RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊 | RAS-1962
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86 

J. W. HAYES 

Despite the presence of troops, military posts and police of two types in the Territory, besides the assistance of the local kuk, the magistrate's power to prevent crime appears to have been limited. Piracy, in particular, was rampant at different times, and ranged from the anti-dynastic activities of Koxinga in the mid-seventeenth century on behalf of his former masters the Great Ming, (which occasioned the removal from the coast) through the widespread depredations of large pirate bands at the beginning of the nineteenth, to the milder but still disconcerting activities of the period under review. 

It is necessary to emphasise the prevailing unrest, since until quite recently the only striking difference between the New Territory in 1898 and the territory we know to-day was the imposition of the pax britannica. Until the British Government got into the saddle and established its police stations and patrolling launches, the people were subject to piracy, robbery and other forms of violence as from time immemorial. The Governor mentioned specifically in a despatch to the Secretary of State in April 1899 that “the (Tai Po) district is well known in Canton (i.e. to the Viceroy) to be turbulent, that to the N.E. of Mirs Bay being noted for piracy, and so ill-disposed that I am informed no Customs Official dares to land there except with the support of a revenue cruiser”.30 He probably had this from 

Lockhart, his main source of reliable information at this time. Of course, the local population were sometimes not averse to such efforts themselves, and as a British Consul wrote at the time "The old free-booting spirit still survives among many who are now apparently peaceful traders and fishermen [of which] we occasionally get startling proofs in some unexpected daring act of piracy on the high seas or along the coast".31 Smuggling was also common, whether of salt or opium.** 

Looking outside the district to the province and its capital city Canton, the political scene, as revealed by the Trade Reports to the Foreign Office of consuls in the several British treaty ports of Canton, Amoy, Samshui and Pakhoi was the reverse of satisfactory. Though written by a succession of men of obviously varying temperament and outlook they reveal a sad state of affairs. Everywhere there were disturbances which the civil authorities were slow, or incapable to correct, and clear signs that the dynasty was held to have exhausted its mandate from
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RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊 | RAS-1963
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BRITISH LEGATION AT PEKING

61

acquire at Peking a site for Building, or may hire Houses, for the accommodation of Her Majesty's mission, and that the Chinese Government will assist it in so doing". Then, when the Imperial Government appeared to procrastinate over the ratification of these treaties, another English and French force fought its way to the capital and compelled the Manchu authorities to ratify them by the Convention of Peking. This was signed by the British envoy, Lord Elgin,1 and by Prince Kung,2 the chief Chinese representative, on October 24th, 1860 in the Hall of Ceremonies situated in what was later to be called Legation Street. The second clause of the Convention stated that "Her Britannic Majesty's Representative will henceforward reside permanently, or occasionally, at Peking, as Her Britannic Majesty shall be pleased to decide”. 

Lord Elgin proposed that Prince Kung's own residence should be rented to the British, but Prince Kung memorialized the throne as follows: 

As regards the matter of the English residing at the capital in the near future, we have been discussing it with them during the past few days. The chief barbarian official [Lord Elgin] considers that the quarters in Prince I's [Prince Kung] palace are spacious and he insists that it is to be their future residence at the capital. Moreover, he stated that there were still open spaces in the palace and that he wants to build houses there himself. It seems to your ministers that to 

1 James Bruce, eighth Earl of Elgin. He served as Governor-General of Canada 1846-1854. In 1857 he was appointed envoy extraordinary to China and signed the Treaty of Tientsin in 1858, returning to England early in 1859. In 1860 he was again sent to China as special envoy, and signed the Convention of Peking. He returned to England in 1861 and was appointed Governor-General of India in the same year. He died in India in 1863. 

His younger brother Frederick William Bruce held the post of Colonial Secretary at Hong Kong from 9 February 1844 until 27 June 1846. In 1857 he accompanied his elder brother to China as principal secretary. He was appointed minister plenipotentiary to the Emperor of China in December 1858, but had to wait until March 1861 before actually taking up residence in Peking. He left China on his appointment as British Minister to Washington in 1865. 

2 I-hsin (1833-1898), the first Prince Kung, was the sixth son of Emperor Tao-kuang. When the joint French and British forces approached Peking in September 1860 the Emperor Hsien-feng fled to Jehol leaving his half-brother, Prince Kung, to make peace with the allies. When a prototype Chinese foreign office, the Tsungli Yamen, was set up in 1861, Prince Kung was in charge of it, and he played an important part in Chinese affairs for the next fifteen years.
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RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊 | RAS-1964
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JOURNAL OF OCCURRANCES AT CANTON

39

was persuaded to join the firm of Baring Brothers & Co. In 1873 he became senior partner of the house, finally retiring in 1882. (L.T.R.)

24 Lin Tse-hsü's fate. Hunter long survived Commissioner Lin. Lin Tse-hsü was dismissed from office in 1840 and later sentenced to exile in Ili in Chinese Turkistan, where he remained for three years. He was allowed to return to Peking in 1845. He later served as Governor-General of Yunnan and Kweichow, and retired from office in 1849. He died in 1850 at the age of sixty-seven. (J.L.C.B.)

25 Heang-shan (Heungshan). Former name of the District in which Macao lies. Re-named Chung-shan in honour of Sun Yat-sen. (J.L.C-B.)

26 Morrison. John Robert Morrison (1814-1843) was born in Macao, the second son of Dr. Robert Morrison and his first wife Mary (née Morton). He had some schooling in England but at the age of twelve he came back to Canton with his father in 1826. He became a fluent Cantonese speaker as well as a Chinese scholar, and on the death of his father in 1834 was appointed Chinese Secretary to H.M.'s Commission in China. In 1838 he became, in addition, Interpreter, and in 1841 succeeded Elmslie as Secretary and Treasurer to the Superintendent of British Trade in China. In 1843 he was appointed Chinese Secretary and member of the Executive Council of the newly founded Colony of Hong Kong and was recommended for appointment, by the Governor, as Colonial Secretary. Before the appointment was approved, however, he died in Macao in August 1843, and was buried in the Old Protestant Cemetery there. (L.T.R.)

27 Kwang Chow Foo. Kuang-chou fu The Prefect of the Prefecture of which Canton was the chief city. (J.L.C-B.)

28 Kam Hay Hue. No such title. But I suspect Hunter intended to indicate the Namhoi Hien which title was sometimes written Nam Hoy Hien. See note 14. (J.L.C-B.)

29 Pwan Yu Hue. Also written Punyu Hien. The magistrate having jurisdiction over the eastern part of Canton city and the District lying to the westward of the walls which included Whampoa and the foreign shipping there. (J.L.C-B.)

30 Fearon, Samuel Turner Fearon was the second son of Christopher Fearon and Elizabeth Noad who were married on 14 May 1818 at the Streatham Parish Church. His father served as a midshipman at the Battle of Trafalgar and after being discharged from the Royal Navy he joined the Honourable East India Company's marine service. In this service he made a number of voyages to Canton and when he decided to take a shore posting there he brought his wife and family out with him. Samuel became a fluent Cantonese speaker and in 1838 was appointed Interpreter to the Canton General Chamber of Commerce. After the cession of Hong Kong he was appointed interpreter and clerk of the Chief Magistrate's Court and a couple of months later were added the duties of Notary Public and Coroner. Three years later he was appointed Assistant Magistrate of Police and on 1st January 1845 he became Registrar General and Collector of Revenue. In July 1845 he was granted a year's sick leave and while in England he was appointed Professor of Chinese at King's College, London, an appointment which he held from December 1846 until December 1852. (L.T.R.)

31 Van Basel. Magdalenus Jacobus Senn van Basel, born in Groningen, Holland on 27 September 1808, was appointed clerk in the Dutch Consulate at Canton in 1826, and Vice-Consul in November 1831. He was later in partnership with G. M. Toe Laer and P. Tiedenan in the firm of Senn van Basel & Toe Laer & Co. In 1848 he became Collector General of Taxes
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RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊 | RAS-1969
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CHINESE UNOFFICIAL MEMBERS OF COUNCILS

As things turned out, Gibb did not return to Hong Kong, and Ng Choy was therefore appointed on a three-year term. This appointment was unfortunately interpreted by some members of the British community as an attempt to create an anti-English party feeling in Hong Kong.

In May 1880 when one of the magistrates went on leave, the Governor replaced him temporarily by Ng Choy who thus became the first Chinese to hold a senior appointment in the Hong Kong Government. This led to a question in the House of Commons as to why Ng Choy should combine a paid official post with an unofficial seat in the Legislative Council; but by the time these explanations were required the original holder of the post had returned to the Colony.

The attitude of the British community towards him and the Governor as a result of his appointment to the Legislative Council as well as this parliamentary question must have embarrassed Ng Choy very much. During this time, China having suffered repeated defeats from the hands of foreign powers, there was a movement in China to promote western technology and to modernize China, and any Chinese who had been trained or educated abroad would be welcome back to China. Thus when an invitation came from China for him to serve China, Ng Choy accepted it gladly. He left Hong Kong in 1882 before the expiry of the 3-year term in the Legislative Council, and later sent in his resignation from Tientsin.

Ng Choy became Secretary and Legal Adviser to Viceroy Li Hung-chang, one of the most important Chinese political figures of the time. Now known as Wu Ting-fang, he soon rose to become Chief Director of Railways and later Ambassador to the U.S.A. After the founding of the Chinese Republic in 1911, he held important appointments respectively as Minister of Judicial Affairs, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Minister of Financial Affairs. In 1917, when China entered the First World War, he was for a short time nominated as Premier. In 1922 he became Governor of Kwangtung and died the same year in office, soon after General Chan Kwing-ming's revolt in Canton.*

* In his The Chinese (Indianapolis, The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1909) p. 196, John Stuart Thomson praises Wu and styles him "the Chesterfield of China in all the graces of speech and manners." Ed.

Page 15

Page 16
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94

R. BRUCE

necessary for the late King? He would be welcome then, that is in 1852. At the same time he took the initiative in improving trading conditions. Monopolies were partly removed and duties on imports and exports reduced. For a moment it seemed that Siam's foreign relations could be improved without formal treaty and the British Government did not press the matter. But in fact there was much to be done, and with a new British Plenipotentiary at Hong Kong it was opportune to resume discussions.

Sir John Bowring was a very different diplomat from his three British predecessors, Crawfurd, Burney and Brooke or the American envoys Roberts and Ballestier. He was an intellectual, a radical reformer, a disciple and editor of Jeremy Bentham, a linguist who could prattle in a dozen languages, an ex-Member of Parliament and a writer of hymns, an inveterate talker, a man with limitless energy and a Victorian capacity for pomposity and self-glory. After a career of business, politics, writing and self-appointed diplomacy in the courts of Europe, Bowring, being short of money, accepted public office as Consul at Canton. That was in 1849 when he was fifty-seven. Some five years later he became Governor of Hong Kong, Superintendent of Trade and, most glorious of all, Her Majesty's Plenipotentiary responsible for relations with China, Japan, Siam and all countries in the Far East.

Bowring's five years' Governorship of the island colony on the coast of China was anything but successful. Some of his senior officials were incompetent and even corrupt, and he was unpopular among the British merchants. Worst of all he precipitated the second Anglo-Chinese war by sending warships to bombard Canton over a quite unworthy incident. But he was completely successful when he sailed to Bangkok in March, 1855, to negotiate a treaty with the Siamese.

Most of the detailed business of the negotiations was done by Bowring's young assistants, his son John C. Bowring, an employee of Jardine, Matheson and Co. in Hong Kong, and Harry Parkes, his secretary, who was later to have a distinguished career as Consul at several ports on the China coast, (Mongkut referred to the young men as "Mr. Parkes and Your Excellency's upspring".) But it was Bowring and King Mongkut who created the favourable atmosphere which allowed progress to be rapid and the discussions congenial. It was clear from the start that the
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34

!

LEIGH R. WRIGHT

The issue of Brooke's status revolved around, firstly, the question of whether or not a subject of the Queen could hold the position as a sovereign prince of a foreign state; and, secondly, whether Brooke was in fact an independent ruler or a vassal of the Sultan of Brunei.

The issue, however, was not a burning one in the ministries of Whitehall. Despite the fact that Borneo was of concern to Britain as the guardian of the eastern flank of the South China Sea route to the China coast, and was to assume, gradually, more strategic value as first France and later Germany began colonial operations in the area, at mid-century Britain possessed a colony and naval station at Labuan and a (“good strong”) consular treaty with Brunei which gave her a certain measure of control, if she chose to indulge it, in Brunei's relations with foreign states. Most of the Colonial and Foreign Secretaries in London, until the 1870s were not very interested in defining precisely Raja Brooke's status,

For the most part, Whitehall grudgingly approved of Brooke's “civilizing influence" in Borneo. Lord Palmerston, Foreign Secretary in 1846, offered naval support for the suppression of piracy, and during a later term of office gave standing orders to the Eastern squadron to visit Sarawak at regular intervals. But the Foreign Office generally held to the view that "it is not the policy of Her Majesty's Government that British subjects should possess territory on the mainland of Borneo".

Lord Clarendon, when Foreign Secretary in the mid-1850s, came close to disavowing Brooke's position in Sarawak. In 1853 the Raja took issue with a Foreign Office statement that seemed to assume that Brooke was a vassal of Brunei. Clarendon minuted,

It seems to me that the various documents tend to prove how cautiously the government abstained from recognizing his (Brooke's) independence although in various ways the anomalous character of his position has been admitted.

But Clarendon did not leave it at that. When in 1855 Spencer St. John succeeded Brooke as Consul in Brunei he suggested to the Foreign Office that he also be accredited to Sarawak as an independent state. The Raja agreed and insisted that the new consul must receive his exequatur from him. This act would render the desired

6 FO to Admiralty, 24 July 1846, FO 12/4.

7 Clarendon minute upon Brooke to FO, 27 September 1853, FO 12/13.
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RAJA JAMES BROOKE AND SARAWAK

37

France, and in 1859 he "broke off" relations with Britain, upon which the Foreign Secretary, Lord Russell commented,12

Tell Brooke that the people of Sarawak are welcome to any independence they can achieve and maintain but that a British subject cannot throw off his allegiance at pleasure.

And Spencer St. John noted13 that "the Raja's correspondence during this year with Her Majesty's Government was not pleasant, and ended, apparently, in complete estrangement”.

Over the years Brooke had acquired a respectable following of supporters in Britain and Singapore, among whom were some influential figures such as Lord Grey, Bishop Wilberforce of Oxford, and the late Victorian philanthropist, Miss Angela Burdett-Coutts, later Baroness Burdett-Coutts. His friends now took up his cause and lobbied Whitehall from the Prime Minister's office down.

Britain refused to extend a colonial or protectorate status to Sarawak on practical political grounds. Henry Layard, an under-secretary in the Foreign Office, wrote that a protectorate was declined because of the "inconvenience of such relations between this country and a foreign territory", because Sarawak “would not be of sufficient value politically and commercially", and because Brooke's title was not "sufficiently clear"14

Brooke's friends persuaded the Government to have another look at Sarawak, and in 1861 Lord Elgin, who was about to depart as the new viceroy of India, was instructed to investigate the prospects and potential of Sarawak. He delegated the task to Colonel Cavenagh, Governor of the Straits Settlements. In due course Cavenagh and Elgin provided an optimistic assessment of Raja Brooke's state and suggested making Sarawak a lieutenant-governorship under Singapore. "I am disposed to think", wrote Lord Elgin,15

that the acquisition of Saigon by the French and the persistent endeavor of the Dutch authorities to cripple British trade... give enhanced importance to the preservation of the independence of Sarawak as a matter affecting British interests.'

12 See correspondence between the Foreign Office and Raja Brooke between 26 November and 17 December 1859, FO12/35.

13 Spencer St. John, Life of Sir James Brooke, Rajah of Sarawak, (Edinburgh, 1879) p. 327.

14 Layard memorandum to Lord Elgin, 2 January 1862, FO12/35.

15 Elgin to Russell, 8 January 1863, FO12/35.
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38

LEIGH R. WRIGHT

In the meantime Brooke's friend St. John, the Consul in Brunei, provided strong evidence to support Sarawak's claim of independence. In correspondence between the Sultan and the Foreign Office, Raja Brooke's relations with Brunei were the subject of discussion. Lord Russell in 1861 asked the consul if it was true that Brunei looked upon Sarawak as an independent state. He had been told that the Sultan honoured the Raja with a twenty-one gun salute whenever he visited Brunei Town. St. John replied that the Sultan did indeed consider Sarawak independent of Brunei. St. John also produced minutes of an interview he had had with the leading chiefs of Sarawak in which they unanimously confirmed that they had chosen the Tuan Besar, James Brooke, to rule over them in place of the harsh and tyrannical chiefs of Brunei, and that they owed no allegiance to the Sultan of Brunei.16

When, then, St. John's tour as Consul in Brunei ended in 1862 Brooke's friends, with a concerted lobbying effort, prevailed upon the Palmerston government to appoint a consul to Sarawak as distinct from Brunei. In August 1863 the Cabinet approved the appointment "as the most direct and least formal method of recognizing it as an independent state". Whatever in the way of reservations Lord Russell may have held concerning Brooke and Sarawak he was aware that the appointment meant recognition. He minuted some time earlier,17

If we appoint a consul I suppose he must be appointed to reside in the territory of the rajah of Sarawak as an independent sovereign.

And later, when Russell was urged to inform Raja Brooke "that the Cabinet had consented to recognize Sarawak by appointing a consul there", the Foreign Secretary instructed his undersecretary, "We may write to Sir James Brooke to say that he has reason to believe it". The Prime Minister, Lord Palmerston, concurred.

However, bureaucratic procedures now took over, and the Consul's instructions directed him to procure his official acceptance from

16 See L. R. Wright, Origins of British Borneo, pp. 75-76; and St. John, "Minutes of an interview with Sarawak Chiefs", 25th October 1855, FO 12/22.

17 Russell minute on a memo, by Brooke, 13 August 1863, in the Layard Papers (British Museum), ADD.MSS. 38989, f. 244,

18 Russell minute, Layard Papers, ADD.MSS. 38989, f. 245.
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SIR JAMES HALDANE STEWART LOCKHART

57

duties, and shown around various government departments. Lockhart then went by river steamer up to Canton to recruit a language teacher and learn Cantonese; but at times cadets were sent to Peking to learn Mandarin, the national language, because the Hong Kong Government always needed some officials who could converse in Mandarin with Chinese officials from the North.5

E.H. Parker, then serving in the Canton Consulate, tells us that: 'on the arrival in 1879 of a Hong Kong cadet (i.e., Lockhart) to study Chinese in Canton, I lent him “Old Ow”, who took the youngster up country and taught him Cantonese very well.' Ou-yang Hui 歐陽惠 -- known affectionately to several generations of cadets as 'Old Ow' was a Cantonese scholar who had once worked in a yamên in Hunan but had fallen out of favour with officialdom. Parker also says of ‘Old Ow' that Lockhart ‘always cherished a noble veneration for his memory; and, indeed, he it was who, as a cadet, first introduced “Old Ow" to "outer" barbarian life'. In 1893 Lockhart wrote that 'Old Ow' 'enjoyed a high reputation among several distinguished foreign students of Chinese for his power of ready and lucid explanation'. A few years after Lockhart's return from Canton (he became a ‘passed cadet' in 1882), he persuaded the old Cantonese scholar to come to Hong Kong and obtained for him a clerical post in the Registrar General's Department, in which Lockhart was then employed. In this department 'Old Ow' soon became a venerated institution, a lovable but formidable eccentric who deeply impressed young cadets with his Mandarin airs and graces and oddities. After his death, his portrait in oils was placed in the Registrar General's Office, a remarkable tribute to a relatively humble employee of the government.

Lockhart soon made his mark in the Hong Kong Civil service and his rise was rapid. He was appointed Superintendent of the Opium Revenue in March 1883; Assistant Colonial Secretary and Assistant Auditor-General in August of the same year; Acting Registrar-General in 1884 and 1885; Registrar-General in 1887, a post he occupied until 1901; and Colonial Secretary in 1895, a post he combined with that of Registrar-General. But in nineteenth-century Hong Kong departments were stringently staffed. In 1884, for example, when Lockhart worked as Assistant Colonial Secretary, apart from his superior, the Colonial Secretary, there were only five other assistants: a chief clerk and four junior clerks.
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36 

A. J. S. LACK 

At the same meeting another unofficial member, Mr. Osborne,* mounted a quite blistering attack upon Government's past failure to provide adequately for the shelter of the boat people in Hong Kong. He referred to the typhoon of 1841 and to the storm of 1874 in which over 2,000 lives were lost within the space of 6 hours and 35 foreign vessels were wrecked or badly damaged. He claimed that the screaming of those in distress on the water could be heard in the mid levels of the town above the noise of the storm. He went on to refer to subsequent and more recent typhoons, one of which (1906) had exacted a toll of 10,000 lives in two hours. He demanded to know what it was that had been done with the lessons of previous years, and came to the reluctant conclusion that very little had been done. He castigated Government's lavish expenditure on various new public buildings, notably the Supreme Court, the Harbour Office, and the intended Post Office Building, as being quite beyond the bounds of what was required, and ended with these remarks,

During a rather long residence in the Colony, I have had exceptional opportunities of coming into contact with the boat population. Though, like most humanity, their character is a blend of the good and the bad, there is one quality they possess in marked degree, which has always commanded my deep admiration, and that is their patience and philosophic bearing under circumstances of trial and suffering. In their name, Sir, and apart from the commercial aspect to which I have alluded, in the name of thousands who have already suffered in silence the misery wrought by these destructive storms, I appeal to your Excellency that there shall be no further delay in giving them the shelter which it is our clear and bounden duty to provide.

These words put the officials on their mettle. At the next meeting of the Council, the Director of Public Works and His Excellency the Governor were at pains to assure members that something was going to be done about the typhoon shelter: in fact, they had purchased a dredger on which to begin work on the foundations of the shelter. This provoked an unexpected row because some members considered that another dredger also for sale in the harbour at that

* Edward Osborne, listed in Who's Who in the Far East as Secretary of the Hong Kong and Kowloon Wharf and Godown Co., b. 1861, with P & O Steam Navigation Co. in London and Hong Kong 1880-1889. Director of Hong Kong Hotel, Dairy Farm, Steam Laundry, etc.
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98

TIN-YUKE CHAR

at the main mast of every war ship. . . . It was a pretty sight, very noisy and warlike.”* 

The Hong Kong Government Gazette of April 16, 1881, published the announcement with the Chinese and English placed side by side:

GOVERNMENT NOTIFICATION-No. 131.

His Majesty the King of HAWAII arrived in Hongkong on Tuesday evening, the 12th instant, and was welcome to the Colony by the Governor, in the name of Her Majesty Queen VICTORIA. His Majesty, the King KALAKAUA, was accompanied by His Excellency W. N. ARMSTRONG, Minister of State, and Colonel JUDD, Chamberlain,

By His Excellency's Command,

FREDERICK STEWART,

Acting Colonial Secretary.

Colonial Secretary's Office,

Hongkong, 16th April, 1881.

號一十三百一第報憲

署輔政使司史

爲篩論事照得現有

浩德護送前來於本月十二日卽禮拜二晚抵港 夏威儀國大君主加拉嘉華隨帶宰臣士當及司儀長參將

香港總督郎敬用

大英后帝城克多壢阿名迎接登岸爲此特示俾衆週知

一千八百八十一年 四月 十六

示

A tiffin (luncheon) party was given by Mr. Chater, a rich merchant.† Men of all nationalities came to meet the King and his party at this magnificent affair. The King asked Armstrong to take his place and propose a toast to the Governor who later asked Armstrong to write out the speech for transmission to the Home Government in London. Armstrong in his letters back to Foreign Minister Green mentioned, "I must admit having a glorious time with Sir John Pope Hennessy, as he is a man of immense information, great experience, and liberality. . . . Governor Hennessy will

* The Hawaiian flag was designed by Capt. Alexander Adams, Englishman, in 1810, with eight stripes for the islands and the British Union Jack in the upper left corner.

† See Plate 16.
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THE U.S. AND THE QUESTION OF HONG KONG 1941-45

9

Hong Kong, stated without authorization but from his "knowledge of the movement of opinion in England", he felt confident that when the time came to deal with Hong Kong, the Chinese would be completely satisfied." The Foreign Office was naturally most displeased by such an utterance,36

By contrast, the American behaviour at the conference was dis-coordinated. While much of the criticism of British imperialism and skepticism regarding the British attitude and intention in respect to the Atlantic Charter were expressed by the American participants, and while they generally supported the Chinese stand on Hong Kong, the pressure they succeeded in exerting was considerably discounted because they failed to function as a closely coordinated team. Stanley Hornbeck, a delegate to the conference, commented specifically on the organization of the American group in a memorandum on his observations of the conference: "It needs to be kept in mind with regard to I.P.R. Conferences that, whereas, as a rule, the Groups from most countries... attend and function as “delegations” (with a certain amount of guidance if not definite instructions from their Governments), the members of the American Group attend the function simply as members (without a "group" organization and without express guidance and with no instructions from their Government.)" This disjointed approach was to largely characterize the American stand regarding the question of Hong Kong during the war,

Such an approach did not long escape Britain's attention. In March 1943 Anthony Eden, the British foreign secretary, paid a visit to Washington, apparently on Churchill's prompting. Eden's conversations with Roosevelt and senior American officials only "provided an exchange of views with regard to such matters as cooperation between the Governments with respect to political questions arising in connection with the prosecution of the war"; there was no intention of commitment on either side.38 Early in Eden's visit Harry Hopkins, special assistant to Roosevelt, made the general remark, in front of the president, to the British visitor that he "thought no useful purpose would be served at this stage of the war, and surely no useful purpose at the Peace Table, by Great Britain and [the United States] having no knowledge of [their] differences of opinion” regarding Hong Kong, Malayan Straits, and India.39 Eden could do no harm in agreeing to this comment.40 Roosevelt, however, was much more direct about Hong Kong. He
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THE U.S. AND THE QUESTION OF HONG KONG 1941-45

17

◄ Hornbeck to Cordell Hull, secretary of state, 20 May 1942, Hornbeck Papers (Hoover Institute, Stanford University), box 465.

* Generally see Thorne, op. cit., p. 163, and note 51 on pp. 168-9, referring to Leahy's diary and the King Papers. Also Hornbeck's memorandum, 3 October 1942, Hornbeck Papers, box 180.

• Ballantine's diary in Ballantine Papers (Hoover Institute, Stanford University), box 1. Also see Tung Hsien-kuang, Chiang Tsung-t'ung ch’uan (Biography of Chiang Kai-shek; Taipei, 1954), II, pp. 343-4; and B. W. Tuchman, Stilwell and the American Experience in China, 1911-45 (New York, 1971), p. 352.

'Hornbeck's memorandum, 20 May 1942, op. cit.

8 The two sets of statistics are available in Hornbeck Papers, box 466 and box 467 respectively.

"Thorne, op. cit., pp. 175-6.

1o Announcement of the loan was made on 1 February, but the agreement was not signed until 21 March. For details of the loan and its use during subsequent years, see Department of State, United States Relations with China (hereafter US and China; Washington, 1949), pp. 470-71.

11 Hornbeck's autobiography, Hornbeck Papers, box 497.

12 For more details, see US and China, p. 37,

1a Madame Chiang, however, was intensely disliked by Roosevelt's household staff at Hyde Park who found her "arrogant and overbearing", W. D. Hassett, then aide to President Roosevelt, Off the Record with F.D.R. (Rutgers University Press, 1958), pp. 181-2, 288.

14 For text of the relevant treaty between the United States and China, see US and China, pp. 514-7.

15 For more details, see ibid., p. 37.

1 Chinese leaders freely expressed their anti-British sentiments to the Americans; see, for example, H. Morgenthan, Morgenthau Diary (China; Washington, 1965), II, pp. 862-895.

17 Minute of Sir John Brenan, a veteran official in the Far Eastern Department of the British Foreign Office, on Anglo-Chinese relations since the outbreak of the Pacific War, 3 November 1942, Foreign Office (hereafter FO) 371/31627.

18 For elaboration on this point, see author's article, "The Abrogation of British Extraterritoriality in China 1942-43: A Study of Anglo-American Chinese Relations", Modern Asian Studies, 11, 2 (1977), pp. 262-3.

19 Thorne, op. cit., p. 195.

20 Details of the British discussion leading to the invitation are available in FO 371/31627. The British government was understandably embarrassed by the Chinese response. Ashley Clarke, an official in the Far Eastern Department, confided this point to Stanley Hornbeck, his opposite number in the Department of State. See Hornbeck's attempt to explain for Madame Chiang, Hornbeck to Clarke, strictly confidential, 27 February 1943, Hornbeck Papers, box 467.

21 Thorne, op. cit., p. 161.

22 "The Hong Kong Question during the Pacific War (1941-45)", p. 58.
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CHAN KIT-CHENG

23 W. Range, Franklin D. Roosevelt's World Order (University of Georgia Press; 1959), p. 105.

24 This is according to the observation of Ashley Clarke, head of the Far Eastern Department in the British Foreign Office, during his one month visit to the Department of State early in the summer of 1942; see his report on his visit to A. Eden, secretary of state for foreign affairs, 11 June 1942, FO371/31804. See also Ministry of Information to Colonial Office, 22 October 1942, communicated to the Foreign Office, FO371/31774.

25 "The Abrogation of British Extraterritoriality in China 1942-43: A Study of Anglo-American-Chinese Relations", pp. 266-272.

26 Brenan's minute, 3 December, on J. G. Winant, American ambassador to London, to Eden, 2 December 1942, FO371/31664.

27 Eden to Winant, 7 December 1942, in Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States (hereafter FRUS), China, 1942 (Washington, 1956), p. 390.

28 "The Abrogation of British Extraterritoriality in China 1942-43: A Study of Anglo-American-Chinese Relations", op. cit., pp. 284-5.

29 Ibid., pp. 287-8.

30 Ibid., pp. 288-9.

31 War cabinet conclusions 173 (42), 28 December 1942, Cab65/28. Also Eden to Winant, 29 December; and Eden to Lord Halifax, British ambassador to Washington, tel. 8264, immediate, 29 December 1942, FO371/31665.

32 Thorne, op. cit., p. 179, and note 53, p. 198, referring to G. Atcheson to Hornbeck, 29 December 1942, Department of State, Decimal and Other Files, National Archives (Washington D.C.) 793.003/12-2942.

33 W. L. Tung in his book V. K. Wellington Koo and China's Wartime Diplomacy (New York, 1977), based on the Wellington Koo Papers deposited with Columbia University, gives a possible explanation: "Koo was then Chinese Ambassador to Great Britain and returned to Chungking for consultations. As an experienced diplomat well familiar with the attitude of British official and unofficial circles, he counselled the government to conclude the treaty on the relinquishment of extraterritoriality but reserve the right of later negotiations on the Kowloon question”, p. 53.

34 Halifax to Eden, tel. 6310, immediate, 31 December 1942, FO371/35679.

35 "The Hong Kong Question during the Pacific War (1941-45)", pp. 58-68.

34 Ibid., p. 68.

*7 See memorandum in Hornbeck Papers, box 466.

** Cordell Hull, secretary of state, to United States chargé d'affaires in London, tel., 4 April 1943, in FRUS, The British Commonwealth, Eastern Europe, The Far East, 1943 (Washington, 1963), III, pp. 46-7. Also see R. E. Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins (New York, 1948), p. 707.

30 For American interest in India, especially early in the war, see for example, M. S. Venkatramani and B. K. Shrivastava, "The United States and the Cripps Mission", India Quarterly, XIX, no. 3 (July-September, 1963), pp. 214-65. See also author's article, "Britain's Reaction to Chiang

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CHAN KIT-CHENG

62 "The Hong Kong Question during the Pacific War (1941-45)”, p. 72.

63 Brigadier A. J. H. Dove of the War Office to C. H. M. Weldock of the Admiralty, 12 August 1945, communicated to the Foreign Office, FO371/46251, and Admiralty to commander-in-chief, British Pacific Fleet, tel. 131957A, important, 13 August 1945, communicated to the Foreign Office, FO371/46252.

64 Seymore to Ernest Bevin, foreign secretary, tel. 857, most immediate and top secret, 16 August; tel. 865, most immediate and top secret, 17 August; tel. 909, most immediate and top secret, 23 August; and Bevin to Seymore, tel. 984, 25 August 1945, FO371/46252.

**Harry S. Truman, Memoirs by Harry S. Truman (New York, 1965), I, p. 492.

**Thorne, op. cit., p. 649.

67 General Hurley, now United States ambassador at Chungking, to secretary of state, tel. 1414, 21 August 1945, in FRUS, The Far East, China, 1945 (Washington, 1969), VII, pp. 507-8.

**Truman, op. cit., pp. 493-4.

*Hurley to secretary of state, tel. CFB$633, 23 August 1945, in FRUS, The Far East, China, 1945, op. cit., p. 511.

70 Truman, op. cit., pp. 494-5.

71 Truman, ibid., p. 496.

72 G. B. Endacott, A History of Hong Kong (Oxford University Press, 1958), p. 302.
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Notes and QUERIES

287

It is possible to trace the history of Mr. Herton's unhappy experience in the matter of transit passes in the consular correspondence from Kiungchow (H) or Hoihow (now Hai-k’ou), the port of Hainan Island facing the mainland. Briefly, the facts appear to be as follows. On 7th June 1877 the British firm of Herton, Ebell & Co. applied for transit passes to bring sugar from the interior. The reply from the Chinese customs authorities was that regulations for issue of transit passes had not yet been drawn up, so none could be issued. Edward Herton decided nevertheless to go and buy sugar and galangal (or galingale), for which he paid duty at Hai-Ant customs house. Further purchases were made in July and November 1877, on each occasion transit passes being applied for and refused, and duties at a higher rate than would have been due under the transit scheme were paid.

On 8th May 1878, Messrs. Herton, Ebell & Co. made a formal complaint to H.M. Consul at Kiungchow, claiming $20,000 against the Chinese Government for excess duty paid and losses incurred due to the non-issue of transit passes. The acting consul, James Scott, forwarded this to Hugh Fraser, H.M. Chargé d'Affaires in Peking on 30th May (F.O.228, v.612, p.273-4), with his comment that there was insufficient supporting evidence for such a large claim. Scott had previously submitted to Fraser on 8th May (F.O.228, v.612, p.267-71) a claim on behalf of Messrs. Herton, Ebell for excess duty amounting to $909.57, for which there was supporting documentation. What happened to this earlier claim is not clear, but Fraser forwarded the larger claim, which was in the form of a petition to the Secretary of State with supporting documents, to the Foreign Office on September 25 (F.O.228, v.603, p.262-3) with the comment:

“British traders may perhaps not unjustly ask to be reimbursed the amount actually paid by them as Transit duty over and above that which they would have had to pay had passes been allowed them; but I am not prepared to support any such demand for an additional ‘indemnity’ as that which is made in Mr. Herton's letter to acting Vice Consul Scott of the 8th August last.”
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NOTES AND QUERIES

The reply from the Secretary of State, Lord Salisbury, was, “I approve your proceedings" (F.O.228, v.605, p.237, dated Dec. 9, 1878).

The letter from the Foreign Office to Mr. Herton which he referred to in his letter to Mr. Keswick has not been traced in F.O.228. Perhaps he would have been less pleased with Foreign Office action if he had been aware of the above exchange.

Nothing further appears to have happened until 24th July 1879, when Sir Thomas Wade, who as H.M. Minister in Peking had meanwhile taken over from Chargé d'Affaires Fraser, wrote to Mr. Scott enclosing a memorandum on the Herton claim (F.O.228, v.630, p.101-2), and instructing him to inform the Superintendent of Customs at Kiungchow that the firm's claim for $909.57 was supported, and that the attention of the Chinese authorities in Canton had been directed to the case. It is not entirely clear whether this was before or after Scott's letter of 3rd July, enclosing one from Herton of 2nd July to Sir Thomas Wade (F.O.228, v.630, p.134-6), had reached Peking, though the latter are filed later. Herton claimed that, because of his "unfair treatment at the hands of the Authorities" his business had been "entirely crippled", and he was "now in most pressing need of the money,"

In accordance with Sir Thomas Wade's instructions, Scott wrote on 22nd August 1879 to the Customs, claiming $909.57, and rehearsing the whole affair on the lines of Wade's memorandum (F.O.228, v.630, p.165-7). No reply of substance was received until November, when, on the instructions of the Governor General of the two Kwangs, the old argument was reiterated, that no instructions for issue of transit passes were drawn up until January 1879 and as Herton had made his journeys in 1877 the duties paid were legally charged (F.O.228, v.630, p.174-5). In reply, Scott referred Acting Taotai Liu to the Treaty of Tientsin, art. XXVIII (see note 3 below), and pointed out that transit passes had been obtainable at Shanghai and other open ports for many years. He continued, "Are the Canton Authorities then alone to be free to carry out their individual opinions under pretext of drawing up rules, refuse to issue passes and levy any dues they please in opposition to Treaty rights?"

In
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These local views were expressed in the dispatch of the Governor, Sir Richard MacDonnell, to the Colonial Office in London and in a memorial from the Hongkong General Chamber of Commerce. Both reflect, as we shall see, the uneasiness underneath the comfortable life of the expatriate in nineteenth century Hong-kong.

COLONIAL PRESSURE STOPS CONSUL MOVE

In 1891, Ho A-mei wrote to the newspapers supporting a proposal of the British Foreign Office that a Chinese Consul be appointed for Hongkong. It was an issue which in the past had sharpened differences between Hongkong and the Home Government.

The matter had first been raised in 1868. When news reached Hongkong at that time that it was being considered by the Foreign Office in London, there was an immediate outcry.

The Governor, Sir Richard MacDonnell, rushed off a protest to the Colonial Office. He objected not only to the proposal, but also to the manner in which the British Minister at Peking had ignored Hongkong.

The Governor was not on good terms with the Minister, Sir Rutherford Alcock. He complained that it had been his experience that Sir Rutherford was not concerned about the interests of Hongkong and in his negotiations with China paid little attention to Hongkong opinion.

The Governor wrote to the Secretary of the Colonies that it was no surprise to him that Sir Rutherford had sent the suggestion of a Chinese Consul to the Foreign Office without consulting or informing the local government, nor had he given Hongkong an opportunity to register its opinion on the matter.

When the Governor had eventually heard the British Minister's suggestion, he immediately called together his Executive Council to consider the issue. At that time all the members of the Council were Government officials.
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hope to catch up soon, with the aid of the Editorial group which includes Dr. Betty Wei, Dr. Thomas Lau and myself!

Finally, a word of thanks to our printers, Messrs Yee Tin Tong, and especially to their Mr. Henry Law who is the soul of courtesy and cooperation.

Events in China

I turn now to a world event which it was impossible to ignore, especially in Hong Kong. Like other associations in Hong Kong, the RAS Council felt it had a plain duty to write to the British Government, leading Parliamentarians and other influential figures in public life, expressing concern for Hong Kong's future in the light of the repressive action taken in Beijing in May-June 1989. A copy of this letter was sent to all local and overseas members of the Society, and many of us circulated it more widely among friends or sent copies to persons who they felt ought to know that a letter had been sent.

Both as President and as an individual, I received a number of responses from Members at home and abroad. These were all supportive of the action taken by the Council. I regret to have to say, however, that there was no response from the Foreign Secretary's Office, to whose head the letter was addressed, not even a printed acknowledgement slip, despite a courteously worded reminder enclosing a copy of the original letter. Surely two copies could not have gone astray?

In my personal capacity as President, I also sent a private submission to the Basic Law Drafting Committee last autumn, before the period allowed for submissions expired. It gave my own statement on how this Society has been able to operate without let or hindrance, fear or favour, and relying upon the open, willing cooperation of others for almost thirty years, and how essential it was for us, and Societies like us, to be able to continue operating in this way after 1997. A copy of this letter has been tabled at this meeting, and the text will be annexed to this report when it is published in the appropriate number of the Journal,

The Council

You will have noted that David Gilkes has been nominated as President for the coming year. No other nominations have been received, and this is a very appropriate appointment in view of his 23 years on the Council

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before Mesny reached Hami,

During the Franco-China War of 1883 when Tso was Governor-General of the southern provinces of Fukien and Chekiang, which included Formosa [Taiwan] where the French did much of their fighting, Mesny was invited by Tso's private secretary in Foochou to come to that city to see Tso with a view to undertaking some of the 'progressive' works he, Mesny, had recommended years beforehand, including telegraphs, railways and mining. Mesny was involved at the time transacting some business in Shanghai for Viceroy Chang Chih-tung and replied that he would call at Foochou on his return from Canton. Viceroy Tso, however, died before Mesny arrived in Foochou.

Mesny appears to have revelled in including short tabloid-style titbits usually revealing some appalling or unspeakable act by a Chinese official. One such was the tale of the Manchu bannerman who became such an intolerable nuisance as a Chinese government spy at the British Legation in Peking, where he had been employed as a teacher for many years, that he was expelled from his job. Mesny added that as a reward for the efficient secret services he had rendered his government he was given the rank of Expectant prefect of Kueichou, in about 1874, where he did much mischief and was then transferred to Kuangtung where he remained as an ‘incorrigible anti-foreign mischief maker under the protection of the notorious anti-foreign Tatar, General Chang-shun.'

Mesny went into a little detail on the subject he called "Traitors in Camp' [Nei-ying or li-ying]. These he noted were greatly depended upon in all official (and most other) undertakings. He supposed that there was not a Yamen or office in which there was not some individual paid by a rival to disclose the affairs of that place. Writing in 1905 he accused some of the anti-Christian Chinese of sowing discord amongst Christian missionaries. The latter he claimed 'are so bigoted yet simple that they are very easily imposed upon by designing mischief makers who wish to embroil the missionaries and bring them into evil repute'.

Although the majority of titbits on Chinese culture, the social scene and personalities, consisted of one or two paragraphs, Mesny occasionally
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parallels Hong Kong's, petitioned the British government to acquire 'an insular possession near the coast of China... beyond the reach of future despotism and oppression,' Matheson, who did not have Hong Kong specifically in mind, thought of British merchants as 'princes of the earth,' and despised the Chinese, ‘a people characterized by marvellous degree of imbecility, avarice, conceit and obstinacy... [in] possession of a vast portion of the most desirable parts of the earth.'

Chinese officials were no less culture-bound: Commissioner Lin Zexu, the Emperor's man in Canton, confronted the British just before the 1839-1840 Opium War by burning 2,613,879 pounds of British opium, 'surely the largest drug haul ever collected,' says Welsh. The British had been smuggling opium into China, hoping to balance off the large amounts of money they were spending for tea and other products exported home to Britain. Lin Zexu advised punishing the British traders by withholding exports to them of rhubarb and tea, without which they could not exist. Because 'their legs were too tightly bound to permit them to box or wrestle,' British soldiers, he said, were not suited to fighting on shore. Unfortunately for the Chinese, their confiscation of opium was followed by attacks by British gunboats on their port cities. They were forced to open Shanghai and other coastal cities to the British and cede Hong Kong to them.

Not until Chris Patten was appointed governor in 1992 did Hong Kong become a high British priority. While publicly demanding that the garrison lay down their lives for it, says Welsh, Churchill privately considered the colony not worth defending against the Japanese. During World War II, the Foreign Office regarded Hong Kong as 'something of a thorn in the side' - a view some of its diplomats still hold — and wanted to return it to China; the Americans wanted this too. In 1946, the first postwar governor, Sir Mark Young, drafted a plan for a 'Municipal Council' constituted on a fully representative basis, but this was consistently turned down. Later, the colonial secretary, Oliver Lyttelton, commented, "The electorate of Britain didn't care a brass farthing about Hong Kong.' Welsh says this remains true, but he also reminds us that, in 1992, Chris Patten was proposing a more democratically elected Legislative Council not for the British voters but for the people of Hong Kong. As Welsh suggests, in 1946 China would have been in no position to object. But Hong Kong has since become more valuable than anyone could have dreamed in 1946.

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aloof on his return. The present writer can vouch for his active approval of an African-inspired experiment whereby departmental administrative officers in the urban areas would collect and transmit upwards a monthly 'intelligence digest' of local opinion, morale and responses to government action or inaction, and of attitudes to prominent local figures and to Chinese or foreign affairs: this was meant to supplement what was collected in their own specialist manners by the HK Police Special Branch (SB), the New Territories Administration (NTA), the Foreign & Commonwealth Office (FCO)'s Political Adviser (PA) and the Security Liaison Officer (SLO). Some of what was collected may have been too near the knuckle, some was rather too easily discounted as mere "gossip," important though that might be as a reflection of influential belief at the grass roots, and some may have hurt the dignity of those who had the existing duty of intelligence-gathering. The governor was persuaded to drop the experiment as proving trivial.

But Trench also showed interest in another interloping proposal that, in the absence of any generalist government institutions to supplement the Secretary for Chinese Affairs (SCA)'s advisory staff (who liaised with the various kai fong (Neighbourhood) Welfare Associations, Clansmens' Associations and Residents' Associations, which were often self-perpetuating), District Officers (DOs) should be appointed in the urban areas; these should have certain executive functions, fewer than those of their colleagues in the New Territories so as not to encroach on the licensing prerogatives of the Urban Council, but sufficient to ensure that all should know of their existence and, above all, of where their offices were. Primarily they should oversee and co-ordinate the activities of the various professional and technical departments in their bailiwicks, but also, like paternalistic mandarins, inquire into, report upon and seek answers to the needs and concerns of the inhabitants. This suggestion was effectively smothered by a DCS who was unable to understand what such DOs might achieve in a city that existing institutions did not already adequately do: the concept of such junior, peripheral, government officers being responsive to people, as opposed to being mere executive agents responsible for essential infrastructural public services, was alien. Apart from the SCA's and District Commissioner New Territories (DCNT)'s contacts with often self-appointed élites, there was little by way of direct exchange with the man in the street: the same DCS once said, "Government must, of
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where the territory was not debarred from doing so by treaty. In preparation for the negotiations at Ottawa the colonies were also asked to consider what preferences might be accorded them by the dominions and what preferences they might give to the dominions in return on the lines of the Canada-West Indies agreement.”

34

The governor, Sir William Peel, discussed Hong Kong's position while visiting the Colonial Office in June 1932. Officials agreed with him that Hong Kong's status as a free port made it impossible to impose anything like a general tariff. Any such tariff would ruin the entrepôt trade which was vital to Hong Kong's existence and no practicable means could be devised of landing goods in bond for re-export without involving so much inconvenience as to drive the entrepôt trade to other neighbouring ports. Peel was prepared as a gesture to give a preference to empire products on articles such as spirits and tobacco which were subject to excise duty and to impose a higher rate of first registration tax on foreign motor cars than on cars imported from Britain and Canada. He did not ask for any preference from the dominions in return since in his view the bulk of Hong Kong exports consists of foreign goods the proportion of the cost of which, due to treatment in Hong Kong, was not large enough to secure a preference...” This showed a surprising ignorance of Hong Kong's growing trade in domestic manufactures which were largely exported to neighbouring Asian countries.

The Ottawa conference convened in July 1932. The British delegation was led by Stanley Baldwin, the former prime minister, and four other cabinet ministers. Canada, Southern Rhodesia and Newfoundland were represented by their prime ministers; Australia and New Zealand by former prime ministers; South Africa and the Irish Free State by their finance and trade ministers. India, which had been given the freedom to establish protective duties in 1923, was represented by Sir Atul Chatterjee and other members of the Viceroy's Council. The interests of the colonial empire were safeguarded by the secretary of state for the colonies, Sir Philip Cunliffe-Lister and one civil servant from the Colonial Office, G.L.M. Clauson.

The conclusions of the conference were embodied in agreements between the United Kingdom government and the governments of the dominions and India. Britain consented to continue the free entry of goods grown, produced or manufactured in any part of the empire, and to impose additional duties on specified foreign goods which would give empire produce a preferential margin higher than the 10 per cent tariff already imposed by the Import Duties Act. Britain also agreed to 'invite' the non-self-governing colonies and protectorates to extend to all the dominions any preference at present extended to any part of the empire, and to increase the margin of preference or impose specific duties on a long list of items requested by the dominions. In return the dominions confirmed the existing
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preferences granted to British goods, to increase the margin of preference on a few specific items and to review the level of existing tariffs which protected dominion manufactures against British goods. The dominions approved tariff preferences on specified colonial goods, mostly tropical agricultural products, asphalt, rum and cigars. Each dominion offered a different list of concessions to the colonies and not all were equally generous. South Africa granted preferences only on raw coffee and asphalt. Canada gave little more than the preferences already embodied in the 1920 trade agreement with the West Indian colonies." New Zealand was the only dominion which agreed to grant preferences at the same rates as were accorded to Britain to all the colonies and protectorates. The agreements with the dominions provided that the preferences accorded to British goods might be extended to the colonies, protectorates and mandated territories ‘if His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom so request'. All these preferences were for British manufactured goods. The development of manufacturing industry in the colonies was not anticipated by the governments represented at Ottawa. If it had been foreseen it is probable that the dominion governments would have raised strong objections to admitting goods manufactured under oriental conditions to their markets under a tariff designed to benefit British manufacturers.28

After the Ottawa conference a circular despatch was sent to all colonies and dependent territories setting out the tariff preferences which would be granted by the dominions to colonial exports of foodstuffs and raw materials." These preferences would give the dependencies a reasonable prospect of replacing foreign imports by imports from empire sources in the dominion markets concerned. In return the dependent territories were 'invited' to grant to the dominions the preferences which the colonial secretary had negotiated at Ottawa. Cunliffe-Lister made clear that it was a matter of the highest importance that the Ottawa settlement should be put into effect as an integral whole.

I should feel that I had been guilty of a breach of faith if the legislature concerned refused to grant the preference in question, unless I could put to the dominion government concerned clear evidence that there were really substantial reasons for not granting the proposed preference. It would not be an adequate ground of objection to say that the desired preference might increase the local cost of living, so long as the increase was only moderate and did not cause hardship to a particularly poor class of the community.

Governors prepared the necessary legislation for introduction into the colonial legislatures, but a number warned the Colonial Office that they

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sufficient to qualify for preference in colonial 'native' markets then it is a very bad outlook for us as I cannot see how the growing population of Victoria and Kowloon are going to find employment without industrial development,

I therefore consider it as politically important as it is, from our point of view, economically advantageous to give the Hong Kong Chinese a commercial attachment to the empire. Our military and naval defences are designed against external aggression, but if relations with China ever became antagonistic there would be an enemy totalling over one million within the fortress gates, unless their bread is liberally spread with Empire butter.

The governor's plea for Hong Kong's manufacturing industry was warmly supported by all the Colonial Office officials who wrote minutes on this despatch. It was quickly passed up to the colonial secretary, W. Ormsby-Gore, who endorsed it as 'an admirable letter' and gave instructions for copies to be sent to the Foreign Office and the Board of Trade." Officials made frequent use of Caldecott's argument of imperial interests when attempting to repulse proposals from the Board of Trade and other departments to place further restrictions on Hong Kong's manufactures in the years that followed.

British textile manufacturers continued to protest that they were suffering from unfair competition in the British and colonial markets and demanded that Hong Kong exports should be excluded by tariffs or quantitative restrictions. In order to fend off these pressures the Colonial Office suggested to the governor of Hong Kong that all cotton and artificial silk piece goods exported to Britain and the colonies should be accompanied by a certificate that they had been made from cloth which had been spun, woven and finished within the empire. This proposal posed difficulties for Hong Kong. There were no spinning mills in the colony and more than half the cotton yarn used in the production of piece goods and hosiery was imported from Japan and Shanghai. In order to continue to enjoy the benefits of imperial preference, the Hong Kong General Chamber of Commerce secured the manufacturers' agreement to switch their purchases of yarn from China and Japan to cotton mills in India which were within the empire. But the manufacturers of goods made from artificial silk protested strongly that the only alternative to yarn from Japan was British yarn which was double the price ($1.70 a pound compared to 85c). This would destroy their competitiveness with Japanese products in British Malaya, the African colonies and the West Indies and drive them to bankruptcy. The Colonial Office put its case to the Board of Trade which refused to compromise, asserting that if Hong Kong was to continue to enjoy the advantages of the
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22. The requirement of an empire content of 25 per cent to qualify for preference was set in consultation with the Board of Trade, which pointed out that some British manufacturers using foreign sources of raw material would not qualify for preference if the empire content was set at 50 per cent. CO323/1192/11.

23. L.M. Drummond, British Economic Policy and the Empire 1919–1939 (London, 1972), 92; Report of the Interdepartmental Committee on the Industrial Development of the Colonial Empire, Colonial Office Confidential Print 445, CO885/40.

24. Secretary of State to all colonies and protectorates, 4 Feb. 1932, DO35/242/4, PRO.

25. Minutes of a conference at the Colonial Office, 27 June 1932, CO323/1193/2.

26. The texts of the agreements are in Imperial Economic Conference at Ottawa Cmd4175 (London, 1932), 19–76.

27. Canada agreed to extend to the colonies and protectorates the preferences accorded to Britain, but in practice raised objections when requested to do so by the British government. See for example CO323/1099/16, CO852/51/9 and CO852/251/10. Cunliffe-Lister minute, 22 Oct 1933, CO323/1232/8, 'Canada has done less than nothing to implement the most essential part of the Ottawa accords.'

28. See the comments in paragraphs 18 and 30 of the Report of the Interdepartmental Committee.

29. Confidential Circular Despatch, 29 Sept. 1932, CO854/174. Sir Philip Cunliffe-Lister is better known by his later title, Viscount Swinton.

30. Secretary of State to Governor of Ceylon, 27 Sept. 1932; S. of S. to High Commissioner, Federated Malay States, 30 Sept. 1932; S. of S. to Barbados, 24 Oct. 1932; S. of S. to Jamaica, 10 Oct. 1932; S. of S. to Windward Islands, 24 Oct. 1932, CO323/1188/5. A clause was drafted for inclusion in the 1933 Finance Bill to allow Britain to withdraw preferences from any colony if it did not grant the Ottawa preferences to empire products, CO323/1230/3.

31. Officer Administering Government, Leeward Islands to Secretary of State, 19 Oct. 1932, CO323/1188/5.

32. Governor Barbados to Secretary of State, 17 Oct. 1932, CO323/1188/5.

33. Governor Windward Islands to Secretary of State, 21 Oct. 1932, CO323/1188/5.

34. Stevens to Cunliffe-Lister, 17 Nov. 1932, CO323/1193/11.

35. Cunliffe-Lister to Stevens, 8 Dec. 1932, CO323/1193/11.

36. Hong Kong Trade Returns show exports of rubber shoes to the British West Indies as follows: 1932 - HK$4,894; 1933 - 116,670; 1934 - 643,337; 1935 - 574,376; 1936 - 1,071,932; 1937 - 1,427,634.

37. High Commissioner for Canada to Cunliffe-Lister, 15 Nov. 1933, CO323/1232/8.

38. Cunliffe-Lister to High Commissioner, 27 Nov. 1933, CO323/1232/8. Canada later succeeded in excluding Singapore shoes by setting a fictitious high rate of exchange for the Singapore dollar. See minute by Calder, 8 June 1933, CO323/1232/8.

39. Peel to Cunliffe-Lister, 13 Nov. 1933, CO323/1231/16.

40. Minute by Vernon, 21 Dec. 1933, CO323/1231/16. R.V. Vernon was an Assistant Secretary who joined the Colonial Office in 1900. He had previously expressed his disapproval when Cunliffe-Lister refused to approach India and South Africa to ask for imperial preference for Hong Kong's rubber shoes: 'The Secretary of State is placed practically in the position of a trustee who is bound to act with the sole regard to the interests of the colonies and is not at liberty to abstain from any claim on the account of the interests of U.K. industry or the susceptibilities of dominion industrial interests.' Minute, 9 Nov. 1933, CO323/1232/3. The attitude of Cunliffe-Lister may be contrasted with that of Alan Lennox-Boyd (Colonial Secretary 1954-59) who threatened to resign if Hong Kong was forced to accept a limitation on its textile exports to Britain. Harold Macmillan, Riding the Storm, 1954–1959 (London, 1971), 739-43.

41. CO323/1294/3.

42. Hong Kong Trade Returns 1932, 1933, 1934.

43. Minute by Cunliffe-Lister, 7 June 1933, CO323/1232/8.

44. Edgcumbe (Department of Overseas Trade) to Eastwood (Colonial Office), 18 April 1936, CO323/1298/10.
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opposite extremity of the foreign settlement. Some years passed before the site was occupied. On 5th February, 1889, the Consulate building was burnt in a riot together with several neighbouring houses. The final Consulate of a main building and four houses was erected on the same site in 1890. Built predominantly of red brick with white and grey bricks forming the decoration, it had double windows to keep the rooms warm during the bitter winters and a royal reign tablet on the rear wall. This white oval plaque bearing the enjoined letters VR is still in place a century or so later.

All the British consuls serving in Zhenjiang from its opening in 1860 found time hanging heavily and a number became medically unfit within a short time of taking up their posts. Adkins, the Consul writing to his father in December 1861 wrote in passing that 'the office of Consul at a thriving port is no sinecure I can tell you. He is judge, bishop, police magistrate, coroner etc. etc etc.' As is usual his own countrymen give him the least possible support and abuse him like a pickpocket.' It was also soon realized just how unimportant Zhenjiang had become to foreigners and by 1867 it was decided to post a junior consul to the port under the aegis of the senior consul at Shanghai. However, ten years later the number of British residents had increased sufficiently to warrant a return to the consular post being restored to its former independent status. It was by no means a comfortable place to live though PD Coates wrote that all in all Zhenjiang would have been a pleasant enough post had the [foreign] community been more congenial.24 One incident in the history of the consulate in Zhenjiang related by Coates, tells how in 1879 the Chairman and Treasurer of the Zhenjiang Concession Council, Bean, a British merchant who held several of the nineteen concession leases, physically assaulted H. J. Allen, the British consul, in the Club when the latter as Consul had asked to examine the Council's books before approving its accounts. Duff, another merchant, was the Secretary to the Council. Coates describes the constant and major friction between Bean and Duff, Bean and the Consul, and between other foreign residents of the Concession and this was reiterated by William Mesny as we shall soon see. Oxenham, a subsequent Consul in 1886, described Bean as a coarse, cantankerous, uneducated man of low tastes and malignant disposition who had insulted practically every Consul and Customs commissioner serving at the port.

Adkins described in one of his letters to his father how English
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Japanese cruiser YAHAGI11 was due to arrive at 2200 hours that evening.

In the interim the freighter MADRAS MARU2 arrived. She attempted a rescue operation but this was not successful. Indeed the seas were so high that it was not even possible to contemplate sending the nine survivors across to her for repatriation to Japan.

Since all these Japanese flag ships had appeared or were due to appear at the scene of the grounding Captain Mackinnon informed NASHI that he would sail for Hong Kong that afternoon, and take with him the nine men. Later he was to write:

'Many friendly and complimentary flag signals were exchanged with all ships present, including the wreck. At 1700 I proceeded to Hong Kong leaving the Japanese destroyer NASHI in charge of the situation.'

On Saturday 7 November HERMES returned to her buoy at Hong Kong and a short while later the nine rescued seamen were landed ashore.

It is pleasant to be able to record that in due course official thanks were rendered by the Japanese minister of foreign affairs, Baron Kijuro Shidehara. His letter was addressed to the British ambassador to Tokyo, H.E. Sir Francis Oswald Lindley who forwarded these thanks to the Foreign Office in London from where, in turn, they were passed to the Secretary to the Admiralty.

A year later, on 6th December 1932 at Hong Kong, the C. in C. came onboard our ship to present Lloyds Silver Medals to the three officers, and Bronze Medals to the six ratings who had taken part in the rescue. Also a bronze shield, mounted on a wooden base, was presented to the ship by the Committee of Lloyds.

In December 1931 an epidemic of diphtheria struck Hong Kong. Amongst those taken ill was Captain Mackinnon. Commander Baxter temporarily assumed command until the arrival of the ship's new commanding officer, Captain W.B. Mackenzie, on 25th February 1932.

Captain Mackinnon duly returned home and on 21 January 1933
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