RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊 | RAS-1973 https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/8910rj06r 158 NOTES AND QUERIES 22. 1865 Oct. 24 SACRAMENTO W.H. Nelson San Francisco to Hong Kong: London & San Francisco Bank Ltd. to Augustine Heard & Co. 85 7 boxes refined silver bars weighing 14225 ounces Troy 23. 1866 Feb. 2 100 BENEFACTOR Gordon Berry New York to Hong Kong: W.H. Smith & Son to order 35 casks and 5 bbls merchandise 24. 1866 March 13 VALETTA Charles Cavanagh San Francisco to Foochow: Macondray & Co. to Augustine Heard & Co. 600 quarter sacks flour 50 twenty hoop barrels flour 50 Cases bread 20 boxes maccaroni 20 boxes vermacelli 25. 1866 April 18 LUBRA San Francisco to Hong Kong: Benjamin P. Howes Dibblee & Hyde to Augustine Heard & Co. One sealed box containing 800 Mexican dollars 26. 1866 April 25 JEANIE W.C. Dunham New-York to Hong Kong: L.M. Murray Co, to Augustine Heard & Co. 50 cases oysters 27. 1866 May 14 JEANIE W.C. Dunham New-York to Hong Kong: Jas. Nickerson & Co. to Thomas Hunt & Co. 150 barrels flour 28. 1866 May 14 JEANIE W.C. Dunham New York to Hongkong: M.C.G. With to order 29 cases merchandize "Contents unknown. Goods to be received at ship's tackle when ready... 29. 1866 May 30 SUWONADA Jayne Shanghae to Hong Kong: Russell & Co. to same 113 pkgs merchandise "Copy" ================================================================================ RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊 | RAS-1973 https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/8910rj06r NOTES AND QUERIES 161 Galastauro, C. 6 Macao 4, 5, 11, 34, 36 Gilman & Co. 30 Macaroni 24 Gould, W.H. 34, 36 Mackenzie, Lieut. Comdr., U.S. Navy 35 HARRY HASTINGS Heard (Augustine) & Co. 20 Mackerel 38 14, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21 Mackillop. Stewart & Co. 24 Macondray & Co. 22, 24, 25, 26, 38 Magniac & Co. 1, 3, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 Hemp 33 Herrings 38 Matheson & Co. 34 Hobsons Bay (Melbourne) 17 Medicine 33 Holliday, Wise & Co. Hong Kong 14, 15, 16, 17, 18 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 25, 26 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33 34 Meren & Co. 1 MEROPE 3 Mitchinson, J. 6, 10 Moore, S. 34, 35, 37, 38 Hooghly, River (Bombay) Morgan, Stone & Co. 26 gang 9 Murray (L.M.) & Co. 1, 2, 3, 10, 13, 14, 20 Hookumchund, Oomedchund 13 Nankeens* 33 Howes, B. P. 25 Nelson, W. H. 22 Hunchund, Pemabhoy 14 New York 23, 26 27, 28, 32, 35 Hunt (Thomas) & Co. 27 Nickerson (Jas.) & Co. 27 Jafferbhoy (Ameeroodeen) Oil 33 & Co. 37 see also Downers oil, Turpentine Jardine, Matheson & Co, 13, 34 Jayne 29, 33 Opium 2, 3, 10, 11, 13, 14 JENNY (=JEANIE?) 16, 27, 28 Osborn, Cushing & Co. 17 35 Oysters 26 JOSHUA BATES 17 JULIA G. TYLER 19 Paddy 8 Jyiebhoy, Jamseljie [?] 10 PALMETTO 18 Parkyns, G. 3 Lead (metal) 17 Penang 6 LIGHTNING 14 PENANG MERCHANT 6, 10 Lintin 2, 6, 8, 9, 10, 12 PENGUIN 15 London 36 Pigs feet 38 London & San Francisco Bank Pollard, R. 15 Ltd. 22 Pork 38 LUBRA 25 Premjee, Mool Chund 13 *See notes at end of index ================================================================================ RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊 | RAS-1974 https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/x633mp077 O.S. S.S. 122 yau 攸 123 ye 爺 jraw jreah HONG KONG PLACE NAMES Meaning or Remarks Alternative to ngau (54). 155 Grandfather, i.e., the grand-father king of the mountain, an important genius loci. See wong-ye (120). For some reason this word suffers transformation into yi, jrih, jri (125), nai nray (49) nei nrey (53), lai, Iray (27), lei, Irey (31, 38) and ngai, ngray (54) which makes it appear possible that this is a Chinese adaptation of an aboriginal word. 124 yeung jreonq Sometimes interchangeable with mong (46), but in other cases can only mean 'village' and may be the Yao179 word yong. See ye (122). I = jci ཚ་ 125 yi 宜二 jrih 營盤 126 ying-pun jrenqpruunn 127 ying 應 jeng 128 yiu 窯 jriw Barracks. The places where this name occurs all appear to be on the route by which the Taipo pearls were convoyed to Castle Peak. In none of them was there a fortified place in the Ts'ing77 dynasty. See (77) and (3). See yan (121). Sometimes occurs where there is no kiln, nor tradition of one; and in those cases may be... ================================================================================ RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊 | RAS-1984 https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/5h73wh572 Trustee British Episcopal Church 1852-1853,199 TALBOT, G.W. 1864-1865 In 1874 he was a partner in Olyphant & Co., Hong Kong. Member of the NCBRAS 1864.201 200 221 Active in amateur dramatics and in March 1864 he participated in performances of the Shanghai Volunteer Theatrical. TATE, Joseph Priestley 1861-1862 Authorized to sign for Jas. Bowman & Co. April 23, 1858,203 later partner in Blain, Tate & Co.204 Member Committee Shanghai Literary and Scientific Society 1858,205 member NCBRAS till 1873,206 member Recreation Fund Committee 1866.207 Member Committee I. THORBURN, William 1855-1856 Lived in Shanghai from 1847;208 partner in Hargreaves & Co. till May 17, 1856,209 in Blenkin, Rawson & Co. from August 4, 1856,210 later (1863, 1864) partner in Jarvie, Thorburn & Co.211 Member Committee IV. Possibly Thorburn Road was named after him. THORNE, John 1858-1859 Came to China as agent of Wells Fargo & Co.;212 later he acted as a broker. From its foundation in October 1867 till December 1871 he was editor of "The Shanghai News-Letter for California and the Atlantic States".213 Member Committee Society for the Relief of Distressed Foreigners of All Nationalities, 1865;214 member Committee NCBRAS 1865.215 TURNER, Henry 1862-1863 Manager Agra and United Service Bank 1862.216 ================================================================================ RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊 | RAS-1985 https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/gt54s866x 15 11 At the time of my research in 1985, Tam was still alive in Canton. He has not altered his Protestant faith. 12 From my interview with Alfred Lo. 13 Lo translated it as the "Tao of Apocalypse." He probably was not aware that the word 'apocalypse' had connotations which were not in keeping with his teaching. 14 By now it is obvious that the first generation of disciples all changed their middle names to Han (). This is significant in that a name-change signifies a new identity, that is, the disciples were conscious that they belonged to a new sect. 15 **. This worshipping hall must have been built before the fall of Hong Kong to the Japanese, for Alfred Lo recalled the pillage of the hall by neighbouring villages during the period of lawlessness. Page 1 16 XANT · KM. There are certain esoteric elements in Lo's teaching, especially those which pertain to specific methods of sitting in meditation and the method of curing and of chasing of demons. These specific instructions cannot be divulged to the uninitiated. However, the abstract formulation of his teaching is open to the public. 17 至大至達顧聖紀念館講詞, 18 See his essay "Does God exist? { »h_27[® )". 19 神也否無形而有徵者也 20 有,形,名,性,欲,尬,恩怨,注,數情, 21 This text appears as the centre-piece on one of the altars of this sect. 22 This is as much as Lo is prepared to say about the creative function as the Supreme Deity. 23 See photo on the inside of back cover of the AM (Plate I). 24「歿後可以復歸干种」至大至尊顯聖紀念館講詞。「復貼於神,復節於無極」神之有無講詞。 25 AZGI, ch. 8. 26 Ibid., ch. 3. 27 神之有無。 28 Thus, human destiny in Tan Tse Tao is envisioned quite differently from monistic Indian religious thought. 29「養身之道先修達德伤去监性」太太真jch. 17. 30 Aliki chỉ 28. 31 Ibid., ch. 8. 32 Ibid., ch. 7. 33 神之有無 34 £ì, ch. 31. Also in f¡¡ ch. 18. Page 1 ================================================================================ RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊 | RAS-1990 https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/d79206299 344 REVIEW NOTES The following books have been received by the Journal from the publishers and are briefly noted here. Titles of immediate interest to the region are in bold letters; others are in standard type. All the books noted here have been placed in the RAS Library. THE BOOK REVIEW EDITOR Balfour-Paul, Glen, THE END OF EMPIRE IN THE MIDDLE EAST: BRITAIN'S RELINQUISHMENT OF POWER IN HER LAST THREE ARAB DEPENDENCIES, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1991. xxiii + 279pp. Notes. Bibliography. Comparative chronology. Index. The three Arab dependencies from which the British withdrew after World War II were the Sudan in 1955, South West Arabia (Aden) in 1967, and the Gulf States in 1971. Bernstein. Gail Lee, JAPANESE MARXIST: A PORTRAIT OF KAWAKAMI HAJIME 1879-1946. Paperback. Cambridge (Mass); Harvard University Press, 1976. Second Printing 1990. xiv + 221 pp. Notes. Bibliography. Glossary. Index. The subject, a professor at Kyoto Imperial University who embraced Marxism at the age of 40, is especially interesting in the context of his samurai family and early 20th century Japan. Blake, Stephen P., SHAHJAHANABAD: THE SOVEREIGN CITY OF MUGHAL INDIA. 1639-1739, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991. xvi + 226 pp. Glossary. Bibliography Index. This is a study of the old capital city of Old Delhi as a symbol of the power and influence the Mughal rulers were extending over their states in Pre-modern India. Brodie, Patrick, CRESCENT OVER CATHAY: CHINA AND JCI, 1898-1956, Hong Kong, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1990. Chan, Wing-tsit (editor), CHU HSI AND NEO-CONFUCIANISM, Honolulu, University of Hawaii Press, 1986. xii + 644 pp. Notes. Glossaries. Appendixes. Index. This is a comprehensive and extremely important publication on Neo-Confucianism, comprising more than 30 papers presented at an international conference on Chu Hsi (Zhu Xi; 1130-1200) at the University of Hawaii in the summer of 1982. The papers, by noted and respected contemporary scholars in the field in Chinese, English, and Japanese, are presented in English in this volume. ================================================================================ RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊 | RAS-1996 https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/3n209j641 180 The Issei, "The Jiao Festival in Hong Kong and the New Territories," in Julian F. Pas, ed., Turning of the Tides: Religion in China Today (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1989), pp. 271-298 Interviews: K'ung Chao-hsiang (age 79), Lung Tseng Tau, Jul 6, 1991; Hsieh Ch'i, op. cit. Interview of Mo Shu-ling (age 65), Mok Ka, Jun 29, 1991 Interview of Lo Ch'uan, op. cit., Jul 8, 1991 [hid] "Ho, op. cit.; while some villagers did not remember the role of the Houwang in the rituals, an old man, who had witnessed the festival three times, indicated that the Houwang idol would be "invited" from the temple and enshrined on an altar set up for the ceremony (Interview of Lo Ch'uan, op. cit., Chap Mun Tau, Jun 22, 1991) "Tanaka, op. cit., pp. 273-274 *Faure, 1986, op. cit., p. 84 14 James Hayes, The Rural Communities of Hong Kong: Studies and Themes (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1983), pp. 159-160 "Ho, op. cit., p. 6 16 Interviews: Cheng P'o, op. cit.; K'ung Chao-hsiang, op. cit. "Interviews: Cheng Man-hung, op. cit.; the Tung Chung Public School, Jul 1991; Tseng Kuan-hsing (age 60+), Upper Ling Pei, Jul 12, 1991 *Interview of K'ung Chao-hsiang, op. cit. 14 JCH Ibid.; Interviews: "Uncle Li", op. cit.; Cheng Man-hung, op. cit.; the Tung Chung Rural Committee, Aug 12, 1991 Interview of Feng Po (age 65), Ma Wan Chung, Jun 16, 1991 Brum, op. cit. *James Hayes, "Chinese Temples in the Local Setting," in Some Traditional Chinese Ideas and Conceptions in Hong Kong Social Life Today, Week-end symposium, Oct 2, 1966, the Hong Kong Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, p. 92 "Faure, 1981, op. cit., p. 76 **"Ch'ung-hsiu Houwang-miao pei-chih," IV, 1910, collected in K'o Ta-wen, Lu Hung-chi, & Wu Lun Ni-hsia, comp., Hsiang-kang... ================================================================================ RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊 | RAS-1997 https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/wp98g7579 Africa and South-east Asia to be suspicious of the pretensions of local leaders whose personal interests were not always easily identifiable with those of the common man—or, in their new surroundings, the worker in the plastics factory and his family. They had been conditioned by British policy and practice elsewhere to accept a goal of parliamentary democracy and self-determination as the norm; and while admitting that Hong Kong was, in the other cant phrase, “unique,” they saw no reason for it to be utterly different in ethos. Someone who appreciated the subtle differences within colonies and between their officials was the last Colonial Service Governor, Sir David Clive Crosbie Trench GCMG MC. Trench had started his service in the Western Pacific, where as a District Officer in the Solomon Islands he had been a wartime "coastwatcher" in the mountains, reporting on Japanese activity, and had earned a military decoration during the Allies' reoccupation. He was one of the few Administrative Officers to benefit from the old Colonial Office's unspoken "seven year rule." Under this, those who had spent that length of time in the supposedly enervating climate and mores of the Pacific should be sent to more politically and mentally bracing parts of the empire, the better to come back refreshed when more senior (determined Resident Commissioners in the Western Pacific, who thought seven years only just enough to train their juniors in the proper ways, usually managed to circumvent this best-laid plan.) Trench came to Hong Kong after the war, where he acquired a strong and popular reputation, notably in the Labour Department, as reorganiser of the Fire Brigade and as Deputy Colonial Secretary (DCS). It was no surprise when he went back to the Western Pacific as High Commissioner; there he presided over the creation for the egalitarian Melanesian society in the Solomon Islands of a novel democratic form of government based, via a constitution already adapted for Ceylon, on the pre-war London County Council, with committees instead of ministers (some of whose chairmen, however, inevitably assumed ministerial pretensions.) After three years, he returned to Hong Kong as Governor in 1964. Before he had left, Trench had naturally always shown greater sympathy with and understanding of the "interlopers," as the aforesaid subset was vulgarly known, than did some of his senior colleagues. Although relations with a governor were inevitably more remote than those with a senior secretariat officer had been, he contrived not to be ================================================================================ RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊 | RAS-1997 https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/wp98g7579 4 aloof on his return. The present writer can vouch for his active approval of an African-inspired experiment whereby departmental administrative officers in the urban areas would collect and transmit upwards a monthly 'intelligence digest' of local opinion, morale and responses to government action or inaction, and of attitudes to prominent local figures and to Chinese or foreign affairs: this was meant to supplement what was collected in their own specialist manners by the HK Police Special Branch (SB), the New Territories Administration (NTA), the Foreign & Commonwealth Office (FCO)'s Political Adviser (PA) and the Security Liaison Officer (SLO). Some of what was collected may have been too near the knuckle, some was rather too easily discounted as mere "gossip," important though that might be as a reflection of influential belief at the grass roots, and some may have hurt the dignity of those who had the existing duty of intelligence-gathering. The governor was persuaded to drop the experiment as proving trivial. But Trench also showed interest in another interloping proposal that, in the absence of any generalist government institutions to supplement the Secretary for Chinese Affairs (SCA)'s advisory staff (who liaised with the various kai fong (Neighbourhood) Welfare Associations, Clansmens' Associations and Residents' Associations, which were often self-perpetuating), District Officers (DOs) should be appointed in the urban areas; these should have certain executive functions, fewer than those of their colleagues in the New Territories so as not to encroach on the licensing prerogatives of the Urban Council, but sufficient to ensure that all should know of their existence and, above all, of where their offices were. Primarily they should oversee and co-ordinate the activities of the various professional and technical departments in their bailiwicks, but also, like paternalistic mandarins, inquire into, report upon and seek answers to the needs and concerns of the inhabitants. This suggestion was effectively smothered by a DCS who was unable to understand what such DOs might achieve in a city that existing institutions did not already adequately do: the concept of such junior, peripheral, government officers being responsive to people, as opposed to being mere executive agents responsible for essential infrastructural public services, was alien. Apart from the SCA's and District Commissioner New Territories (DCNT)'s contacts with often self-appointed élites, there was little by way of direct exchange with the man in the street: the same DCS once said, "Government must, of ================================================================================ RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊 | RAS-2002 https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/mp4901278 36 after Britain lost Hong Kong, the closest Allied power to the territory was its original owner China. Then there was Hong Kong's status as a port. Any mainland port that touched the Pacific attracted the attention of the USN, because it was in its interest that China continued to keep the bulk of the Japanese Army occupied on the continent while the U.S. seized Japan's possessions in the Pacific. Hence, Allied commanders like Admiral Ernest King, the USN's highest-ranking officer and a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), thought that the U.S. had a major responsibility to help keep China in the war, In 1943, China was tying down 20 per cent of the Japanese Army. No major fighting had occurred there for a while, but the Allies knew that this relative calm might not last. The fear that Japan would resume her efforts to knock China out of the war was real, and Allied planners wanted to prevent this by keeping the Chinese Army (of the Nationalist government) battle-worthy. To do this, they had to establish and maintain secure lines of communication (LoC) into China. As Japan had already occupied China's ports and the lone road into China from Burma (the Burma Road), the sole means of supplying China was through a risky, costly, and feeble air route over the Himalayas (the Hump). The best method of supplying China was to recapture a port on the China Coast and establishing LoC to the interior of China. Initially, the Chinese Army was allotted the bulk of this task - if it could be strengthened by deliveries over the Hump and (if the Allies could retake it) the Burma Road. But by 1943, supplies over the Hump remained minuscule, the Burma Road was not reopened, and the Chinese (Nationalists, Communists, and third-party elements) preferred to fight among themselves rather than against the Japanese. With the Allied drives in the Pacific gathering momentum, the main responsibility for a campaign to recapture a port on the China Coast eventually fell to the U.S. Hong Kong and Shanghai have long been the two best ports on the China Coast, with each possessing excellent harbour facilities. But Hong Kong rated ahead of Shanghai as the initial port to be opened up in China because of the strong Japanese presence around Shanghai. In the Hong Kong-Canton area during 1943, the Japanese still occupied only a beachhead. As long as Hong Kong remained a beachhead, and the Chinese forces ringing it maintained a measure of resolve, Japanese ================================================================================ RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊 | RAS-2002 https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/mp4901278 52 than the US$2 billion Manhattan Project that built the atom bomb - and its total production run stopped just short of 4,000. (In comparison, the combined production run for its predecessors - the B-17 and B-24 - surpassed 30,000.) As previously mentioned, the B-29's novelty was enough to render some of its numbers unserviceable due to mechanical failures. But a low production rate and a shortage of trained air crews and fuel also contributed to its meagre deployment when it first went into action in 1944. In a place like Hong Kong, bad weather could reduce the number of operational B-29s even further. The fuel shortage problem was exacerbated when the JCS ordered that bombing operations against Japan commence before Hong Kong's recapture.48 Thus, the B-29s began bombing Japan from bases in Central China. Such extreme distances for the time - about 1,600 miles (2,575 km) from their targets - increased the fuel consumption of each aircraft and reduced its bomb load to two tons. As a land or sea route into China had not yet been reopened, all supplies had to be flown in over the Hump by the B-29s themselves (sometimes supplemented by B-24s), which was a wasteful task because each B-29 had to expend two tons of fuel to haul one ton of supplies.49 These early bombing missions were inauspicious, with a good raid numbering only about 100 unescorted B-29s (compared to the 1,000-plane raids the Allies were by then routinely making against Germany), and usually less. The primitive airfields of Central China were not all-weather; although the runways would be painstakingly constructed to such standards, and a few B-29s would sometimes be mired in mud after heavy rains and therefore written off for a mission,50 Tokyo (enemy capitals were used as benchmarks), however, lay beyond the range of a B-29 operating out of Central China. If B-29s were to operate from Hong Kong, which was about 1,800 miles (2,897 km) from Tokyo, each bomber would theoretically be able to carry only about 20 percent of its maximum 10-ton bomb load. This doesn't take into account other factors, like the need to fly off course and make evasive manoeuvres during combat, and obviously the weather. This would necessitate cutting back even further on bombs in favour of more fuel. While B-29s based in Hong Kong could bomb other areas of Japan that were closer, the Allies knew that only an ability to get off consistent and heavy strikes at the Japanese capital would have the desired political, if not military, effect on the enemy. Hence, a bomber ================================================================================ RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊 | RAS-2002 https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/mp4901278 58 1. 1 Edward S. Miller, War Plan Orange: the U.S. Strategy to Defeat Japan (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1991), p.14. 2 Miller, p.21-22, 24. 3 Miller, p.33-36. (1) Steven T. Ross (ed.), American War Plans, 1919-1941, vol.2 (New York: Garland Publishers, 1992), p.125-126. (2) Miller, p.4-5, 31-32. • Ernest J. King & Walter Muir Whitehill, Fleet Admiral King, A Naval Record (New York: WW Norton & Co., Inc., 1952), p.432. The JCS was the military committee that directed the war on the American side. 6 Charles F. Romanus & Riley Sunderland, Stilwell's Command Problems, 1956 of U.S. Army in World War II: the China-Burma-India Theater, (pt. Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1976), p.10. 7 Christopher M. Bell, "Our Most Exposed Outpost: Hong Kong and British Far Eastern Strategy, 1921-1941," The Journal of Military History, 60 (January 1996), p.65. • Colonel Lindsay T. Ride, "Memorandum on the Liberation of Prisoners-of-War, Hong Kong," 30 Sep 43, p.11-13; Series 2/33, BAAG (British Army Aid Group) Correspondence Concerning Operations, September 1942-November 1943; Personal Papers of Sir Lindsay Tasman Ride (microform); Canberra, ACT: Australian War Memorial, 2001 (hereinafter known as the Ride Papers). * Unless otherwise noted, information for this section was collected from Weather Information Branch, HQ, USAAF, R&A Report #71087, "Climate of Hong Kong (China)," October 1943; Intelligence Reports ("Regular Series"), 1941-1945; Research and Analysis Branch Division; Records of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), RG226; National Archives (NA), Washington, DC. 10 Later, it was reported that an all-weather road ran from Hong Kong to Canton, and the Japanese had improved other roads nearby to the same capacity. See "G-2 Estimates of the Following Places: Haiphong-Liuchow Peninsula-Hainan Island-Hong Kong-Swatow-Amoy-Foochow-Santuao-Wenchow-Hangchow Bay Region-Laoyao-Chingtao-and the Tip of the Shantung Peninsula to Include Wei Hai Wei," 17 Feb 45, p.5; Ch.7-Intelligence, Correspondence, 1945, Folder ================================================================================ RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊 | RAS-2002 https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/mp4901278 60 would be unfavourable. 18 G.S.P. Heywood, Hong Kong Typhoons (Hong Kong: Government Printers, 1950), p.15. 19 Spring 1944 estimates for the number of Japanese aircraft able to oppose a Hong Kong landing numbered 400, with perhaps another 1,150 in nearby areas able to be diverted to Hong Kong. Allied planners believed that they could maintain a CAP of about 120 aircraft over Hong Kong at any time. See (1) CPS107/1, p.35-36, 40. (2) JIC177, "Campaign in China: Japanese Aircraft Available to Oppose a Landing in the Hong Kong Area," 21 Mar 44, p.3-4; CCS381 Hong Kong; RG218; NA, Washington, DC. 20 Heywood, p.15. 21 There are other possible origins of the word. Tufan means smoke in Arabic, and typhon means monster in Greek. See William J. Kotsch & Richard Henderson, Heavy Weather Guide, 2nd Ed. (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1984), p.167. 22 (1) Heywood, p.1-2. (2) Hans Christian Adamson & George Francis Kosco, Halsey's Typhoons (New York: Crown Publishers, Inc., 1967), p.10-14, 176-177. 23 Heywood, p.1. 24 (1) HKRO, Tropical Cyclones, p.2. (2) Heywood, p.16, 19. (3) Adamson & Kosco, p.11-12. 25 (1) HKRO, Meteorological Results, 1937 (Hong Kong: Government Printers, 1938), Appendix II, p.4-5 (hereafter referred to as HKRO, Meteorological Results). (2) Denis Campbell Bray, Hong Kong Metamorphosis (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2001), p.144. (3) Gordon John Bell, Surface Winds in Hong Kong Typhoons: Preliminary Report (Hong Kong: Royal Observatory, 1963), p.1 26 (1) HKRO, Meteorological Results, p.6. (2) South China Morning Post (SCMP), September 4, 1937, p.12. 27 (1) HKRO, Meteorological Results, Appendix II. (2) Charles E.J. Eather, Airport of the Nine Dragons: Kai Tak, Kowloon (Surfer's Paradise, Queensland: Ching ================================================================================ RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊 | RAS-2002 https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/mp4901278 61 28 Chic Publishers, 1996), p.12-14. (3) Heywood, p.17: Typhoon winds that approach Hong Kong from the southeast blow on Victoria Harbour from the north, so Kowloon's mountains can serve as a partial barrier. See Donald Alan Mantner & Samson Brand, An Evaluation of Hong Kong Harbour as a Typhoon Haven (Monterey, CA: Environmental Prediction Research Facility, Naval Postgraduate School, 1973), p.53. 29 Navy Department, "Advanced Base: Hong Kong," p.14-15. However, Tolo Harbour could do little more than serve as a secondary anchorage because shore facilities in Tai Po were limited. 30 31 32 (1) Heywood, p.7-8. (2) Adamson & Kosco, p.12. Although described by many sources as a "tidal wave," the wave would be more appropriately described as a storm surge because it is not caused by the moon. HKRO, A Statistical Survey of Typhoons and Tropical Depressions in the Western Pacific and China Sea Area From 1884 to 1947 (Hong Kong: Government Printers, 1951), p.3 (hereafter referred to as HKRO, Statistical Survey). See also P.C. Chin's Tropical Cyclone Climatology for the China Seas and Western Pacific From 1884 to 1970, Vol. I: Basic Data (Hong Kong: Government Printers, 1972) for maps of typhoon tracks for each year. 33 The evasion option became more popular after the war, probably because of better typhoon location and tracking methods. See Mantner & Brand, p.78-79, 88. The authors cited British and American dissatisfaction with Hong Kong as a "safe haven" for ships during a typhoon. 34 HKRO, Statistical Survey, p.9. 35 Romanus & Sunderland, Stilwell's Mission to China, 1953 of U.S. Army in World War II: the China-Burma-India Theater (rpt. Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1984), p.12-13. CPS 83, "Appreciation and Plan for the Defeat of Japan,” 8 Aug 43, Map F; CCS 381 Japan (8-25-42), sec.6; Geographic File, 1942-45; Records of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, RG 218; NA, Washington, DC. The map shows that Hong Kong lay within the minimum area required for the air bombardment of Japan. * United States Army Air Force, B-29 Erection and Maintenance Manual (Dayton, ================================================================================ RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊 | RAS-2002 https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/mp4901278 63 45 USAAF, p.178. 46 (1) G.L.D. Alderson, History of Royal Air Force Kai Tak (Hong Kong: Royal Air Force Kai Tak, 1972), p.70-71. (2) SCMP, July 20, 1946 (Morning Edition), p.1. (3) Eather, p.54-56. 47 For bomber production figures, see Adrian Gilbert (ed.), The Military Hardware of World War II: Tanks, Aircraft and Naval Vessels (New York: Random House Value Publishing, 1985). *CCS323, "Air Plan for the Defeat of Japan," 20 Aug 43, p.3; CCS373.11 Japan (8-20-43), pt.1; RG218; NA, Washington, DC. "The mission for B-29s flying their own supplies over the Hump was codenamed MATTERHORN (for the B-24s DRAKE). See (1) CPS86/2, "The Defeat of Japan Within Twelve Months After the Defeat of Germany," 25 Oct 43, p.4; sec. 8; RG218; NA, Washington, DC. (2) CCS417/2, "Overall Plan for the Defeat of Japan," 23 Dec 43, p.10-15; sec.10; RG218; NA, Washington, DC, So Wheeler, p.35, 59. The runways in China were 19 inches (almost half a metre) thick and made of hand-crushed rock. 51 CPS86/2, Map II, "B-29 Factor of Effectiveness at Various Ranges". The exact ranges and maximum bomb load at each range are as follows: 1,367 miles (2,200 km) 10 tons 1,484 miles (2,390 km) 8 tons 1,614 miles (2,600 km) 5 tons 1,860 miles (3,000 km) 2 tons As the figures show, an extra 500 miles (805 km) one way for a B-29 theoretically reduced its bomb load by 80 per cent! 52 Waichow Intelligence Summary No.16, 14 Jan 43, p.9; Series 11/7; Chop Suey, WIS Sub-Division No.1; Prisoner of War Camps and Covering Letters: File Ref. 5668/A; Waichow Intelligence Summary Nos.29-34; May-June 1943; Ride Fapers. Allied planners believed that the Japanese could commit up to four battleships and three fleet carriers to harass Allied LoC to Hong Kong. See CPS107/1, p.37, 119. ================================================================================