[
    {
        "id": 207068,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1974",
        "page_number": 139,
        "title": "RAS-1974",
        "content_text": "THE HONG KONG REGION\n\n133\n\nHayes, J. W., 'Old Ways of Life in Kowloon: the Cheung Sha Wan Villages\" in Journal of Oriental Studies, Vol. VIII, No. 1, January 1970: 154-188.\n\nHo, Ping-ti, Studies on the Population of China, 1368-1953, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1959.\n\nHsieh, Kuo Ching, 'Removal of Coastal Population in Early Tsing Period', The Chinese Social and Political Science Review, XIII, 1929: 559-596.\n\nHummel, Arthur W. (Editor), Eminent Chinese of the Ch'ing Period (1644-1912), Taipei, Ch'eng Wen Publishing Company, 1967. Reprint of the first edition, Washington, United States Government Printing Office, 2 vols., 1943.\n\nKrone, Rev. Mr., A Notice of the Sanon District. C.B.R.A.S. Transactions VI, 1859: 71-105. Reprinted in JHKBRAS 7, 1967: 104-137.\n\nLo, Hsiang-lin, 'The Sung Wang T'ai and the Location of the Travelling Courts by the Sea-shore in the Last Days of the Sung' in Journal of Oriental Studies, Vol. III, No. 2, July 1956.\n\n-, (and others), Hong Kong and Its External Communications before 1842. Hong Kong, Institute of Chinese Culture, 1963. An English version, abbreviated, of the Chinese edition of 1959.\n\nMayers, W. F., Dennys, N. B. and King, C., The Treaty Ports of China and Japan. A Complete Guide to the Open Ports of these countries, together with Peking, Yedo, Hong Kong and Macao. London, Trübner & Co., Hong Kong, A. Shortrede & Co., 1867.\n\nMurphey, Rhoads, The Treaty Ports and China's Modernization: what went wrong? Michigan Papers in Chinese Studies, No. 7, Ann Arbor, 1970.\n\nMontalto de Jesus, C. A., Historic Macao, International Traits in China Old and New. Macao, 2nd edition, revised and enlarged, 1926.\n\nNeumann, C. F., Translations from the Chinese and Armenian with Notes: 1 History of the Pirates who infested the China Sea from 1807 to 1810, London, John Murray, 1831.\n\nNg, Peter Y. L., The 1819 Edition of the Hsin-an Hsien-chih, A Critical Examination with Translation and Notes. Hong Kong, Kowloon and the New Territories (1644-1842). Unpublished M. A. thesis, University of Hong Kong, 1961.\n\nNg, Ronald C. Y., 'The San On Map of Mgr. Volontieri. On the Centenary of the Copy in the R.G.S. Collection', London, Geographical Journal, Vol. 135, Part 2, June, 1969: 231-235. Reprinted in JHKBRAS 9, 1969: 141-148.\n\nOrme, G. N., Report on the New Territories for the Years 1899 to 1912. in Sessional Papers 1912.\n\nPerkins, Dwight H., Agricultural Development in China 1368-1968. Chicago, Aldine Publishing Company, 1969.\n\nPotter, Jack M., Capitalism and the Chinese Peasant, Social and Economic Change in a Hong Kong Village. Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1968.\n\nSchofield, Walter, Personal Communications, 1958-1968.",
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        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/x633mp077",
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    {
        "id": 207723,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1976",
        "page_number": 111,
        "title": "RAS-1976",
        "content_text": "96\n\nTIN-YUKE CHAR\n\ncountries in the hope to find suitable people to replenish our population. We have the productive land. Sugar and rice are our main and most profitable crops.\" The letter also mentioned that the Chinese did not bring their women and that it was dangerous to give them franchise because their numbers would be a threat to the Kingdom. The suggestion was to try India where the British had been successful in using their coolies in agricultural development of the colonies. Armstrong, however, later sent a report that the East Indians were not suitable nor desirable as immigrants to Hawaii. Minister Green had also written on January 18, 1881 to William Keswick, Hawaiian Consul General in Hong Kong to expect King Kalakaua's arrival and to assist Armstrong in obtaining a good class of Chinese immigrants to be accompanied by wives and children.\n\nFrom Hawaii the party first started for San Francisco where the Chinese Consul General entertained the Royal party at Hang Fen Lou Restaurant and took the occasion to thank the King for his kind treatment of the Chinese in Hawaii.\n\nSailing for Japan on the Oceanic, the Royal party arrived after twenty-four days at the Bay of Yedo on March 4, 1881 and landed at Yokohama. King Kalakaua wrote back from Tokyo on March 15, 1881, “Our reception has been most cordial and pleasant with the Emperor [Meiji]. He extended the hospitality of being his guest during our stay in the City of Tokio, occupying the same buildings that General Grant did when he was here and other distinguished guests, Prince Henri of Germany and the Duke of Genoa.”\n\nThe subject of possible Japanese emigration to Hawaii received some consideration by the Japanese officials. And on February 8, 1885, the first group of Japanese immigrants (676 men, 159 women, and 108 children) came to Hawaii. Major credit for this successful endeavor was due to \"the personal friendship of the Emperor of Japan for King Kalakaua.\" commented the editor of the Pacific Commercial Advertiser.\n\nTo proceed to China, the party sailed on the Tokio Maru. Upon arrival at Shanghai, they were furnished the Pautah by the China Merchants Steam Navigation Company to take the Royal group to Tientsin. They had hopes of being received at Court in",
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    {
        "id": 207771,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1976",
        "page_number": 159,
        "title": "RAS-1976",
        "content_text": "144\n\nW. A. REYNOLDS\n\ntruck so that the payload of 2 tons was the maximum. However, by 1944 the charcoal trucks were being operated successfully over the Luhsien road with its high altitude as well as all the other routes. Charcoal was obtainable in most villages and was cheap in the mountain areas and the cost, per ton carried, was 1/5 of that of alcohol. The charcoal burners carried the major load of supplies through 1944 and the first part of 1945.\n\nThe successful Burma campaign of autumn 1944, the opening of the Ledo road and the petrol pipeline laid along it made a great difference to the Unit transport systems. Not only was the Unit allocated 25 Canadian W.D. 3-ton Dodge trucks in the summer of 1945 from ARC and UNRAA, but it was also able to obtain P.O.L. (Petrol, Oil and Lubrication) supplies from the US army free of charge. To quote from a letter written 10/6/45 “It was a great moment when at Kunming, Rupert (Stanley) and I drove up in a truck to the P.O.L. station and pulled up beside a real petrol pump (and bright red at that too) and said to the Sergeant \"Fill'er up\" and he filled her up to the tune of 22 gallons US. When I told him it was 34 years since I'd done that he registered the usual GI amazement that anyone could stand the place that long”.\n\nSystem Performance\n\nThe cargo carried by the system was in three categories: Medical and Relief supplies for NHA, IRC, ARC etc.; FAU maintenance and fuel supplies; and return cargoes. The Government transport administration ruled that no trucks should travel empty and on return journeys must take Government, usually military, cargoes. The Unit had a special pass, as a Christian pacifist organization, exempting it from taking soldiers or weapons and instead usually had cargoes of salt from the Yangtse valley south to Kweichow and Yunnan.\n\nThe system performance figures in terms of kilometre tons for the 4 years, as far as they are at present available, are given in Table VII. The number of trucks available on average through the years are given, and from this it will be seen that the operating efficiency in terms of kilometre tons per truck per year steadily increased. This was due to:---\n\n1) increased efficiency of the Charcoal truck operations, more than compensating for the deterioration of the diesel trucks",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1976.txt",
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    },
    {
        "id": 208572,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1979",
        "page_number": 29,
        "title": "RAS-1979",
        "content_text": "2\n\nCHAN KIT-CHENG\n\nThe American sense of guilt was largely attributable to three factors: United States' military defeats in Southeast Asia, the American commitment to the policy of defeating Germany first before concentrating on Japan, and the American failure in delivering the bulk of lend-lease and other war materials promised to China. On the first point, according to Stanley K. Hornbeck who was political adviser to the Department of State, reports from American sources from or through Chungking indicated that the American defeat in the Philippines, together with the rapid collapse of the British position in Southeast Asia, had bred \"a sense of frustration and defeatism” among the Chinese.4 To be fair, however, one must add that China had been vastly more appalled and disillusioned by, and consequently more contemptuous of, the British performance.\n\nOn the second point, it was only natural that China was disappointed and embittered by the American policy of “Germany First”. Support for this order of priority was by no means unanimous within American government circles. Admirals Ernest J. King and William D. Leahy, General Douglas MacArthur (at his new headquarters in Australia), and Stanley Hornbeck, to give some examples, all expressed doubt about it and urged that a greater military effort should be directed against Japan. While President Roosevelt was firm on his decision to stand by the agreement reached at the 'Arcadia” Conference it did not mean that he was entirely free from embarrassment when faced with his Far Eastern ally, Chiang Kai-shek.\n\nM4\n\nOn the third point, immediately after Pearl Harbour, President Roosevelt had been generous in promising China war materials, including planes, mainly through lend-lease channels. However, the Americans soon realized that it was easier to make the promise than to implement it. Two difficulties were involved. The first was the problem of transport. After the fall of Burma and the seizure of the southern part of the Burma Road by the Japanese early in 1942, air transport became the only feasible means of getting supplies into China. Until the opening of the well-known Ledo Road (later on re-named Stilwell Road) early in 1945, the bulk of the supplies flown from India to China was transported by the Tenth United States Air Force between April and December 1942, and thereafter by the United States Air Transport Command in what Joseph W. Ballantine, who became director of the Office of",
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        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/2801w5938",
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    },
    {
        "id": 208947,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1980",
        "page_number": 109,
        "title": "RAS-1980",
        "content_text": "SILK & SILVER: MACAU, MANILA TRADE\n\n77\n\nIn 1629 the Viceroy Conde de Linhares ordered that both the Macau-Nagasaki and Macau-Manila voyages should henceforth be made under the supervision and control of the Crown and the profits from them used for the upkeep of the royal dockyard at Goa and the maintenance of the Portuguese fleet in Asian waters, but it was not until 1635 that an administrator for the voyages was sent from Goa to Macau to enforce the new system.32 In the same year the Viceroy finally agreed to allow one pinnace to make the Macau-Manila voyage each year, laden with munitions for the Manila garrison and enough silk for local consumption in the Philippines without any surplus for export to Mexico, where it would compete with silks from Seville.\n\nBy the end of the 16th century Macau's trade was already being threatened from several quarters. On the one hand, the development of the Manila-Japan trade, the increasing power and cohesion of the Japanese state under the Tokugawa and the encouragement of a Japanese merchant navy by Tokugawa Ieyasu — the famous Red Seal ships33 — and, above all, the growing hostility of the shoguns towards Christianity and the missionary activities of Portuguese Jesuits and Spanish friars undermined Macau's trade with Japan. On the other hand, competition from the Dutch, whose control of the Straits of Malacca made trade and communications between Macau and Goa difficult and dangerous and whose establishment in Taiwan after 1624 extended this danger into the China Seas, had a deleterious effect on Macau's trade with Indonesia. The extortions of the Chinese merchants, who also of course carried on direct trade in competition with the Portuguese, licitly or illicitly, both with Japan and Manila, weakened Macau's position still further. Between 1613 and 1640, an average of 60 to 80 Chinese junks visited Japan yearly, though from 1634 they were, like the Portuguese, confined to Nagasaki. These difficulties culminated in the summary expulsion of the Portuguese from Japan in 1639 by the Shogun Iemitsu and in the fall of Malacca to the Dutch in 1641. The embassy sent from Macau in 1640 in a last attempt to get Iemitsu to revoke his edict of expulsion met a terrible fate. 61 of the 74 members of the delegation were beheaded by 61 executioners sent specially from Yedo to Nagasaki for the purpose. A contemporary Portuguese account of how the citizens of Macau reacted to the news of the calamity sums up well the peculiar quality of the whole Portuguese adventure in the East, its mixture of missionary zeal and ...",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1980.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/kh04md207",
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    },
    {
        "id": 211855,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1989",
        "page_number": 270,
        "title": "RAS-1989",
        "content_text": "# BIBLIOGRAPHY\n\n245\n\n1. Archives:\n\n\"London Missionary Society\": Incoming Letters, Central China.\n\n2. Newspapers and Periodicals:\n\n**Boletim do Governo de Macao**, Macao, 1855-1865.\n\n\"China Mail\", Hong Kong, 1845-1860.\n\n\"North China Herald\", Shanghai, 1850-1867.\n\n\"Puck, or the Shanghai Charivari\", Shanghai, 1871-1873.\n\n*Shanghai Commercial Record*, Shanghai, 1865.\n\n3. Books and Articles:\n\nAdams, W. Davenport: \"A Dictionary of the Drama. A Guide to the Plays, Playwrights, Players and Playhouses of the United Kingdom and America from the earliest times to the present\", Vol. I (A-G) (no more published). Philadelphia, 1904.\n\nAppleton, William W.: \"Madame Vestris and the London Stage\", New York - London, 1974.\n\nBarr, Pat: \"The Deer Cry Pavillion. A Story of Westerners in Japan 1868-1905\", London, 1968.\n\nBlack, J.R.: \"Young Japan. Yokohama and Yedo. A Narrative of the Settlement and the city from the signing of the treaties in 1858 to the close of the year 1879\", Tokyo-London, 1968 (reprint of 1880-1881 edition).\n\nBoase, Frederic: \"Modern English Biography\", London, 1965 (reprint of the 1891-1921 edition).\n\nBooth, Michael (Ed): \"English Plays of the 19th century\", Volumes I and IV, Oxford, 1969-1973.\n\nBritish Museum General Catalogue of Books.\n\nBrown, T. Allston: \"A History of the New York Stage from the first performance in 1732 to 1901, 3 vols.; New York 1964 (reprint of 1903 ed.).\n\nBuckley, C.B.: \"An Anecdotal History of Old Times in Singapore 1819-1867, Singapore, 1902.\n\nCarse, A.: \"The Life of Jullien\", Cambridge, 1951.\n\nChesterfield, Lord: \"Advice to his son on Men & Manners in which the principles of politeness and the art of acquiring a knowledge of the world are laid down in an easy and familiar manner\", Chiswick, 1826.\n\nConolly, L.W. and J.P. Wearing: \"English Drama and Theatre 1800-1900. A Guide to information sources\", Detroit, 1978.\n\nCordier, Henri: \"Bibliotheca Sinica\", second edition; 5 vols.; Paris 1904ff.\n\nDavis, Jim (Ed.): \"Plays of H.J. Byron\", Cambridge, 1984.\n\n'Dictionary of National Biography\".\n\nDyce, C.M.: \"Personal Reminiscences of Thirty Years' Residence in the Model Settlement. Shanghai 1870-1900\", London, 1906.\n\nEngle, Gary D.: \"This Grotesque Essence. Plays from the American Minstrel Stage\". Baton Rouge, 1978.\n\nFétis, F.J.: \"Biographic Universelle de Musiciens\", Paris, 1864; Supplement by Arthur Pougin, 1880.\n\nFitzgerald, Percy: \"Principles of Comedy and Dramatic Effect\", London, 1870.\n\n\"The New Grove Dictionary of Music and Musicians\", London, 1980.\n\nHaan, J.H.: \"Origin and Development of the Political System in the Shanghai International Settlement\" in: \"Journal of the Hong Kong Branch of Royal Asiatic Society\", Vol. 22 (1982), p. 31-64.\n\nHaan, J.H.: \"The Shanghai Library: A history of the first foreign library in Shanghai\" in: \"Journal of the Hong Kong Library Association\", 1987.\n\nHartnoll, Phyllis: \"The Concise Oxford Companion to the Theatre\", London, 1972.\n\nHoward, Diana: \"London Theatres and Music Halls, 1850-1950\", London, 1970.\n\nPage 270\n\nPage 271",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1989.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/8336pm92h",
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    },
    {
        "id": 212824,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1992",
        "page_number": 133,
        "title": "RAS-1992",
        "content_text": "118\n\nassistance which it might be possible to provide, and, soon after, the Myosa left to return to his country.\n\nIn August 1943 British troops were poised on the Assam border at Imphal, Tamu, and Tiddim, awaiting sufficient replenishment of equipment and the cessation of the rains to undertake the return advance into Burma; and there was activity down in the Arakan: while General Stilwell's Chinese divisions, retrained, reinforced, and re-equipped in India after their withdrawal from Burma, were just beginning to feel their way forward from Ledo, away up at the northern end of Assam, down the road which later was to become famous as the Ledo road. General Wingate's first expedition into Burma had just been completed, with heavy loss on our side, but with much success in confusing the enemy and disorganising his effort to consolidate his positions. The shape of future operations depended on the enemy's dispositions, so that any information which could be collected in eastern Burma would be useful: and in Kokang it might also be possible to organise patriot parties to assail his communications.\n\nIt was not an easy matter to obtain the consent of our allies for the passage of a British party to Kokang. The Chinese have unfortunately imitated the Japanese in a predilection for red tape; formalities are extended ad infinitum. It was fair enough that any British officer who entered China should require a pass issued by the Chinese authorities - though no such restriction attached to the presence of Chinese officers in India - but was it really necessary that the power to issue the pass should be retained by the highest authority in the land, the Military Affairs Council which would correspond with our Committee of Imperial Defence and that it should have to carry the personal chop of the Generalissimo? It did not make for speed in administration. It should also be remembered that the Chinese refused to serve in Burma under British command: that is how General Stilwell first came on the scene; and I think it is fair to say that our American allies had come to look on the Far East, and perhaps more particularly China, as their own special sphere of operations, where there was no room for any British.\n\nMy appointment was from the Army in India, which in those days, before the South East Asia Command had been established, was responsible for the operations in Burma. The proposal for assistance to the Myosa was submitted by the British representatives in Chungking to the Chinese government with a request that the necessary passes be",
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