[ { "id": 204500, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1962", "page_number": 132, "title": "RAS-1962", "content_text": "BRITAIN AND CHINA\n\n117\n\nnot altogether the fault of the author, who has written the book as part of a series on Britain in the world today—though it detracts slightly from its value, does not in practice make it any the less interesting.\n\nThe question of recognition of the Communist government by Britain is very ably dealt with; the whole trend of opinion at the time, both in Britain and in the rest of the world is summed up. In 1949 Britain's commerce with China still far exceeded that of any other western country, and since the division into blocs was less rigid then than now, (though Britain consulted both the U.S. and the major Commonwealth countries) recognition was still a matter for each country to decide for itself. Happily the British government waited only three months to take this step; had it delayed another six, it would never have been taken, for the Korean war broke out. At the time international comment, even from the United States, was fairly favourable. It was realised that Britain had followed her usual pragmatic policy of recognition where a government was clearly in control as opposed to the U.S. ideological path of recognising only where it approved. Commercial groups and other British residents in China were influential in bringing this about; strangely enough, looking back over the last thirteen years, this was because the Communists appeared more honest and efficient than the KMT, and it was hoped that after recognition British interests would be able to expand.\n\nMr. Luard shows how quickly this hope became vain. For with the Korean war the new China entered on to the world stage with a vengeance, and came face to face with the United States.\n\nIn this conflict the British government always seems to have been slightly more aware of possible Chinese sentiments than the U.S., and to have hesitated rather more than the U.S. at the 38th parallel; and when President Truman began to talk of extending the war to Manchuria and of using the atom bomb, Mr. Attlee at once flew to Washington to make certain that U.N. forces were not to be committed to any extension of the fray without consultation with the other powers involved. Mr. Luard relates this episode in a particularly effective deadpan style which contrasts vividly with the drama of the events.\n\nThis British intervention epitomises the new role that Britain has since played in the world; she has been a mediator between", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1962.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/9s166f47f", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 204501, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1962", "page_number": 133, "title": "RAS-1962", "content_text": "118\n\nCOLINA LUPTON\n\nChina and the U.S. The Korean war of course accounts for much which has gone awry since; the Chinese cannot forget that the Americans (as they always regarded the U.N. army) showed no hesitation in overstepping the 38th parallel and advancing towards the Chinese frontier; they also remember Truman's action taken at the outbreak of war assigning the U.S. seventh fleet to the \"neutralisation\" of Formosa, thus cheating them, so they felt, of their rightful prey: as Mr. Luard says, in the summer of 1950 the Communists were almost certainly poised to invade and exterminate the Chiang Kai-shek regime once and for all. As bad was the fact that American interference brought the question of Formosa from the purely internal to the international level. The fear and resentment engendered in Chinese hearts exists to this day to colour their suspicions of all American actions, and is fostered by the evident American determination to keep them out of the U.N. The great merit of Mr. Luard's account of these events, which is relatively sympathetic to the Chinese point of view, is that it makes clear that Chinese fulminations against, for instance, the landing of U.S. marines in Thailand are inspired by a genuine fear of American imperialism. If the U.S. would comprehend how her actions are misconstrued in Peking she might be more willing to have China increase her contacts with the West in the hope of dispelling Chinese ignorance.\n\nBritain's position in the dispute over the China seat is a paradoxical one. There is not much doubt that, left to its own devices, the British government would choose to have Peking rather than Taipei in the U.N., partly because Peking is the government which is more representative of the Chinese people as a whole, and partly because it believes that China's isolation from the rest of the world can only be dangerous. Mr. Luard draws an interesting parallel between the present situation and that which prevailed before any westerners came to China at all: then and now, the country was and is culturally self-sufficient, inward-looking, arrogant, ignorant of foreigners and their ways and full of misapprehensions about the outside world. Since today such misapprehensions can have world-wide and dangerous consequences, Britain would like to see China mixing with other nations at least to the extent of rubbing shoulders with their representatives in the corridors of the U.N. building.", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1962.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/9s166f47f", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 207515, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1975", "page_number": 283, "title": "RAS-1975", "content_text": "CAPTIVE SURGEON IN HONG KONG\n\n275\n\nA direct assault on the Japanese homeland using conventional weapons was being prepared at the time the bombs were dropped. In spite of their reduced nutrition and lack of supplies of all kinds, there seems little doubt that an Allied invasion of Japan would have been bitterly resisted and would have proved very costly. The cost of the invasion of the sacred territory will now never be known. It seems quite possible that in the prevailing mood at that time, reprisals of all kinds might have been ordered to be taken upon any Allied personnel in Japanese hands. The execution of the airmen captured in the Doolittle air raid on Japan in 1942 comes to mind.\n\nI do not intend to examine the morality or the political implications of the use of the atomic bomb at all, nor the fact that two were dropped. Opinions on these matters will always differ. I confine myself here to what I see as the facts as they affected us. A Japanese-Chinese war in the neighbourhood of Hong Kong would have been prolonged; situations would certainly have arisen in which our safety would have been jeopardised, and at best, many of us might not have survived at all. The decision by President Truman to use the atomic bombs resulted in our release almost overnight. Seen in contrast with the other possibilities which might have been envisaged, this was a wonderful outcome.\n\nA VIEW IN PERSPECTIVE\n\nThirty years after the events and after making allowances for the discreet phrasing of my diaries and for the effects of the passage of time in scaling down the few peaks of elation and levelling up the much more numerous troughs of depression, I conclude that we, the staff and patients in the British Military Hospital, Hong Kong, fared better than many other prisoners in Japanese hands. The published accounts of others, most of them written nearer to the events than my present story and so perhaps more influenced by passion, are far too numerous and ring true. I am allowing myself now to speculate on the somewhat privileged position we enjoyed, privileged that is by the standards of those who were Japanese prisoners.\n\nFirstly, our unit fell into Japanese hands as a fully equipped and staffed hospital with a full complement of patients seriously wounded in action, and hence, perhaps, in the eyes of our captors, more worthy of consideration than men who had surrendered, even though", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1975.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/j0995146d", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 208547, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1979", "page_number": 4, "title": "RAS-1979", "content_text": "THE U.S. AND THE QUESTION OF HONG KONG 1941-45\n\n15\n\nurgent consent of the United States Chiefs of Staff to detach a British naval force from the British Pacific Fleet to accept Japan's surrender and assume full powers of military administration in the colony.63 The Japanese accepted defeat on 14 August. However, the British Pacific Fleet assigned for service at Hong Kong, under the command of Rear-Admiral Sir Cecil Harcourt, did not arrive until 30 August. During this interval of a fortnight, the question of Hong Kong sorely tried the British government and placed the United States government in an uncomfortable position.\n\nHong Kong again became a serious point of contention between Britain and China. This time the argument was not whose sovereignty was to be set up but who was to receive Japan's surrender there. Despite the assurances given by Chiang Kai-shek on 16 August, and repeated on 24 August, that China had \"no territorial ambitions\" in Hong Kong and regarded it \"as a matter which would require eventual settlement through diplomatic channel\", the British Foreign and Colonial Offices insisted that Sir Cecil Harcourt receive Japan's surrender on behalf of Britain by virtue of her sovereignty over Hong Kong.64\n\nThe prime minister, now C.R. Attlee, appealed to the American president for assistance. Fortunately for Britain, Truman, who had assumed the presidency on Roosevelt's death in April, was in favour of a cautious policy. While being conscious of his predecessor's views regarding the future status of Hong Kong, he, however, decided to adhere to the \"recognition of the established rights\", although he told both Britain and China that such recognition \"did not in any way represent U.S. views regarding the future status of Hong Kong.\" General Douglas MacArthur was therefore instructed to arrange for the surrender of Hong Kong to the British commander.65 Again fortunately for Britain, MacArthur was known for \"his support for the cause of the British Empire in the Far East.\" In fact in October 1944 he had specifically expressed that he \"fully appreciated the need for British forces to recapture Hong Kong.\"66\n\nChiang Kai-shek, on the other hand, insisted on his right to accept Japan's surrender at Hong Kong as commander-in-chief of the China theatre. He was therefore most distressed by Truman's agreement with the British. To avoid embarrassing Truman, Chiang now suggested that the Japanese forces in Hong Kong should surrender to his representative in a ceremony in which both", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1979.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/2801w5938", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 208586, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1979", "page_number": 43, "title": "RAS-1979", "content_text": "16\n\nCHAN KIT-CHENG\n\nAmerican and British representatives would be invited to participate. After the surrender he would authorize the British to land troops for the reoccupation of Hong Kong.37 In a private letter in reply to Chiang, Truman reiterated that his decision was in no way related to the question of British sovereignty in Hong Kong.68\n\nChiang Kai-shek remained reluctant to concede the main point. However, he realized that he needed American aid in getting his forces to Hong Kong. Consequently, he communicated a further compromise to Truman on 23 August: he had notified the British that, as supreme commander of the China theatre, he agreed to delegate his authority to a British commander to accept the surrender of Japanese forces in Hong Kong.69 Although Truman regarded Chiang's concession as \"quite reasonable\" and hoped that it would settle the matter,70 it was not acceptable to Britain. While he deplored the Sino-British friction, Truman clearly did not contemplate taking further action.71 It was therefore a relief both to Britain and the United States that Chiang eventually accepted Britain's revised offer that Harcourt accept Japan's surrender on behalf of both Britain and Chiang as supreme commander of the China theatre.72\n\nHong Kong was thus reverted to British rule, much as the Americans, both in official and unofficial circles, had clamoured against during the Pacific War. Such clamouring, especially during the first half of the war, no doubt troubled the British and encouraged the Chinese. But, in the main, American wartime policy, if one can at all speak of a conscious and consistent policy, regarding the postwar status of Hong Kong had been characterized by much talk and little action. \"Hopes\", \"wishes\", \"opinions\", \"views\" were abundantly expressed to Britain, but little can be said of direct and persistent American pressure on the subject.\n\nNOTES\n\n1 Author's article, \"The Question of Hong Kong during the Pacific War, (1941-45)”, The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, II, no. 1 (October 1973), pp. 56-78.\n\n2 C. Thorne, Allies of a Kind (London, 1978), p. 156.\n\n3 Thorne, ibid., pp. 172-3, referring to opinions cited in the New York Times, the Chicago Daily News, and the Christian Science Monitor.", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1979.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/2801w5938", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 208590, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1979", "page_number": 47, "title": "RAS-1979", "content_text": "20\n\nCHAN KIT-CHENG\n\n62 \"The Hong Kong Question during the Pacific War (1941-45)”, p. 72.\n\n63 Brigadier A. J. H. Dove of the War Office to C. H. M. Weldock of the Admiralty, 12 August 1945, communicated to the Foreign Office, FO371/46251, and Admiralty to commander-in-chief, British Pacific Fleet, tel. 131957A, important, 13 August 1945, communicated to the Foreign Office, FO371/46252.\n\n64 Seymore to Ernest Bevin, foreign secretary, tel. 857, most immediate and top secret, 16 August; tel. 865, most immediate and top secret, 17 August; tel. 909, most immediate and top secret, 23 August; and Bevin to Seymore, tel. 984, 25 August 1945, FO371/46252.\n\n**Harry S. Truman, Memoirs by Harry S. Truman (New York, 1965), I, p. 492.\n\n**Thorne, op. cit., p. 649.\n\n67 General Hurley, now United States ambassador at Chungking, to secretary of state, tel. 1414, 21 August 1945, in FRUS, The Far East, China, 1945 (Washington, 1969), VII, pp. 507-8.\n\n**Truman, op. cit., pp. 493-4.\n\n*Hurley to secretary of state, tel. CFB$633, 23 August 1945, in FRUS, The Far East, China, 1945, op. cit., p. 511.\n\n70 Truman, op. cit., pp. 494-5.\n\n71 Truman, ibid., p. 496.\n\n72 G. B. Endacott, A History of Hong Kong (Oxford University Press, 1958), p. 302.", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1979.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/2801w5938", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 212534, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1991", "page_number": 88, "title": "RAS-1991", "content_text": "68\n\ncan demonstrate the relationship between arts exchanges and political, and cultural developments in domestic-bilateral terms. To meet that end, I will analyse the stimulus for arts exchanges between the People's Republic of China and the United States of America and examine the consequences of these exchanges. I maintain that arts exchanges, the product of foreign and cultural policies, are generated by political and international developments. They are affected by these developments, though there may be some time lag between major policy changes and a consequent development in the area of arts exchanges. On the other hand, the two governments, consciously and sometimes directly, were involved in this enterprise, aiming at creating a cultural imagery in order to promote what they consider their respective national interests. Nevertheless, I hold that arts exchanges are not passive. Rather, they have their own impact on affairs in domestic cultural and political life as well as in bilateral relations. In certain cases, this impact generates a new political international environment.\n\nArts exchanges in Sino-American relations are seldom mentioned by political leaders, nor are they sufficiently explored in academic writings. This is because arts exchanges hold a very low position in the two countries' foreign policy priorities. There are always more urgent and apparently bigger issues to handle. However, arts exchanges as part of cultural relations stand for a major facet of the Sino-American general relationship and they often serve as a barometer of the development, and more importantly, the nature of such a relationship. In the period between 1949 and 1972, arts exchanges were non-existent. Artists in the United States were biased against a communist China or hindered by the U.S. government from visiting China. Simultaneously, China made few efforts to send performing groups or arts exhibitions to the United States. In a like manner, there were no exchanges of movies.\n\nBefore 1972, the United States regarded China as a major antagonist. Anti-Communism and hostility to China had characterized every president's foreign policy since Truman. In American domestic politics, anti-Communism had been a constant theme, especially dominating politics in the early fifties when McCarthyism was strong. When writing later on his experience in this period, John King Fairbank reflected: \"It became second nature to indicate that one was safely anti-Communist.\" McCarthyism did not last long, but it left a shadow over the succeeding decades.\n\n114", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1991.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/k356gt84j", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 213215, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1994", "page_number": 37, "title": "RAS-1994", "content_text": "16\n\nKirchmann transferred his tavern to Silbermann. The Land We Live In passed through a succession of proprietors with German, Jewish or Polish sounding names, Gustav Neubrunn, Moritz and Adolph Freimann, Bernat Cohen, Moses Tchetchilnızkı and lastly David Freeman. The Tavern was closed in 1912. The licensees of two other establishments suggest Jewish proprietorship: The Central Hotel, 1890 to 1906, Isaac Samuel Greenstein, 1907 to 1912, Ichel Gruman; and the Globe Hotel, 1894 to 1909, Isydor Silbermann, the nephew of Tevil, Ephraim Fischel Zellermayer 1910, and Adolph Weingarten 1911 and 1912. Both the Central and the Globe were closed in 1913.\n\nMrs. Petersen and the German Hotel Trade\n\nIn 1911 Frederich Reichmann, a German national, sought an interim injunction from the court to restrain Mrs. Uschmann and her husband from operating the Station Hotel in Kowloon. Mr. Reichmann charged that Mrs. Uschmann had broken a contract they had signed in November 1909, when he purchased from her for $30,000 her interest and good will in the Oriental Hotel on Queen's Road Central. The contract contained a clause preventing her from conducting in Hong Kong the business of innkeeping, publican or restaurant. The purpose of the clause was to prevent her from attracting to a new establishment the German trade. A summary of evidence presented in court provides information on the background of both the parties in the case. Mrs Uschmann claimed in her defence that the good will of the Station Hotel was the property of her husband, Robert Albrecht Uschmann, and that she was only his assistant. She had been connected with establishments licensed to sell spirits for some twenty or twenty-five years. She became the proprietress of the Thomas' Hotel on the south side of Queen's Road between Ice House and Duddell Streets. The hotel when she took it over had become bankrupt and was closed. No good will went with the transaction. Mr. O E. Owen, then proprietor of the Grand Carlton Hotel, but a former employee of Mrs. Uschmann in 1904 when she and her former husband, Mr. R.A. Matthaey, were operating the Occidental Hotel in Kowloon, stated to the court that it was his opinion \"that the Station Hotel would compete with the Grand\" (Mrs. Uschmann had changed the name of the Thomas' Hotel to the Oriental Hotel and Mr. Reichmann, in turn, had changed it to the Grand Hotel) because of her \"long association with the hotel business and her intimate knowledge of the German community.\" In fact, \"The German customers used to call her 'Mother' as a pet name\" (HKT 6 June 1911).", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1994.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/zk522640g", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 215663, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-2001", "page_number": 440, "title": "RAS-2001", "content_text": "392\n\nMs. Han did not practice medicine in China in the 1950s or at any other time\n\n*\n\nMs. Leon Comber was a superintendent (not assistant superintendent) with the Malayan police, and acted as assistant commissioner\n\nOn the morning of Sunday, 25 June, 1950, communist forces from North Korea crossed the border into South Korea. The next day, on 26 June, President Harry S. Truman ordered American air and naval forces to go to the assistance of South Korea, and Clement Attlee in the House of Commons expressed support for Mr. Truman's actions.\n\nOn 27 June, the United Nations Security Council passed a resolution recommending that all members of the UN furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to meet the armed attack.' The Korean War had begun.\n\nThe unexpected outbreak of the Korean War took all newspapers by surprise but The Times had Ian Ernest McLeavy Morrison, a member of its staff, in the Far East at that time. By August of that year he would be dead.\n\nBorn in Beijing on 31 May 1913, he was the son of the famous Australian journalist, Dr. George Ernest Morrison (4 February 1862-29 May 1920) and a New Zealander Jennie Wark Robin (1889 – 20 June 1923), Dr. Morrison's former secretary who he had married in 1912. Dr. Morrison was known as \"China Morrison\" and was himself a correspondent for The Times during 1897-1912 and later political adviser to the Chinese Government.\n\nHis brother, Alastair Gwynne Morrison was born on 24 August 1915. He ultimately joined the Diplomatic\n\nDr. Morrison and his three sons, Ian, Colin and Alastair, 1917, (Mitchell Library)", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-2001.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/zg651950g", "rank": 0 } ]