RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊 | RAS-1980
https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/kh04md207
58 

LEWIS M. CHERE 

and recognized in later periods? As in so many cases of this sort, closer examination of the events leads to the conclusion that it may have been both. 

What little evidence is available at this distance points to a popular nationalistic outbreak against the French, encouraged by the activities of the Imperial authorities at Canton. There is also reason to believe that the old anti-foreignism so frequently pointed to among the coastal Chinese also had some role in the affair. Some local Chinese leadership groups, like the Tung Wah, may also have tried to make use of the incident to enhance their own position vis-à-vis the colonial administration. 

The troubles of September and October 1884 were set off by two events in other parts of the China Coast. China and France had been very close to an open break over the suzerainty of Annam and the occupation of Tongking since early in 1883. When the Chinese appeared to have violated a May 1884 agreement between Li Hung-chang and Captain Ernest Fournier of the French Navy, France presented China with a series of ultimatums in June and July demanding compensation for French deaths incurred in the incident. Since the Chinese believed that it was the French who had violated the agreement they naturally were not inclined to sub-mit to the French demands.9 

France, determined to enforce what she considered her just demands, issued one last ultimatum in August. When Peking refused to give in, the French Asiatic Squadron under Admiral Courbet, which was anchored at Foochow opposite a Chinese fleet and the shipyard, opened fire on August 22. The Chinese Foochow Fleet was utterly destroyed with much loss of life. The Shipyard was severely damaged, and the forts along the Min River were taken and destroyed as the French went back downstream. 

In the competition among the governors and viceroys of the coastal provinces to demonstrate their patriotism in the furor that followed the Foochow incident, Chang Chih-tung, newly appointed Viceroy of the Two Kwangs; Peng Yü-lin, Imperial Commissioner for the Coastal Defenses of Kwangtung; and Ni Wan-yuh, Governor of Kwangtung, issued a proclamation calling on Chinese in Singapore, Penang and Vietnam (interestingly enough they did not mention Hong Kong) to sink French ships, or sell them tainted provisions. 

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RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊 | RAS-1982
https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/mk61z420p
66

ELIZABETH SINN

and were repulsed. Then, on the 23rd, led by Admiral Courbet, they launched an all-out attack on Foochow, destroying, within an hour, eleven Chinese warships and the Foochow shipyard. News of the sinking of the fleet at Foochow left Canton in the grip of hysteria. On the 30th, the high authorities in Canton proclaimed that they would offer awards for the lives of French soldiers. Plans were made to block up the river entrance as fears of a French naval attack on Canton grew.

Meanwhile, French ships arrived in Hong Kong. On 3rd September, the La Galissonière came. This frigate had taken part in the actions both at Keelung and Foochow; moreover, it had Admiral Courbet on board. He was saluted by British guns in the harbour.1

Chang Chih-tung was immediately told of this, and his informer advised him to prepare for war because of rumours in Hong Kong that the French would shortly attack Canton.2

On the 5th September, the Canton authorities issued another proclamation. It called upon all Chinese to support the Chinese government against France, but it seems to be addressed especially to the people of Hong Kong and Macao. It pointed out that Chinese in these localities were often traitorous, because, enticed to work for foreigners for high pay, they frequently ended up in their military service. This meant that they would sometimes be actually fighting China herself. The proclamation called upon these Chinese "to show a devoted regard for [their] fatherland” by refraining from working for the French, especially by refusing to repair their boats, and by killing French commanders and damaging their ammunitions of war. Those who followed these instructions would have their past offences forgiven, and be rewarded, while those who continued to help the enemy would imperil their family and relatives in China. Ten days later, on the 15th September, another equally inflammatory proclamation was issued calling on Chinese in Singapore, Penang and other places to kill and poison French persons.4

In Hong Kong, starting on the 11th, workers at the Cosmopolitan Dock at Hunghom refused to work on the La Galissonière. In addition, they also refused to continue work on the French Mail steamer, the Volga, even though they had
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RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊 | RAS-1982
https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/mk61z420p
78

ELIZABETH SINN

There can be no doubt that there were anti-French feelings among local Chinese of many different classes, feelings which existed independently of any initiative from Canton, but which were likely to rally to any call for patriotism from China.

The choice of the La Galissonière as the first target to boycott is significant. It had taken part in the storming of Keelung and at the attack on the Foochow fleet, and it had carried Admiral Courbet, the man in charge of these operations. It was a symbol of French aggression and a natural focus of Chinese hatred.

Patriotism was recognized as an important factor in the initial strike not only by the Chinese. The Foreign Office in London sympathized with Chinese workers who refused to do work which would further French war efforts, and it implicitly raised the question of whether it was morally right for the Hong Kong Government to fine them for that.55 Questions raised in the House of Commons over the riots in Hong Kong reflected similar views, and the suggestion was made in the House that directions be sent to authorities in Hong Kong and Singapore to refrain from forcing to work Chinese who refused to do so for patriotic reasons.56 When the strike was over, Governor George Bowen identified the feelings behind it as a "common national spirit", and saw its rise as an important turning point of modern Chinese history.57

Of course, the ties between the Canton authorities and local Chinese were not confined to the noble feelings of patriotism. The other forces at work included an assortment of interests. Many local Chinese had business and family ties in China which were vulnerable to retaliation. There was also the incentive of winning rewards from the Chinese Government which could greatly enhance status in Hong Kong. The Canton authorities exerted, therefore, by use of this carrot and stick approach, great influence on the Chinese in Hong Kong who while living and working there, still had their social, political and cultural frame of reference in China.

In many instances, local Chinese were eager to carry out official Chinese instructions. When the problem of finding agents in Hong Kong was brought up among Canton officials in 1884, Chang Chih-tung confidently declared, “All the civil and military
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