though the quality of the BSO's first Beijing concert was controversial to some Americans, due to some flaws in performance, all of its four concerts in China were fully attended and two of the three in Beijing were transmitted by China Central Television (CCTV). The media, musicians, music critics and journalists all offered praise. The atmosphere around the BSO's visit was so warm that the U.S. ambassador claimed the event pushed U.S.-China relations 20 years ahead. What made the BSO's trip different from that of the Philadelphia Orchestra in 1973 was that, though overshadowed by political significance, this tour did bring a chance for Chinese artists to exchange artistically with their American guests, due to the improvement in China's political and cultural environments. By 1979, many artists in China had returned to their former posts. Artistic activities were normalized to a significant extent. Artistically, the BSO's visit generated several concrete results: the Central Philharmonic Orchestra performed with the BSO under the baton of Seiji Ozawa; two of China's most prominent musicians, Liu Dehai and Liu Shikun, toured the United States along with the BSO when it went home in March 1979 and performed with the BSO in the United States; in December, Seiji Ozawa came to China again and conducted the CPO. This event was thus successful both politically and artistically. The impetus of Sino-American cultural exchanges resulting from the BSO's tour to China was reinforced in August 1979 when Vice President Mondale visited China and signed the first implementing accord under the cultural agreement. In his visit, Mondale praised Deng Xiaoping's visit to the United States in January for resparking the friendship of the American towards the Chinese people. This atmosphere of Sino-American cultural intimacy created by top political leaders received a new impulse in 1980 when the two governments exchanged high-level cultural delegations. In July, Chinese Vice Minister of Culture Liu Fuzhi visited the United States and the USICA director John E. Reinhardt returned his visit in October. In the latter's visit to China, both parties expressed hopes for more high-level exchanges, and confirmed the policy, agreed upon in Liu's earlier visit to the United States, to encourage and support private sector activities in cultural exchanges. Traditionally, China's cultural relations with Western countries have ================================================================================