[
    {
        "id": 207643,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
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        "document_key": "RAS-1976",
        "page_number": 31,
        "title": "RAS-1976",
        "content_text": "16\n\nRICHARD J. SMITH\n\npolicies, the Meiji government managed to avoid most of the difficulties that had plagued the Chinese effort to use foreign assistance efficiently.\n\nBuilding on the foundation of pre-Meiji experience, Western-trained and Western-oriented leadership,24 and strong central government direction and support, Japan made rapid strides in the modernization of her military after 1868. A leading figure in this effort was Yamagata Aritomo, who became Vice Minister of Military Affairs upon his return to Japan after a year-long tour of Europe in 1869-1870.25 With French advice and assistance, the Meiji government created an Imperial Guard in 1871, which not only made possible the abolition of the feudal han in the same year, but also set the stage for the introduction of conscription in 1872. By 1875, the Japanese had established a centralized military academy at Tokyo, with branch schools in veterinary medicine and other subjects.26 At the same time, numerous officers were sent abroad for further military education.27 By 1893, Japan had a total of sixteen military schools instructing over 2,600 students per year.28 Overseas-educated officers returned in a steady stream to assist in teaching these individuals.\n\nIn 1878, following the Satsuma Rebellion (1877), the Japanese established an independent General Staff on the German model. This marked the eclipse of the French in Japanese military affairs and the rise of Germany. Presseisen attaches profound significance to this development: \"So long as French influence prevailed, Japan's army remained under unified civilian control, her law code owed much to French legal opinions, and her government might have evolved toward a liberal, parliamentary system. After Germany's triumph the command structure, the constitution, and the Imperial Court followed the German ideological style.”\n\n19\n\nThe outstanding contributions of Jacob Meckel's German military mission to Japan in 1885 have been described in detail by Presseisen,30 The salient point is that by the early 1890's, Japan had built a modern, centralized army and had eliminated the need for further foreign military assistance. China, meanwhile, had done neither. The Sino-Japanese War underscored the stark contrast between the Chinese and Japanese reform efforts.31\n\nArmies, like individuals, can both reflect and effect change in society. Sir Lewis Namier has offered the opinion that \"the social",
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    {
        "id": 207650,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1976",
        "page_number": 38,
        "title": "RAS-1976",
        "content_text": "STUDY OF MODERNIZATION IN CHINA & JAPAN\n\n23\n\n23 See Umetani Noboru, \"Foreign Nationals Employed in Japan during the Years of Modernization,\" East Asian Cultural Studies, 10.1 (March, 1971).\n\n24 Ibid., 5-6.\n\n25 See Roger Hackett, \"The Meiji Leaders and Modernization: The Case of Yamagata Aritomo,\" in Marius Jansen, ed., Changing Japanese Attitudes toward Modernization (Princeton, 1965).\n\n26 Yamagata Aritomo, \"The Japanese Army,\" in Okuma Shigenobu, comp., Fifty Years of New Japan (New York, 1909), 206.\n\n27 Ibid., 206.\n\n28 Ibid., 206-208.\n\n29 Presseisen, vii; also chapters 2 and 4.\n\n30 Ibid., esp. 135-136. As a professor at the Army Staff College and an adviser to the General Staff, Meckel helped to reorganize the Army Ministry, refine the General Staff, improve the system and content of Japanese military education, and develop the Japanese system of logistics and medical services. In addition, he helped restructure the army into divisions and taught the Japanese \"the demands of full-scale mobilization, which included a strategic railroad network, a new conscription act, and improved staff exercises.\"\n\n31 Mary Wright, The Last Stand, 220-221; Rawlinson, 167-204; Presseisen, 139-143; Hsü, The Rise of Modern China (New York, etc., 1975), 418-420; Yamagata Ariyoshi, \"The Army,\" in Albert Stead, ed., Japan by the Japanese (London, 1904), 107-109; etc.\n\n32 Cited in Roger Hackett, \"The Military: Japan,\" in Robert E. Ward and Dankwart Rustow, eds., Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey (Princeton, 1964), 328.\n\n33 Ike Nobutaka, \"War and Modernization,\" in Robert Ward, ed., Political Development in Modern Japan (Princeton, 1968), 209.\n\n34 Hackett, \"The Military,\" 346-348.\n\n35 See, for example, Ike, 196; also Shibusawa Keizo, ed., Japanese Life and Culture in the Meiji Era (translated and adapted by Charles Terry; Tokyo, 1958), 303-309, esp. 308-309.\n\n36 Hackett, \"The Military,\" 335.\n\n37 Ogawa Gotaro, The Conscription System in Japan (New York, 1921), chapter 3.\n\n38 Shibusawa, 306-307.\n\n39 H. Paul Varley, Japanese Culture: A Short History (New York, 1973), 163-164.\n\n40 Donald Keene, \"The Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95 and Its Cultural Effects in Japan,\" in Donald Shively, ed., Tradition and Modernization in Japanese Culture (Princeton, 1971).\n\n41 Ogawa, part 2.\n\n42 See Harry T. Oshima, \"Meiji Fiscal Policy and Economic Progress,\" in William Lockwood, ed., The State and Economic Enterprise in Japan (Princeton, 1968), esp. 372. See also Shibusawa, 305, 315; Fairbank, et al., 199-200; Ike, 205.",
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    {
        "id": 207651,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1976",
        "page_number": 39,
        "title": "RAS-1976",
        "content_text": "24\n\nRICHARD J. SMITH\n\n43 See Ono Giichi, War and Armament Expenditures of Japan (New York, 1922), 57-58, 70-71, 140-144, 273-277, and Ono's Expenditures of the Sino-Japanese War (New York, 1922), 120-126; also Oshima, 372-375, 376, note 18.\n\n44 Smith, \"Foreign-Training,\" 219-220; Yamagata, \"The Army,” 107-108; British Public Record Office, W.O. 33/34, Captain Trotter, \"Some Remarks on the Army of Li Hung-Chang;\" Rawlinson, 190.\n\n45 Smith, \"Foreign-Training,\" 219, 221; see also Rawlinson, 202-203; Thomas William Ayers, Chang Chih-tung and Educational Reform in China (Cambridge, Mass., 1971), 164-189, 204-215.\n\n46 Smith, \"Foreign-Training,\" 218-219; Cavendish, 721.\n\n47 Cavendish, 711, 713-715, 719-723.\n\n48 Smith, \"Chinese Military Institutions,\" 157, note 135.\n\n49 See Fairbank, et. al., “Economic Change,\" 20-21; Hsü, The Rise of Modern China, 527-534. On the more positive side of the ledger, consult Ernest Young, \"Nationalism, Reform and Republican Revolution: East Asia: Essays in Interpretation, 160-162; Hsü, The Rise of Modern China, 535.\n\n50 See, for example, Hatano Yoshihiro, \"The New Armies,” in Mary Wright, ed., China in Revolution: The First Phase, 1900-1913 (New Haven and London, 1968).\n\n51 Paul Cohen, Between Tradition and Modernity: Wang T'ao and Reform in Late Ch'ing China (Cambridge, Mass., 1974), 4, 148-149.\n\n52 See Kublin.\n\n53 Smith, \"Foreign-Training:\" Ralph Powell, The Rise of Chinese Military Power, 1895-1912 (Princeton, 1955), 245-246, 262. An interesting question is whether the Manchus could have preserved their power, and even enhanced it, by undertaking meaningful military reform at the central government level. Although vested interests in the army were pervasive and solidly entrenched, one cannot assume that what happened to the dynasty in 1911 would necessarily have happened in the same way had the Ch'ing government initiated reforms in the 1860's and 1870's comparable to those undertaken by the dynasty in the early 1890's. By the beginning of the twentieth century, anti-Manchu sentiment was a powerful ideological weapon, at least in part because the Manchus had proven so totally incapable of protecting Chinese interests against foreign encroachments. But during the Tung-chih period, anti-Manchuism was no real issue at all.\n\n54 Dwight Perkins, \"Government as an Obstacle to Industrialization: The Case of Nineteenth-Century China,” Journal of Economic History (1967), esp. 486, 492.",
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