[
    {
        "id": 215934,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-2002",
        "page_number": 233,
        "title": "RAS-2002",
        "content_text": "167\n\nsocieties in the Japanese Army, though in his memoirs he downplayed this role. When Mrs Bush, a Japanese, was later forced to work as a Kempeitai interpreter, she talked to a prisoner who was in American Naval Intelligence about their mutual friend Charles Boxer. Bill Kendall, of whom more below, was told by Boxer that the Japanese were on the move: when he saw the zeros flying overhead, and knew that the attack had finally started.\n\nBeyond military intelligence\n\nFW Kendall was a Canadian from Vancouver who had lived in Hong Kong since childhood, and spoke not only fluent Cantonese but other dialects as well. He had had a mining business in China, but after the Japanese occupied east Guangdong and Chekiang his business was cut off. He then moved back to Hong Kong and worked for the Government organising refugee relief, building and running the main large camp at Kam Tin. Early in 1940 Kendall was approached by Col LA Newnham, in his capacity in charge of Military Intelligence, and asked to set up a small unit of civilians and volunteers. Being non-military personnel, they could undertake training in the use of sabotage and \"ungentlemanly warfare,\" which the official armed services could not legitimately carry out. The unit was given the cover name Z Force. Allocating £1,500 for this 'unit for independent action behind enemy lines' had to be done outside normal accounting channels, GOC Hong Kong told the War Office in September 1941, because of the need for absolute secrecy in a small place like Hong Kong.\n\nThe Special Operations Executive, under the Ministry for Economic Warfare, had been established in Europe for some years to assist resistance. They trained agents for the specific purpose of operating behind enemy lines using espionage, sabotage, and guerrilla warfare. Specialist SOE units created miniature code machines, wireless facilities and concealed weapons, known by the cheerful name of 'toys.' Where strategically useful, SOE created facilities for specialised sabotage. The whole point of SOE was to facilitate war in situations such as in occupied countries where traditional warfare was impractical. Its methods were ideally suited to the situation in China, where the front was so large and diverse that Japanese supply lines were stretched to vulnerability. The populace was strongly motivated for resistance, and the Japanese, whose control was weak beyond urban areas, were",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-2002.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/mp4901278",
        "rank": 0
    },
    {
        "id": 215935,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-2002",
        "page_number": 234,
        "title": "RAS-2002",
        "content_text": "168\n\nparticularly vulnerable to guerrilla harassment. SOE targeted China in its plans, but had to hold them in abeyance pending the outright declaration of war, since Britain was supposed to be neutral.\n\nKendall and his friend Eddie Teesdale were trained at the SOE base at Singapore. Kendall also had explosives experience from his days as a mining engineer. Kendall organised a group of hand-picked volunteers, who included the talented Administrative Cadet Ronald Holmes, a Russian-born businessman named Monia Talan, a PE instructor Colin McEwan, Dr Harry Talbot, Bobby Thompson, Hugh Williamson, all to play a role later in underground services. In addition, two police officers trained with them to learn SOE techniques. Intriguingly, with the group was also at least one Chinese, a man recorded only as ‘Brigadier Lee of North China.'\n\nKendall's men met secretly at a camp near Kam Tin, each weekend, usually trained by Teesdale, as Kendall was often in China. They received training in cipher and intelligence work, weapons, wireless and explosives. They also spent much time literally walking through the scrubland, often in the dark, getting to know the trails and terrain at first hand, in preparation for the day that they would have to work behind Japanese lines. Weapons were stored in Kendall's bungalow near Shing Mun, where Holmes and Teesdale lived for extended periods. They also set up five hidden stores, for supply in the event of a prolonged campaign behind Japanese lines. In the event, the Japanese found the main store, in a cave on Tai Mo Shan about 1,800 feet up on the south-east slope. Another was in an old lead mine at Lin Ma Hang, near the border at Sha Tau Kok. It was later raided by villagers, who would have seen troops of Indian soldiers carrying supplies there on mules. On the outbreak of battle, Col Newnham ordered Kendall and Talan out of the New Territories and into Lyemun Pass, to fix limpet mines to scuttle a ship being used by the Japanese as an observation post.\n\nThe remaining SOE men in the New Territories, led by Holmes and Teesdale, spent a month behind Japanese lines, crossing back and forth across the border, collecting information, setting up contacts and reconnoitring.\n\nZ Force was by no means the only undercover agency operating in Hong Kong: there are hints and rumours of a much wider, high-level series of groups, but firm proof is hard to substantiate. By definition such work would be secret. For security reasons networks had to operate",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-2002.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/mp4901278",
        "rank": 0
    },
    {
        "id": 215948,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-2002",
        "page_number": 247,
        "title": "RAS-2002",
        "content_text": "181\n\nSignificantly, this party was the only escape group without a regular military officer in their midst, and to have a Chinese to organise their escape and travel with them. All three Europeans were academics, without experience of up-to-date, modern military thinking. Moreover, given the nature of colonial society, they were used to being treated with deference. It would not have occurred to them to question why the Chinese along their escape route had been so helpful, or why they were met by Europeans in this very remote area, still bandit country, where few ventured, who were not only expecting them, but 'who were quite conversant with the route back to Kowloon and were assistants to FW Kendall, another member of the same organisation whose address... was c/o Col Chauvin, British Embassy, Chung King.'\n\nLt DF Davies, formerly a Lecturer in Physics, solemnly advised that he understood 'Col LT Ride of our party was to attempt some sort of underground railroad back to the Camp...(and) if they could be persuaded and/or allowed to carry out this work, I would suggest that the Cloak and Dagger Group be approached.' Since the Cloak and Dagger Boys they met were Z Force, this was in fact one of the jobs they had long been trained for.\n\nThe trip from Hong Kong had been stressful, not least because a commanding officer had told Ride in no uncertain terms before departure that he should be court-martialled on arrival in Chongqing for deserting his troops. From Lt Davies' report, we know that the group had talked with Z Force members about their organisation. Grimsdale was later to refer to Ride blaming Kendall as a 'complete failure' for delaying his departure from Kukong, then a safe town with Chinese Army presence. Ride himself makes no mention, describing the men later as mere escapees with the Chan Chak group.\n\nWhile still in Kukong, after meeting MacEwan and Talan, the group met Col Chauvin and Dr Wan Wan Yik Shin, a doctor who had served both in the Chinese Army and in the British RAMC. It was at this stage that Ride appears to have outlined his proposals to set up an elaborate escape and evasion organisation. By the time he arrived in Chongqing a few days later, he had formulated an elaborate proposal. Operational details were sketchy, to be left to others to sort out, naming Dr Wan and General Yu Mo Han, commander of Chinese forces in the area. On one point he was unequivocally adamant: that 'the section should be under the command of Lt Col Ride.' It was an absolutely essential prerequisite that the British authorities provide him with a letter confirming his",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-2002.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/mp4901278",
        "rank": 0
    }
]