RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊 | RAS-1975
https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/j0995146d
68

E. G. PRYOR

intelligence service to pin-point danger spots and proposed the distribution of 100,000 hand bills publicising the causes and symptoms of plague, the destruction of rats and the addresses of places where sickness could be reported. Another recommendation was the establishment of a plague department with wide powers for the discovery, prevention and cure of plague including inoculation with a highly potent horse antiserum prepared at the Haffkine Institute in India.

A final recommendation made by Simpson was a general improvement of sanitary conditions and stricter control over the design of tenement blocks which he described as follows:

"The rooms, as a rule, are far too deep, the object of this depth being to subdivide each room into a number of cubicles for the accommodation of families or lodgers. Though there may be windows at each end of the room, the great depth materially obstructs the light to take an example from the better class of buildings, many of the houses that are being erected are eighty feet deep without lateral windows and contain long, narrow rooms of fifty-five feet in depth, by twelve or thirteen feet in width, lighted in front by a window and also in the rear by another window which looks into a backyard of twelve feet. . . .”*

From the recommendations made by Simpson arose the Public Health and Buildings Ordinance of 1903 which set new standards for the design and occupancy of buildings and which remained in force until 1935.

By 1904 a considerable amount of deductive evidence had accumulated to link the occurrence of plague to the fleas carried by rats. Dr. J. M. Howie of Changpoo, for example, was of the opinion that the main cause of plague was inoculation through the bite of fleas, lice and mosquitos. Dr. H. Dobson of Yung Kong also noted that the cases he had observed appeared to have been caused by "the bites of insects (fleas), contamination of open wounds on legs or elsewhere (or) through food containing the germ." William Hunter, the Government Bacteriologist of Hong Kong also noted

* Second Memorandum from W. J. Simpson to James Stewart Lockhart Sanitary Board Office, 20th March 1902, p. 15 in Blue Book Reports on Bubonic Plague 1894-1907.

+ W. J. Simpson, Report on the Causes and Continuance of Plague in Hong Kong and Suggestions as to Remedial Measures, London, 1903, p. 31.
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RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊 | RAS-1975
https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/j0995146d
158

DONALD C. BOWIE

thought fit to fight was discharged from hospital, but there must have been many of those manning the mainland defences whose legs felt weak and shaky following the fever and anaemia of the disease as they covered the hilly and terribly uneven country they were called on to defend,

The news from Europe, North Africa and the United Kingdom during 1940 and the first part of 1941 was very bad, while the stories of the German advances in Russia after June 1941 added to the general depression. In October 1941, two battalions of Canadian infantry, the Winnipeg Grenadiers and the Royal Rifles of Canada, disembarked in Hong Kong. With these came a number of Canadian Army Medical Officers, with Major John Crawford in charge, and two Canadian Army Nursing Sisters. The sight of these strongly built young men was momentarily, and quite irrationally comforting, but this feeling was soon replaced by astonishment that anyone should have dreamed that reinforcements of this order could possibly have altered the situation. In the event the Japanese attacked before the poor Canadians, who were not even accompanied by their transport, had time to settle down and they merely added to the numbers of casualties incurred and prisoners taken by the enemy. In February 1941 it might have been agreed that there were no ships available to withdraw the troops from Hong Kong, but in October of the same year ships were found to bring in more.

I have chronicled my own thoughts on the situation in Hong Kong in the years leading up to December 1941 only to give some idea of the position as it appeared to one individual and as a background to an account of the events which followed. I do not know that these thoughts were shared by many others though it would be strange if they were not. There was certainly no defeatist spirit abroad and the general feeling seemed to be one of some confidence in our ability to hold the Japanese for a time. I imagine that many shared my own feeling in 1941 that since I could not change the situation I would have to put up with it. And so, on the morning of 8 December 1941, Dr. J.W. Anderson, who had most generously shared his house with me, and I stood at Magazine Gap and had a spectacular grandstand view of the short Japanese air attack on Kai Tak airport by the end of which no British planes remained able to fly. Together he, now a Major R.A.M.C., and I moved into
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