RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊 | RAS-1975
https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/j0995146d
154

DONALD C. BOWIE

conflict. I came to regret my thoroughness, for there was never time to use the equipment thus accumulated and this must have been splendid booty for the Japanese. There was also a full social life; many British women had enrolled for nursing and other essential duties and had not been evacuated. The Hong Kong Hotel was a gay place indeed, particularly on a Saturday night.

In October 1938, 35,000 Japanese troops had landed in Bias Bay on the China coast 35 miles from Hong Kong, and had then occupied Canton and had cut all communications between Hong Kong and mainland China. Patrolling Japanese ships thereafter made sailing from the Colony outside a circumscribed area very hazardous. In February 1939 the Japanese occupied the island of Hainan, 300 miles to the south of Hong Kong thus controlling the sea communications with Singapore. Curiously, after my arrival I do not remember taking part in any serious discussions with my friends about the prospects of a successful defence of Hong Kong. There were however plenty of rumours to fill the air. It was generally known that the strategic plan required Hong Kong to resist an attack for 90 days before a relief could arrive, a decision taken by the British Chiefs of Staff in 1937. In February 1940 the home authorities decided that food reserves should be accumulated for 130 days, while in August 1940 the Chiefs of Staff reached a further decision that in case of war with Japan, Hong Kong should be regarded as an outpost to be held as long as possible. After the war I learned from Liddell Hart's History of the Second World War, that in February 1940 the Chiefs of Staff concluded that the troops should be withdrawn from Hong Kong. Nothing was done to give effect to this decision. I have no doubt that the decision taken in February 1940 was the correct one which could with advantage have been taken much earlier. Ever since my arrival in Hong Kong in 1939 I believed that the Colony could not be defended successfully. The frontier, beyond which lay a strong Japanese army, was some 20 miles from Hong Kong harbour, the line to be defended, the so-called Gin Drinkers line was less than 5 miles from the harbour, the Japanese navy controlled the coast, our airport was tiny and the Air Force planes were few in number and no match in performance for their potential opponents. One and a half million Chinese civilians were crowded into Kowloon and Victoria. Roads suitable for wheeled traffic were few and open to close observation at many points. The whole picture left no doubt
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RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊 | RAS-1979
https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/2801w5938
THE U.S. AND THE QUESTION OF HONG KONG 1941-45

15

urgent consent of the United States Chiefs of Staff to detach a British naval force from the British Pacific Fleet to accept Japan's surrender and assume full powers of military administration in the colony.63 The Japanese accepted defeat on 14 August. However, the British Pacific Fleet assigned for service at Hong Kong, under the command of Rear-Admiral Sir Cecil Harcourt, did not arrive until 30 August. During this interval of a fortnight, the question of Hong Kong sorely tried the British government and placed the United States government in an uncomfortable position.

Hong Kong again became a serious point of contention between Britain and China. This time the argument was not whose sovereignty was to be set up but who was to receive Japan's surrender there. Despite the assurances given by Chiang Kai-shek on 16 August, and repeated on 24 August, that China had "no territorial ambitions" in Hong Kong and regarded it "as a matter which would require eventual settlement through diplomatic channel", the British Foreign and Colonial Offices insisted that Sir Cecil Harcourt receive Japan's surrender on behalf of Britain by virtue of her sovereignty over Hong Kong.64

The prime minister, now C.R. Attlee, appealed to the American president for assistance. Fortunately for Britain, Truman, who had assumed the presidency on Roosevelt's death in April, was in favour of a cautious policy. While being conscious of his predecessor's views regarding the future status of Hong Kong, he, however, decided to adhere to the "recognition of the established rights", although he told both Britain and China that such recognition "did not in any way represent U.S. views regarding the future status of Hong Kong." General Douglas MacArthur was therefore instructed to arrange for the surrender of Hong Kong to the British commander.65 Again fortunately for Britain, MacArthur was known for "his support for the cause of the British Empire in the Far East." In fact in October 1944 he had specifically expressed that he "fully appreciated the need for British forces to recapture Hong Kong."66

Chiang Kai-shek, on the other hand, insisted on his right to accept Japan's surrender at Hong Kong as commander-in-chief of the China theatre. He was therefore most distressed by Truman's agreement with the British. To avoid embarrassing Truman, Chiang now suggested that the Japanese forces in Hong Kong should surrender to his representative in a ceremony in which both
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RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊 | RAS-1979
https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/2801w5938
14

JULIAN F. PAS

recommendations for ultimate implementation." Appearing on the master list was the subject "Treatment by United States Occupation Forces of Special Areas: Hong Kong."59

The Department of State was first invited to submit a paper, bearing on the political aspects of the question, to the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee. After considerable deliberation the department concluded that in view of the political differences between China and Great Britain regarding the future status of Hong Kong, United States forces should not participate in operations for the reconquest or occupation of Hong Kong unless absolutely necessary from a military point of view, and that the United States should make no plans to participate in military government in Hong Kong which, according to the previous agreement of the Combined Civil Affairs Committee, was to be instituted by Britain.60

On receiving the department's recommendation, and after consulting the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the State-War-Navy Coordinating Subcommittee for the Far East submitted a draft report in mid-June. Apart from reiterating the Department of State principle of non-involvement, the report further pointed out that while the Joint Chiefs of Staff had agreed to substantial United States participation in the Canton-Hong Kong operation, it was a Chinese operation under Chiang Kai-shek and not an operation conducted by United States forces under the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Joint Chiefs of Staff therefore should not regard themselves as obligated, in so far as the Canton-Hong Kong operation was concerned, to the civil affairs agreement with the British. Moreover, China was not a signatory to this agreement, and it did not cover the situation in the case of a Japanese withdrawal from Hong Kong. The subcommittee accordingly recommended that the United States Chiefs of Staff inform the British Chiefs of Staff that United States support of the operation was being furnished to attain strictly military ends, and that arrangements with regard to the civil affairs administration of Hong Kong should be worked out between Britain and China.61 This document, with some minor alterations, was accepted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee by the end of July. The suggestion that Chiang Kai-shek should be consulted with regard to civil affairs in Hong Kong was naturally unpalatable to Britain.62

The news that Japan would accept defeat in the near future changed the entire picture. Britain now decided to secure the
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RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊 | RAS-1999
https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/s178b887x
117 

A Review of the Literature? 

Strategy 

In terms of the strategic and historical aspects of the Battle, the best known works from the British points of view are those of Winston Churchill (Churchill 1950), the Minister who led Britain to final victory, and Liddell Hart (Liddell Hart 1970), the strategist renowned for his theory on the use of tanks in modern warfare and "indirect approach” (Liddell Hart 1991) as a general war strategy. There are few recent works in English that make reference to Hong Kong at this level of analysis. The common tenor of Churchill and Liddell Hart was that Hong Kong could not be defended. The former, however, held that Hong Kong should be nominally defended to deter the Japanese. In early 1941, Churchill told General Sir Hastings, his Chief of Staff: 

"There is not the slightest chance of holding Hong Kong or relieving it. It is most unwise to increase the loss we shall suffer there. Instead of augmenting the garrison it ought to be reduced to a symbolic scale.... Japan will think long before declaring war on the British Empire, and whether there are two or six battalions at Hong Kong will make no difference to her choice.” 

It was true that Churchill's Chiefs of Staff favoured reinforcing the Hong Kong garrison so that it could maintain a "more worthy” defence or even a degree of deterrence, and Major-General A.E. Grasett, the former General Officer Commanding in Hong Kong, made a contribution to the strength of the defence by arranging for two Canadian battalions to arrive in the Colony in October 1941. Yet, under the dominant influence of Churchill's strategic concept, the Hong Kong garrison was outnumbered three to one by the Japanese when the invasion occurred. 

Churchill's position and decision apparently attracted universal criticism after the war. Liddell Hart thought that this was a patent mistake, which was exacerbated by Grasett's contribution, which cost many lives of the garrison. In other words, Liddell Hart considered that as Hong Kong could not be defended, it should not have been defended. In his History of the Second World War, Liddell Hart recalled what he said to General Dill in March 1935 about Hong Kong
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RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊 | RAS-1999
https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/s178b887x
135

Supplement, 29 January 1948; A Record of the Actions of the Hong Kong Volunteer Defence Corps in the Battle of Hong Kong December, 1941 (1953). For the official Hong Kong account of the surrender, see Hong Kong Government (1948).

3 The literature referred to in this section is not exhaustive and focuses on books and reports only. English and Chinese newspapers and periodicals from time to time carry articles on the Battle. Post-war annals of universities, university halls and secondary schools in Hong Kong are also a good source of materials about the Battle. There are also a number of novels on war events,

+ The emphasis is placed on attacking the enemies' "line of least resistance" or "line of least expectation".

5 As quoted in Ko and Wordie (1996), p.18.

"They were influenced by the views of Air Chief Sir Robert Brooke-Popham, the British Commander-in-Chief in the Far East.

7 During the initial stage of the Battle, BBC broadcasts (Orwell, 1987) placed high hopes on the availability of Chinese forces in the vicinity of Hong Kong. Such forces were never to come.

Liddell Hart (1999): footnote at 219.

"Colonel Hewitt is the author of a number of books on the Battle and Japanese occupation of the Colony.

10 The title of the book is a misnomer as the police force obtained the royal title only in the late 1960s.

Blackburn gave an account of the anarchic situation of Hong Kong shortly before the surrender (Blackburn 1989).

12 On 23 October 1937, the Joint Overseas and Home Defence Committee considered re-fortification or demilitarisation of Hong Kong, assuming that it took 90 days for the British fleet to relieve Hong Kong. Rollo (1992): 113. According to Aldrich, the British Chiefs of Staff considered the abandonment of Shanghai and demilitarisation of Hong Kong to avoid confrontation with Japan. Aldrich (1993): 261.
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RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊 | RAS-2002
https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/mp4901278
61

28

Chic Publishers, 1996), p.12-14. (3) Heywood, p.17:

Typhoon winds that approach Hong Kong from the southeast blow on Victoria Harbour from the north, so Kowloon's mountains can serve as a partial barrier. See Donald Alan Mantner & Samson Brand, An Evaluation of Hong Kong Harbour as a Typhoon Haven (Monterey, CA: Environmental Prediction Research Facility, Naval Postgraduate School, 1973), p.53.

29 Navy Department, "Advanced Base: Hong Kong," p.14-15. However, Tolo Harbour could do little more than serve as a secondary anchorage because shore facilities in Tai Po were limited.

30

31

32

(1) Heywood, p.7-8. (2) Adamson & Kosco, p.12. Although described by many sources as a "tidal wave," the wave would be more appropriately described as a storm surge because it is not caused by the moon.

HKRO, A Statistical Survey of Typhoons and Tropical Depressions in the Western Pacific and China Sea Area From 1884 to 1947 (Hong Kong: Government Printers, 1951), p.3 (hereafter referred to as HKRO, Statistical Survey). See also P.C. Chin's Tropical Cyclone Climatology for the China Seas and Western Pacific From 1884 to 1970, Vol. I: Basic Data (Hong Kong: Government Printers, 1972) for maps of typhoon tracks for each year.

33

The evasion option became more popular after the war, probably because of better typhoon location and tracking methods. See Mantner & Brand, p.78-79, 88. The authors cited British and American dissatisfaction with Hong Kong as a "safe haven" for ships during a typhoon.

34 HKRO, Statistical Survey, p.9.

35

Romanus & Sunderland, Stilwell's Mission to China, 1953 of U.S. Army in World War II: the China-Burma-India Theater (rpt. Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1984), p.12-13.

CPS 83, "Appreciation and Plan for the Defeat of Japan,” 8 Aug 43, Map F; CCS 381 Japan (8-25-42), sec.6; Geographic File, 1942-45; Records of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, RG 218; NA, Washington, DC. The map shows that Hong Kong lay within the minimum area required for the air bombardment of Japan.

* United States Army Air Force, B-29 Erection and Maintenance Manual (Dayton,
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