[ { "id": 204978, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1965", "page_number": 86, "title": "RAS-1965", "content_text": "PIRACY ON THE CHINA COAST\n\n77\n\nWest River, and which were stationed permanently on those rivers. These were divided into two squadrons, one for the Yangtze, and one for the West River, with a senior naval officer in charge of each squadron under the overall command of the Commander-in-Chief of British naval forces at Hong Kong. The officer in charge of the Yangtze squadron was called Rear Admiral, Yangtze. The assumption of this title seems to have aroused little comment from the Chinese, unlike the British public's reaction when the Kaiser called himself Admiral of the Atlantic a few decades later.\n\nAs old-fashioned piracy died out with the coming of steamships, a new kind designed to cope with the new conditions appeared. While some of the new pirates may have been recruited from the old, the new piracy required a knowledge of modern shipping practices unlikely to have been common among the old fishermen cum pirates. As before, however, the new-style piracy was most prevalent around Hong Kong, embarrassingly close to the headquarters of the anti-piracy forces. It was adding insult to injury when the steam launch Wo Fat Shing was pirated in Hong Kong Harbour in 1927, and $30,000 in gold bars stolen. The newspapers made great play out of such facts. Highly coloured accounts of pirate companies being established in Hong Kong along sound business lines, replete with boards of directors and so on, were common in the British and American press in the 1920's and early 30's. The rumour that some of these companies had attractive Chinese women in command added some spice to these stories.\n\nOne of the earliest cases of this new kind of piracy took place in 1874, when the Hong Kong, Canton, and Macao Steamship Company's small river steamer Spark was pirated between Canton and Macao.2 The Spark's captain, mate, purser, one fireman, and four passengers were murdered. The pirates went ashore in the ship's boats, and the engineers took refuge in the bunkers then took the ship to Macao. The Spark was only 133 tons burden, but she had over 150 passengers who had prudently taken...\n\n2 The Spark was one of the oldest steamers on the river. She had been built in New York in 1849 for Russell and Company, sent out in sections and assembled at Whampoa. She was sold to the Hong Kong, Canton, and Macao Steamship Company in 1870.", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1965.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/s752cj653", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 205952, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1970", "page_number": 32, "title": "RAS-1970", "content_text": "LORD ELGIN AND THE TAIPINGS\n\n27\n\nThe next evening, the squadron anchored off the city of T'ai-p'ing, also in Taiping hands, after having previously silenced some other forts a few miles below under equally questionable circumstances. Nevertheless, at T'ai-p'ing a request came to the British from the Taipings for assistance against the Imperialist war junks. The request note referred to its writer as \"your younger brother\" and was addressed to \"your Excellencies the Foreigners.\"12 In reply, Elgin sent a note recalling what had happened the previous day at Nanking, indicating that this had been a \"warning to all who may be hereafter minded to interfere with the ships of Her Majesty.\"3 For their part, however, the Taipings apologized for the firing at Nanking, explaining that it had been a mistake. Assurances were also given that the mission would not again be molested. Elgin conceded that he believed the Taipings to be sincere.14 Their request for assistance, however, was ignored.\n\nTwo days later, on November 23, the English arrived at Wu Hu, where they paused and sent ashore Thomas Wade \"to ascertain the disposition of the insurgents\" and \"in particular to determine if supplies could be obtained.\"15 This proved to be another instance of unmitigated presumption on the part of the visitors, and we see this by reading the English account only. Even though the Taipings' suggestion as to the form in which the request be made (a letter to the Taiping chief) was ignored by the English, the Taipings were still quick in making available the requested provisions. In spite of this gracious and generous Taiping hospitality, Wade's report of this visit is filled with language prejudicial to his hosts. There is not the slightest indication that appreciation was felt, or expressed.16 The squadron continued its progress up the Yangtze,\n\nThe next clash, at Anking, remains a classic instance of international effrontery. As the English ships approached this city it was under attack by Ch'ing forces, an assault that may have been coordinated with the English arrival. According to eyewitness Laurence Oliphant: \"It seemed that the Government troops had received notice of our approach and had determined to take advantage of it, in order to make a grand attack upon Ngan-king…\". Aside from these circumstances, not mentioned in most accounts of the affair, Elgin himself knew that the Taipings", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1970.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/ww72j0241", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 207799, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1976", "page_number": 187, "title": "RAS-1976", "content_text": "172 \n\nA. D. BLUE \n\nshe was retained as the headquarters ship of the Royal Navy's Upper Yangtze squadron. \n\nThe Royal Navy had always maintained a strong presence on the river, since British ships commenced to trade on the Yangtze in the early 1860s. So far as the Yangtze was concerned, ‘trade followed the flag\". Naval ships were the first British ships to navigate the lower Yangtze, and continued to lead the way as British shipping extended its operations further up the river. As we have seen, H.M.S. Woodcock reached Chungking and beyond to Suifu a few months before the Pioneer made the first successful commercial passage of the Upper Yangtze. By the mid 1920s, when British shipping had reached its peak there, the Royal Navy's Yangtze Squadron consisted primarily of six general purpose gunboats of the \"Insect\" class based on Hankow. These had been built originally for service against the Turks on the Tigris and Euphrates in World War 1. Each carried fifty-four officers and men, and had two six-inch guns, and they were powerful little ships in flat country. For the Upper River there were several smaller ships of the \"Bird class\", which carried twenty-six or thirty-one men. Two operated on the Tungting Lake and on the Siang River to Changsha, and another two on the Upper Yangtze to Chungking, with occasional trips to Suifu. In the high water season the \"Insect\" class ships could also operate on the Upper River. \n\nThis force was commanded by the Rear-Admiral, Yangtze, at Hankow, who came under the overall command of the Commander-in-Chief of the British naval forces in the Far East at Hong Kong. The Yangtze Squadron, therefore, consisted of about 500 officers and could be quickly reinforced from Shanghai and Hong Kong if necessary. It was also possible for a 10,000 ton cruiser to reach Hankow in the high water season. The Royal Navy was frequently called on to protect British ships and British interests on the Yangtze, sometimes against rebels, pirates, war lords, or threats from other foreign powers. The term 'gunboat diplomacy' probably originated from the operations of the Royal Navy on the China coast and on the Yangtze. \n\nThe most notable naval occasion on the Yangtze, since the First China War of 1839-42, was the Wanhsien Incident of 1926. This originated in the refusal of the captain of the China Navigation Company's Wanliu to carry soldiers of Yung Lin, one of the war", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1976.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/hq382988q", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 207800, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1976", "page_number": 188, "title": "RAS-1976", "content_text": "LAND AND RIVER ROUTES TO WEST CHINA \n\n173 \n\nlords then fighting for power in Szechuan. Before the 'Incident' closed nearly a month later, another two China Navigation Company ships had been seized by Yung Lin. All available ships of the Yangtze Squadron were involved, and H.M. ships Dispatch, a light cruiser, and Hawkins, the flagship of the China Station, had been sent to Hankow. In addition the Indo-China Steam Navigation Company's Kiawo had been requisitioned by the Navy to carry reinforcements to Wanhsien. During the sometimes severe fighting which occurred at times, the chief engineer of the Wanliu and seven servicemen lost their lives, and several others were wounded. It was nearly two years later, and after Chiang Kai-shek had expelled the left wing elements of the Kuomintang and his Russian advisers, before the situation on the Yangtze returned to something approaching normal.\n\nAfter the Royal Navy took over the Pioneer, Captain Plant built a junk and traded between Ichang and Chungking, and made a thorough study of the Upper Yangtze. In 1908 he persuaded a group of Chinese business men and government officials to form the Szechwan Steam Navigation Company, forty per cent of the capital coming from official sources, and the balance from private Chinese merchants. The Company's first ship, the Shutung, was built by Thorneycrofts in Southampton under Captain Plant's supervision. She cost £26,000 and arrived at Ichang in 1909. The Shutung was 115 feet long, sixteen feet beam, and six and a half feet depth, and was described as 'a mass of machinery.' She towed a float alongside in which her cargo and passengers were accommodated, and in spite of only being able to carry sixty tons dead-weight of cargo, twelve first and sixty-six steerage passengers, was a great success financially and comparatively trouble-free. The Shutung's success was largely due to Captain Plant's intimate knowledge of the Upper River, his ability to inspire confidence in Chinese official and commercial circles in Chungking, and in his Chinese crew. Until 1914 the Shutung was the only steamer on the Upper Yangtze; but in April of that year she was joined by the Shuhun, a larger and more powerful sister ship, also built in Britain, sent out in sections, and assembled in Shanghai. At the same time the Szechwan Railway Company, then planning a railway from Hankow to Chungking, put three smaller steamers on the Upper Yangtze. Two of these ran between Ichang and Chungking, and the third between Chungking and Suifu. By 1914, therefore, the technical", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1976.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/hq382988q", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 215822, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-2002", "page_number": 121, "title": "RAS-2002", "content_text": "54\n\nremained an integral part of Allied strategy to defeat Japan. Even if her expected contribution to Allied victory over Japan had been downgraded and a squadron of B-29s based on the mainland was not as promising as a combat-ready Chinese Army, the politics of basing such a new and promising weapon on Chinese soil were thought to be enough to boost Chinese morale.53\n\nThe issue is in doubt\n\nBy the end of 1943, Allied planners had not settled on a decision to drop Hong Kong from the list of future objectives, nor did they elevate its status to that of a territory whose possession was beyond debate. In short, if a campaign in China was likely, a port on the China Coast would need to be opened up, and Hong Kong was a leading candidate for such a port. The development of the war in 1944-1945 would determine Hong Kong's importance.\n\nAs the USN's Central Pacific offensive gathered momentum in early 1944, the adjacent Southwest Pacific offensive under General Douglas MacArthur also stepped up its pace so as not to be left behind. The competing dual advances sped up the Allied timetable, and brought the Allies to within striking distance of Japan by summer 1944.\n\nIn China, it was a different story. Chinese forces here had not faced a major Japanese attack since 1938. When the Japanese attempted to link their possessions in the south (including Hong Kong) with the large portion of China they held north of the Yangtze River with a major offensive in the summer, the Chinese forces standing in the way largely disintegrated without offering much resistance. By early 1945, the Hong Kong beachhead had linked up with the rest of Japanese-held China. By now, the prospect of recapturing Hong Kong from the sea, while still not entirely infeasible, was made harder due to the potential ease with which the Japanese could reinforce Hong Kong from the interior of China. Intelligence reports indicated that the Japanese probably intended to wage a last-ditch defence of Hong Kong like they were already doing in the Pacific.54\n\nJ\n\nThe Japanese eventually overextended themselves in China, while China belatedly began to receive supplies in some quantity once the road link from Burma was reopened and the air link over the Hump", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-2002.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/mp4901278", "rank": 0 } ]