[ { "id": 205979, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1970", "page_number": 59, "title": "RAS-1970", "content_text": "54 \n\nH. J. LETHBRIDGE \n\nSt. Andrews 2, Aberdeen 2, Glasgow 1). Sir Joseph Kemp attended Cape University, South Africa and Edward Wynne-Jones the University of Wales. \n\nThese university-educated gentlemen represent a social stratum lying somewhere between Mathew Arnold's Barbarians and the Philistines. A large number of them had been educated in schools animated by the ideas and ideals of Arnold's father, Thomas Arnold, the headmaster of Rugby. \n\n28 Alexander Macdonald Thomson (1863-1924), Educated at Aberdeen University. Lecturer in Mathematics, Naini Tal College, India, 1884-5; Assistant Professor of Mathematics, Aberdeen, 1887; entered the Hong Kong Civil Service, and attached for one year to the Colonial Office, 1887; Treasurer 1898-1918. Retired in 1918. He is the only cadet who retired to live in the United States (San Mateo, California); most cadets, including the Scots, settled in the Home Counties on retirement. \n\n29 Norman Lockhart Smith (1887-1968) was the son of Hugh Crawford Smith, M.P., Newcastle-on-Tyne, and Lewis Audley Marsh Johnston (1865-1908) the son of William Johnston, M.P., Ballykilbeg, Ireland. \n\n30 Robert Huessler Yesterday's Rulers, Syracuse, New York, 1963, p. 98. \n\n31 In H. R. Wells and Lam Tong Chinese Documents and Petitions, Hong Kong, 1931, some examples are given in Chinese, with English translations. There are also some interesting specimens of petitions received by the Secretariat for Chinese Affairs from Chinese in Hong Kong. In the section on the Secretariat for Chinese Affairs in the General Orders of the Hong Kong Government, 1924, we read: \"Before taking action affecting bodies or classes of people, the Chinese Government is in the habit of issuing proclamations explaining the action to be taken and the reason for it and the Chinese in Hong Kong expect the same notice to be given. It is desirable that whenever the Head of a Department finds it necessary to take notice of any slackness in complying with the law, or to put a stop to gradual encroachments on the part of individuals, or to bring some new regulation into force, he should first consult the Secretary for Chinese Affairs and ask him to notify the people affected in the same way\". \n\n32 Margery Perham Lugard, vol. 2, London 1960, p. 302. \n\n33 Ibid., p. 367. \n\n34 Geoffrey Robley Sayer (1887-1962), Educated at Highgate School, London, and Queen's College, Oxford. Hong Kong Civil Service 1910; Director of Education 1934-6; retired 1938. \n\n35 Stephen Francis Balfour (1905-1945). Educated at King's College, Cambridge. Hong Kong Civil Service 1929; died in internment during the Japanese occupation of Hong Kong. \n\n36 Walter Schofield (1888-1968). Educated at the University of Liverpool. Hong Kong Civil Service 1911. First Police Magistrate 1934-1937; retired 1938. Schofield was noted for his work pre-war on the geology and archaeology of Hong Kong, in which fields he was a pioneer scholar. \n\n37 Roger Soame Jenyns (born 1904). Educated at Eton and Magdalene College, Cambridge. Hong Kong Civil Service 1926; resigned in 1931 to join the British Museum. He is a noted expert on the arts of the Far East and has written extensively in that field. \n\n38 Robert Andrew Dermod Forrest (born 1893). Educated at Aberdeen University. Hong Kong Civil Service 1919; Inspector of Vernacular Schools; Immigration Officer 1940. Lecturer in Tibeto-Burman Linguistics at the School of Oriental and African Studies at London University.", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1970.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/ww72j0241", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 206780, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1973", "page_number": 57, "title": "RAS-1973", "content_text": "EARLY STEAMSHIPS IN CHINA\n\n51\n\nthe Chinese more than all the rest of the British warships put together,\n\nChinese opposition to steamships was overborne after the First China War, and in the years between then and the Second China War 1857-1858, steam navigation in China was established on a secure foundation. During the first two decades of steam, American ships were as prominent as British on the Canton River and on the coast, and sometimes more technically efficient. This was largely because the Americans made good use of their experience on the Hudson and Mississippi Rivers, and also because their early steamships were designed specially for coastal and river conditions. Many of the early British steamships were merely sailing ships equipped with engines.\n\nThe earliest American steamers were associated with Russell and Company, and Robert Benet Forbes was the man mainly responsible for bringing most of these early steamships to China. The first was the Midas, built at East Boston in 1844, which was the first American steamship to round the Cape of Good Hope, as well as being the first to be seen in China. The Midas arrived at Hong Kong on 21st May 1845, and was put on a twice weekly service between Hong Kong and Canton, the first regular steamship service in China. She also engaged in towing and salvage work, which was usually more profitable than carrying passengers or cargo; so that the advertised regular sailings were often more honoured in the breach than in the observance.\n\nThe Midas was followed by the wooden screw bark Edith, also built at East Boston, which arrived at Macao on 2nd September 1845 and Hong Kong a few days later. The Edith was originally intended to run in the opium trade between India and China, but plans were changed and she was loaded with general cargo for Shanghai. Bad weather and engine trouble foiled two attempts to make this passage, and the Edith was eventually sent back to Boston via Rio de Janeiro, reconditioned at Boston and then chartered to the United States War Department.\n\nIn 1846 Forbes sent the small 20 ton screw steamer Firefly on another ship to Hong Kong, and put her in service between Hong Kong and Whampoa until 1849, usually making two trips daily. She was withdrawn in 1849 and sent to California by sailing ship.\n\nIn 1846 Jardines were successful in inaugurating the first British steamship service on the river, with the Corsair between Hong Kong", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1973.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/8910rj06r", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 208572, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1979", "page_number": 29, "title": "RAS-1979", "content_text": "2\n\nCHAN KIT-CHENG\n\nThe American sense of guilt was largely attributable to three factors: United States' military defeats in Southeast Asia, the American commitment to the policy of defeating Germany first before concentrating on Japan, and the American failure in delivering the bulk of lend-lease and other war materials promised to China. On the first point, according to Stanley K. Hornbeck who was political adviser to the Department of State, reports from American sources from or through Chungking indicated that the American defeat in the Philippines, together with the rapid collapse of the British position in Southeast Asia, had bred \"a sense of frustration and defeatism” among the Chinese.4 To be fair, however, one must add that China had been vastly more appalled and disillusioned by, and consequently more contemptuous of, the British performance.\n\nOn the second point, it was only natural that China was disappointed and embittered by the American policy of “Germany First”. Support for this order of priority was by no means unanimous within American government circles. Admirals Ernest J. King and William D. Leahy, General Douglas MacArthur (at his new headquarters in Australia), and Stanley Hornbeck, to give some examples, all expressed doubt about it and urged that a greater military effort should be directed against Japan. While President Roosevelt was firm on his decision to stand by the agreement reached at the 'Arcadia” Conference it did not mean that he was entirely free from embarrassment when faced with his Far Eastern ally, Chiang Kai-shek.\n\nM4\n\nOn the third point, immediately after Pearl Harbour, President Roosevelt had been generous in promising China war materials, including planes, mainly through lend-lease channels. However, the Americans soon realized that it was easier to make the promise than to implement it. Two difficulties were involved. The first was the problem of transport. After the fall of Burma and the seizure of the southern part of the Burma Road by the Japanese early in 1942, air transport became the only feasible means of getting supplies into China. Until the opening of the well-known Ledo Road (later on re-named Stilwell Road) early in 1945, the bulk of the supplies flown from India to China was transported by the Tenth United States Air Force between April and December 1942, and thereafter by the United States Air Transport Command in what Joseph W. Ballantine, who became director of the Office of", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1979.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/2801w5938", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 208573, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1979", "page_number": 30, "title": "RAS-1979", "content_text": "THE U.S. AND THE QUESTION OF HONG KONG 1941-45\n\nFar Eastern Affairs in the Department of State in 1944, terms “the most difficult supply operation of the entire war\" over the towering hump of the Himalayas. The second difficulty was connected with the priority given to the European theatre. The result was that much of the promised materials to China was often diverted, much to the distress of Hornbeck and others, from its original destination for the European fronts.? Speaking in more specific terms, by late September 1942, US$3.1 billion worth of lend-lease materials were sent to the British Empire, $750 million to Russia, and only $112 million to China. The disparity became even more remarkable by early June: $7,030,000,000 to the British Empire, $1,899,000,000 to Russia, and only $133,000,000 to China.8\n\nUnder the circumstances, it is understandable that the United States should entertain grave anxiety regarding China, especially over a possible collapse of Chinese resistance against Japan. This concern, which the Chinese did everything to keep alive, was universally shared by senior men in the Washington government, including the president himself, H. L. Stimson, then secretary of war, Henry Morgenthau, secretary of the Treasury, Leahy, and many involved in Far Eastern affairs in the Department of State, principally Hornbeck.9 While some doubt was expressed as to how much China could and was willing to contribute to the war effort in the east, the consensus was that her collapse would be a fatal blow to the United Nations, especially the United States, in the Pacific theatre. This event, therefore, must be prevented at all cost.\n\nIt was only natural that the United States, torn by anxiety, should be obsessed with the desire to compensate China as best she could. Consequently, the American government announced at the beginning of 1942 a loan of 500 million dollars to China, with next to no strings attached.10 Meanwhile, the move to push for the allies' recognition of China as one of the great powers, of which Hornbeck claimed himself to be the originator, became increasingly prominent in the American government.11 The outcome was the American insistence that China be included as a signatory, together with Britain, the U.S.S.R., and the United States, of the Declaration of Four Nations on General Security, signed in Moscow on 30 December 1943, and that Chiang Kai-shek, together with Roosevelt and Churchill, be a party to the Cairo Declaration, issued on 1 December 1943.12 The American eagerness to compensate naturally did not allow Madame Chiang Kai-shek's visit to the United States,\n\nPage 30\nPage 31", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1979.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/2801w5938", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 208577, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1979", "page_number": 34, "title": "RAS-1979", "content_text": "THE U.S. AND THE QUESTION OF HONG KONG 1941-45\n\n7\n\ncould not refuse point blank either because, significantly, no American support could be expected in taking this stand, and the Chinese were likely to refuse to sign the treaty under the circumstances. The only alternative left was to endeavour to obtain postponement of the question by using the formula laid down by, surprisingly, the Colonial Office for the future status of Hong Kong earlier in August: \"should the post-war reconstruction of the Far East to be undertaken jointly by all the United Nations require special contributions from Hong Kong, the British government would not 'regard the maintenance of British sovereignty over the Colony [here applied only to the New Territories] as a matter beyond the scope of... discussion.\" Such, plus the argument that the New Territories were leased territories and therefore unrelated to the question of extraterritoriality, was the British reply to the Chinese at the beginning of December,28\n\nBy mid-December, all outstanding obstacles in the American-Chinese negotiations had been removed, but the problem over the New Territories persisted in the Anglo-Chinese talks. The Chinese would not accept a settlement which did not include the cancellation of the Kowloon lease. The United States indicated that she would sign her treaty with China on New Year's Day 1943. Obsessed with the desire to sign the Anglo-Chinese treaty simultaneously, Britain informed the Chinese government through her ambassador at Chungking that \"the future of the New Territories was outside the scope of the extraterritoriality treaty, but if the Chinese government desired [my italics] that 'terms of the lease of these territories should be reconsidered'\", this should be done when war was over.29 Thus the British had clearly conceded to China the initiative to raise the question in future.\n\nThe Chinese, however, remained adamant. On 28 December the Foreign Office decided to omit the words \"terms of\" before \"lease\" in her statement to China, having learned earlier of the suspicion of T.V. Soong, the Chinese foreign minister, of the words in question. But it was to be Britain's very last concession, even at the risk of sacrificing the treaty as a whole.30\n\nAt the war cabinet meeting that day Eden obtained permission to ask for the support of the United States, in deference to whose opinion Britain had conceded a number of important points in her negotiations with China, as a last attempt to save the situation.31 The State Department, however, did not comply with the Foreign", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1979.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/2801w5938", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 208578, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1979", "page_number": 35, "title": "RAS-1979", "content_text": "8\n\nCHAN KIT-CHENG\n\nOffice's wish. The Far Eastern division in the department believed that \"the sympathy of the American public would lie almost entirely with China and would be strongly critical of this Government,”32 The American government was fortunately spared the embarrassment of having to reject the British request in that the Chinese, for some still unknown reasons, agreed on 31 December not to raise the question of the New Territories in connexion with the extraterritoriality treaty.33 Under the changed circumstance, Lord Halifax, British ambassador to Washington, was given to understand that the American government would have been prepared to indicate its displeasure had China been obstinate over the inclusion of the New Territories in the treaty.34 The interesting question remains as to what attitude the United States would have adopted had China requested her support.\n\nMeanwhile, the Institute of Pacific Relations was actively preparing for a conference to be held at Mont Tremblent in the United States at the beginning of December. The conference attracted the serious attention of all those countries concerned with Pacific affairs because of the increasingly wide publicity enjoyed by the Institute since Pearl Harbour through its large publishing programme of books, pamphlets, and periodicals. From late spring onwards, earnest preparations for attending the conference were made by Chatham House, the British national council of the Institute of Pacific Relations, together with the Foreign Office which, despite its earlier apprehension of \"the risk of a lot of washing of dirty linen in public' ”, had now decided to make full use of the conference as a platform from which Britain could educate the American opinion about the British empire. From the beginning the Foreign Office was alive to the danger that the question of Hong Kong would arouse great attention at the conference. However, it was decided that the British delegation would not be briefed on Hong Kong because it was feared that the idea of returning Hong Kong on terms after the war, a point the British government had conceded after much painful inter-departmental consultation and deliberation, would be badly received by the Americans and Chinese who would denounce anything short of an outright retrocession,35\n\nThe Chinese delegation was equally well prepared. Pressure coming from the Chinese delegates, who explicitly expressed their desire for Hong Kong, was so intense that Sir John Pratt, the British delegate charged with the duty to speak on China, Japan, and", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1979.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/2801w5938", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 208581, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1979", "page_number": 38, "title": "RAS-1979", "content_text": "THE U.S. AND THE QUESTION OF HONG KONG 1941-45\n\n11\n\nBritain of Hong Kong, and the development by Great Britain of a great port which he felt had benefited the whole world. He said that it was British territory and he saw no good reason why it should cease to be such. He went on to say that perhaps some arrangement could be made with the Chinese whereby the question of sovereignty could be adjusted but the political control and administrative responsibility remain with Great Britain. He referred to public utterances of his own to the effect that he was not Prime Minister for the purpose of being a party to a liquidation of the British Empire. He said that he had convictions on that subject and that he was perfectly willing to say so frankly to anybody.\"45\n\nIt might well have been his own weak performance in London, among other things, which prompted Hornbeck early in January 1944 to urge the Secretary of State not to repeat Woodrow Wilson's mistake in being too much of a \"gentleman\". The American government must obtain from Britain agreement and cooperation in any reasonable course of action upon which the United States might choose to insist, especially in relation to colonial matters, before the defeat of Germany when Britain still depended on the Americans for their preservation.46\n\nThe Secretary's reaction to the advice is not known. But it appears from his memoirs that he was not in favour of coercion in dealing with the Anglo-American differences, and specifically with the question of Hong Kong.47 In any case, the Department of State had become less and less consulted by the President with regard to general war and foreign policies. The War and Navy Departments and the Treasury were far more important in the President's mind. On the personal level, moreover, Hull was certainly not one of Roosevelt's trusted few. Hull himself was conscious and sensitive of the truth: that FDR was his own Secretary of State.\"48 In fact, many of Roosevelt's utterances at the major Allied conferences, beginning with the Cairo Conference late in 1943, were made without prior reference to and consultation with the Department of State. Hull resigned late in 1944, frustrated and in poor health.\n\nDespite Roosevelt's well-known anti-imperialist and anti-colonial stand and his interest in Hong Kong, his behaviour regarding the future of the British colony was generally characterized by weakness and the lack of persistent and direct pressure on Britain. At the", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1979.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/2801w5938", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 208584, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1979", "page_number": 41, "title": "RAS-1979", "content_text": "14\n\nJULIAN F. PAS\n\nrecommendations for ultimate implementation.\" Appearing on the master list was the subject \"Treatment by United States Occupation Forces of Special Areas: Hong Kong.\"59\n\nThe Department of State was first invited to submit a paper, bearing on the political aspects of the question, to the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee. After considerable deliberation the department concluded that in view of the political differences between China and Great Britain regarding the future status of Hong Kong, United States forces should not participate in operations for the reconquest or occupation of Hong Kong unless absolutely necessary from a military point of view, and that the United States should make no plans to participate in military government in Hong Kong which, according to the previous agreement of the Combined Civil Affairs Committee, was to be instituted by Britain.60\n\nOn receiving the department's recommendation, and after consulting the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the State-War-Navy Coordinating Subcommittee for the Far East submitted a draft report in mid-June. Apart from reiterating the Department of State principle of non-involvement, the report further pointed out that while the Joint Chiefs of Staff had agreed to substantial United States participation in the Canton-Hong Kong operation, it was a Chinese operation under Chiang Kai-shek and not an operation conducted by United States forces under the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Joint Chiefs of Staff therefore should not regard themselves as obligated, in so far as the Canton-Hong Kong operation was concerned, to the civil affairs agreement with the British. Moreover, China was not a signatory to this agreement, and it did not cover the situation in the case of a Japanese withdrawal from Hong Kong. The subcommittee accordingly recommended that the United States Chiefs of Staff inform the British Chiefs of Staff that United States support of the operation was being furnished to attain strictly military ends, and that arrangements with regard to the civil affairs administration of Hong Kong should be worked out between Britain and China.61 This document, with some minor alterations, was accepted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee by the end of July. The suggestion that Chiang Kai-shek should be consulted with regard to civil affairs in Hong Kong was naturally unpalatable to Britain.62\n\nThe news that Japan would accept defeat in the near future changed the entire picture. Britain now decided to secure the", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1979.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/2801w5938", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 208587, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1979", "page_number": 44, "title": "RAS-1979", "content_text": "THE U.S. AND THE QUESTION OF HONG KONG 1941-45\n\n17\n\n◄ Hornbeck to Cordell Hull, secretary of state, 20 May 1942, Hornbeck Papers (Hoover Institute, Stanford University), box 465.\n\n* Generally see Thorne, op. cit., p. 163, and note 51 on pp. 168-9, referring to Leahy's diary and the King Papers. Also Hornbeck's memorandum, 3 October 1942, Hornbeck Papers, box 180.\n\n• Ballantine's diary in Ballantine Papers (Hoover Institute, Stanford University), box 1. Also see Tung Hsien-kuang, Chiang Tsung-t'ung ch’uan (Biography of Chiang Kai-shek; Taipei, 1954), II, pp. 343-4; and B. W. Tuchman, Stilwell and the American Experience in China, 1911-45 (New York, 1971), p. 352.\n\n'Hornbeck's memorandum, 20 May 1942, op. cit.\n\n8 The two sets of statistics are available in Hornbeck Papers, box 466 and box 467 respectively.\n\n\"Thorne, op. cit., pp. 175-6.\n\n1o Announcement of the loan was made on 1 February, but the agreement was not signed until 21 March. For details of the loan and its use during subsequent years, see Department of State, United States Relations with China (hereafter US and China; Washington, 1949), pp. 470-71.\n\n11 Hornbeck's autobiography, Hornbeck Papers, box 497.\n\n12 For more details, see US and China, p. 37,\n\n1a Madame Chiang, however, was intensely disliked by Roosevelt's household staff at Hyde Park who found her \"arrogant and overbearing\", W. D. Hassett, then aide to President Roosevelt, Off the Record with F.D.R. (Rutgers University Press, 1958), pp. 181-2, 288.\n\n14 For text of the relevant treaty between the United States and China, see US and China, pp. 514-7.\n\n15 For more details, see ibid., p. 37.\n\n1 Chinese leaders freely expressed their anti-British sentiments to the Americans; see, for example, H. Morgenthan, Morgenthau Diary (China; Washington, 1965), II, pp. 862-895.\n\n17 Minute of Sir John Brenan, a veteran official in the Far Eastern Department of the British Foreign Office, on Anglo-Chinese relations since the outbreak of the Pacific War, 3 November 1942, Foreign Office (hereafter FO) 371/31627.\n\n18 For elaboration on this point, see author's article, \"The Abrogation of British Extraterritoriality in China 1942-43: A Study of Anglo-American Chinese Relations\", Modern Asian Studies, 11, 2 (1977), pp. 262-3.\n\n19 Thorne, op. cit., p. 195.\n\n20 Details of the British discussion leading to the invitation are available in FO 371/31627. The British government was understandably embarrassed by the Chinese response. Ashley Clarke, an official in the Far Eastern Department, confided this point to Stanley Hornbeck, his opposite number in the Department of State. See Hornbeck's attempt to explain for Madame Chiang, Hornbeck to Clarke, strictly confidential, 27 February 1943, Hornbeck Papers, box 467.\n\n21 Thorne, op. cit., p. 161.\n\n22 \"The Hong Kong Question during the Pacific War (1941-45)\", p. 58.", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1979.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/2801w5938", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 208588, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1979", "page_number": 45, "title": "RAS-1979", "content_text": "18\n\nCHAN KIT-CHENG\n\n23 W. Range, Franklin D. Roosevelt's World Order (University of Georgia Press; 1959), p. 105.\n\n24 This is according to the observation of Ashley Clarke, head of the Far Eastern Department in the British Foreign Office, during his one month visit to the Department of State early in the summer of 1942; see his report on his visit to A. Eden, secretary of state for foreign affairs, 11 June 1942, FO371/31804. See also Ministry of Information to Colonial Office, 22 October 1942, communicated to the Foreign Office, FO371/31774.\n\n25 \"The Abrogation of British Extraterritoriality in China 1942-43: A Study of Anglo-American-Chinese Relations\", pp. 266-272.\n\n26 Brenan's minute, 3 December, on J. G. Winant, American ambassador to London, to Eden, 2 December 1942, FO371/31664.\n\n27 Eden to Winant, 7 December 1942, in Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States (hereafter FRUS), China, 1942 (Washington, 1956), p. 390.\n\n28 \"The Abrogation of British Extraterritoriality in China 1942-43: A Study of Anglo-American-Chinese Relations\", op. cit., pp. 284-5.\n\n29 Ibid., pp. 287-8.\n\n30 Ibid., pp. 288-9.\n\n31 War cabinet conclusions 173 (42), 28 December 1942, Cab65/28. Also Eden to Winant, 29 December; and Eden to Lord Halifax, British ambassador to Washington, tel. 8264, immediate, 29 December 1942, FO371/31665.\n\n32 Thorne, op. cit., p. 179, and note 53, p. 198, referring to G. Atcheson to Hornbeck, 29 December 1942, Department of State, Decimal and Other Files, National Archives (Washington D.C.) 793.003/12-2942.\n\n33 W. L. Tung in his book V. K. Wellington Koo and China's Wartime Diplomacy (New York, 1977), based on the Wellington Koo Papers deposited with Columbia University, gives a possible explanation: \"Koo was then Chinese Ambassador to Great Britain and returned to Chungking for consultations. As an experienced diplomat well familiar with the attitude of British official and unofficial circles, he counselled the government to conclude the treaty on the relinquishment of extraterritoriality but reserve the right of later negotiations on the Kowloon question”, p. 53.\n\n34 Halifax to Eden, tel. 6310, immediate, 31 December 1942, FO371/35679.\n\n35 \"The Hong Kong Question during the Pacific War (1941-45)\", pp. 58-68.\n\n34 Ibid., p. 68.\n\n*7 See memorandum in Hornbeck Papers, box 466.\n\n** Cordell Hull, secretary of state, to United States chargé d'affaires in London, tel., 4 April 1943, in FRUS, The British Commonwealth, Eastern Europe, The Far East, 1943 (Washington, 1963), III, pp. 46-7. Also see R. E. Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins (New York, 1948), p. 707.\n\n30 For American interest in India, especially early in the war, see for example, M. S. Venkatramani and B. K. Shrivastava, \"The United States and the Cripps Mission\", India Quarterly, XIX, no. 3 (July-September, 1963), pp. 214-65. See also author's article, \"Britain's Reaction to Chiang\n\nPage 45\n\nPage 46", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1979.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/2801w5938", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 208589, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1979", "page_number": 46, "title": "RAS-1979", "content_text": "THE U.S. AND THE QUESTION OF HONG KONG 1941-45\n\n19\n\nK'ai-shek's Visit to India, February 1942\", The Australian Journal of History and Political Science, XXI, no. 2 (1975), pp. 52-61, in which the American attitude is discussed.\n\n40 Memorandum by Hopkins, 15 March 1943, in FRUS, the British Commonwealth, Eastern Europe, the Far East, 1943, III, p. 17.\n\n41 Sherwood, op. cit., p. 719, and H. C. Allen, Great Britain and the United States (London, 1954), p. 828.\n\n42 For a summary of the allied military situation at the end of 1943, see J. M. Burns, Roosevelt: the Lion and the Fox (New York, 1956), p. 464. **Hornbeck to Ashley Clarke, 16 December 1943(?), in Hornbeck Papers, box 469.\n\n44 Hornbeck's autobiography, op. cit.\n\n46 Hornbeck's memorandum, 15 November, on his conversation with Churchill, Hornbeck Papers, box 468.\n\n10\n\n16 Hornbeck to Hull, 3 January 1944; also see Hornbeck's memorandum, 3 December 1943, Hornbeck Papers, box 181.\n\n47 C. Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull (New York, 1948), II, p. 1599, 4 Hornbeck's autobiography, op. cit., and J. Bishop, FDR's Last Year (New York, 1974), p. 40.\n\n**E. Roosevelt, As He Saw It (New York, 1946), pp. 163-4, 203-4, 249-50; J. T. Flynn, The Roosevelt Myth (New York, 1948), p. 349; Hull, op. cit., II, p. 1596; and T. H. White (ed.), The Stilwell Papers (New York, 1976), p. 252. Stilwell was summoned to the conference to discuss China.\n\n50 See SWNCC III, secret, 17 April 1945, in ABC 014 Japan (13 April 44) see 32, National Archives.\n\n01 See minutes of the meeting in FRUS, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945 (Washington, 1955), p. 769. Also F. L. Loewenheim (ed.), Roosevelt and Churchill: Their Secret Wartime Correspondence (New York, 1975), p. 656.\n\n52 FRUS, ibid., pp. 664-5, 676.\n\n53\n\n58 Thorne, op. cit., p. 549.\n\n54 Tung, op. cit., p. 61.\n\n55 Bishop, op. cit., p. 95.\n\n56 Division of Public Liaison and Office of Public Information, Department of State, \"Fortnightly Survey of American Opinion on International Affairs\", Survey no. 13, confidential, 18 October, Survey no. 14, confidential, 6 November, and Survey no. 15, confidential, 20 November 1944.\n\n57 Examples of these booklets are: \"The British Commonwealth and Empire\" (May 1944), and \"Britain and Japan\" (June 1944).\n\n**See paragraph six of the Chapter of the Combined Civil Affairs Committee at Washington, FO371/46251.\n\n**SWNCC 111, 17 April 1945, op. cit.\n\nSWNCC 111, 17 April 1945, ibid.\n\n61 SWNCC 111/2, top secret, 14 June 1945, in ABC 014 Japan (13 April 44) see 32.", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1979.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/2801w5938", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 210564, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1985", "page_number": 171, "title": "RAS-1985", "content_text": "152\n\nFOUND IN A PENNSYLVANIA ATTIC –\n\nLetters from China 1903-1906*\n\nWEI PEH T'I\n\nWhile cleaning out his mother's attic in Bala Cynwyd, Harry V. Ryder Jr.' found a bunch of letters that had been sent from Taiho. Bala Cynwyd is an affluent suburb of Philadelphia in Pennsylvania; Taiho a river town in the northwestern corner of the interior province of Anhui in China.\n\n2\n\nThe letters were dated between January 1903 and April 1906. They were written to Harry's maternal grandmother, Louese Hedges Strawbridge, by Edith Rowe, who was a classmate at a \"finishing school” in Philadelphia. Both Louese and Edith were Baptists. Edith's letters reflected the high standard of private school education in eastern United States at that time. Her command of written English was more than respectable. Scenes and events were vividly described; ideas eloquently expressed; and grammar and spelling impeccable. Except for one or two words, her handwriting can be read without any difficulty. Two of the letters contain charming line-drawings, an old-fashioned practice still favoured by young students in American schools today.\n\nLouese Strawbridge was the only child of Samuel and Ann Hedges, who had come originally from Ohio. Samuel Hedges had served as a colonel in the Union Army during the American Civil War. After the war he brought his wife to Philadelphia where he became a successful horse trader.3 Bala Cynwyd is near Devon, in the heart of the Pennsylvania horse country. After graduating from the Friends School, Louese went to a “finishing school\", then was married to George Strawbridge, scion of a family that had founded and operated the prestigious department store, Strawbridge and Clothier. Louese and George had four children. Catherine was born in 1896, Helen in 1900, Janet in 1903 and Benjamin in 1907. Except for Benjamin who died in\n\n* Lecture delivered to the Society on 6 October 1986. The author is grateful to Harry and Phyllis Ryder for making available the letters and for information on Harry's grandmother and her family.", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1985.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/gt54s866x", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 212403, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1990", "page_number": 345, "title": "RAS-1990", "content_text": "322 \n\nwas also the proximate cause of American entry into World War II. Not until 1959, however, did it become one of the United States. \n\nIn Hawaii there was an important, American-backed annexationist movement; the Philippines, by contrast, were acquired largely due to the accident of the Spanish-American War of 1898, when Commodore (later Admiral) George Dewey sailed south from Hong Kong and defeated the Spanish fleet at the Battle of Manila Bay. American troops initially cooperated with the Filipino insurgents who had for some time rebelled against Spanish rule; within a few months, however, Congress, after fierce debate, decided to keep the islands, the beginning of the most significant formal colonial episode in United States history. American involvement in the Philippines would illustrate both the strengths and weaknesses of the American approach to international affairs. The Filipino insurrection, led by Emilio Aguinaldo, was brutally suppressed by Arthur MacArthur (father of Douglas), yet American rule was in many respects benign; indeed, the supposed American overlords were frequently manipulated by members of the Filipino elite for their own political ends. Even so, American possession of the Philippines fostered an unhealthy sense of dependency among Filipinos, still not entirely dissipated today, while overextending the United States strategically. As Theodore Roosevelt had foreseen more than thirty years earlier, in World War II the islands would prove indefensible, a military hostage and the United States' \"Achilles' heel\". \n\nAlthough Dudden fails to cite recent works by Ralph Eldin Minger on William Howard Taft's and Jack C. Lane on Leonard Wood's gubernatorial efforts in the Philippines, the early sections of the book are thorough and well-researched. Regrettably, the standards slip in his chapters on American relations with China and Japan in the decades before Pearl Harbour. Here, indeed, his determination to deal with each country in turn is a defect, since by World War I, if not before, United States policies towards China, Japan, and the Philippines were closely inter-related. The resulting repetition leads to a somewhat confused narrative. Dudden's grasp of the financial dealings between the United States government and private American bankers and China and Japan is shaky; the American Group of the Second China Consortium had not collapsed by the end of World War I, but was about to be established. His understanding of the complexities of interwar American State Department and governmental \n\nPage 345\nPage 346", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1990.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/d79206299", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 212547, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1991", "page_number": 101, "title": "RAS-1991", "content_text": "81\n\nrelations with China were employed for the first time by Richard Nixon. Among a number of measures, he lifted restrictions against Americans wanting to travel to China as a gesture for and, therefore, a step to reconciliation. Nixon approved the visit of the American table tennis team to China. At the White House, the president chatted with members of a table tennis team which was the first Chinese sports delegation that ever toured the United States since the founding of the People's Republic. On 13 January, 1973, he interviewed the Shenyang Acrobatic Troupe. Such meetings were conducted as part of the administration's policy of strengthening the U.S.-China general relationship. Even at a time when the administration could only place cultural exchanges low on its priority list, they still enjoyed the attention and support of the president.\n\nAt this stage, Sino-American ties in culture were far from sufficient. This does not mean that either party failed to see the importance of such exchanges. Thus, the Nixon Administration repeatedly expressed its recognition of the importance of cultural relations in the Shanghai Communique and the communique on 22 February, 1973 which actually announced a programme to expand cultural relations. The president's meetings with visiting Chinese artists were also expressions of this concern. However, in the two years after Nixon's visit, the administration could not find the time to handle matters other than strategic concerns. Furthermore, the president was bogged down in the domestic political difficulties which eventually led to his resignation. The Ford Administration, afraid of irritating the Soviet Union and the right wing at home, could only maintain the status quo and even sacrificed arts exchanges with China. By doing so it accelerated a general deterioration in Sino-American relations.\n\nThe Carter Administration made no improvement in either the general relationship or cultural relations with China in its first eighteen months in office. When a new China policy began to take shape in the middle of 1977, the general relationship improved. In May, the State Department prepared a memo for the president which pointed out that unless diplomatic relations were established, the existing cultural and economic relations would possibly stagnate or even be weakened. It also pointed out that Sino-Soviet relations would get closer if the United States failed to have a formal relationship with China. But what played a decisive role in the American efforts to establish diplomatic relations was the soaring influence of the Soviet Union in international affairs, a situation Nixon faced before the Sino-American rapprochement. Clearly", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1991.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/k356gt84j", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 213214, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1994", "page_number": 36, "title": "RAS-1994", "content_text": "Colonel Mosby had been sent to Hong Kong by the United States State Department to investigate and eradicate reputed abuses that had arisen in the affairs of the Consulate. His report to Washington was published as a pamphlet. The report claimed that Mr Smith had been instrumental in the perpetration of great frauds on the United States Government. The court found Consul Mosby guilty of slander. Before sentence, Mosby spoke in his own defence. \"It has been proved that when I came here Peter Smith was what was known as 'the shipping master' at the American Consulate. He had a desk and a clerk, and he had a monopoly of the shipping business. He was a powerful man at that time, so far as American shipmasters and sailors were concerned” (CM 10, 11 Jan. 1881). Upon losing the lucrative business of shipping master for the American Consulate, Peter Smith applied for a spirit licence for a house on Queen's Road West which he wished to name the City of Hamburg. The Superintendent of Police questioned whether a boarding house keeper should also operate a tavern. However, the licence was granted, but only for a year and with the caution that if there were any complaints regarding its conduct, the spirit licence would not be renewed (CM 4 Jan. 1881). Smith did not live long to enjoy his accumulated wealth. He died in December 1882, aged forty-seven.\n\nOther taverns which would have attracted the German sailor on shore were the City of Hamburg 1861 to 1976, Bremen Tavern 1866, City of Bremen 1866 to 1867 - when the name was changed to Scandinavian Tavern, the Prussian Eagle 1870, and the Hamburg Tavern 1861 to 1878. Several of the proprietors of these establishments followed a pattern set by Peter Smith in marrying women from Macao families. William Gardner, who was born at Strassburgh in 1834, married, in 1863, Cecilia Libina de Jesus Correa. Her sister Melena Rita Correa married William von den Busche in 1864. Both Gardner and von den Busche were associated with the Hamburg Tavern. John Juster took over the Hamburg Tavern from William Gardner in 1871. He had been born in Hanover in 1834 and married in Hong Kong, in 1875, Maria Antonia Botelho, a native of Macao. Louis Kuchmann held the licence for the Land We Live In for twenty years. In 1886 the licence was transferred to Tevel Silbermann, probably a German Jew. Kuchmann had one daughter, possibly by a Chinese wife. She married in 1885 Carl Holm, captain of a German schooner.", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1994.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/zk522640g", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 215829, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-2002", "page_number": 128, "title": "RAS-2002", "content_text": "61\n\n28\n\nChic Publishers, 1996), p.12-14. (3) Heywood, p.17:\n\nTyphoon winds that approach Hong Kong from the southeast blow on Victoria Harbour from the north, so Kowloon's mountains can serve as a partial barrier. See Donald Alan Mantner & Samson Brand, An Evaluation of Hong Kong Harbour as a Typhoon Haven (Monterey, CA: Environmental Prediction Research Facility, Naval Postgraduate School, 1973), p.53.\n\n29 Navy Department, \"Advanced Base: Hong Kong,\" p.14-15. However, Tolo Harbour could do little more than serve as a secondary anchorage because shore facilities in Tai Po were limited.\n\n30\n\n31\n\n32\n\n(1) Heywood, p.7-8. (2) Adamson & Kosco, p.12. Although described by many sources as a \"tidal wave,\" the wave would be more appropriately described as a storm surge because it is not caused by the moon.\n\nHKRO, A Statistical Survey of Typhoons and Tropical Depressions in the Western Pacific and China Sea Area From 1884 to 1947 (Hong Kong: Government Printers, 1951), p.3 (hereafter referred to as HKRO, Statistical Survey). See also P.C. Chin's Tropical Cyclone Climatology for the China Seas and Western Pacific From 1884 to 1970, Vol. I: Basic Data (Hong Kong: Government Printers, 1972) for maps of typhoon tracks for each year.\n\n33\n\nThe evasion option became more popular after the war, probably because of better typhoon location and tracking methods. See Mantner & Brand, p.78-79, 88. The authors cited British and American dissatisfaction with Hong Kong as a \"safe haven\" for ships during a typhoon.\n\n34 HKRO, Statistical Survey, p.9.\n\n35\n\nRomanus & Sunderland, Stilwell's Mission to China, 1953 of U.S. Army in World War II: the China-Burma-India Theater (rpt. Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1984), p.12-13.\n\nCPS 83, \"Appreciation and Plan for the Defeat of Japan,” 8 Aug 43, Map F; CCS 381 Japan (8-25-42), sec.6; Geographic File, 1942-45; Records of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, RG 218; NA, Washington, DC. The map shows that Hong Kong lay within the minimum area required for the air bombardment of Japan.\n\n* United States Army Air Force, B-29 Erection and Maintenance Manual (Dayton,", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-2002.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/mp4901278", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 215879, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-2002", "page_number": 178, "title": "RAS-2002", "content_text": "111\n\n(a) a satellite pentagonal pillbox (shown in a government 1:600 survey plan of 1963 but not in any 1:1000 plan); and\n\n(b) the inscription “REN 30th Coy 1914\", first reported by Dr. Solomon Bard.\n\nFrom old aerial photos and survey plan, an earth mound that looks like a double circular earth gun revetment for a heavy 75mm or 105mm AA gun (United States War Department 1944: pp. 110-116) could be found along the watershed to the northwest of the redoubt. It was to the southeast of the ruins of a bunker, which has been incorporated into the Chinese Permanent Cemetery. This revetment-like earth structure was destroyed when the Cemetery was built. The revetment was huge and was almost as large as the 9.2 gun emplacement in Gough Battery. The slopes below the redoubt have several tunnels, probably also of Japanese occupation origin. One is found above the steps of the Lord Wilson Trail leading to the Chinese Cemetery and another near the ruins of a bunker below the northern rock face of Devil's Peak. We leave the nature of the circular earth mound and the tunnels to experts on military engineering.\n\nThe 196m site\n\nFurther down the ridge, at 196m above the mean Principal Datum (mPD), lies the '196m site.' The site is connected with the redoubt by a firing trench built of stones, which is full of dense undergrowth.\n\nThis levelled site is small in size with the ruins of a concrete structure (approximately 40 square metres on plan) that is believed to be an observation post or machine gun emplacement that covers both the redoubt and Gough Battery. Only lower parts of some of the wall structures have remained on site. But apparently, there is no immediate danger to visitors. An area bigger than the 196m site itself uphill has been formed and developed into a plant nursery, probably by morning hikers. Such unauthorised site formation and planting work has not only created visual blight, but has also accelerated the soil erosion process by removing the top soil and the natural vegetation (Figure 6).", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-2002.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/mp4901278", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 215881, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-2002", "page_number": 180, "title": "RAS-2002", "content_text": "113\n\nto be shown in government survey plans, were surveyed and shown in Figure 4:\n\n(a) a circular pill box (a British \"tett turret\" or a 1.3mm light Japanese AA gun position (United States War Department 1944: pp. 110-116) in the proper of the battery site [and there is another similar structure to the east of Lord Wilson Trail, to the north of (d) below];\n\n(b) two iron rings fixed to the ground of the battery site;\n\n(c) a pennant holder behind a rock of the battery site;\n\n(d) a pillbox built of stones on a rock to the east of Lord Wilson Trail, which is annotated as a rock outcrop in a 1964 1:600 government survey plan (Figure 7). The ruins of a two-storey communication centre can still be found to the southeast of Gough Battery; and\n\n(e) a number of foxholes dug into the slopes below the pillbox (and above the ruins of the communication centre referred to in (d) above) were exposed after a hill fire in autumn 2002. Like the tunnels found elsewhere in the area, it is possible that these foxholes were also constructed during the Japanese occupation. (Figure 8).\n\nRemarks\n\nThe key structures on Devil's Peak have a history of one century or nearly so, and are, by urban Hong Kong standards, extremely old. Wild vegetation has colonised large tracts of the sites since their abandonment by the military. The humid climate of Hong Kong has added to the weathering and erosion process that compromises the integrity of the ruins. Systematic removal of the roofs of disused military structures for internal security and squatter control purposes as well as scavenging have also contributed to the demise of the sites.\n\nHowever, it is careless and deliberate human action facilitated by the good system of footpaths left behind intact and upgraded from time to time that has ruined the sites the most. Littering, the careless filming gang fighting movies, and mosquitoes that breed in water containers used by unauthorised gardeners may be regarded as mere nuisances.\n\nof\n\nPage 180\n\nPage 181", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-2002.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/mp4901278", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 215884, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-2002", "page_number": 183, "title": "RAS-2002", "content_text": "116\n\nKong, the Gunners' Roll of Hong Kong.\n\nSiu, Kwok Kin 1997 Forts and Batteries: Coastal Defence in Guangdong and Qing Dynasties. Hong Kong, Urban Council.\n\nUnited States War Department 1944 Handbook on Japanese Military Forces. Baton Rouge, Louisiana State University Press.\n\nGovernment reports and letters\n\nEnvironmental Resources Management (1999). Technical Report 3 (dated 16 August 1999) in Study on Village Improvement and Upgrading of Lei Yue Mun Area, Agreement No. CE108/98. Hong Kong.\n\nEnvironmental Resources Management (2002). Study on Village Improvement and Upgrading of Lei Yue Mun Area: Agreement No. CE108/98. February 2002. Hong Kong.\n\nKwun Tong District Board (1999). Environmental and Health Improvement Committee Paper No. 29/99. Hong Kong, Hong Kong District Office. (Chinese documents)\n\nKwun Tong District Office (2002). Letter from Kwun Tong District Office ref.: KTDO C4/28/7 dated 13 June 2002. Hong Kong. (Chinese documents)\n\nMaunsell Consultants Asia Ltd (in association with Environment Resources Management Hong Kong Ltd; Hassell Ltd and MVA Asia Ltd., 1999). Feasibility Study on the Alternative Alignment for the Western Coast Road, Tseung Kwan O Final Report- Executive Summary November 1999 Agreement No. CE46/96. Hong Kong.\n\nMeinhardt (C&S) Ltd (in association with Montgomery Watson (HK) Ltd; Jacobs Associations, USA and Environmental Management Ltd., 2000a). Preliminary Feasibility Study on Tunnel Alignment Option of Tseung Kwan O: Western Coast Road Final Report Volume 1- Main Report December 2000 Agreement No. NTE1/2000. Hong Kong.\n\nMeinhardt (C&S) Ltd (in association with Montgomery Watson", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-2002.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/mp4901278", "rank": 0 } ]