[ { "id": 204977, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1965", "page_number": 85, "title": "RAS-1965", "content_text": "76\n\nA. D. BLUE\n\nthe countryside for miles from the coast. The leaders of such fleets were often opposed to the ruling dynasty, sometimes being disaffected former high officials. Koxinga, the greatest of all Chinese pirates, comes into this category. Koxinga was a supporter of the fallen Ming Dynasty against the Manchus, and the Chinese honour him to this day as a great patriot. His greatest exploit was the capture of Formosa from the Dutch in 1661. This type of rebel cum bandit cum pirate continued to appear down to modern times.\n\nThe expansion of the China trade, and the opening of Japan to foreign trade resulted in a great increase in British naval forces in the Far East. The first naval ships to operate in the China seas were based on the East Indies station, but very soon China became an important sphere of naval operations on her own. The suppression of piracy was only one of the Navy's responsibilities. The distance between Britain and China meant that unusual and interesting duties were often entrusted to naval officers, especially before telegraphic communications were established and when senior Foreign Office or Diplomatic officials were unavailable. Hong Kong became the headquarters of the China station, which extended from Singapore to Shanghai, and later to Japan. It continued as such until, as the result of a reorientation of naval policy in the inter-war period, Singapore became the major British naval base in the Far East. Even after that Hong Kong continued to be the headquarters of the anti-piracy forces.\n\nUntil France sent naval forces to co-operate with the Royal Navy in the Second China War, the Royal Navy was the only effective naval force in the China seas, and undertook the protection of all shipping. Even after the United States and France stationed naval forces permanently in these waters, the major responsibility for the suppression of piracy remained with the Royal Navy. It was British policy to station a warship at or near each treaty port, whether it was a coastal or a river port. This meant warships of two distinct types. There were the larger ships and their auxiliaries, which only saw action on rare occasions, and which were based in Hong Kong, with a summer cruise to Wei-hai-wei. Then there were the shallow-draft river gunboats, specially designed to operate on the Yangtze and the", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1965.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/s752cj653", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 205285, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1967", "page_number": 47, "title": "RAS-1967", "content_text": "40\n\nL. CARRINGTON GOODRICH\n\nChinese by Mi-t'o-hsien tu, a monk from Tokhara in central Asia, who lived at Ch'ang-an (then capital of China) from 680 to 704, after which he returned home. These are the years when the Empress Wu (reigned 684-704) ruled the land. This fact\n\n武后 is important as the Empress foisted certain strange characters upon her Chinese subjects. One at least of these appears in the sutra: for (heaven; the elements sun, moon, and earth appearing inside an old form for ); this helps to establish the genuineness of the text. Now the stupa seems to have been erected at the same time as the temple itself, which was completed in 751. Unfortunately no date has so far been found on the text, as was the case in the above-mentioned Diamond Sutra of 868. There seems little reason to doubt the mid-8th century attribution, however, as the calligraphy of the scribe who brushed out the characters for the woodblock is like that of other literary remains of mid-T'ang provenance (found at Tun-huang and elsewhere), and the scholars reporting the discovery assert that the artifacts found together with the text showed no sign of a disturbing hand.\n\nIf then the date of 751 or earlier may be accepted, Korea has revealed evidence for printing which pre-dates the evidence from Japan. As may be recalled, the exact dates for the printing of the charms distributed by the Empress Shōtoku are not exactly known but they run between 764 and 770. (See the discussion in my revision of Thomas Francis Carter, The Invention of Printing in China and its Spread Westward, 2nd edn., Columbia University Press 1955, chapter 7.) Add to this another remarkable fact: both the Japanese empress and the unknown individual responsible for the printing at Pulguk sa made use of the same sutra. They must have considered that it had unusual powers. The main difference between the texts is that the Korean made much more use of it. His runs to twenty feet or more as against eighteen inches in the Japanese examples. The width of the two texts is almost identical (2 inches). These measurements may be compared with the sutras printed about two centuries later; one group, found in the pagoda of a monastery at Hu-chow (Chekiang) bearing a date equivalent to 956, and others found in the Thunder Peak Pagoda near Hangchow, dated 975. The first measured 2.5 inches in width (inner portion 1.95 ins.), length not specified; the second 2.8 inches wide and 6 feet 9 inches long. Incidentally the items dated 956 were also dhāranīs taken from the sutra translated by Mi-t'o-hsien.", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1967.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/0c488p70g", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 205507, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1968", "page_number": 49, "title": "RAS-1968", "content_text": "44\n\n# THE HANKOW STEAMER TEA RACES\n\nT. J. LINDSAY*\n\nClipper ships, with their vast spread of canvas, racing home with the season's China teas have earned the admiration of artists and the narrative skill of many authors. But the steamer tea races from Hankow have attracted much less attention. Endurance of the crews aloft in clippers catches the imagination more than the endurance of the stokehold gangs, and the development of reliable and fast ocean-going steamers is not as picturesque a subject as that of the sailing ship.\n\nNevertheless, at the time, the annual steamer tea race from Hankow caused excitement enough in Far Eastern waters. Although steamers also sailed laden with tea from Foochow and from Japan, it was the race from the centre of China, with the first hazardous leg down the Yangtsze to Woosung, that held the public interest. Until 1869, when the Suez Canal was opened, the Clipper ship could hold its own with the steamer service to China via the Cape. But the much shorter route afforded by Suez, which cut across the wind routes and so was suitable only for steamers, meant the end of sailing vessels in the high-value cargo eastern trade.\n\nThe steamer tea races resulted in a reduction of transit time from Hankow to London from sixty-one days in 1870 to thirty-one days in 1883 (see Table I), although in later years a few more days were added to the passage. The account of the races in the following pages covers the eleven-year period from 1877 to 1887.\n\nEvery year in the beginning of May came Hankow's short period of excitement and glory. The tea buyers from Shanghai and England, the chuszes,† arrived to pit their wits against the Chinese\n\nMr. Lindsay joined Butterfield and Swire in Shanghai in 1933. He studied Chinese in Peking in 1934, served in Shanghai and Tsingtao, and was interned in Shanghai during the Pacific War. He was transferred to the firm's Hong Kong office in 1949 and was Staff Manager until he retired in 1966. He was a Councillor and Hon. Treasurer of the Hong Kong Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society until his retirement, and is M.A.\n\n† The newspapers use chaszes without characters. Matthews Dictionary gives ch'a shih (*) as the name for tea-tasters. The tea-taster was usually the tea-buyer, so perhaps the phrase \"tea-merchant\" would best cover it.", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1968.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/66833948d", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 206351, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1971", "page_number": 168, "title": "RAS-1971", "content_text": "152\n\nJAMES HAYES\n\nin 1859 and spread outwards through the self-governing and other territories of what became the Commonwealth and Empire. It extended to Britain's Eastern Colonies and to the foreign communities of the treaty ports of China and Japan where, from time to time, various alarms and excursions added self-preservation to the list of factors motivating the continuance or periodic resuscitation of volunteer corps.\n\nIn Hong Kong the Laws of the Colony early provided for their existence as a constitutional force. A succession of Ordinances established volunteers on a proper basis. The earliest of these was No. 2 of 1862, which was repeated with slight variation in No. 18 of 1882. An important re-modelling was carried out by No. 6 of 1893. This was followed by a Volunteer Reserve Ordinance No. 25 of 1910. Both these Ordinances were replaced by a further Volunteer Ordinance No. 2 of 1920, still modelled largely on the important 1893 Ordinance.\n\nVolunteer forces were the rule in the various foreign concessions in China, though save in the larger ones local volunteer forces tended to be formed and reformed whenever events seemed to warrant it. For example, the Shameen Defence Corps was formed after a serious riot in 1884 and was reformed from time to time, e.g. in May 1911 due to the unsettled state of affairs in Canton (see Diary of Events and the Progress on Shameen 1859-1938 compiled by H.S.S. and privately printed about 1938, pp. 19-26).\n\nThe largest of the China volunteer units was, in time, the Shanghai Volunteer Corps. This originated at two public meetings held in April 1853 and its early doings are described in Chapter XXXV of Lanning and Couling's The History of Shanghai, Part I (Shanghai, Kelly & Walsh, 1921).\n\nInteresting details of its development are given here and there in Brigadier J. V. Davidson-Houston's Yellow Creek, The Story of Shanghai (London, Putnam, 1962). As in Hong Kong, the passing of the first emergency resulted in the demise of the Corps. \"Enthusiasm for the Volunteer Corps sank to a low ebb, members neglected to turn up for training and it was soon practically defunct\" (p. 58). The Corps was again raised in August 1860 with the onset of the Taiping rebels, when 107 volunteers came forward for enrolment (p. 65). However, after the successful operations against the rebels the Corps \"wilted and died\" and was wound up in 1867 to \"pay for its debtor's balance by selling its rifles\" although the rifle club continued to function (p. 90). The Corps was again formed in 1870 following the Tientsin massacre and continued in being thereafter, its numbers fluctuating between 250-350 for the rest of the 19th century (pp. 92-93). It then continued to grow in size, like the Hong Kong Volunteer Defence Corps, to meet the difficulties of the troubled 1920s and the war with Japan.\n\nThe number of foreign residents in China is relevant to the size and location of Volunteer Corps. Some figures are given at pp. 292-295 of J. Dyer Ball's Things Chinese or Notes Connected with China, 4th edition, Hongkong, Kelly and Walsh 1903. There were, for instance, 4,424 foreigners in Shanghai (exclusive of those living in the French Settlement) in 1895 and 6774 in 1900. The Hong Kong Census of 1891 listed 10,446 British and foreign residents.", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1971.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/z029vt43g", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 206352, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1971", "page_number": 169, "title": "RAS-1971", "content_text": "HISTORY OF MILITARY VOLUNTEERS IN H.K.\n\n153\n\nway to the Volunteer Ordinance No. 10 of 1933 which was replaced, in its turn, by Ordinance No. 63 of 1948. The present Force is constituted under the Royal Hong Kong Defence Force Ordinance Chapter 199 of the Laws of Hong Kong, Ordinance No. 25 of 1951, modified by subsequent amendments.3 Besides being established by law, all volunteers have also been subject to rules and regulations provided for in the main Ordinances,\n\nBesides serving as a reminder to the present day volunteer that he and his predecessors have always operated within the laws of the Colony, these Ordinances and Regulations are a valuable source of information about volunteering over the past century and more. They are milestones in the growth and development of the Hong Kong Volunteers and provide the essential framework of accurate facts on to which information from other sources can be fitted.4 These include annual inspection reports for part of the period, personal reminiscences, newspaper reports, old photographs and memorials and the wide range of material included in the pages of the pre-war Year Book of the Hong Kong Volunteer Defence Corps, 1934-40 and of the post-war Royal Hong Kong Defence Force magazine, The Volunteer. The latter has appeared every year since 1950, with a special edition in 1954 to commemorate the centenary of volunteering in Hong Kong. The war period 1941-45 has been covered in Major Evan Stewart's account which has been supplemented by other publications dealing with the fall of Hong Kong. Material from these different sources has been used in writing this brief\n\n3 Since this article was prepared the Royal Hong Kong Defence Force Ordinance has been repealed and replaced by the Royal Hong Kong Regiment Ordinance and Regulations. Legal Supplements No. 1 of 18th December, 1970 and No. 2 of 24th December, 1970 in the Hong Kong Government Gazette refer.\n\n4 They are to be found in the various editions of the Laws of Hong Kong and of the Government Gazette.\n\n5 Only those for the years 1893-1907 are available in Hong Kong, printed in Sessional Papers 1894-1908. None of the earlier or later reports are available in the Colony.\n\n6 A Record of the Actions of the Hong Kong Volunteer Defence Corps in the Battle for Hong Kong, December 1941, Hong Kong, Ye Olde Printerie, Ltd. Other sources include the official History of the Second World War - The War against Japan, Volume I edited by Major-General S. Woodburn Kirby (London, H.M.S.O. 1957), John Luff's The Hidden Years (Hong Kong, South China Morning Post, Ltd., 1967) and Tim Carew's The Fall of Hong Kong (London, Anthony Blond, Ltd., 1961).", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1971.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/z029vt43g", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 207378, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1975", "page_number": 146, "title": "RAS-1975", "content_text": "138\n\nRICHARD J. SMITH\n\n86 See Smith, \"Foreign-Training;\" also Yang-wu yün-tung [The “foreign matters\" movement] (Shanghai, 1961), 3: 463, 469, 492, 599, 613, etc.\n\n87 IWSM, TC 22: 12-13b; 23: 42-43.\n\n88 See the IWSM references cited in note 85. Pennell became fully sinicized, shaving his head, changing to Chinese clothing, learning Chinese, marrying a Chinese, and finally petitioning to be registered as a native of Ho-fei, Anhwei. Mesny, too, was attracted by Chinese civilization, thus reinforcing the persistent notion of barbarian \"transformation\". See especially the memorial by Wu Tang and Ch'ung-shih in 1870 requesting that Mesny be advanced to the rank of lieutenant-colonel (ts'an-chiang) and awarded the peacock feather for his efforts against the Miao. This memorial was in many respects a replica of Hsueh Huan's request for similar awards to be granted to Ward in 1862.\n\n89 Examples in IWSM and WCSL abound. See also Fairbank, \"The Early Treaty System,\" esp. 264-265; John Schrecker, Imperialism and Chinese Nationalism (Cambridge, Mass., 1971), 50. Traditional attitudes were, of course, reinforced by the examination system. One of the topics for the metropolitan examinations in 1880 was the following quotation: \"By indulgent treatment of men from a distance they are brought to resort to him from all quarters. And by kindly cherishing the princes of the states, the whole empire is brought to revere him.\" Cited in the North-China Herald, May 18, 1880.\n\n90 See, for example, WCSL 101: 9; 129: 17.\n\n91 See especially K. C. Liu, \"The Confucian as Patriot and Pragmatist: Li Hung-chang's Formative Years, 1823-1866,\" HJAS, 30 (1970); David Pong, \"Confucian Patriotism and the Destruction of the Woosung Railway, 1877,\" Modern Asian Studies, 7.4 (1973).\n\n**\n\n92 For a discussion of the concept of r'i-chih, see Immanuel Hsü, China's Entrance into the Family of Nations (Cambridge, Mass., 1960).\n\n93 See Ella Lonn's Foreigners in the Confederacy (Chapel Hill, 1940) and Foreigners in the Union Army and Navy (Baton Rouge, 1951).\n\n94 See, for example, Ernst Presseisen, Before Aggression: Europeans Prepare the Japanese Army (Tucson, 1965); Noboru Umetani, \"Foreign Nationals Employed in Japan during the Years of Modernization,\" East Asian Cultural Studies, 10.1 (March, 1971).\n\n95 What differed was China's international situation. China had to endure far more political, economic and military pressure from the European powers than either the United States or Japan in the nineteenth century.\n\n96 The great majority of Japanese military employees in the latter half of the nineteenth century neither became Japanese subjects nor accepted Japanese culture. See, for example, Presseisen, 112.\n\n97 See the discussion in Smith, \"Foreign-Training.\"", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1975.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/j0995146d", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 207401, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1975", "page_number": 169, "title": "RAS-1975", "content_text": "CAPTIVE SURGEON IN HONG KONG\n\n161\n\ntroops, in my opinion, put up an excellent resistance from the static strong points which were the mainstay of the defence plan. They were pitted against a numerically superior and much more mobile enemy and no blame should be placed on them for the fact that our resistance was broken in under three weeks, nowhere near the ninety days originally judged to be desirable. These views imply no criticism of the defence plan for the circumstances of the Colony decided the plan. The defence was further prejudiced by the huge population of non-combatants in Kowloon and Victoria. Given the conditions under which our troops had to fight, I believe that our defeat could never have been avoided except by avoiding hostilities altogether. I believe we could have accepted any loss of face which a pre-war withdrawal, leaving only internal security forces, would have entailed. Having said that, however, the troops thereby released from Hong Kong would probably have been used in Singapore and almost certainly would not have changed the outcome there. One can only sympathise with the Governor and the G.O.C. and their staffs in their task of defending a Colony whose fate was sealed long before the fighting and they and the troops did their jobs well. The story unfolded slowly but inexorably after the style of a Greek tragedy.\n\n26 DECEMBER 1941–7 AUGUST 1942\n\nThe Japanese were slow to move in to take control of the hospital though they did concentrate our fighting troops at once and moved them to prisoner of war camps. For years I wondered why the hospital and indeed the whole of Hong Kong was spared the large scale rape, murder and looting which seemed to be the reward for Japanese troops upon the capture of large cities in China. The case of Nanking in December 1937 was the best known of these, when the city was given over to the victorious Japanese troops and for some weeks suffered on a huge scale.\n\nIt was not until I read the Official History of the War Against Japan that the probable explanation appeared in Volume 1. The Japanese attack on Hong Kong was made by the 38 Division reinforced by additional troops. The division had three regiments, the 228, 229 and 230 Infantry Regiments. The 228 regiment was transferred from Hong Kong to Davao on 18 January 1942 and thence to Amboina and Timor. The 229 regiment and one battalion", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1975.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/j0995146d", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 207466, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1975", "page_number": 234, "title": "RAS-1975", "content_text": "226\n\nDONALD C. BOWIE\n\nwas found and confiscated, and I was told that searches would continue if forbidden articles of this kind were found. We repacked the boxes as best we could but we could only rope them and not lock them. I passed to the Japanese lists of possessions known to have been taken by them which I claimed belonged to people protected by the Geneva Convention. Nobody ever saw these goods again.\n\nOn 26 September the transmitting room used to broadcast music to the wards was dismantled and the bunk used for this purpose reverted to use as a nurse's bunk. Many in the hospital I think were relieved to know that our radio receiver was no longer active. I have referred elsewhere in this account to the rumour that the receiver was still being operated elsewhere in the hospital.\n\nIn September 1943 there arrived as our hospital interpreter Mr. Watanabe, Uncle John to many. This remarkable man was the minister of a Christian Church in Japan but I had few dealings with him outside official business at this time. He hated war, but while he did much work carrying messages of comfort between prisoners and between them and their relatives in the Colony and forwarding the good work being done by Selwyn-Clarke and his helpers he never betrayed his country and sought only to temper the harshness to human beings which resulted from her policies. After the war he was the subject of one of the \"This is your life\" programmes presented on television from London, to the preparation of which Selwyn-Clarke contributed greatly. I have had the pleasure of entertaining this truly Christian man myself in London. His whole family was killed in an air raid in Japan.\n\nWhen hostilities began in 1941 a number of private cars had been parked in the hospital grounds and most of these were damaged, my own very severely by masonry falling from the building which was damaged by bombing and shell fire. One car had been stripped and used by us for study purposes but all cars along with a lorry and an ambulance car had to be pushed by us up the steep hill to the Japanese officers' living quarters and were thus lost to us.\n\nMy diary records that on 9 November we sent a couple of glass eyes to Sham Shui Po for use by our men there so that they obviously continued to pay attention to their appearance. There was a very cold spell of ten days in November during which we needed all our blankets and all our blue hospital uniforms to keep patients warm. A full course of inoculations against typhoid, cho-", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1975.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/j0995146d", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 207471, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1975", "page_number": 239, "title": "RAS-1975", "content_text": "CAPTIVE SURGEON IN HONG KONG\n\n231\n\nmore than a casual call during an afternoon's stroll but I would never have expected such a call to have been made by chance and at the very least they probably wanted to see for themselves the conditions in which we were guarded. When they left the guards and ourselves resumed our normal behaviour, not unlike the chattering of birds, stilled while the hawk is overhead and resumed when the danger has passed.\n\nIt is not difficult now to attribute some at least of the searches which took place about this time to the prevailing mood of the Japanese in Hong Kong. Suspicion of foreigners had been fostered assiduously in Japan before the war and xenophobia flourished exceedingly when war began. The turn of the tide against the Axis powers I suppose did nothing to soften this feeling. In Hong Kong Dr. Selwyn-Clarke was arrested in May 1943 to face charges some of which sound grotesque, and I have given a short account of his subsequent experiences. In July 1943 the Japanese gendarmerie arrested a number of men in Sham Shui Po. Under torture the names of others who had sent and received messages from Waichow via Chinese drivers of ration lorries were extracted and Colonel L.A. Newnham late Middlesex Regiment, G.S.O.1 British Troops in Hong Kong, Captain D. Ford 2 Royal Scots and Flight-Lieutenant Gray, R.A.F., were implicated. These three officers were tried by Japanese Court martial in Stanley in December 1943 and shot the same month. They had endured interrogation, a word now thoroughly debased, for many months and their condition at the end was described as deplorable.\n\nAgainst the background of events outside which I have just described we were in a position of some privilege in Bowen Road, but it seems likely that there was some link between the two situations. It could easily be that the Japanese inspections of some of our medical and electrical equipment was carried out by men capable of detecting apparatus usable for radio communications. Some of the searches certainly seemed aimed at the detection of concealed radio apparatus. We were lucky that nothing on which suspicion could feed was discovered, but my scalp always crawled a little while the searches were in progress.\n\nWe had a number of visits from Japanese doctors who wanted to see our patients, principally at this time those partially blinded by the deficiency diseases. My diary records that we found one such doctor, a lieutenant-colonel, to be courteous to our patients.", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1975.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/j0995146d", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 207639, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1976", "page_number": 27, "title": "RAS-1976", "content_text": "REFLECTIONS ON THE COMPARATIVE STUDY OF MODERNIZATION IN CHINA AND JAPAN: MILITARY ASPECTS\n\nRICHARD J. SMITH*\n\nPaul Cohen has recently warned against measuring nineteenth century China’s modernization by the yardstick of Meiji Japan. From the vantage point of Japan’s ‘success,’” he writes, “the late Ch’ing epitomizes ‘failure,’ and next to the dynamism of the Meiji era, China, during the latter half of the nineteenth century, appears as the very embodiment of stasis. The trouble with this perspective is that it glosses over a very important fact, namely that China and Japan, in their respective encounters with the West in the last century, did not start out at the same point.” Cohen suggests that a “much more valid way of measuring change in nineteenth century China is by internal points of reference.” “Modernization is not, after all, a horserace,” he maintains,2\n\nThis approach has much to commend it, if only as a reminder that China did not simply stand still in the nineteenth century. Thomas Kennedy correctly indicates, for example, that for all its weaknesses, the “self-strengthening” movement from 1860 to 1894-1895 brought “far more comprehensive and far-sighted [changes] than earlier studies infer.” Cohen notes that when we measure the modernizing experiences of China and Japan against those of the rest of the world, rather than against each other, “we find that both China and Japan come off relatively well.”+\n\nYet the knowledge that historians would eventually vindicate China’s modernizing efforts would have been small consolation to Li Hung-chang at Shimonoseki. One doubts that he muttered at the signing table in 1895, “How far China has come in the last thirty years!” The fact is that Chinese modernizers continually viewed their progress in terms of Japan’s accomplishments. Li Hung-chang wrote as early as 1872: “Japan is just a small nation. Recently she has begun to trade with Europe; she has instituted\n\n* Dr. Smith is Assistant Professor of History, Rice University, Houston, Texas. His article “The Employment of Foreign Military Talent: Chinese Tradition and Late Ch’ing Practice” appeared in Vol. 15 of this Journal, pp. 113-138.", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1976.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/hq382988q", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 207646, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1976", "page_number": 34, "title": "RAS-1976", "content_text": "STUDY OF MODERNIZATION IN CHINA & JAPAN\n\n19\n\nof the army hindered the growth of nationalistic sentiment among Chinese soldiers. Locally raised, armed, and trained, most Chinese troops had little sense of national identification.44 The great majority of Chinese soldiers remained illiterate and uninformed.\n\nNot surprisingly, the Chinese military contributed little bureaucratic talent to the civil sector. In fact, the Manchus actively discouraged this tendency. With few notable exceptions (e.g., Liu Ming-ch'uan), the Ch'ing government avoided the appointment of military men to high posts in the bureaucracy. Throughout the nineteenth century, the virtually unchanged civil service examination system remained the accepted channel of bureaucratic mobility. Only after the Sino-Japanese War did this begin to change.45\n\nThe Ch'ing military did nothing to promote social change. Indeed, it tended to reflect the least modern aspects of Chinese society. Even in the new-style armies of Li Hung-chang and others, personal ties of blood, friendship, or local affinity often counted for more than expertise, thus helping to militate against the introduction of new ideas and influences.46\n\nThere is no evidence to suggest that the Chinese military contributed significantly to urbanization or to the cultural transformation of Chinese soldiers. Although some troops received exposure to limited Western influences through contact with foreign instructors or temporary residence in treaty port areas, the lifestyle of most Chinese soldiers changed imperceptively. Manchu troops remained isolated in Banner garrisons, and Chinese troops continued to wear Chinese uniforms and the Manchu-imposed queue. Ch'ing military forces ate Chinese food, lived in Chinese housing, and often even reverted to Chinese-style weapons.47 The existence of widespread corruption and opium smoking, coupled with the lack of modern medical and other facilities, neither improved the living conditions of the average Chinese soldier nor altered his expectations.48\n\nThe disastrous effects of the Sino-Japanese War on China are too well-known to require elaboration.49 Ironically, however, Japan contributed substantially to China's military modernization and political transformation in the post-war era, providing large numbers of advisers and instructors, as well as a variety of educational opportunities for Chinese students in Japan.50 Mutatis mutandis, we may say that Japan in late nineteenth century China", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1976.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/hq382988q", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 207651, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1976", "page_number": 39, "title": "RAS-1976", "content_text": "24\n\nRICHARD J. SMITH\n\n43 See Ono Giichi, War and Armament Expenditures of Japan (New York, 1922), 57-58, 70-71, 140-144, 273-277, and Ono's Expenditures of the Sino-Japanese War (New York, 1922), 120-126; also Oshima, 372-375, 376, note 18.\n\n44 Smith, \"Foreign-Training,\" 219-220; Yamagata, \"The Army,” 107-108; British Public Record Office, W.O. 33/34, Captain Trotter, \"Some Remarks on the Army of Li Hung-Chang;\" Rawlinson, 190.\n\n45 Smith, \"Foreign-Training,\" 219, 221; see also Rawlinson, 202-203; Thomas William Ayers, Chang Chih-tung and Educational Reform in China (Cambridge, Mass., 1971), 164-189, 204-215.\n\n46 Smith, \"Foreign-Training,\" 218-219; Cavendish, 721.\n\n47 Cavendish, 711, 713-715, 719-723.\n\n48 Smith, \"Chinese Military Institutions,\" 157, note 135.\n\n49 See Fairbank, et. al., “Economic Change,\" 20-21; Hsü, The Rise of Modern China, 527-534. On the more positive side of the ledger, consult Ernest Young, \"Nationalism, Reform and Republican Revolution: East Asia: Essays in Interpretation, 160-162; Hsü, The Rise of Modern China, 535.\n\n50 See, for example, Hatano Yoshihiro, \"The New Armies,” in Mary Wright, ed., China in Revolution: The First Phase, 1900-1913 (New Haven and London, 1968).\n\n51 Paul Cohen, Between Tradition and Modernity: Wang T'ao and Reform in Late Ch'ing China (Cambridge, Mass., 1974), 4, 148-149.\n\n52 See Kublin.\n\n53 Smith, \"Foreign-Training:\" Ralph Powell, The Rise of Chinese Military Power, 1895-1912 (Princeton, 1955), 245-246, 262. An interesting question is whether the Manchus could have preserved their power, and even enhanced it, by undertaking meaningful military reform at the central government level. Although vested interests in the army were pervasive and solidly entrenched, one cannot assume that what happened to the dynasty in 1911 would necessarily have happened in the same way had the Ch'ing government initiated reforms in the 1860's and 1870's comparable to those undertaken by the dynasty in the early 1890's. By the beginning of the twentieth century, anti-Manchu sentiment was a powerful ideological weapon, at least in part because the Manchus had proven so totally incapable of protecting Chinese interests against foreign encroachments. But during the Tung-chih period, anti-Manchuism was no real issue at all.\n\n54 Dwight Perkins, \"Government as an Obstacle to Industrialization: The Case of Nineteenth-Century China,” Journal of Economic History (1967), esp. 486, 492.", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1976.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/hq382988q", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 208021, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1977", "page_number": 60, "title": "RAS-1977", "content_text": "44\n\nW. A. REYNOLDS\n\nfacing the Japanese. Consequently it was part of American policy, especially from 1944 onwards, to re-create a united front against Japan and promote agreement on a form of Constitutional Government for China which would include the Communist Party. To this end Chairman Mao Tse Tung was escorted to Chungking in August 1945 by the US Ambassador Patrick J. Hurley. No real agreement was reached in some 41 days of talks and Chairman Mao returned to Yenan in October. Hurley resigned and in November the United States appointed General George Marshall as special negotiator, a truce was signed on January 10, 1946 and all-party Peoples Consultative Conference began*.\n\nHaving set the scene we may consider what this meant on the ground; specifically in terms of medical supplies to the Liberated Areas. These contained between 80-100 million people and perhaps 350,000 men under arms. Apart from supplies purchased and smuggled in from the Japanese occupied areas or captured, no UNRRA, International Red Cross, or other supplies had been allowed through from Chungking since the beginning of 1941, and the medical services were dependent on traditional medicines and drugs derived from available herbs. The situation was therefore very serious.\n\nThe UNRRA charter required that supplies be distributed to those in need regardless of race, religion, and party and UNRRA therefore applied pressure to the Chinese Government, via CNRRA, to allow supplies to go to the Liberated Areas. This pressure finally succeeded in January 1946 at the time of signing the truce and a permit for a total quantity of about eight tons of medical supplies was granted.\n\nDuring the period from the end of 1941 to 1946, the Friends Ambulance Unit, China Convoy, had been responsible for the transport of most of the civilian medical and relief supplies in the\n\n* For those desiring more detail of this period the following give different approaches:\n\nKenneth S. Chern, \"Politics of American China Policy, 1945: Roots of the Cold War in Asia\". Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 91, No. 4 Winter 1976-7.\n\nJohn S. Service, Lost Chance in China. Random House, 1974. Tang Tsou, America's Failure in China, 1941-50. 2 vols, Chicago, 1964.\n\nPage 60\n\nPage 61", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1977.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/np198x23n", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 208317, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1978", "page_number": 41, "title": "RAS-1978", "content_text": "MILITARY EDUCATION IN CHINA, 1842-1895\n\n25\n\nbasis for progress reports to the throne.58 In 1890, a specialized program of instruction in railroad engineering was introduced, although no information exists on the total number of students involved.59\n\nPeriodically, students from the Tientsin Military Academy were sent to Port Arthur and Shan-hai-kuan for practical training in infantry, cavalry, and artillery units.60 In addition, cadets at the school occasionally gained actual battle experience, notably in 1891 against rebel forces at Jehol and elsewhere. According to Li Hung-chang, the experiment was quite successful.61 Only one group of Tientsin academy cadets went abroad: In 1889, Li sent Tuan Ch'i-jui, Wu Ting-yüan, Shang Te-ch'üan, Kung Ch'ing-t'ang, and T'eng Yü-tsao to Germany for advanced study. After a year of military academy instruction in Berlin combined with advanced training at the Krupp gunworks in Essen, the students returned to China.62\n\nLike the Tientsin Naval Academy, established by Li in 1880, the Tientsin Military Academy was financed by the shrinking Pei-yang maritime defense account.63 In all, the money was reasonably well-spent, but, as Wang Chia-chien has indicated, the academy suffered from a variety of administrative, financial, and other problems (including difficulties with foreign employees), many of which also plagued the few other military and naval training facilities of the period.64\n\nNonetheless, on the eve of the Sino-Japanese War, China appeared to have built a respectable military and naval organization. In fact, when conflict between China and Japan seemed likely, most Westerners gave the strategic edge to China.65 But the illusion of China's superiority on land and sea was quickly shattered by Japan's rapid drive into Korea, Manchuria, and China Proper. Judiciously combining land and sea operations, the Japanese completely overwhelmed the diverse Chinese military forces sent to resist them.66 Throughout the war, reports from British, French, and other foreign observers repeatedly praised the Japanese for their able strategy and tactics, effective training, tight discipline, valor, esprit de corps, and the excellence of their support facilities. No such praise was forthcoming for China.67\n\nThe Sino-Japanese War illustrated with striking clarity the bankruptcy of China's \"self-strengthening\" movement. In almost every respect, Japan's strengths during the conflict were China's", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1978.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/8g84t8593", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 208318, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1978", "page_number": 42, "title": "RAS-1978", "content_text": "26 \n\nRICHARD J. SMITH \n\nweaknesses. Inspired by a vibrant form of nationalism, the Japanese were assured of widespread popular support at home, and heroic dedication on the part of both officers and men in battle. It was a truly national war. Overseas Japanese also rallied to the cause, establishing patriotic associations to discuss the issues, collect contributions, and even to train brigades of student soldiers.68 China's immediate response to the conflict, which has not been as fully studied,69 appears to have been less uniform and extensive, both in China and abroad. To be sure, patriotic voices could be heard even prior to news of China's humiliating capitulation, and Chinese forces occasionally performed heroic deeds on the battlefield. But in the main, China lacked the national cohesiveness of Japan, and her officers were not inspired by the same sense of national duty and self-sacrifice.70 \n\nOwing partially to abysmal lack of preparation and poor internal communications, but also to the natural hesitation of \"province-minded\" Chinese officials, the mobilization of China's military forces during the war was agonizingly slow. Many Chinese troops summoned from the south arrived in the north only tardily or not at all. Li Hung-chang complained bitterly that \"one province, Chihli, is dealing with the whole nation of Japan.\" Ch'en Pi-kuang's effort to secure the release of the captured warship Kuang-ping after the battle at Wei-hai-wei, on grounds that the ship belonged to the Canton squadron which had not taken part in the war, is perhaps the most dramatic illustration of Chinese provincialism; but it is not the only one.72 The preponderance of Ch'ing forces sent against the Japanese in Korea, Manchuria and China Proper were individual yung-ying, each with its own particularistic loyalties and provincial identifications. These diverse military forces, differently armed, trained and led, often had difficulty cooperating with one another.73 In the navy, provincial rivalries and lack of cooperation between Admiral Ting and his subordinates obviously hindered operations at sea, in addition to adversely affecting morale.74 Uniform military and naval education undoubtedly would have diminished these problems. \n\nJapan's rapid and demoralizing offensive drive into Manchuria and China Proper was aided immeasurably by an extremely efficient General Staff, excellent transport facilities, and a well-organized commissariat service.75 China, however, lacked all three. The", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1978.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/8g84t8593", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 208319, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1978", "page_number": 43, "title": "RAS-1978", "content_text": "MILITARY EDUCATION IN CHINA, 1842-1895\n\n27\n\nestablishment of a Directorate for Military Affairs (Tu-pan chün-wu ch'u) in early November, 1894, did virtually nothing to alter the course of the war, and the nearly useless Naval Board (Hai-chün ya-men) was disbanded even prior to the end of the fighting. Neither body found it possible to effectively coordinate land fighting or to insure cooperation between the army and navy.76 Meanwhile, poor field communications and transport facilities, inadequate preparation, faulty intelligence, and widespread corruption in pay and supply, made it virtually impossible for Chinese forces to fight efficiently.77 Ammunition shortages, worthless shells, and lack of standardization in weapons proved especially troublesome at sea. On land, ammunition shortages seem to have been less acute, but morale undoubtedly suffered from the absence of a modern hospital corps and ambulance service such as Japan possessed.78\n\nSurprisingly, Chinese forces did not always do poorly, in spite of these handicaps. Portions of Li Hung-chang's Anhwei Army under Chang Kao-yüan, for example, performed admirably during the war, as they had done a decade earlier under Chang on Taiwan during the Sino-French hostilities. Chang, who had once served with the Ever-Victorious Army, received the praise of foreign observers not only prior to Sino-Japanese War but also during and after the conflict for his tactical ability and the training, discipline, and effective weapons of the troops under his command.79 I-k'o-tang-a, a Manchu general, also gained plaudits from foreigners, including the Japanese, who acknowledged that he had surprising tactical talent for \"a Chinese warrior of the old school.\"80 A few other Ch'ing commanders, such as Tso Pao-kuei, at least received praise for their bravery against the Japanese. But overall, Chinese troops were poorly-led and unsuitably trained. Lack of effective leadership exacerbated all of China's military problems and undermined both discipline and morale. The overwhelming majority of China's field commanders and middle-grade officers were not graduates of China's two infant military academies, and although some such individuals served with distinction in low-ranking positions, their mere presence within a given army was seldom enough to inspire confidence among either officers or the rank and file.81\n\nGenerally, the Chinese were extremely timid on land and sea, encouraging the Japanese to attempt daring and highly successful tactics that would ordinarily be considered too hazardous for use", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1978.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/8g84t8593", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 208320, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1978", "page_number": 44, "title": "RAS-1978", "content_text": "28\n\nRICHARD J. SMITH\n\nagainst a more aggressive enemy.82 Furthermore, in the absence of strict discipline and competent middle-grade officers, the elaborate military evolutions of the parade ground could not be preserved on the battlefield, Chinese tactics were often absurdly simple, or outlandishly naive. One general reportedly planned to arm his men with bags of pepper to be thrown in the faces of the advancing Japanese, whereupon they would be attacked by spearmen.84 Chinese commanders were continually baffled by Japanese tactics, indicating a general lack of acquaintance with even the rudiments of modern warfare. A pincer attack by the Japanese, which threatened the rear of Chinese troops, was almost invariably successful. Even when solidly entrenched and well-armed, Ch'ing forces seldom held their ground for as long as they should have.85 Demoralization and lack of leadership were the root causes.\n\nAnother serious problem was the almost incredibly poor marksmanship of the Chinese in rifle and artillery fire.86 This problem was unquestionably related to inadequate training and discipline, and false economy in drill. During the war there were numerous reports of naval officers being thrown off the bridge by the concussion from their own guns, indicating either the lack of regular practice, the failure of superior officers to supervise gun drill, or both.87 The military commander-in-chief at Shan-hai-kuan undoubtedly spoke for many commanders in informing the British military attaché that he did not believe in musketry instruction for all his troops, since \"it was quite sufficient to have ten good shots in each ying [battalion] to pick off the Japanese officers.\"88 In the early defense of Wei-hai-wei, Liu Ch'ao-p'ei of the Anhwei Army resorted to newly-mounted quick-firing cannon only after two of his older, less effective pieces had jammed.89 In the absence of adequate leadership and training, the Chinese found, contrary to normal experience in war, that although they were on the defensive most of the time, and usually had numerical superiority, they almost invariably suffered much heavier casualties than the Japanese. According to one estimate, China lost over 56,000 men in the fighting to Japan's paltry 4,117.90\n\nAt sea the situation was little better. Although Admiral Ting, a former Anhwei Army cavalry officer, won the praise of virtually all foreign observers, the Peiyang navy proved totally incapable of contending with the Japanese fleet. At the battle off the mouth of", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1978.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/8g84t8593", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 208571, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1979", "page_number": 28, "title": "RAS-1979", "content_text": "THE UNITED STATES AND THE QUESTION OF HONG KONG, 1941-45\n\nCHAN KIT-CHENG*\n\nWhat the question of Hong Kong boiled down to during the Pacific War was the British colony's future status when war was over. Throughout the war China, now Britain's ally, was clamouring for Hong Kong's retrocession when the Japanese were driven out. Britain was naturally concerned, as she wished to retain the territory. But her worry was greatly aggravated by the unsympathetic attitude of the United States, on whose manpower and material support she heavily relied for winning the war against Germany. Britain's, especially Prime Minister Churchill's, response was characterized by a concern disproportionate to Hong Kong's importance in the British empire. Yet the reaction was justified by the fear that concession over Hong Kong would trigger off the disintegration of the British empire, a process Britain refused to recognize as unavoidable. The question of Hong Kong during the period under discussion has been dealt with from the British point of view. This essay attempts to further review the subject by focusing on the American side of the picture.\n\nIn the main, the United States' attitude towards the question of Hong Kong was influenced by two much broader issues: the treatment of China as an ally, and the aspiration to end imperialism and colonialism in the post-war world. For some time after the United States' entry into the Pacific War, certainly during 1942 and the greater part of 1943, the American attitude towards China was characterized by admiration, a sense of guilt, anxiety, and eagerness to compensate. These feelings were connected and interwoven. Admiration is simple to explain. Pearl Harbour, which the Americans took as “an insult to the entire nation”, immediately highlighted China's bravery in having fought single-handedly for over four years against Japan, now a common enemy. For the greater part of the war, Americans seemed never to tire of praising China along this theme.\n\n* Dr. Chan is Senior Lecturer in History at the University of Hong Kong.", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1979.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/2801w5938", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 208572, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1979", "page_number": 29, "title": "RAS-1979", "content_text": "2\n\nCHAN KIT-CHENG\n\nThe American sense of guilt was largely attributable to three factors: United States' military defeats in Southeast Asia, the American commitment to the policy of defeating Germany first before concentrating on Japan, and the American failure in delivering the bulk of lend-lease and other war materials promised to China. On the first point, according to Stanley K. Hornbeck who was political adviser to the Department of State, reports from American sources from or through Chungking indicated that the American defeat in the Philippines, together with the rapid collapse of the British position in Southeast Asia, had bred \"a sense of frustration and defeatism” among the Chinese.4 To be fair, however, one must add that China had been vastly more appalled and disillusioned by, and consequently more contemptuous of, the British performance.\n\nOn the second point, it was only natural that China was disappointed and embittered by the American policy of “Germany First”. Support for this order of priority was by no means unanimous within American government circles. Admirals Ernest J. King and William D. Leahy, General Douglas MacArthur (at his new headquarters in Australia), and Stanley Hornbeck, to give some examples, all expressed doubt about it and urged that a greater military effort should be directed against Japan. While President Roosevelt was firm on his decision to stand by the agreement reached at the 'Arcadia” Conference it did not mean that he was entirely free from embarrassment when faced with his Far Eastern ally, Chiang Kai-shek.\n\nM4\n\nOn the third point, immediately after Pearl Harbour, President Roosevelt had been generous in promising China war materials, including planes, mainly through lend-lease channels. However, the Americans soon realized that it was easier to make the promise than to implement it. Two difficulties were involved. The first was the problem of transport. After the fall of Burma and the seizure of the southern part of the Burma Road by the Japanese early in 1942, air transport became the only feasible means of getting supplies into China. Until the opening of the well-known Ledo Road (later on re-named Stilwell Road) early in 1945, the bulk of the supplies flown from India to China was transported by the Tenth United States Air Force between April and December 1942, and thereafter by the United States Air Transport Command in what Joseph W. Ballantine, who became director of the Office of", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1979.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/2801w5938", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 208573, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1979", "page_number": 30, "title": "RAS-1979", "content_text": "THE U.S. AND THE QUESTION OF HONG KONG 1941-45\n\nFar Eastern Affairs in the Department of State in 1944, terms “the most difficult supply operation of the entire war\" over the towering hump of the Himalayas. The second difficulty was connected with the priority given to the European theatre. The result was that much of the promised materials to China was often diverted, much to the distress of Hornbeck and others, from its original destination for the European fronts.? Speaking in more specific terms, by late September 1942, US$3.1 billion worth of lend-lease materials were sent to the British Empire, $750 million to Russia, and only $112 million to China. The disparity became even more remarkable by early June: $7,030,000,000 to the British Empire, $1,899,000,000 to Russia, and only $133,000,000 to China.8\n\nUnder the circumstances, it is understandable that the United States should entertain grave anxiety regarding China, especially over a possible collapse of Chinese resistance against Japan. This concern, which the Chinese did everything to keep alive, was universally shared by senior men in the Washington government, including the president himself, H. L. Stimson, then secretary of war, Henry Morgenthau, secretary of the Treasury, Leahy, and many involved in Far Eastern affairs in the Department of State, principally Hornbeck.9 While some doubt was expressed as to how much China could and was willing to contribute to the war effort in the east, the consensus was that her collapse would be a fatal blow to the United Nations, especially the United States, in the Pacific theatre. This event, therefore, must be prevented at all cost.\n\nIt was only natural that the United States, torn by anxiety, should be obsessed with the desire to compensate China as best she could. Consequently, the American government announced at the beginning of 1942 a loan of 500 million dollars to China, with next to no strings attached.10 Meanwhile, the move to push for the allies' recognition of China as one of the great powers, of which Hornbeck claimed himself to be the originator, became increasingly prominent in the American government.11 The outcome was the American insistence that China be included as a signatory, together with Britain, the U.S.S.R., and the United States, of the Declaration of Four Nations on General Security, signed in Moscow on 30 December 1943, and that Chiang Kai-shek, together with Roosevelt and Churchill, be a party to the Cairo Declaration, issued on 1 December 1943.12 The American eagerness to compensate naturally did not allow Madame Chiang Kai-shek's visit to the United States,\n\nPage 30\nPage 31", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1979.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/2801w5938", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 208574, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1979", "page_number": 31, "title": "RAS-1979", "content_text": "CHAN KIT-CHENG\n\nOstensibly for medical reasons, at the end of 1942 and early in 1943, to pass unutilized. No effort was spared to make the visitor feel welcomed and cherished. She was a guest at the White House and at President Roosevelt's home at Hyde Park. She was invited to address the Senate and the House, and was welcomed by huge gatherings at all the stops she made from the east to the west coasts.13 A further and significant gesture of American friendliness was embodied in the United States' renunciation early in 1943 of her extraterritorial rights in China,14 a subject to be further dealt with later. One last example of the American compensatory effort during the first two years of the Pacific War was the passing of an act in December 1943, by large majorities of both Houses of Congress, repealing the longstanding Chinese exclusion laws, establishing an annual Chinese immigration quota, and making legally admitted Chinese eligible for naturalization as American citizens.15\n\nIt is imperative to spell out in some detail the general American attitude vis-a-vis China, not only to serve as background to the subject under discussion, but also because such attitude unavoidably influenced Britain in her dealings with China, including those over the question of Hong Kong. Ever since Pearl Harbour, China had made no secret of her resentment of Britain for having rejected China's offer of assistance in the defence of Hong Kong and Burma, for having been so catastrophically defeated by Japan in such a short time, and for, according to Chou En-lai who was then representative of the Chinese Communist Party at Chungking, having “discriminated against and treated as inferiors the Chinese who fought with the British at Hong Kong and in Malaya.”16 Britain, on her part, was anxious to improve relations with China and to collaborate closely with the United States in relation to their Far Eastern ally. She was, not unlike the United States, \"obsessed” for the greater part of 1942 with the fear that China might \"throw up her hands.\" The Foreign Office decided that all that Britain could do was to \"adopt an apologetic and ingratiating attitude towards the Chinese.\" However, the United States, much to Britain's annoyance, stole the limelight from all the major British attempts at appeasing China. Britain's offer of a loan of £50,000,000, with stringent regulations regarding expenditure to maintain equilibrium in her post-war balance of payments, was a clear anti-climax to the Chinese after the unconditional American loan.18 Although Britain renounced her extraterritorial rights in China simultaneously", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1979.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/2801w5938", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 208582, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1979", "page_number": 39, "title": "RAS-1979", "content_text": "12\n\nCHAN KIT-CHENG\n\nCairo Conference at the end of 1943, Roosevelt offered Chiang Kai-shek, behind Churchill's back, American support in preventing Britain from getting back Hong Kong if Chiang would cooperate with the communists in fighting against Japan and establish a representative government in China. Roosevelt's idea was that on regaining sovereignty over Hong Kong, Chiang should \"make a grand gesture and make it a free port.\"49 At Teheran in November 1943, during a break in the Cairo Conference, Roosevelt raised with Churchill the question of the possible return of Hong Kong to China, and the latter refused even to discuss the question.50\n\nAt his secret meeting with Stalin during the Yalta Conference, on 8 February 1945, Roosevelt again mentioned his hope \"that the British would give back the sovereignty of Hong Kong to China and that it would then become an internationalized free port.\" He added, however, that he knew Churchill \"would have strong objections to this suggestion.” At the conference proper, however, Roosevelt did not raise the question of Britain's return of Hong Kong, although references were made to the colony on several occasions.52 Later, in the spring of 1945, Roosevelt used Bernard Baruch, a financier and a friend of both Roosevelt and Churchill, as a messenger to press the British prime minister on the matter of Hong Kong. Roosevelt was now additionally concerned that the Soviet Union might make use of Britain's presence in Hong Kong as an argument for opening a port of her own in China.53 In April 1945 when General Patrick J. Hurley was sent by Roosevelt to talk with Churchill over the retrocession of Hong Kong to China, among other subjects, the latter replied that the colony would not be yielded \"over [his] dead body.\"54 The truth is that already by 1944 Roosevelt had become increasingly reluctant to offend the sensitivity of Churchill who by then was no longer \"subservient to the friendly strength of the United States\" as he clearly had been in 1941-42.55\n\nBritain was not slow to perceive the American weakness. Moreover, by 1944 American enthusiasm about China and Chiang Kai-shek had somewhat cooled down. Roosevelt, as it has been mentioned, had for some time been troubled by the disunity between the nationalists and the communists, and by growing criticism of the autocracy of the Chiang regime. Discussion and criticism of the Chungking government and its conduct of the war increased remarkably in the United States following the American recall of General Joseph Stilwell under pressure from Chiang Kai-shek,56", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1979.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/2801w5938", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 208586, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1979", "page_number": 43, "title": "RAS-1979", "content_text": "16\n\nCHAN KIT-CHENG\n\nAmerican and British representatives would be invited to participate. After the surrender he would authorize the British to land troops for the reoccupation of Hong Kong.37 In a private letter in reply to Chiang, Truman reiterated that his decision was in no way related to the question of British sovereignty in Hong Kong.68\n\nChiang Kai-shek remained reluctant to concede the main point. However, he realized that he needed American aid in getting his forces to Hong Kong. Consequently, he communicated a further compromise to Truman on 23 August: he had notified the British that, as supreme commander of the China theatre, he agreed to delegate his authority to a British commander to accept the surrender of Japanese forces in Hong Kong.69 Although Truman regarded Chiang's concession as \"quite reasonable\" and hoped that it would settle the matter,70 it was not acceptable to Britain. While he deplored the Sino-British friction, Truman clearly did not contemplate taking further action.71 It was therefore a relief both to Britain and the United States that Chiang eventually accepted Britain's revised offer that Harcourt accept Japan's surrender on behalf of both Britain and Chiang as supreme commander of the China theatre.72\n\nHong Kong was thus reverted to British rule, much as the Americans, both in official and unofficial circles, had clamoured against during the Pacific War. Such clamouring, especially during the first half of the war, no doubt troubled the British and encouraged the Chinese. But, in the main, American wartime policy, if one can at all speak of a conscious and consistent policy, regarding the postwar status of Hong Kong had been characterized by much talk and little action. \"Hopes\", \"wishes\", \"opinions\", \"views\" were abundantly expressed to Britain, but little can be said of direct and persistent American pressure on the subject.\n\nNOTES\n\n1 Author's article, \"The Question of Hong Kong during the Pacific War, (1941-45)”, The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, II, no. 1 (October 1973), pp. 56-78.\n\n2 C. Thorne, Allies of a Kind (London, 1978), p. 156.\n\n3 Thorne, ibid., pp. 172-3, referring to opinions cited in the New York Times, the Chicago Daily News, and the Christian Science Monitor.", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1979.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/2801w5938", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 208696, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1979", "page_number": 153, "title": "RAS-1979", "content_text": "126\n\nREVS. J. SMITH AND WM. DOWNS\n\nevery foreign enemy building, whether public or private property, and those which have escaped confiscation have not escaped the looting by Chinese. Curiously enough, there was an almost total absence of English signs on streets and over buildings and stores, the Japanese having taken all these down, and in many instances, replacing them with Japanese signs. In the lobbies of office buildings all the tenants' names were in Chinese or Japanese, and it was often very difficult to find one's own family doctor, unless one happened to be familiar with his Chinese name. It seemed that everything reminiscent of the hated foreigner had to be effaced. Placarded all around the town, too, were flaming posters depicting the New Order in the Far East, showing smoking chimneys of busy factories, smiling Chinese gathering grain in the fields, and other indications of what Japan expected to do for the downtrodden Chinese. At various conspicuous places were also huge maps showing the conquests in East Asia of the Imperial Japanese Army and Navy. The streets were fairly clean, though here and there might be seen some piles of rubbish, and I understand that in the beginning, the Japanese kept in office some of the officials of the Sanitary Squad, that is, British officials. Just to show the effect of Japanese progress, now some of the streets in the downtown sector were actually being washed daily!\n\nHowever, along the side streets, one could find more sordid scenes--emaciated and dying beggars lying on the pavement, and others looking pretty thin and hungry. Before we left Hong Kong, most of these beggars had disappeared and I suppose it is not hard to imagine what became of them, for the Japanese are not very often moved to pity. There are many tales of cruelty inflicted on the Chinese, and one significant fact is that the huge Prison at Stanley is practically empty. It is said that often offenders against the laws were thrown off the bund into the sea; others were tied up and left standing in the broiling sun until they died, and some of us have seen the police dogs which the Japanese have trained to hunt down Chinese who cut wood on the mountain sides. A friend of mine was an actual eye-witness of a Chinese woman whose flesh was literally torn by these dogs and who ran screaming down the mountain. These brushwood gatherers are often shot at, too.\n\nThe Japanese have retained both the Indian and the Chinese police and they patrol this city and the roads. The Indian police", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1979.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/2801w5938", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 208938, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1980", "page_number": 100, "title": "RAS-1980", "content_text": "68\n\nJOHN VILLIERS\n\nfined to the limited, though evidently still profitable, carrying trade between China and Japan.3\n\nConditions in Japan were no more conducive to an organised system of state trade than they were in China. The period from 1467 to 1568 was the age of the warring states, in which both the Emperor and his shoguns were powerless against the might of the regional war lords, the daimyō. Even amid the anarchy to which this state of affairs gave rise, merchant communities nevertheless flourished and cities such as Hakata, Hirado and Sakai prospered. Japanese exports to China included copper, sulphur and weapons, and their imports from China were chiefly raw silk and porcelain, both of which they considered superior to their own products, cash, drugs and books. Again, from the Chinese point of view this trade was technically tribute and the ships were officially dispatched by the Emperor, the Shogun, by great daimyō or monasteries, while the fitting out of the ships and the business arrangements were in the hands of the merchants of Sakai and Hakata, and chiefly to their profit.\n\nAs both Chinese policy became more restrictive and isolationist and the power of the shoguns grew weaker, so this Sino-Japanese trade collapsed and by the 1540s had been replaced by extensive piracy and smuggling. Pirates ranged up and down the coasts of China and the many offshore islands more or less unchecked. In Japan the daimyō and in China the mandarins connived at this illegal activity because it brought them considerable profits.4\n\nThus, when the Portuguese first arrived on the scene, they found great opportunities for acting as trading agents in goods which for various reasons could no longer be traded directly between the countries that produced them. They soon found that \"there is as great a profit in taking spices to China as in taking them to Portugal\". But they had to fit into existing trade patterns both in the inter-island trade of the Indonesian archipelago centred on Malacca and in the trade of the China Seas. Even in theory they were never able to attain a complete monopoly but had to trade in competition—and often in conflict—with the Asian traders already active in those waters. Within a few years of their conquest of Malacca the Portuguese had opened up direct trade relations with the spice islands and sent expeditions to the Lesser Sunda Islands in search of sandalwood. They also endeavoured to open relations with China. Their first attempt was a disaster and led to", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1980.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/kh04md207", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 209464, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1982", "page_number": 121, "title": "RAS-1982", "content_text": "THE NEW CONSTITUTION AND\n\nCHINA'S EMERGING LEGAL SYSTEM\n\nIN PERSPECTIVE\n\nW. ALLYN RICKETT*\n\nOn December 4, 1982, China's National People's Congress (NPC) adopted the fourth and perhaps most favourable constitution since 1949 in terms of paper guarantees for the protection of individual citizens against the arbitrary abuse of Party and state power. When coupled with such laws as the Criminal Code and Criminal Code of Procedure, promulgated in July 1979 and implemented in January 1980, there is some room for optimism that China has embarked on a path toward a stable legal system and the provision of basic guarantees for the rights of its citizens. However, given China's traditional disregard of individual rights and the almost constant state of political turmoil prevailing throughout this century, not to mention the Chinese Communists' generally negative attitude toward jural or formal law in the past, such optimism may well prove to have been undeserved. It might be worthwhile to look briefly at previous efforts on the part of the Chinese Communists to establish some semblance of a stable legal system before trying to reach any conclusions about the future.\n\nThe early judicial experience of the Chinese Communists, which began with the special tribunals set up in Hunan in 1926-27 to try \"bad elements,\" can at best be described by Mao Zedong's own words \"zao de hen\" [extremely crude]. It was not until November 1931 with the founding of the Chinese Soviet Republic in Jiangxi that any real attempt was made by the Communists to establish a formal body of law and judicial procedure. During this and the following Yenan period, laws were promulgated and legal institutions established, but this took place within the context of violent revolutionary struggle and the war of resistance against Japan. Moreover, judicial personnel\n\n* Professor Rickett is Professor of Chinese Studies at the University of Pennsylvania.", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1982.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/mk61z420p", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 209677, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1982", "page_number": 334, "title": "RAS-1982", "content_text": "312\n\nBOOK REVIEWS\n\nto a halt and where the physical past remains frozen or fossilized by political currents.\n\nALAN BIRCH\n\nFujiwara Iwaichi, F. Kikan: Japanese Army Intelligence Operations in S.E. Asia, 1983. Heinemann's Asia.\n\nProfessor H. J. Benda, authority on the Japanese occupation of the Indonesian archipelago, once remarked \"Japan's war-time aims were never as clearly defined as in South-east Asia”.\n\nRecognizing this significance of Japanese plans and preparations for the war waged against the imperialism of the West, Heinemann's have published a number of studies illuminating in depth several aspects of this important programme, notably Joyce Lebra's Japanese trained Armies in South-east Asia. It is she who writes the introduction to this present volume Lt. General Fujiwara's account of the operations of F. Kikan in Malaya in this critical area of World War II in the Far East. (Actually, this is a translation by the noted Japanese scholar Professor Akashi Yoji, biographer of Loi Tak, the notorious and typical middleman figure in these entanglements of the contending forces of imperialism).\n\nLebra claims for the author of this war-time account of the activities of this Japanese propaganda intelligence group stood for Fujiwara, Freedom and Friendship that he developed a vision of Japan's military role in Asia at its most idealistic, Seeing himself as the Japanese 'Lawrence of Arabia' he took the war-time propaganda slogan ‘Asia for the Asians' most seriously.\n\nFujiwara's relatively short-term, but significant, role in furthering the formation of the Indian National Army, which, of course, was to attempt the removal of the colonial bondage of the British rule of India and further to demonstrate the self-proclaimed role of Japan as the instrument of liberation, is therefore of more than passing interest to historians of that critical period in the shifting of political power in the East.\n\nFujiwara's part in this crusade, and particularly his relations with the least ambiguous of Indian nationalists, Chandra Bose,", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1982.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/mk61z420p", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 210793, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1986", "page_number": 144, "title": "RAS-1986", "content_text": "127\n\ncontinued the guerilla war from bases in the nearby Nanlin Hills (Paul, 1982). As a revolutionary base was established, workers' and peasants' democratic governments were formed at the county level throughout Hainan, the first being set up in Lingshui County amongst the Li community (Gao, 1981).\n\nThreatened by the possible emergence of a unified China, Japan, which already had a firm foothold in northern China, landed troops in Shanghai in 1928 in order to weaken Chiang Kai-shek's power and prolong the onset of the inevitable Sino-Japanese war. Taking advantage of the rift between the KMT and Communists, Japan strengthened her influence, first by invading Manchuria in 1931, and finally, by means of a number of orchestrated landings in 1937, secured the whole of the coast of China, effectively severing all major supply arteries to the country: China was no longer a dangerous adversary (Eberhard, 1969). As part of this offensive, Hainan was first attacked in August, 1937 (Clark, 1938), and Japanese forces quickly occupied the coastal fringe. By February, 1939, Hainan, like the mainland, was subdued (Wigmore, 1957).\n\nRemnants of the old Red Guard units, hardened by 12 years of battle with the KMT, took up positions around the island immediately behind the Japanese and used their guerilla tactics to harass the intruders, while the KMT held defensive positions in the central mountains (Fairtex-Cholmeley, 1963). It appears that a non-interference agreement was quickly ratified between the Japanese and the KMT, leaving the Communist guerillas to pose the chief threat to the invading Japanese (Paul, 1982). Although Mao Tse-tung committed the Communist Party to collaborate with the KMT, conflict continued between the two factions even in Hainan where in 1943, the Li leaders, Wang Guo-xing* and Wang Yu-jin, led 20,000 tribesmen in an armed foray against KMT troops entrenched in the Five Finger Mountains (Gao, 1981). In spite of these \"domestic\" conflicts, the combined Chinese forces tied up two Japanese divisions in Hainan (MacCrae, personal communication).\n\nDue to its strategic location, Hainan became a training and staging area for the Japanese southward thrust, with components of the XXV Japanese Army being exercised on the island during", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1986.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/jq08c7063", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 210975, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1987", "page_number": 37, "title": "RAS-1987", "content_text": "To be invited to give this lecture in memory of George Ernest Morrison, that remarkable Australian, is not only a pleasure and an honour; it provides a very appropriate occasion to review the unique position China has held for more than three centuries in the eyes of French intellectuals. Morrison, himself quite fluent in French and well versed in French literature, was very familiar with some distinguished members of the French intelligentsia who visited China during those ‘Morrison years', such as Loti, Segalen and Claudel. He also knew well how prestigious China had been in the eyes of French intellectuals of an earlier period, namely French Jesuits and French Philosophes of the late seventeenth and eighteenth century. Their writings occupy a distinctive position on the shelves of Morrison's own library, once in Peking and later transferred to Japan. These early French books with their old-fashioned print and leather binding indicated, and Morrison was fully aware of it, that a major intellectual encounter had taken place between France and China. For the Philosophes, for Voltaire, Diderot and other contributors to the Great Encyclopedia, China was a powerful war machine which they directed against the backwardness, the tyranny, the impotence of the Versailles monarchy. As seen in the very title of a well-known French Ph.D. dissertation, China played an essential role in the formation and growth of the esprit philosophique in eighteenth century France.\n\nChina, in the view of these philosophes, was an empire ruled by an intellectual elite, namely the Confucian literati. In our subsequent Western political culture, our universities being no exception, ‘mandarin' has become a symbol of bureaucratic rigidity, almost a dirty word. But such was not the case in the eighteenth century. Voltaire praised very highly the Confucian degree holders he called Talapoints, a strange word which has since vanished entirely. China was seen as being ruled by men of wisdom, and this was an obvious contrast to the practices of the French monarchy and its corrupt, incompetent, uneducated officials. China was supposed to be at least as advanced as France, on the way towards Enlightenment, towards l'Age des Lumières.\n\nThese peoples [said Diderot], gifted with a 'consentement unanime, are superior to all other Asiatics in antiquity, intellect, art, wisdom, policy, and in their", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1987.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/rx919b522", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 211067, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1987", "page_number": 128, "title": "RAS-1987", "content_text": "103\n\n5.55 acres) for a Cemetery for Protestant foreigners and the right to construct a Cemetery was confirmed by the Spanish Government by a further Superior Decreto of August 30th, 1864. The lease was for a period of 90 years from May 2nd, 1863 at an annual rental of one hundred Philippine pesos (P), (presently Stg. 2.50).\n\nIn 1907 the area of the Cemetery was reduced to allow for the construction of an electric street car line from Pasig to Manila and the rent for the remaining 16,811 sq metres (4.15 acres) was reduced to P85.00. Road widening took another 469 sq metres in June 1941, shortly before the Japanese occupation during which the destruction of the boundary wall added to the inevitable neglect. Nevertheless, P429.30 back rental for the period of the war had to be paid in January 1946. In 1947 the lease was extended until December 31st, 1987.\n\nThe five hundred odd burials give an interesting insight into the variety of life amongst foreigners who took up living halfway across the world in these lovely islands.\n\nMostly British, with Germans the second largest national group, they included master mariners from Liverpool and Plymouth, seamen from Nova Scotia, Belfast and Hamburg; businessmen from London and Lancashire, a Parisian shopkeeper, an operatic impressario from Milan, engineers on the British owned Manila Railroad, a diplomat who had served in the American Consular Service for forty-five years, and many children. Jews were also buried in the Cemetery, as were Japanese, although all these remains were removed to Japan during the occupation in 1942. Perhaps the most interesting burial was Prince Ludwig Zu Lowenstein-Wertheim-Freudenberg who went to Manila as a military observer during the revolution against American occupation and was killed by a stray bullet during fighting in Battangas in March 1899.\n\nThere were 93 recorded British deaths in the Philippines during the Second World War, mostly priests and civilians, from natural causes, privation, enemy action and execution by Japanese and by Filipino collaborators. These people were buried in many different places including Baguio Cathedral, Cebu, Davao, La Loma,", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1987.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/rx919b522", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 211419, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1988", "page_number": 135, "title": "RAS-1988", "content_text": "111\n\nTwo other physicians, one Japanese trained in Japan and one American trained in the United States, were also denied entry. Butterfield and Swire contested this decision in court; the court not only ruled against the company, but also made it pay a fine. Uncle felt he had to return to private practice because he had a family to support, even though he would have liked to study for two more years, and decided to go back to Shanghai where Western medicine was becoming more accepted among the Chinese residents.\n\nAlthough Uncle was proficient in Chinese, in preparation for an imperial examination (I believe this was one of the last imperial examinations held) for students who had studied abroad, he sought tutoring in the language and in the use of interjections. He passed the examinations and, according to Toby, he was awarded the degree of chü-jen. However, as I recall it, Father told me that Uncle received the degree of chin-shih; but would have been awarded a higher honour if his Chinese had been a little better. We have a copy of a photograph of him and the other recipients in their ceremonial caps and gowns taken in Peking. For Uncle, his family and his clansmen, it was an honour indeed and there was much rejoicing when he returned to Shanghai. His one regret was that he could not see clearly the Kuang-hsu Emperor (1875-1908) during the ceremonial awards, for although near-sighted, he was not allowed to wear his glasses in the imperial presence.\n\nOut of a sense of civic duty, Uncle served as medical officer for both the Customs Service and the Post Office in Shanghai, from 1916 until 1925 when he retired. When we visited him in 1919, his home was on Hankow Road. He later invested in real estate in the Chapei district and moved to Darrock Road, but all of his real property was taken over by the Japanese, and then by the Communists. When the Japanese invaded Shanghai, Uncle and Aunt moved south to live in Macau where he had become a Portuguese citizen earlier, and also in Hong Kong where he owned another home. When the war ended, they returned to Shanghai to live with their second son, Ting Hing R (Charles), and in 1948 visited with Toby in Taiwan for several months. When the Communists took over, they did not dare venture out of their home. Uncle died in 1953 at the age of 83, and Aunt a half year later in 1954 at the age of 81.\n\nPage 135\n\nPage 136", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1988.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/ft84gb83q", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 212126, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1990", "page_number": 68, "title": "RAS-1990", "content_text": "45\n\ngroup, headed by the Nestorian patriarch. Although they were not permitted to convert Moslems, Nestorian missionaries were otherwise given a free hand, and by the end of the twelfth century Nestorian churches could be found in Egypt and Cilicia, in Persia and Mesopotamia, in India, Ceylon and Socotra, and in much of Turkestan. All these churches, organised into at least twenty, and possibly as many as thirty, metropolitan provinces, recognised the authority of the Nestorian patriarch or catholicus, who ruled from Baghdad, the capital of the Abbasid caliphate.\n\nThe Nestorian church enjoyed a final period of expansion under the Mongols. For a while, during campaigns against Moslem enemies, the Mongols saw that Christian support could be valuable to them, and the Nestorians were able to take advantage of the Mongol unification of Asia from the Euphrates to the Sea of Japan to establish themselves in strength in China in the second half of the thirteenth century. The Nestorian church now reached its greatest geographical extent. But appearances were deceptive. As Mongol power waned throughout Asia the vacuum was filled not by Christianity, but by Islam. The Nestorian church in China did not survive the Mongol Yüan dynasty, and in central Asia most Nestorian Christians apostasised in the face of Moslem persecution in the middle years of the fourteenth century. Any surviving communities of Christians were almost certainly either wiped out or converted to Islam during the terrible campaigns of Timur Leng towards the end of the fourteenth century.\n\nApart from a tiny offshoot in India, the church which dominated Asia in the middle ages survives today only in Kurdistan, uneasily placed astride the borders of the modern states of Syria, Turkey, Iraq and Iran. Emigration from Kurdistan during the last two centuries has also created a Nestorian diaspora in the United States, Europe, and Australia. The total membership of the Nestorian church was reckoned in 1989 at about 1,770,000.\n\nThe Nestorians in China\n\nFor more than two hundred years during the T'ang dynasty (618-906), and for a further sixty or seventy years during the Mongol Yüan dynasty (1260-1368), Nestorian Christians could be found in significant numbers in China. The dates are not entirely certain. As far as the T'ang period is concerned, the first officially-recognised Nestorian", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1990.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/d79206299", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 212179, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1990", "page_number": 121, "title": "RAS-1990", "content_text": "98\n\nThese figures compare with the total American investment in China of £32,000,000).\n\nFeeling had been further embittered recently by the damage and heavy casualties caused when Chinese pilots, attempting to bomb the **\"Idzumo\"**, had dropped 1000-pound bombs in the most crowded street of the city, while evading Japanese pursuit planes. These incidents were attributed to carelessness and, though the victims were mainly Chinese, the Chinese population of Shanghai at that time was around five million; many foreigners, moved also largely by sympathy for the victims, felt the Chinese government had given insufficient consideration to the international investments at stake in Shanghai. They resented the fact that the Chinese had deliberately brought the war to Shanghai. They argued that the Chinese intention was to provoke the foreign powers to intervene on their behalf.\n\nIn such an atmosphere, whispering campaigns detrimental to Chinese morale flourished. One of the most ridiculous, which to this day is still firmly believed by many, was that had the Chinese troops succeeded in driving the Japanese into the Whangpoo, they would then have turned to looting the International Settlement. If there was one thing that was clear at that time to the unprejudiced, it was that Chinese advantage lay in courting the goodwill of the powers, not in estranging it by allowing Chinese troops to commit anti-foreign excesses. It is true that in the past Chinese troops had acquired an unenviable notoriety for rapine and looting, but unfortunately, the seclusion from China in which the majority of foreigners resident in Shanghai lived had not allowed them to discover the great improvements the Central government had brought about in the administration and discipline of the Chinese army. The discipline in the 86th and 87th divisions, who were inspired at Shanghai to fight to the death, was equal to that of any Western troops.\n\nIt was not realised that the Chinese were fighting for the democracies against fascist aggression. What the Chinese needed most at that time was sympathy and the expression of some confidence in their ability to weather the storm; and that is just what they did not get. No confidence was shown in the ability of the Chinese government to withstand Japan. The prolonged resistance at Shanghai came as a surprise, although Chinese troops had already proved to...", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1990.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/d79206299", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 212310, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1990", "page_number": 252, "title": "RAS-1990", "content_text": "224\n\nraw silk for their mills. Adanison arrived in Shanghai, on their behalf, in 1852. In 1858 he formed his own firm, exporting tea and general merchandise, and set up branches in Hong Kong, Foochow and Hongkow. There were ten European employees.\n\nIn 1872, the firm appointed a shipping clerk in its Shanghai office named George Benjamin Dodwell. He was 20 years old, born in Derby, and was paid 400 pounds for the first year of service, with a room, fire, light and medical bills met by the firm. Dodwell was allowed five per cent of all profits of the shipping business on everything earned above 700 taels per annum (equivalent to 2,100 sterling). He also had a share in other profits in an attempt to stop him branching out on his own account. Another condition of appointment was that he should 'not indulge in racing of horses and ponies'. This contrasted with the conditions of service for Jardine's who were not against their employees having a wager.\n\nIn 1876, Adamson Bell and Company's tea shipments (at the end of the nineteenth century nearly 60 per cent of China's exports consisted of tea and silk) were only marginally behind those of Jardines and Butterfield and Swires. For much of his work Dodwell was assisted by the firm's compradore. Nonetheless, a considerable amount of financial risk was involved. Dodwell and A.J.M. Carlill finally took over the bankrupt Adamson Bell Company [which is still known as Tien Cheang (天昌) meaning heavenly prosperity] on May 1st, 1891.\n\nCanadian Pacific Railways (CPR) chartered sailing ships to import goods from China and Japan. Dodwell had entered into a three-year contract with Sir William Van Horne of CPR. But, as business was good, CPR decided to run its own fast mail line in place of hiring old Cunarders.\n\nDodwell was told his contract would not be renewed, but he was asked to continue to manage the CPR services at the Far Eastern end. Van Horne was impressed by Dodwell as a man, and he offered him full control of the new CPR shipping line if Dodwell would abandon his newly established firm and join CPR as an employee. He was offered a salary and commissions totalling at least 4,000 pounds a year. Dodwell declined, preferring to head his own new enterprise which he had rescued, and would rebuild, from bankruptcy.\n\nIt is the worst day's work you have ever done, Dodwell\",", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1990.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/d79206299", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 212401, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1990", "page_number": 343, "title": "RAS-1990", "content_text": "320\n\nwho acted upon them. By piecing together this information, Bartlett has begun the reconstruction of the inner, secret workings of the Qing government. We can build from this base to explore other crucial issues.\n\nMICHAEL IPSON\n\nArthur Power Dudden. The American Pacific: From the Old China Trade to the Present. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992. xx + 314 pp. Index.\n\nWhen Christopher Columbus discovered the Americas, he was attempting to find an alternative sea route to the exotic trading wealth of Cathay, as Westerners then called China. It is perhaps symbolic that 1992, the quincentenary of his momentous voyage, should finally bring the publication of a work which summarizes between one pair of covers the history of American involvement in the Pacific. Despite a plethora of monographs, many of them excellent, on almost every aspect of this topic, and several fine works on American relations with particular Pacific countries, there has long been a need for such a volume. Both Arthur Power Dudden, the Fairbank Professor of History at Bryn Mawr College, situated in a city with more than two centuries of activity in the China trade, and Oxford University Press, are to be thanked for producing this survey. General readers and college students in search of an introductory survey will unite in welcoming The American Pacific.\n\nFor more than two centuries, the United States has been active in Pacific affairs. From the late eighteenth century onwards, the Pacific was the major focus for American missionary endeavours and an important venue of United States commercial activities. The Philippines, by far the most substantial American \"colony\", were acquired in 1898. In the twentieth century, the Pearl Harbour attack would impel the United States into war against both Japan and Germany. Under the pressure of the Cold War, within the next three decades Americans would engage in costly interventions in civil wars in both Korea and Vietnam, in the second case destroying much of their own self-confidence in their imperial mission. Today many Americans see the economic power of Japan as the most serious international threat to their own country, while Asian immigration has dramatically changed the racial mix of the United States.", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1990.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/d79206299", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 212403, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1990", "page_number": 345, "title": "RAS-1990", "content_text": "322 \n\nwas also the proximate cause of American entry into World War II. Not until 1959, however, did it become one of the United States. \n\nIn Hawaii there was an important, American-backed annexationist movement; the Philippines, by contrast, were acquired largely due to the accident of the Spanish-American War of 1898, when Commodore (later Admiral) George Dewey sailed south from Hong Kong and defeated the Spanish fleet at the Battle of Manila Bay. American troops initially cooperated with the Filipino insurgents who had for some time rebelled against Spanish rule; within a few months, however, Congress, after fierce debate, decided to keep the islands, the beginning of the most significant formal colonial episode in United States history. American involvement in the Philippines would illustrate both the strengths and weaknesses of the American approach to international affairs. The Filipino insurrection, led by Emilio Aguinaldo, was brutally suppressed by Arthur MacArthur (father of Douglas), yet American rule was in many respects benign; indeed, the supposed American overlords were frequently manipulated by members of the Filipino elite for their own political ends. Even so, American possession of the Philippines fostered an unhealthy sense of dependency among Filipinos, still not entirely dissipated today, while overextending the United States strategically. As Theodore Roosevelt had foreseen more than thirty years earlier, in World War II the islands would prove indefensible, a military hostage and the United States' \"Achilles' heel\". \n\nAlthough Dudden fails to cite recent works by Ralph Eldin Minger on William Howard Taft's and Jack C. Lane on Leonard Wood's gubernatorial efforts in the Philippines, the early sections of the book are thorough and well-researched. Regrettably, the standards slip in his chapters on American relations with China and Japan in the decades before Pearl Harbour. Here, indeed, his determination to deal with each country in turn is a defect, since by World War I, if not before, United States policies towards China, Japan, and the Philippines were closely inter-related. The resulting repetition leads to a somewhat confused narrative. Dudden's grasp of the financial dealings between the United States government and private American bankers and China and Japan is shaky; the American Group of the Second China Consortium had not collapsed by the end of World War I, but was about to be established. His understanding of the complexities of interwar American State Department and governmental \n\nPage 345\nPage 346", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1990.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/d79206299", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 212761, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1992", "page_number": 70, "title": "RAS-1992", "content_text": "55\n\non him. Mesny had taken every opportunity to praise Tso and, in good Chinese fashion, looked upon him as his 'protector' or 'patron'.\n\nIn a comparatively brief single-page highlights-only curriculum vitae printed in the Miscellany in 1905, Mesny would appear to have been careful in his choice of words. He used the phrase 'Volunteered for service' not only when he went to Kueichou in 1868, about which he later wrote at length, but also in connexion with 'Manchuria' and 'Peking', the former during the Sino-Japanese War and the latter at the time of the Boxer Rebellion, neither of which has been mentioned elsewhere in the Miscellany. This suggests that he was not taken up on his offers of service, especially as his name does not appear in any of the standard writings on the Boxer era in north China and he does not describe or offer any anecdotes on the subject in his Miscellany.\n\nHis Miscellanies contain a large number of items culled from other works such as Mayer's Chinese Reader's Manual written in Peking in 1874 where Mayers was a Chinese Secretary to HM Legation, and published in Shanghai the same year by the American Presbyterian Mission Press. At one point Mesny claimed that W F Mayers was a friend of his; but reading between the lines one is tempted to see Mesny meeting Mayers over dinner at the Legation in Peking where polite conversation would lead to a discussion on the failure of the Chinese to help build a railway, with Mesny offering advice and suggestions and Mayers, again politely, concurring. This would appear to have been seen by Mesny as Mayers accepting Mesny's ideas and entrusting him with various tasks. Mayers in all probability forgot all about the conversation, but not so Mesny who repeated himself several times in his Miscellanies, explaining how he had offered advice and had been waiting for a follow up from Mayers which never arrived. It is a matter for speculation how often this type of conversation took place, with other parties forgetting, either with or without intent, their talks with Mesny.\n\nMesny periodically advanced oracular statements which in later years would be referred to as 'China-watching'. In 1899 he made several predictions about the 'inadequacies' of the Manchu Ch'ing dynasty and forecast that the end was 'very' nigh with a new reformed China ahead. He also predicted that the Russians for all their implied power would be unable to retain Manchuria against the Japanese who also, Mesny thought, might join up with China making a powerful empire under the Mikado as ruler of the Greater China and Japan. These predictions", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1992.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/qf85tx75x", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 213092, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1993", "page_number": 160, "title": "RAS-1993", "content_text": "141\n\nwith some happier notes.\n\nJuly 23rd\n\nBy this time we had broken down the opposition and matters began to run smoothly\n\nAnd after a long gap, the final entry,\n\nSeptember 3rd\n\nI left for Japan about this time spending all September in Colony In Japan the guest of the Japanese Government and made a national hero Valuable presents numerous and suite of rooms in the Imperial Hotel\n\nThis red-carpet treatment must have been recommended by Kitasato in appreciation of the help given him by Lowson in making the discovery that earned him international fame\n\nHaving read the diary, I learnt more about the situation as it developed from day to day but it came as a surprise to me that so much had gone on behind the scenes arising from clashes of personalities The three important people whose responsibility in the fight against the Epidemic was no less onerous than that of Ayres or Lowson were called: fools, cowards and nonentities. They were the Governor, who was in overall charge as head of the administration, the Colonial Secretary, who was the Governor's principal assistant, and the Chairman of the Permanent Committee of the Sanitary Board which was set up to recommend on legislation Were the accusations justified? We do not know, but it would be interesting to find out something about these three.\n\nSir William Robinson was Governor of Hong Kong from December 1891 to January 1898. His governorship covered a most difficult period in the history of Hong Kong, during which 'misfortunes after misfortunes assailed the colony in swift succession', to quote from Sayers. The year 1894 was a particularly bad one for Robinson and Hong Kong. His wife died but not from plague. Two very severe typhoons struck Hong Kong in September and October, causing much devastation and many casualties. Above all, there was the Epidemic with its effect on the economy and other aspects of life in the Territory. Robinson reported to the Secretary of State for the Colonies that 'Without exaggeration, I may assert that so far as trade and commerce are concerned the plague has assumed the", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1993.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/66833t302", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 213635, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1995", "page_number": 231, "title": "RAS-1995", "content_text": "206\n\ntrials, International Military Tribunals were established, and Russia took part in the Tokyo trial although it had been in the war against Japan for only one week before the surrender. In all the other trials, Tribunals of Officers were set up to hear the cases. The range of offences to be tried as war-crimes was never precisely defined, but broadly concerned “offences against humanity” including events causing cruelty, indeed often death, to prisoners and civilians in occupied territories. The notorious Kempetai (military police) had tortured, and indeed, killed, many thousands usually in an effort to extract confessions. Were these trials a \"Victor's Justice\"? It is true that the Japanese surrender had made the trials possible, but the catalogue of criminality left no doubt that those appearing in the dock deserved the punishment they received. There were acquittals mostly as a result of problems of identification, and some because the required standard of proof had not been satisfied. Tribunals did not attach much weight to affidavit evidence since cross-examination was not feasible. Documents which were contemporaneous on the other hand usually told their own story, although bonfires of such documents had been destroying such evidence in the interval between the Emperor's surrender broadcast and the arrival of the Allied forces.\n\nThe first trial was of General Yamashita, the \"Tiger of Malaya\", who became Supreme Commander of Japanese Forces in the Philippines, and this began in Manila on October 29th, 1945. He was sentenced to death. Other trials were conducted by U.S. Tribunals: 90 were sentenced to death. During 1945 and 1946, Nationalist Chinese Tribunals convicted 504 as war criminals. The French convicted 198, the Dutch 969, Australia 644, and in Singapore and Hong Kong, the United Kingdom Tribunals convicted 811.\n\nAccused were permitted legal representation, and given interpreters and the assistance of an Allied officer, and this was strictly adhered to in the British trials. We had the assistance of Army Investigation Units which collected evidence. One problem was that mistreated P.O.W.s wanted to get home to England or Canada as soon as practicable for rehabilitation, and tribute should be paid to the public-spirited few who agreed to return as witnesses.\n\nMy first case in Hong Kong concerned atrocities in Kinkaseki Camp, Formosa, and its \"Hell Mine\", and one of my star witnesses was", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1995.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/95941j25g", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 213886, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1996", "page_number": 238, "title": "RAS-1996", "content_text": "212\n\nthe return of Chen Jiongming from the neighbouring province of Fujian. Chen was the Governor-General of Guangdong in 1912 and 1913. After the failed \"Second Revolution\" in 1913 against Yuan, he escaped to Malaysia (while Sun to Japan) and developed his own anti-Yuan organization independent of Sun's party in Japan. When the Canton Government was established in 1917, nominally under Sun Yat-sen, he returned to Canton only to find that the guest armies had real control over the province. As a result, he gathered a small troop of soldiers made up of native Cantonese and moved to Fujian in early 1918, where he strengthened its fighting potential. Chen Jiongming's return was financially supported by a group of Chinese bankers, who were affiliated with Liu Zhubo, in Hong Kong. They advanced to Chen Jiongming an amount of $200,000 and promised to pay the Guangxi troops a “give-way fee”, if the armies retreated to their home provinces. The fighting could not wait for bargains, as in late October Chen Jiongming's army had forced its way into Canton. The Guangxi guest armies obtained the \"overdue army expenditure\" through a different means. The guest armies retreated westward to Guangxi, looting all the way home.\n\nThe return of the Cantonese troops under Chen Jiongming was welcomed by the Cantonese. The atmosphere in Canton, as reviewed in the newspapers, was that Chen Jiongming should be the Provincial Governor. Funds for a new government were promised by the merchants.\n\nAt this juncture, on November 25, Sun Yat-sen and his key supporters left Shanghai and triumphantly returned to Canton. He prepared to assume power again. After all, Chen was Sun's subordinate in 1913 and 1917. The situation Sun found on his return to Canton was not to his liking. Sun was made Director and Minister of the Interior in the restored government. Wu Tingfang was made Minister of Foreign Affairs. But Chen Jiongming had been planning for the future in Canton, and his list of titles was impressive. Chen was the Minister of War, Governor of Guangdong, Commander in Chief of the Guangdong Army, and High Inspecting Commissioner of Guangdong and Guangxi. In January of 1921, Sun summoned all available parliamentarians to a meeting in Canton. There was no quorum, but they voted anyway. At the end, the Parliament elected Dr. Sun Provisional President of China. Chen Jiongming was in no hurry to act, nor was he ready to listen to Sun. In an interview with the British Consul, Sun described his", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1996.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/3n209j641", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 214063, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1997", "page_number": 131, "title": "RAS-1997", "content_text": "98\n\nprovince.\n\nIn 1941, construction of a 457m-long tarmac-surfaced runway at Kai Tak for military use on an approximate south-east/north-west orientation, which had already necessitated the dismantling of the RAF hangar, was due to start on 8th December 1941, the precise day on which the Japanese invaded the New Territories and attacked Kai Tak airport.\n\nMilitary/Defence Works\n\nPrior to the British administration, there were several forts in the New Territories going back to the early years (17th century) of the Ch'ing Dynasty, the oldest existing fort (1717) probably being that on Tung Lung Chau overlooking the narrow Fat Tong Mun passage in the eastern approaches to the harbour, and the largest still remaining at Tung Chung (60m by 80m) on the northern coast of Lantau, which was completed in 1832. Little remains of the old 4m-high walled Kowloon City, a garrison fort (120m by 230m) with its sturdy granite parapet wall complete with embrasures and watchtowers, which was finished in 1847 soon after the British established themselves on Hong Kong Island.\n\nSubsequently, the British military have been involved in a considerable amount of civil engineering. The Royal Engineers were first involved in 1841 in the early construction of Queen's Road in Victoria. Perhaps their most impressive roadworks over the years, constructed before the Pacific war, have been Jat's Incline, which provides access to the upper levels of the steep hills overlooking Kowloon. Nevertheless, the main military engineering effort was expended on providing defences and back-up facilities (for example, naval dockyards, aviation needs, storage depots, barracks, and hospitals), principally against possible seaborne attack by Russia last century and later against the increasingly land/sea invasion threat by Japan in the 1930s. Novel defence measures included excavation of a cavern at Lei Yue Mun towards the end of the nineteenth century to house the sophisticated Brennan torpedo, which, after launching down a ramp, was controlled from the shore with a wire attached to the rudder.\n\nRegarding defence facilities, at the outbreak of the Pacific war in", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1997.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/wp98g7579", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 214739, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1999", "page_number": 154, "title": "RAS-1999", "content_text": "118\n\n(Liddell Hart 1999);\n\n\"I suggested, and he appeared to agree, that it would be better to risk its loss by holding it too lightly than to strengthen it so much as to make it, morally, a \"Verdun\" or \"Port Arthur\" with great danger to our prestige if lost.\"\n\n9\n\nSome veterans complained about the lack of sympathy of London with colonial subjects, as evidenced in Colonel Anthony Hewitt's comments in his foreword to the work of Ko and Wordie (Ko and Wordie, 1996). Hewitt's passing comment is mild compared with the criticism of military historians of the allied countries. Vincent (1981) and Ferguson (1980), Cameron (1991) and most Chinese authors such as Yip (1982); Yuen (1988) and Tse (1995) criticised the British Government for being totally unprepared for the invasion of the Colony. The critical views expressed in English works in this period were pertinent to post-war claims for compensation by ex-servicemen in Commonwealth countries. The prevailing Chinese position is that Hong Kong should and could have been defended. An odd view is Tse (1995) who argued that Japan made a strategic mistake by taking the Colony, as it would serve no useful military purpose.\n\nBell's archive research (Bell, 1996) established that Hong Kong was not treated as an outpost but \"an integral component of an offensive strategy” based on faith in the superiority of the Royal Navy and the certainty of Hong Kong's relief. However, Bell's offensive strategy view is hardly consistent with the absence of fighters or bombers in the Colony before the outbreak of the Battle.\n\n\"Britain did not have enough men, or enough guns, tanks, ships and aeroplanes for the war against Germany. So it was impossible to send sufficient men and supplies for the defence of Hong Kong. These included the men of the Hong Kong Volunteer Defence Corps. These men - English, Chinese, Eurasians, Portuguese and others - whose homes were in Hong Kong, prepared to defend the Colony from attack.” (Stokes, 1965, p.89)\n\nThough it is highly questionable whether the Scottish, Canadian and Indian soldiers in the \"others category\" mentioned by Stokes would regard Hong Kong as their permanent homes, Stokes' description is", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1999.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/s178b887x", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 215201, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-2000", "page_number": 297, "title": "RAS-2000", "content_text": "261\n\nMorrison, Ian. (1943). This War Against Japan, Sydney: Angus and Robertson Ltd.\n\nNew York Times, The. August 13, 1950.\n\nSouth China Morning Post, August 13, 1950\n\nSpectator, The. August 18, 1950.\n\nWaters, D.D. (2001). A Brief History of Realty Gardens and its Environs, unpublished\n\nWordie, Jason. (2001). A pillar of the society, South China Morning Post, Tuesday, March 20, 2001\n\nNOTES\n\nIllustration and Appendix 1 photos source: http://home.hiwaay.net/~oliver/splendoured.net\n\n2 Photo source: Teresa Kowalska\n\n3 Photo source: Malayan Postscript, p.44\n\n4 Photo source: Eldest Son, p.55\n\n5 http://english.cla.umn.edu/courseweb/1591/Students/HanSuyin/HanSuyin.html\n\n6 http://www.notsorry.com/hansuyin.html\n\n7 http://members.aol.com/dbryantmd/Page38.html\n\n8 Photo source: Eldest Son, p.374.\n\n9 Malayan Postscript, p.\n\n10 Photo source: Teresa Kowalska, http://www.asiawind.com/pub/forum/fhakka/mhonarc/msg02476.html", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-2000.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/nk328168n", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 215671, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-2001", "page_number": 448, "title": "RAS-2001", "content_text": "400\n\nIn researching the original Note, I came to a profound admiration for Ian Morrison. His newspaper reporting was erudite and he demonstrated a perceptive understanding of the issues involved. His two books; Malayan Postscript (1942) and This War Against Japan (1943) were equally perceptive. By all accounts the picture that Han Suyin painted of him in A Many Splendoured Thing; as being a gentle, kind and understanding man, is borne out by the facts. Alastair describes him as ...a cultivated and gentle man and no swashbuckler but (he) had an insatiable curiosity about events in Asia.' Accordingly, I offer this tribute to his memory. R.I.P.\n\nREFERENCES\n\nMorrison, Alastair (1993), The Road to Peking, Canberra: The Highland Press (for private distribution).\n\nPearl, Cyril (1967). Morrison of Peking, Sydney: Angus & Robertson Ltd.\n\nNOTES\n\nhttp://www.fechk.org/archives/achives historyconduit.htm\n\n2 See JHKBRAS Vol. 40: The Battle of Hong Kong: A Note on the Literature and\n\n3\n\nthe Effectiveness of the Defence, Lawrence Lai Wai Chung, pp. 115-136.\n\nSource: Alastair Morrison, personal communication and The Road to Peking, p. 151\n\nAll images, unless otherwise stated, courtesy of The Times of London.\n\nIan and Maria met in Shanghai and were married, in Hong Kong, in 1941. Maria was Steffi's sister (Colin's subsequent wife) Their first home was at the Cathay Building, in Singapore. After the War, they returned to Singapore and lived in Gallop Road. According to Alastair, the marriage was not a happy one (The Road to Peking, p. 151). After her husband's death, Mrs. Morrison and the children (who were seven and five at the time of his death) appear to have stayed on in Singapore, at any rate for a while, and then moved to Australia. According to Alastair Morrison, Maria 'died long ago.' The son, Nicholas (?), lives in the U.K. and visited Alastair in Canberra on his eighty seventh birthday", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-2001.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/zg651950g", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 215691, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-2001", "page_number": 468, "title": "RAS-2001", "content_text": "421\n\nbeing starved. The complainant was later severely beaten by the Japanese. This prisoner could well have been HKBRAS member the late KMA Barnett although the book does not say so.\n\nWhen I have talked to ex-POWs I have seldom heard mention of acts of kindness by Japanese guards. As an ex-POW Dr Solomon Bard, who is well known to many HKBRAS Members, holds views which many regard as exceptional. He maintains there was 'no unprovoked cruelty within his experience. There are also instances quoted, in Long Night's Journey into Day, where individual Japanese were considerate to prisoners. This was more likely if a prisoner spoke Japanese.\n\nTo counterbalance instances of kindness there was the case of the American prisoner who requested permission to urinate. Permission was refused. Eventually, in agony, he broke ranks and urinated nearby. Afterwards he was made to lick his urine off the wall.\n\nThere is no doubt that, by and large, prisoners were severely treated. We have to remember, however, there was a war on and, in many cases, Japanese guards were little better off than their prisoners. Generally, when the war turned against them, both Japanese service personnel and civilians readily tightened their belt the extra notch. Japanese soldiers were brutalised from the day they entered service. Life in the Hong Kong camps, however, was not as bad as being a prisoner in Manchuria (Unit 731 and others) where inmates were subjected to inhumane medical experiments. In some camps in German-occupied Europe there was state-sponsored genocide, among the Jews for example, the full details of which did not come to light until the end of the War [Hon. Editor - As an aside, I recently paid a visit to Auschwitz, an experience which will haunt me for the rest of my life].\n\nMost prisoners in Hong Kong could envisage the war continuing for several years more and, when the Allies started to fight back and for the Japanese the going became even tougher, Allied prisoners were under the impression they would eventually be killed off in batches. The atom bomb saved the day. Although I fought against the Germans and the Italians, and not the Japanese, I remember no one at the time shedding tears at the dropping of the bomb on Japan.\n\nAlthough bushido and chivalry are in some respects similar this is", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-2001.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/zg651950g", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 215802, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-2002", "page_number": 101, "title": "RAS-2002", "content_text": "34\n\nBETWEEN THE NINE DRAGONS AND A DIVINE WIND: HOW HONG KONG'S WEATHER MIGHT HAVE AFFECTED AN ALLIED INVASION TO RETAKE THE TERRITORY*\n\nCHOHONG CHO\n\nSynopsis\n\nIn the War in the Pacific during World War II, the question of whether or not to engage Japan directly in China was a major one for Allied planners. If the Japanese weren't enough of a problem, an age-old factor - the weather - certainly would have provided the Allies with additional concerns. The Pacific and Asia are home to some of the most extreme weather in the world.\n\nHong Kong, a possible target in any Allied campaign in China, played host to some of this extreme weather. What this study attempts to do is to consider how Hong Kong's adverse weather conditions could have affected an Allied operation to recapture it from the Japanese.\n\nBackground\n\nAfter Hong Kong fell to the Japanese in December 1941 and Great Britain was expelled from the Pacific, only the U.S. was left to face Japan in this theatre. The U.S. itself was in bad shape, as most of its Pacific Fleet had been mauled at Pearl Harbor. On the Asian mainland, Japan was still busying herself with China and Britain. A stalemate had developed with the former, while the latter was being pushed out of Burma into India.\n\nHowever, the U.S. Navy's (USN) aircraft carriers were not caught in the Pearl Harbor debacle, and during much of 1942, they bore the brunt of the action against the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) in the Pacific. In a series of three engagements with the IJN (at Coral Sea, Midway, and Guadalcanal), with inferior numbers accompanied by\n\n*The author would like to thank Mr. Ko Tim-keung for bringing a draft of this article to the attention of the Hon. Editor, and Professor Elfed Roberts for his comments on an early version of the draft.", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-2002.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/mp4901278", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 215803, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-2002", "page_number": 102, "title": "RAS-2002", "content_text": "35\n\nheavy losses, the USN stemmed and then turned the tide of Japanese conquest by early 1943.\n\nAfter evicting the Japanese from Guadalcanal, the Allies (mainly the U.S. and Australia) took advantage of this opportunity to move north against other Japanese positions in the Solomon Islands and New Guinea. This was the Southwest Pacific Area.\n\nThe USN, while assisting the Allied drives in the land-dominated Southwest Pacific, continued to wait for a chance to launch its own offensive in the Central Pacific Area, which was dominated by ocean. Such a drive was not opportunistic like the Southwest Pacific drive, but had been envisioned for almost 35 years prior to the war in the form of War Plan Orange (WP Orange).\n\nThe origins of WP Orange could be traced even further back to the last years of the 19th Century. During this time, many Japanese emigrated to the continental U.S. and Hawaii, and incurred the hostility of White Americans. In time, such acts aroused Japan's fury, who considered herself a great power after her defeat of Russia in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905. Alarmed over Japan's growing influence in the Pacific, American war planners began to draft the forerunners of WP Orange in 1907.2\n\nIn brief, WP Orange pitted the U.S. (Blue) against Japan (Orange). Orange planners expected the U.S. to lose the Philippines early in the war (which was what happened). The USN would steam all the way across the Pacific to recapture the Philippines, defeat the IJN in a decisive battle, and lay siege to Japan, eventually forcing her surrender.3 As for China (and Hong Kong), Orange planners had cautioned against trying to establish an American presence there. The Japanese were expected to have firmly planted themselves in and around China by the start of the war, and it was advisable for the U.S. to not undertake a campaign on the mainland.4\n\nThe reality in 1943, however, was that there were other participants in the war, like Britain and China. Both had interests on the Asian mainland, and they could not be ignored. A common interest was Hong Kong, which both China and Britain wanted to recover after the war. At the start of the war, Hong Kong was a British responsibility, but", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-2002.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/mp4901278", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 215804, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-2002", "page_number": 103, "title": "RAS-2002", "content_text": "36\n\nafter Britain lost Hong Kong, the closest Allied power to the territory was its original owner China. Then there was Hong Kong's status as a port. Any mainland port that touched the Pacific attracted the attention of the USN, because it was in its interest that China continued to keep the bulk of the Japanese Army occupied on the continent while the U.S. seized Japan's possessions in the Pacific. Hence, Allied commanders like Admiral Ernest King, the USN's highest-ranking officer and a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), thought that the U.S. had a major responsibility to help keep China in the war,\n\nIn 1943, China was tying down 20 per cent of the Japanese Army. No major fighting had occurred there for a while, but the Allies knew that this relative calm might not last. The fear that Japan would resume her efforts to knock China out of the war was real, and Allied planners wanted to prevent this by keeping the Chinese Army (of the Nationalist government) battle-worthy. To do this, they had to establish and maintain secure lines of communication (LoC) into China. As Japan had already occupied China's ports and the lone road into China from Burma (the Burma Road), the sole means of supplying China was through a risky, costly, and feeble air route over the Himalayas (the Hump).\n\nThe best method of supplying China was to recapture a port on the China Coast and establishing LoC to the interior of China. Initially, the Chinese Army was allotted the bulk of this task - if it could be strengthened by deliveries over the Hump and (if the Allies could retake it) the Burma Road. But by 1943, supplies over the Hump remained minuscule, the Burma Road was not reopened, and the Chinese (Nationalists, Communists, and third-party elements) preferred to fight among themselves rather than against the Japanese. With the Allied drives in the Pacific gathering momentum, the main responsibility for a campaign to recapture a port on the China Coast eventually fell to the U.S.\n\nHong Kong and Shanghai have long been the two best ports on the China Coast, with each possessing excellent harbour facilities. But Hong Kong rated ahead of Shanghai as the initial port to be opened up in China because of the strong Japanese presence around Shanghai. In the Hong Kong-Canton area during 1943, the Japanese still occupied only a beachhead. As long as Hong Kong remained a beachhead, and the Chinese forces ringing it maintained a measure of resolve, Japanese", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-2002.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/mp4901278", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 215817, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-2002", "page_number": 116, "title": "RAS-2002", "content_text": "49\n\nSo whether Allied LoC were disrupted by the Japanese or a typhoon, the end result would be the same: troops and supplies prevented from achieving their objectives, and Allied strategy would be hampered. The Allies could do something about the Japanese, but not much about a typhoon.\n\nAs nasty as it is, a typhoon does have a redeeming factor. The rain that accompanies it can help alleviate the water supply problem in a place as dependent on rainfall for its fresh water as Hong Kong (which itself has no rivers). During wartime, an adequate water supply was a most invaluable resource for both sides.33\n\nThe B-29\n\nThere was another important reason for recapturing Hong Kong: to use it as a base from which to bomb Japan. Before the war, China was thought to be the best place from which to do this.34 During her conquests of 1941-1942, Japan had wisely expanded her perimeter far enough so that she would be impervious to retaliatory bombing raids by Allied land-based aircraft, or so she thought. The Doolittle Raid on Tokyo in April 1942 was as unorthodox as it was daring, having been accomplished by land-based bombers operating from aircraft carriers, but it was not practical to replicate on a large scale. If the Allies wanted to devastate Japan, they needed a real land base and a bomber with enough range and bomb capacity to reach Japan.\n\nThat bomber was the Boeing B-29 Superfortress. It was classified as a Very Heavy Bomber (VHB), and it was, with a maximum bomb load of 10 tons, a range of 3,600 miles (5,800 km), and a top speed of 358 mph (577 kph). But it could not display all of these qualities at the same time, for speed and range decreased as the bomb load increased. The B-29 had been originally designed to operate from across the Atlantic to hit Germany, but once the older Allied bombers were performing adequately against Germany by 1943, the decision was made to operate the B-29 in the war against Japan. Initially, China was believed to be the best place from which to operate the B-29s.\n\nSoutheastern China, of which Hong Kong was a part, was deemed the best part of China to begin B-29 operations against Japan.35 The prerequisite, of course, was a strong enough LoC being established", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-2002.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/mp4901278", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 215825, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-2002", "page_number": 124, "title": "RAS-2002", "content_text": "57\n\nbut it was harder to replace soldiers with combat experience.\n\nBecause the weather changes from day to day, so must the extent to which it could influence the approval or rejection of a certain operation in war. Hong Kong's weather, as formidable as it was, could not by itself determine if it merited recapture or not. Nor could any objective's weather be the lone factor. If it was, then many of the war's campaigns would not have taken place. If the control of a specific territory was judged crucial, then the powers concerned would do anything within their capacity to seize or retain it.\n\nNo place in the world has perfect weather at any time of the year. In Hong Kong's case, its worst weather occurs during the middle of the year. Had a Hong Kong operation taken place, Allied planners would have naturally preferred that it take place towards the end of the year. That would give the Allies up to six months of relatively trouble-free weather with which to work.\" A Hong Kong operation was bound to include amphibious landings, and these were very susceptible to bad weather. It was important for the Allies to gain at least a foothold on land, as it would give a political and psychological boost to the Allied war effort, as well as put them in a better position militarily vis-à-vis Japan. The China Coast was a perimeter within Japan's empire, and any breach made here would accelerate Japan's demise. So that first foothold was vital, just as it was equally vital for the Japanese to prevent it. In Japan's history, foul weather had worked in her favour when she had to defend against an amphibious invasion, so it wasn't unprecedented for the weather to play a decisive role in war. For the Allies, the last thing they would want was to see a Hong Kong operation in progress be thwarted by a non-human entity like the weather. Such a contest would be a no-win situation for the Allies.\n\nIn the end, the Allies never carried out any landings on any port on the China Coast. Their destruction of the IJN and blockade of Japan by sea and air was so complete that they didn't have to worry about the Japanese in China, which remained a secondary theatre at the end of the war. Hong Kong's weather was never specifically mentioned as a factor, but was probably on the minds of some Allied planners after the poundings their navies had taken in the last months of the war. Hong Kong returned to British, and eventually Chinese, rule, and was fortunate to have not undergone a destructive campaign for it to change hands again.", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-2002.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/mp4901278", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 215832, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-2002", "page_number": 131, "title": "RAS-2002", "content_text": "64\n\n53 Ronald Spector, Eagle Against the Sun: the American War with Japan (New York: Vintage Books, 1985), p.489.\n\n54 (1) South China Weekly Situation Report No.4, 30 Mar 45; Series 1/1; War Diary, January-April 1945; also includes South China Weekly Situation Reports Nos.1-23, 9 Mar-23 Oct 45; Ride Papers. (2) South China Weekly Situation Report No.14, 8 Jun 45 (rest of details the same as above).\n\n55 Romanus & Sunderland, Time Runs Out in CBI, 1959 of U.S. Army in World War II: The China-Burma-India Theater (rpt. Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1976), p.332-334.\n\n56 Adamson & Kosco, p.149-150, 190.\n\n57 Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas Report, Serial 0395 of 11 February 1946; Entry 351; World War II Action and Operational Reports; RG38; NA, Washington, DC,\n\n58 Alderson, p.57.\n\n59 Adamson & Kosco, p.52-53, 185-187. Interestingly, the carriers in question, the USS Hornet (CV-12) and USS Bennington (CV-20), had survived previous Japanese attacks (including Kamikazes) without suffering anything worse than strafing, but they couldn't escape the typhoon.\n\n60 CPS107/1, p.15.", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-2002.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/mp4901278", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 215929, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-2002", "page_number": 228, "title": "RAS-2002", "content_text": "162\n\nquite early on to professional military strategists. War, when it came to Hong Kong, would have to be waged by means other than conventional warfare. Realistically, occupation would be a foregone conclusion: the challenge was to struggle on by covert means and to develop some resistance mechanism. In short, a new concept of waging war, based on intelligence and action behind enemy lines.\n\nMilitary intelligence\n\nThree years after the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war, [Hon. Ed. - I find it difficult to see how Japan's unprovoked occupation of large parts of China and the atrocities committed by its army can be termed a 'war.'] the British Army, Navy and Air Force created a 'Far East Combined Bureau.' It operated openly, employed no agents and depended on information volunteered by customs officials, commercial travellers and the like. Its offices, based within the Naval Dockyard compound, discouraged visits from casual informants, and much of its work involved monitoring personal reports from China sent by courier, rather than proactive intelligence gathering. Naval Intelligence provided support and maintained a signals station on Stonecutters Island for transmitting information to Singapore. GE Grimsdale, later to become Major General, joined the FECB in its early days. One of his earliest recommendations on curbing Japanese espionage in Hong Kong was to suggest that tourists be banned from using cameras! Later he was to acknowledge that espionage was harmless in a place like Hong Kong where defences were open and unsophisticated - one snatched photo of a ship leaving the naval dockyard revealed less than its official description in Jane's Fighting Ships.\" In any case, Japanese had been known to go to Kelly and Walsh, the booksellers in Central District, to find maps better than their standard issue 1:20,000 series.\n\nIn January 1937, Capt. Charles Ralph Boxer, of the Lincolnshire Regiment arrived in Hong Kong. Everything about Boxer contrasted strongly with the stereotype of a colonial in the Far East. Although he came from a family of military men, he was an unconventional individualist. Moreover, he was a scholar, who spoke fluent, literary Japanese, studying Japanese history and culture to the extent that he was welcomed in some of the most influential Japanese social circles. After the war, these values would pit him against bigots for whom any sympathy for the Japanese was anathema. But pre-war, he represented", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-2002.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/mp4901278", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 216322, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-2003", "page_number": 81, "title": "RAS-2003", "content_text": "30 \n\non the China coast, first occupied intermittently in 1517 and then from 1557 continuously under payment of a ground rent until 1849, when the Portuguese threw off Chinese control not long after the Opium War.2 Its picturesque title was \"City of the Name of God in China\". \n\nE \n\nIn the 1830s, the entire Portuguese population, including slaves, was not above 5,000; whilst the Chinese of Macau were calculated to exceed 30,000.3 Macau had a senate, a bishop, thirteen churches, three monasteries and a convent. A visiting Protestant wrote, \"...you are every moment reminded you are in a papal town: the bells ring often every day, processions with crucifixes and lighted candles go and come, and priests with black frocks and cocked hats are seen in the streets'.5 \n\nMacau owed its rise solely to trade. Despite its minute size, it was an important part of the Portuguese seaborne empire. It had thrived on the Japan trade, lost after the Japanese rulers turned against Christianity and the overseas trade, which brought its priests into their country; had beaten off Dutch attempts to capture the place in the 1620s; and due to its pivotal role in Eastern trade with South-east Asia and the West, was able to flourish in succeeding centuries. \n\nWith the growth of world trade in the 17th and 18th centuries, Macau became the place to which, by Chinese decree, all foreign merchant ships trading with China through Canton had to report for clearance, and pay for the pilot and permit needed to enter the Canton River. Vessels could then proceed upstream to the Whampoa anchorage where they had to wait to take on their cargoes. Their departure was authorized by a licence, known picturesquely as the Grand Chop. (Plate 2). It is well-known how the foreign merchants conducting business in Canton could only reside there for half the year, and how they had to return thereafter to join their wives and families in Macau. \n\nMacau to Canton \n\nThe Delta is broad, the shores on each side out of sight save for distant mountains, but two-thirds of the way from Macau, we enter the narrow approaches to the Pearl River at the Bocca Tigris or Bogue (\"Tiger's Door\" or \"Gate\"). The change is almost abrupt, and made the more dramatic by the island in mid-stream which blocks the passage into the River. To left, right and centre there were forts. That on the", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-2003.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/2v242g390", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 216400, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-2003", "page_number": 159, "title": "RAS-2003", "content_text": "109\n\ntrouble in Hankow might be expected, the unrest in the Atlantic Fleet, the Japanese aggression in Manchuria, and the change of Sterling from a gold basis, with its serious effect on ships' companies paid in silver, were events all calling for the closest attention.\n\nOn 18th September 1931 the Japanese Kwantung army in Manchuria, Lieut. General Shigeru Honjo, staged an incident which enabled them to allege that the Japanese owned South Manchuria Railway had been dynamited north of Mukden. Armed with this excuse, a premeditated assault was launched by them against the city of Mukden itself.\n\nAt the time the local Chinese war lord was a protégé of Chiang Kai-shek, Chang Hsueh-liang or the 'Young Marshal'. In June 1928 his father, Chang Tso-lin, the 'Old Marshal,' had been assassinated by the Japanese.\n\nUnfortunately as a consequence of his internal conflict with the Chinese communists, Chiang Kai-shek had decided on a policy of first conquering the bandits and rebels, his euphemism for the communists. He reasoned that with these left wing groups eradicated then later he would be able to deal with the foreign, or Japanese, invaders. So it was that in order to limit the extent of what he saw as merely being an incident, he ordered the 'Young Marshal' not to actively resist the Japanese move against Mukden.\n\nIn short order the Japanese army went on to occupy the remainder of that large and rich province of Manchuria. Thus was established the region later to become their puppet state of Manchukuo.\n\nThere were two important results.\n\nFirst, by their action in Manchuria, which certainly had not been sanctioned by the civilian government of Japan, the army established itself as a power within the government. No longer was every aspect of government under civilian control.\n\nSecondly within China the people saw that China as represented by Chiang Kai-shek, had permitted Japan to occupy a part of their country. By not attempting to eject the Japanese, and so endeavouring to rally all", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-2003.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/2v242g390", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 216419, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-2003", "page_number": 178, "title": "RAS-2003", "content_text": "128\n\nimmediately led to political intervention by Russia, France and Germany which forced Japan to give way and retrocede Liaodong to China. This high-handed action by Western powers left a permanent scar on the Japanese psyche.\n\nIn the last years of the 19th century, as a result of Russian forward policy in the Far East, Russian pressure had forced the Chinese to grant them railway and territorial concessions in the southern part of Manchuria. This, as well as Russian interference in Korea, led to ever increasing Japanese fears of further Russian expansion within the Pacific region. The Russian Government used the Boxer Rebellion in 1900 as a pretext for sending thousands of troops into Manchuria, ostensibly to protect the China Eastern Railway. Her encroachment in Manchuria, which she had promised to evacuate after having occupied it on the pretext of protecting it against the Boxers but which she firmly held, disturbed the Powers.\n\nThe causes of war were not insignificant. During the years immediately following the suppression of the Boxers Russia saw an increasingly formidable Japan rise up before her. Put bluntly, Russia and Japan went to war to determine who would control Manchuria and Korea, with one of the main Japanese grounds being fear generated by the threat posed by the land-bridge of Korea pointing threateningly straight at Japan, with the belligerent Russians poised on Korea's northern border. Another, and possibly a more credible threat, was the probability that a strong, victorious Russia would lead to the dismemberment of the Chinese Empire. This would have made a case for Japan's 'defensive war' - to occupy Port Arthur in order to place herself in a position to prevent any such dismemberment by laying the first stone in her long-term plan for predominance in Peking.\n\nThe war 1904-1905\n\nAfter several years of Russian-Japanese political sparring the latter grew impatient with diplomacy and war became inevitable. The Japanese took the initiative. Their plan envisaged a swift knock-out blow against the Russian Far Eastern Fleet with a night torpedo-boat attack, followed the next day by her fleet attacking the Russian fleet off Port Arthur and defeating it. Their next move was to get two armies into the field, the first to be landed on the west coast of Korea at", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-2003.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/2v242g390", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 216421, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-2003", "page_number": 180, "title": "RAS-2003", "content_text": "130\n\nThe Treaty showed Japan that white races would stand together against the yellow, and the Japanese as a race were mortified at what they were convinced was a dishonourable peace.\n\nThe peace treaty provided for, amongst other things, the mutual withdrawal of Russian and Japanese armies from Manchuria within eighteen months; and the return of Manchuria to China except for the leased territories of Liaodong (Guandong) and the southern section of the Manchurian Railway which was transferred to Japan by Russia.\n\nHowever, at a Conference held in Peking in December 1905 at which the Chinese government approved the Treaty, the now enfeebled and impotent Qing dynasty gave Japan even greater rights in Chinese territory than had been agreed in Portsmouth. The Japanese had now acquired rights and concessions on Chinese territory for the first time.\n\nChinese involvement\n\nIt has not been my intention to describe the detailed progress of the war as this has been covered in numerous books and articles, but to highlight how the Chinese were involved. It has proved disappointing to find that even when China and the Chinese position are referred to, writers usually skim over the subject in a single page or two.\n\nThe Russian promise to evacuate territories in Manchuria occupied after the Boxer insurrection was ignored and the progressive Russification of the Three Provinces could only mean one thing - that the Russians had no intention of withdrawing. During 1903 the Chinese Government showed a firmer attitude in their request for promises from the Russian Minister relating to the evacuation of Manchuria. Japanese strong moral support acted as an incentive to the more progressive Chinese to strengthen the influence of the few patriotic Chinese statesmen who had the welfare of the Empire at heart. Meetings of the literati in most of the larger cities in China during October 1903 denounced Russia in no uncertain terms. Little could be expected from the Empress Dowager and her clique. One day she ranted on hearing some real or fancied desecration by Cossacks in the former Manchu capital at Mukden where the ancestors of the Manchu ruling clan were buried, and threatened reprisals; the next day she was considering possibilities of closer links between Russia and China and even, perhaps,\n\nPage 180\n\nPage 181", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-2003.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/2v242g390", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 216431, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-2003", "page_number": 190, "title": "RAS-2003", "content_text": "140\n\nthe Russian military with a major headache. Russian attempts to destroy brigandage inadvertently increased the dislike with which they were regarded by the local inhabitants. It was not long before Chinese peasants supported the bandits who also received secret encouragement from Chinese and Manchu officials. The native officials hated the foreign usurpation of their power, but were impotent to openly protest against it.\n\nThe Russians tried to avoid any interference with the Chinese provincial administration in Manchuria which remained intact, continuing in the hands of Chinese officials, though the Russians instituted their own police service. However, the Russian occupation was distasteful to the official class as a whole, as it diminished both their prestige and, consequently, their emoluments. So that from the official class the Russian met with a hostility which took the form chiefly of passive resistance.\n\nA number of snippets in the illustrated War in the East refer to the 'Chunchuses' operating alongside Russian troops on the road to Mukden. One such reads 'On 15th June 1905 took place the battle of Telissu while on the 12th General Kuoki reported the occupation of Huairen Xian by a detachment of his (Japanese) troops, who expelled a force of six hundred Russians and Chunchuses.'\n\nThe Red Beards were to all intents and purposes soldiers of fortune, and as such fought for whomsoever they wished but only for as long as it suited them. In view of their general attitude towards the Russians it was surprising that they ever co-operated with them in the field. However, the Red Beards resembled the Cossacks with their habits of free life and distrust of military discipline, a common love of their horses and a shared prowess at horsemanship.\n\nBandits serving with Japanese forces\n\nThe Japanese were quick to appreciate the potential of the Hong Huzi as guerrillas. The large contemporary two-volume Japan's Fight for Freedom, a contemporary illustrated popular history produced in Britain, included several references to the Hong Huzi, describing them in the text as 'Hunhuses, serving under Japanese command.'", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-2003.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/2v242g390", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 216443, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-2003", "page_number": 202, "title": "RAS-2003", "content_text": "152\n\nemulate. The long term result was a higher standard of living in Japanese-occupied Manchuria than in China proper, leading to an increase of Chinese migrants from China proper. Many of the gentry and students had had contacts with Japan down the years and saw Japan as an alternative to life under the rapidly decaying Manchu Chinese dynasty in Peking. Sir Robert Hart, the IG of Chinese Maritime Customs, made an interesting comment when he referred to militarism having taken root in China following Japan's victory, particularly with the call on Chinese Princes and Nobles to send their sons and brothers to military schools.\n\nBy October 1905 Hart wrote that the Commission for Army Reorganisation, established in 1903 under the stimulus of the impending Russo-Japanese War, hastened the modernisation of the Chinese Army. 'Chinese military manoeuvres were over. The new troops were pronounced an immense improvement on anything before seen in China - stout men, well paid and well-dressed, strict discipline willingly obeyed, arms in good condition, and officers who are really soldiers and not merely be-buttoned mandarins with fans in their hands instead of swords. Even Yuan (Shikai), the Viceroy, and Tich Liang, the military chief of the War Bureau, got out of their Chinese robes and put on gold-laced trousers and jackets, etc.'\n\nJapan's victory over Russia led to Kaiser Wilhelm repeating the warning against the 'Yellow Peril,' whilst Japanese perception of a 'White Peril' in Asia reflected their concern with European and American penetration of China.\n\nThe Russo-Japanese War opened a new chapter in world history; however, Manchuria remained in Japanese hands until the end of World War II in 1945 when finally it reverted to China.\n\nPostscript\n\nA subject that might justify further research emanates from the inability of seasonal labour from Shandong province to cross over to Manchuria during the hostilities. This raises the question whether the Chinese labour shipped down to South Africa to work in the mines in the Transvaal in 1904 was a consequence and thus an act of desperation on the part of the labour force? (even though the initial decision to", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-2003.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/2v242g390", "rank": 0 } ]