[
    {
        "id": 204970,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1965",
        "page_number": 78,
        "title": "RAS-1965",
        "content_text": "69\n\nPIRACY ON THE CHINA COAST\n\nA. D. BLUE\n\nFor most of recorded history piracy has been a menace to sea-borne trade, and there have been times when it has been difficult to distinguish between pirates and honest or should one say legitimate traders. Nationality has often been the only mark of distinction, as Spanish and English views of Drake, Hawkins, and the like illustrate.\n\nThe Chinese were pioneers in piracy, as in so many other things, and a history of piracy in China would begin many thousands of years ago. The Chinese were probably skilled practitioners of the art before history began to be recorded. The earliest accounts are in the records of the Chou Dynasty in the fourth century B.C., and piracy continued in China long after it had been suppressed in other parts of the world.\n\nWhen the first Europeans arrived in the China Seas in the sixteenth century, many of the pirates on the coast were Japanese. For three centuries after the defeat of Kublai Khan's invasion of Japan in 1281, Japanese pirates mainly from Kyushu were active along the whole coast, from the Liaotung Peninsula in the north to Hainan Island and the Straits of Malacca in the south. The famous Arctic explorer, John Davis, met his death at their hands in 1604. Davis was serving on an East India Company ship which was anchored off the island of Bintang, east of Singapore, when it was attacked by Japanese pirates.\n\nThis was at the end of the Japanese era, which came about as the result of several different factors. One was the establishment of a strong central government in Japan by Iyeyasu, the first of the Tokugawa Shoguns at the beginning of the seventeenth century; and another was the increasing superiority of Chinese over Japanese junks.\n\nThe depredations of these Japanese pirates often extended far inland, and they were accompanied by atrocities reminiscent of the Japanese Rape of Nanking in 1937. Because of this the Ming Emperors banned all intercourse between the two countries, and this afforded the Portuguese the opportunity to act as",
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    {
        "id": 207647,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
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        "document_key": "RAS-1976",
        "page_number": 35,
        "title": "RAS-1976",
        "content_text": "20\n\nRICHARD J. SMITH\n\nplayed an historic role similar to that played in the West in late Tokugawa Japan, first precipitating a political crisis, and then helping to resolve it in favor of revolution. It would not be the last time Japan would play the part in China.\n\nViewed from the perspective of military modernization in China and Japan, two factors seem crucial to Meiji Japan's domestic and international success: (1) A sustained sense of crisis, sufficient to justify fundamental institutional change; and (2) strong central government leadership and support in implementing reform, together with the systematic use of foreign assistance. Paul Cohen is obviously correct in pointing out that pre-Meiji Japan enjoyed a number of distinct advantages in responding quickly and creatively to the Western \"impact.\"51 But we may question whether without the self-conscious and concerted modernizing policies of the Meiji central government Japan could have achieved \"wealth and power\" so quickly, even with these advantages. An examination of military change in Japan during the period 1853-1868 indicates, for example, that Bakumatsu military reform efforts were in fact no more effective than those of the T'ung-chih era.52\n\nIn China, the Manchus refused to sponsor basic institutional change, fearful of upsetting the system of military checks and balances that had preserved their rule in China for over two hundred years. More concerned with the maintenance of internal control than with the problem of external defense, the Manchus had little incentive to go beyond the limited military changes that had enabled them to suppress the major rebellions of the 1860's and 70's. It was not until 1907 that the throne took the first concrete steps to dismantle the costly, cumbersome and worthless Manchu Banner system-steps that even then were soon retraced.53\n\nIt should be noted that Manchu rule was less significant in other areas of Chinese life, notably the economy. Dwight Perkins insists, for example, that the Ch'ing government's sins in the economic realm were less those of commission than of omission, that the policies of the Chinese government \"were not so much wrong as inadequate.\"54 But in comparing Japan's economic success with China's failure, Perkins attributes China's difficulties primarily to \"lack of funds.\" Sapped of money by foreign and domestic wars, heavy indemnities, the sustenance of huge and useless \"regular\" standing armies, and the high cost of maintaining irregularly financed \"temporary\" imperial armies, the Ch'ing government...",
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    {
        "id": 207649,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1976",
        "page_number": 37,
        "title": "RAS-1976",
        "content_text": "22 \n\nRICHARD J. SMITH \n\n11 Comparative studies on selected aspects of modernizing change in these two time periods would be illuminating. One might compare, for example, the aims and accomplishments of the Peking Tung-wen kuan (established in 1862) and the Bansho Shirabesho (established in 1858). On the former, see Wright, The Last Stand of Chinese Conservatism: The T'ung-chih Restoration, 1862-1874 (New York, 1967), 241-248; on the latter, consult Marius Jansen, \"New Materials for the Intellectual History of Nineteenth-Century Japan,\" Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies, 20 (1957), 569-582. On the use of Westerners in military affairs in Japan from 1853-1868, see Presseisen, 1-23; H. J. Jones, \"Bakumatsu Foreign Employees,\" Monumenta Serica, 29.3 (Autumn, 1974).\n\n12 Presseisen, chapter 1; Smith, , chapter 4.\n\n13 Albert Craig, Chôshu in the Meiji Restoration (Cambridge, Mass., 1961), 131-136, 201-203, etc.; Richard J. Smith, \"Foreign-Training and China's Self-Strengthening: The Case of Fenghuang-shan, 1864-1873,” Modern Asian Studies, 10.2 (1976).\n\n14 Presseisen, 22-23.\n\n15 See notes 7 and 8; also Hyman Kublin, \"The 'Modern' Army of Early Meiji Japan,\" Far Eastern Quarterly, 9.1 (November, 1949), 24-26; Meron Medzini, French Policy in Japan during the Closing Years of the Tokugawa Regime (Cambridge, Mass., 1971), 125-133.\n\n16 For a discussion of Li's modernizing efforts, his extensive use of foreign assistance, and the obstacles he encountered, see S. Y. Teng and John K. Fairbank, China's Response to the West (New York, 1966), 111-112; K. C. Liu, “The Confucian as Patriot and Pragmatist: Li Hung-chang's Formative Years, 1823-1866,” Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies, 30 (1970); Kenneth Folsom, Friends, Guests and Colleagues (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1968), 152-157; and K. C. Liu, “Li Hung-chang in Chihli,” in Albert Feuerwerker, et al., eds. Approaches to Modern Chinese History (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1967).\n\n17 See, for example, Lord Charles Beresford, The Break-up of China (New York and London, 1899), 267-289, esp. 270-280; Major A. E. J. Cavendish, \"The Armed Strength (?) of China,\" Journal of the Royal United Service Institution, 42 (June, 1898), 709-710, 713-714, 717; Richard J. Smith, \"Chinese Military Institutions in the Mid-Nineteenth Century, 1850-1860,\" Journal of Asian History, 8.2 (1974), 127.\n\n18 See Smith, \"Foreign-Training,\" 212; Cavendish, 709-710, 713-714.\n\n19 See, for example, Cavendish, esp. 720-723; Captain W. R. E. Gill, \"The Chinese Army,\" Journal of the Royal United Service Institution, 24 (1881), 371-377; Chester Holcombe, China's Past and Future (London, 1904), 81-88; \"The Chinese and Japanese Armies,\" reprinted from the Army and Navy Gazette in the Journal of the Military Service Institution of the United States, 15 (1894), 1258; James Scott, \"The Chinese Brave,\" Asiatic Quarterly Review, 1 (1886), esp. 240; etc.\n\n20 See Smith, , Chapters 8 and 9.\n\n21 See Yang-wu yün-tung cited in Smith, \"Foreign-Training,\" 218. On Chinese resistance to foreign instructors and officers, see ibid.; also Cavendish, 720-721.\n\n22 See, for example, L. C. Arlington, Through the Dragon's Eyes (London, 1931), 18; Stanley Wright, Hart and the Chinese Customs (Belfast, 1950), 478-481; John Rawlinson, China's Struggle for Naval Development, 1839-1895 (Cambridge, Mass., 1967), 65-78, 93-94, 163; Holcombe, 80-85, esp. 83.",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1976.txt",
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    },
    {
        "id": 208942,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1980",
        "page_number": 104,
        "title": "RAS-1980",
        "content_text": "72\n\nJOHN VILLIERS\n\nlegitimate trade that could be allowed to the Portuguese. Portuguese ships were indeed used both by the Chinese and Japanese for suppressing local pirates.\n\nThere was keen competition among the daimyō of Kyushu to attract the Great Ship from Macau to their fiefs. In 1562 Omura Sumitada gave what amounted to extra-territorial rights to the Portuguese at Yokoseura and soon after was baptised with the name of Dom Bartholomeu. Yokoseura was however destroyed in 1564 by some anti-Christian merchants from Bungo and the Great Ship was diverted to Hirado. In 1568 Jesuit missionaries first visited Nagasaki, then a small fishing village in a wood belonging to a Christian vassal of Omura Sumitada. It provided excellent anchorage and in 1571 the Great Ship called there for the first time. From then on it was the chief port in Japan for the Macau trade and by 1580 had become a large settlement with an entirely Christian population. In that year Omura offered possession of Nagasaki to the Jesuits, reserving only the shipping dues for himself.\n\nFrom about 1578 the Macaonese began to make use of the Jesuit missionaries, then gaining rapidly in influence in Japan, to market their goods. As the Italian Fr. Valignano wrote to his superiors in 1580: “After the grace and favour of Goa, the greatest help we have had hitherto in securing Christians is that of the Great Ship. For as the Lords of Japan, even though they have much land, are very poor in revenue and ready money, the benefits they derive when the ships come to their ports are very great...they try hard to entice them to their fiefs\".15 The Jesuits indeed depended for most of their revenue on this investment in the Macau-Japan trade. By an agreement of 1578 with the Macau merchants they were allotted a share of 50 piculs in the annual cargo of 1600 piculs of raw silk.16 These 50 piculs brought a profit of about 1600 cruzados. There was much opposition to this arrangement — from the Mendicant Orders, particularly the Spanish Friars in the Philippines, from the Jesuit General in Rome and even from some of the more scrupulous merchant casados in Macau, but it survived at least until 1614, when the first decree of the Tokugawa Ieyasu banishing all foreign and Japanese missionaries from Japan was issued, and it gave the Portuguese an edge over their English, Dutch and Spanish rivals.17\n\nMeanwhile, the Philippines were being brought under Spanish rule by force and the missionary work of the religious orders. The",
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    },
    {
        "id": 208947,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
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        "document_key": "RAS-1980",
        "page_number": 109,
        "title": "RAS-1980",
        "content_text": "SILK & SILVER: MACAU, MANILA TRADE\n\n77\n\nIn 1629 the Viceroy Conde de Linhares ordered that both the Macau-Nagasaki and Macau-Manila voyages should henceforth be made under the supervision and control of the Crown and the profits from them used for the upkeep of the royal dockyard at Goa and the maintenance of the Portuguese fleet in Asian waters, but it was not until 1635 that an administrator for the voyages was sent from Goa to Macau to enforce the new system.32 In the same year the Viceroy finally agreed to allow one pinnace to make the Macau-Manila voyage each year, laden with munitions for the Manila garrison and enough silk for local consumption in the Philippines without any surplus for export to Mexico, where it would compete with silks from Seville.\n\nBy the end of the 16th century Macau's trade was already being threatened from several quarters. On the one hand, the development of the Manila-Japan trade, the increasing power and cohesion of the Japanese state under the Tokugawa and the encouragement of a Japanese merchant navy by Tokugawa Ieyasu — the famous Red Seal ships33 — and, above all, the growing hostility of the shoguns towards Christianity and the missionary activities of Portuguese Jesuits and Spanish friars undermined Macau's trade with Japan. On the other hand, competition from the Dutch, whose control of the Straits of Malacca made trade and communications between Macau and Goa difficult and dangerous and whose establishment in Taiwan after 1624 extended this danger into the China Seas, had a deleterious effect on Macau's trade with Indonesia. The extortions of the Chinese merchants, who also of course carried on direct trade in competition with the Portuguese, licitly or illicitly, both with Japan and Manila, weakened Macau's position still further. Between 1613 and 1640, an average of 60 to 80 Chinese junks visited Japan yearly, though from 1634 they were, like the Portuguese, confined to Nagasaki. These difficulties culminated in the summary expulsion of the Portuguese from Japan in 1639 by the Shogun Iemitsu and in the fall of Malacca to the Dutch in 1641. The embassy sent from Macau in 1640 in a last attempt to get Iemitsu to revoke his edict of expulsion met a terrible fate. 61 of the 74 members of the delegation were beheaded by 61 executioners sent specially from Yedo to Nagasaki for the purpose. A contemporary Portuguese account of how the citizens of Macau reacted to the news of the calamity sums up well the peculiar quality of the whole Portuguese adventure in the East, its mixture of missionary zeal and ...",
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    {
        "id": 210293,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
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        "document_key": "RAS-1984",
        "page_number": 264,
        "title": "RAS-1984",
        "content_text": "243\n\nThe content of the invitation card is: \"The overseas Chinese in Japan will hold a 3-days-4-nights Pu Tu, for the sake of establishing luck by offering and helping all the imprisoned spirits of the water and the earth. The meeting will take place at the Kwan T'i Temple in Kobe city. Please come to the \"Tan\" (altar) to present incense sticks during the 14th, 15th, and 16th of the 7th moon. (1st, 2nd and 3rd of September 1982).” The card was red in colour.\n\n9\n\nThe 13th day and the 17th day of the 7th moon were not mentioned in the invitation card.\n\n10 The Lantern Floating ritual in Japanese is \"To Ro Nagashi', which means to float lanterns(s) (to the sea). During the Japanese Obon, lanterns are sent off on the last day of the festival. Through this, the ghosts and the ancestors are all sent back. During the Kobe festival, the ritual, according to the committee members, was to send off the \"wandering ghosts or those who are not worshipped by anyone (= Mu Zhi Kuai)\". However it seems confusing because after the floating ritual, they continued to give offering to the hungry ghosts as well as to the ancestors for two more nights, and the tablets of the wandering spirits were still inside the Tao Ch'ang. A similar ritual practised in Hong Kong during the Chiao festival is called 'Fong Shui Dang' (t, sending off the water lanterns), which is parallel with the 'Fong Luk Dang\" (PW10, put on the street lights) ritual. The rituals are to invite all the water and earth spirits to attend the offering during the Pu Tu or 'Sai Tai Yau* (*9A, to worship the numerous spirits) of the Chiao festival). The prayer book the Obaku Buddhists used for their morning and night rituals is \"Obaku Zenlin Choobo Kashoo\" (R). The priests called this daily work \"Zenlin Kashoo\" (M).\n\nSee below.\n\n12\n\nPlate 21.\n\n13\n\nPlates 22, 23.\n\n14 The \"Pang' was a book-form name-list in yellow. It had 8 pages with an introduction explaining the reason for holding a Pu Tu. (The introduction is printed in the Appendix).\n\n15 See the introduction to the Pang printed in the Appendix.\n\n16 The beach is at the western end of the Prefecture.\n\n17 Plate 24.\n\n18\n\nSee footnote 10.\n\n19\n\n20\n\nPlate 25.\n\nThe book used for the ritual was \"Yoga Enkoo Kahan\" (1⁄2μÅμ) which is similar to that used in Hong Kong during the 'Sai Tai Yau' ritual. According to an old taoist in Hong Kong, Mr. Lam Pui ( ), the gesture is called \"Poh Yuk” (Z, to break Hell), and through this the ghosts are released and able to come for reincarnation and cross over.\n\n21 Plates 26, 27, 28.\n\n22\n\nNo meat was allowed in the festival area. However, meat was presented at the Ming-che VII. One informant explained that it was because the dead like meat, and one committee member sighed and told me that \"We have no way, because they are from the other Provinces (of China) (##A)\".\n\n20 The sect started from Monk Yin Yuan (C) of Fu-ch'in (Mili), Hokkien. He was invited by the General of the Tokugawa Bankufu (UK) in 1654, In the",
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    {
        "id": 216347,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
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        "document_key": "RAS-2003",
        "page_number": 106,
        "title": "RAS-2003",
        "content_text": "55\n\n70 Gutzlaff, China Opened, op. cit., Vol.II, p.259.\n\n\"1 For a good description of Deshima, with a drawing, and the restrictions placed on the Dutch merchants who lived there in the late 17th century, see Bodart-Bailey, Beatrice M (1999). Kaempfer's Japan, Tokugawa Culture Observed University of Hawaii Press, Chapter 6.\n\nMason, George Henry (1804). The Costume of the Chinese, London, William Miller, preface.\n\n* Milne, William C. (1859). Life in China, London: Routledge, Warnes & Routledge, New Edition, p. 1.\n\n*T.T.T (1842). Life in China, The Porcelain Tower or Nine Stories of China. Philadelphia\n\n\"This topic is well-known, and a source of fun, but its patent inadequacies had serious consequences. Commenting on it in the 1840s, a competent observer wrote, \"The whole trade is conducted in this meagre gibberish, which the natives suppose, however, to be as copious and correct English as foreigners themselves speak... Much of the misunderstanding and trouble experienced in daily intercourse with the Chinese is doubtless owing to this imperfect medium .... These petty annoyances have also had more serious results in strengthening the national dislikes, and still further separating those who originally intended, perhaps, only to endure each other as long as they could make gain thereby\". Williams, S. Wells (1848). The Middle Kingdom, Boston, 2 vols., Vol. II, pp. 411-2. See also note 55 above.\n\nJ\n\nConcerning the Chinese statecraft reformer Wei Yuan, Jane Kate Leonard (1984) comments, 'Never for a moment did he conceive of the West as a new and unique center of culture and civilization in any sense comparable with China,' in Wei Yuan and China's Rediscovery of the Maritime World. Harvard University Press, pp.3-4.\n\n\" Gutzlaff, Charles, Journal of Three Voyages, op.cit., p.44.\n\nTH\n\nMedhurst, W.H.(1838). China, Its State and Prospects, With Special Reference to the Spread of the Gospel. Boston, Crocker and Brewster, p.374.\n\n79 Parkinson, op.cit., p.57.",
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