[ { "id": 205973, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1970", "page_number": 53, "title": "RAS-1970", "content_text": "48 \n\nH. J. LETHBRIDGE \n\nelsewhere and in the discharge of different duties he will gain the confidence of the Government under which he serves, and thus possibly build up a claim to promotion hereafter'.47 Wodehouse and May were also criticised but less severely, and Ripon acknowledge that May, who had already been spotted as a 'coming man', 'showed zeal and capacity in other respects during his short tenure of the office of Treasurer'. \n\nPoor Mitchell-Innes, who was a popular figure in Hong Kong society, did not leave Hong Kong at once. The fine was paid by local subscription and the Chinese petitioned the Secretary of State that he should not be removed from the Colony. The petition was successful and he remained temporarily in the Treasury; but on it becoming known in the Straits Settlements that it was the intention of the Home Government to appoint him to the position of assistant Protector of Chinese in Penang which had become vacant, vigorous opposition on the part of the Straits Settlements authorities was brought to bear, and the intention afterwards abandoned'.48 In 1895 Mitchell-Innes proceeded to England on leave of absence and in 1897 news reached the Colony that he had received appointment as Deputy Governor of a large gaol in the North of England.49 \n\nThe Mitchell-Innes case is instructive. It throws light on administrative practices in Hong Kong at that date and on the scarcity of trained administrative officers. There were only 8 cadets in office in 1893 and these were often shuffled from department to department for short periods of time and expected to master the details of their jobs in a matter of weeks. The tradition of 'omnicompetent generalism' was already believed in by Government and cadets were expected to do all things equally well. Mitchell-Innes was a victim of the system and the tradition. He had been, as the Marquis of Ripon noted, ‘a gentleman who after a comparatively short service had been promoted to a new important position'. The case also throws light on the influence the Chinese notables could exercise on certain occasions: their plea was listened to and as a consequence Mitchell-Innes continued to act as Treasurer for a further two years. Mitchell-Innes is also unique in that he is the only cadet out of the eighty-five appointed to be sacked, for all intents and purposes, from Government.", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1970.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/ww72j0241", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 210195, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1984", "page_number": 166, "title": "RAS-1984", "content_text": "145\n\nfree of disease. Thus the control system achieved its main objective, which was not the protection of women from exploitation, but, as it was commonly expressed in Hong Kong, 'the provision of clean Chinese women for the use of the British soldiers and the sailors of the Royal Navy'.\n\nIn Britain during the 1870s and 1880s the system set up by the Contagious Diseases Act came under attack by various moral reformers who considered that the licensing of brothels by the state implied official condonation of immoral behaviour. They also objected to the discrimination by which the women were compelled to submit to a demeaning medical examination. As a result of a long campaign the system was brought to an end and the Contagious Diseases Act was repealed by Parliament in 1886. In itself this had no effect on the colonial ordinances, but colonial governments were then instructed by the Secretary of State to follow the British example. The Governor of Hong Kong protested vigorously to London, claiming that the repeal of the local Contagious Diseases Ordinance would be unanimously opposed by the Executive and Legislative Councils, by the naval and military authorities and by all classes in the community, since it was the only means of controlling the spread of venereal disease, of preventing the proliferation of brothels in respectable areas of the city and of protecting young girls from being forced into brothel slavery. But the Secretary of State was adamant that the law imposing the compulsory inspection of women must be repealed, though he was prepared to allow the registration of brothels to continue solely for the purpose of providing a means to check against the possible enslavement of their inmates. The Hong Kong government continued to prevaricate, forwarding petitions to London from the keepers of 42 brothels reserved for Europeans and from 23 European prostitutes begging that weekly examinations and the issuing of health certificates might be allowed to continue. These pleas had no effect and the Secretary of State sent Hong Kong a copy of an ordinance which had already been passed in the Straits Settlements with instructions to introduce a similar bill as soon as possible. He also ordered that the issuing of certificates should cease forthwith. Finally in 1889, two years after the original directive from London, a bill entitled the Women and Girls' Protection Ordinance was introduced into the Legis-\n\n10", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1984.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/5h73wh572", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 215281, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-2001", "page_number": 58, "title": "RAS-2001", "content_text": "6\n\nStraits Settlements, but not to Hong Kong. The governor protested to the Colonial Office at Hong Kong's exclusion in 1907, 1910 and 1912 but the Canadian government refused to include Hong Kong within its preferential tariff on the grounds that goods from China might be shipped through Hong Kong's open port and fraudulently obtain the benefit of Canada's preferential tariff.\" So Hong Kong's exports of cement and refined sugar were taxed at the highest rate and soon lost their market in Canada. In 1912 a trade agreement was negotiated between Canada and the West Indian colonies whereby Canadian exports were granted preferential tariffs in return for Canadian preferences on Caribbean cane sugar, cocoa beans and lime juice. The West Indian colonies negotiated this trade agreement directly with Canada and the secretary of state for the colonies raised no objection. These preferences were increased by a new trade agreement in 1920 and were generalised to benefit goods from all empire sources.20 The Colonial Office invited all colonies and protectorates to consider the practicability of introducing preferential rates of duty for goods of imperial origin. But most of the colonial empire was prevented by international treaties from imposing discriminatory tariffs. Northern Rhodesia, Kenya and Uganda, being part of the Congo Basin, were forbidden to discriminate by the Convention of St. Germain (1919); Nigeria and the Gold Coast by the Anglo-French treaty of 1898; and Tanganyika, Togoland, Cameroons and Palestine were mandated territories of the League of Nations which prohibited discrimination. By 1932 the only colonies which were free to adopt imperial preference but had not done so were Somaliland, Ceylon, the Straits Settlements, Hong Kong and certain islands in the Pacific.\" Canada and New Zealand were the only dominions which granted any preferences to the colonial empire before 1932. Australia, South Africa, Newfoundland, Southern Rhodesia and India granted none.\n\nThe world trade depression which began in 1929 convinced British politicians that the liberal principles of free trade which had been followed for the past 70 years must be abandoned. The National government elected in 1931 quickly passed the Import Duties Act which imposed a general duty of 10 per cent ad valorem on all imports. Section 5 of the act granted an entire exemption from the general duty to imports from all colonies, protectorates and mandated territories, provided that at least 25 per cent of the value was derived from materials grown or produced or from work done within a part of the empire.\" Imports from the dominions and India were exempted from duty only until November pending the outcome of an Imperial Economic Conference.\" A circular despatch was sent by the Colonial Office to all colonies and protectorates drawing attention to the great advantages extended to the colonies by the Import Duties Act and inviting them to give similar preferences to United Kingdom manufactures", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-2001.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/zg651950g", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 215772, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-2002", "page_number": 71, "title": "RAS-2002", "content_text": "In Calcutta's eyes, the main duties of the governor of the Straits Settlements were to 'balance his budget and to insulate the settlements from complications in the hinterland.' This policy, as Turnbull puts it, was doomed to fail;15 instead it provided the background causes for the agitation of the European merchant community for the transfer of the Straits Settlements from the India Office to the Colonial Office in London.\n\nFor example, as the settlements prospered, the European merchants demanded more expensive and sophisticated administration, an efficient judicial system, defence, and security for their property and trade.1 However, due to Raffles' free trade policy, which was extended to all three settlements, and the failure of land and agriculture, there was insufficient revenue to fund these demands.\n\nThe activities of ambitious pioneers, mainly Chinese migrant workers, who were 'lured by the wealth of the interior [of the Malay states],' made it impossible for the Straits government to cut the settlements off from the affairs of the Malay states. Calcutta maintained its policy of non-intervention to the end, but in practice, every would-be final settlement the government of India authorized merely provided the basis for further involvement.18\n\nThe petition of 1857, wherein the grievances of the Straits merchants were cited\n\nIn 1857, the Straits merchants sent a petition to the House of Commons,19 explaining their grievances with regard to the administration of the Straits Settlements under the EIC, and requesting a transfer of control (by means of an Act of Parliament) from the EIC to the Colonial Office. However, some of the issues raised to the House of Commons appear to be questionable (that is, not all the issues were as serious as they were made out to be). This calls for an examination of the validity of these hazy 'problems,'20 in order to assess the necessity of the transfer.\n\nIn the process, I will also highlight the way in which constitutional and legal changes were introduced in the Straits Settlements. Legal changes emerged in response to the demands of the Straits society; that is, such changes were governed by a variety of factors. Hence, I will", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-2002.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/mp4901278", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 215773, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-2002", "page_number": 72, "title": "RAS-2002", "content_text": "5\n\nalso study how the English system of law was introduced into a largely Far Eastern society and the extent of its impact.\n\nThe nature of the Calcutta administration\n\nLackadaisical attitude\n\nOne of the most glaring problems in the Straits Settlements was the failure of the Indian authorities to establish an effective form of government. This was due to its distance and lack of accessibility which cultivated an indifferent or disinterested attitude on the part of the Indian officials.21 The Indian government was far more interested in its Indian territories than in its possessions in the Malay Peninsular.22 This led to the administrative problems in the Straits Settlements. Owing to this indifference, the men sent from India were young and inexperienced who knew nothing of the problems in the settlements but were only too eager to return to India to reap bigger rewards and promotion.23\n\nLack of representation in Legislative Council\n\nAs the administration of the Straits Settlements was highly centralised in India, the governor of the Straits Settlements had very little authority and merely supervised administration.24 All important matters had to be referred to India for a decision and the governor had no executive or legislative power.25 All the legislation for the Straits Settlements was planned by the Indian government. As the Straits Settlements had no official representation in India, it could not block any legislation that could prove detrimental to the Straits Settlements.26\n\nThus it can be established that the 'roots of the transfer movement lay in the constitutional rearrangement in the Straits Settlements of 1830 and the [Indian] Charter Act of 1833. The system of government was unsatisfactory both for the governor and the mercantile community.'27\n\nThe petition of 1857: A critical evaluation of the complaints raised\n\nThe Currency Act 185528\n\nThe Currency Act is an example cited by the Straits merchants in", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-2002.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/mp4901278", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 215774, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-2002", "page_number": 73, "title": "RAS-2002", "content_text": "their petition. Even before 1826, the Spanish silver dollar and local copper cent had been used widely by the Straits merchants in their trade and commerce, (even though in theory, in 1835, the rupee was the currency of account for official purposes until 1867).\n\nThe directors of the EIC, considering only the Indian Empire's interests,29 established a uniform rupee currency throughout its territories, which of course included the Straits Settlements. In 1854, a bill was introduced to the Indian legislative council 'to improve the law relating to the copper currency in the Straits,' which provided for a copper currency based on fractions of the rupee.30 According to the Currency Act, the Indian pice was to be made legal tender instead of the copper cent and the rupee was to be enforced as legal tender.31\n\nThis Act was fiercely objected to by the Straits merchants, and in response to the opposition, the directors ordered the act to be repealed in 1857. Mr Ballie (Secretary of the Board of Control of the EIC) argues that 'it was very natural that the governor-general should desire to establish a uniform currency throughout the whole of the territories subject to his authority'32 and that after the complaints made at Singapore, this grievance was redressed, and that therefore the petitioners did not have a right to complain.**\n\nPage 36\n\n33\n\n35\n\nThe 1867 Act legalised a currency which was already assured,” and by the time the transfer to the Colonial Office took place, the currency issue was virtually resolved. However, as it was a problem that could have been prevented instead of cured, I would accord little credit to the Indian government's role in this issue.\n\nPiracy and western laws\n\nThis was another arguable \"problem\" that was cited in the petition, and used as an example of the Indian government's inefficiency. Piracy was widespread in the Straits until the mid-19th century, and was a threat to the property and commerce of the merchants. The pirates that predominated in the 1830s and 1840s were pirates of the Sulu archipelago, Illanun pirates from Mindanao and Dyaks from North Borneo. Complaints were that 'no systematic measures of protection have ever been adopted or carried out by the EIC, who have been content to leave the service to be performed by the Royal Navy.”37", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-2002.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/mp4901278", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 215776, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-2002", "page_number": 75, "title": "RAS-2002", "content_text": "The EIC and relations with the Malay states\n\nIn the merchants' own words, 'The Supreme Government of India had uniformly discouraged the local Government at Singapore from interfering with matters beyond the limits of the Island. The cultivation of friendly relations with Native States and Chiefs has been neglected.'44 In this section, I will examine the merchants' reasons for this complaint, and also assess the accuracy of their claim. Rupert Emerson, a historian, calls the period during the Indian government's administration of the Straits Settlements 'a half-century of inactivity.' This is arguably the truth but not the whole truth, because DGE Hall, another historian, tends to disagree with Emerson's assertion. He says that 'one only has to glance through the many volumes of records relating to the period to realise that even if there was little or no spectacular achievement there was plenty of activity.' 'Even if by inactivity is meant the pursuit of non-intervention policy in native affairs, the term is misleading.\n\nPage 48\n\nThe Calcutta administration, wherever possible, adhered to a policy of strict non-intervention in the affairs of the Malay States. This policy had its roots in Pitt's India Act of 1784,49 which stipulated that the EIC's aim was peace, not interference in local politics or extension of the company's territories.50 The main reason for this policy was to avoid any form of entanglement in the internal troubles or wars of the Peninsula which could incur unnecessary expenses for the EIC,51 As it was, the EIC had lost its monopoly over the China trade in 1833 and, with this, the Straits Settlements ceased to be a source of direct profits, and were maintained at an annual loss.52\n\nPage 51\n\nYet despite the law on non-intervention, there was evidence that in some cases concerning threats to British interests, whether commercial, political or involving prestige, local administrators often found it necessary to intervene. In such cases, the actions were often condoned by the Supreme Government. Thus, there was a violation of Pitt's India Act (which eventually did lead to the change in British policy of non-intervention to intervention in 1874),54\n\nPage 53\n\nThio summarises the politico-legal scenario thus:\n\n...when responsibility for the Straits was transferred from the Government of India to the Colonial Office in 1867, the British were already bound by treaties with four of the five states south of Kedah, two of whom they\n\nPage 75\n\nPage 76", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-2002.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/mp4901278", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 215777, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-2002", "page_number": 76, "title": "RAS-2002", "content_text": "were pledged to protect and three over whose external relations they had a right of control.\"55 Hall strongly claims that, 'the Malay States were in a state of chronic unrest, external and internal,56 and had become completely incapable of putting their house in order. Intervention, therefore, could not be avoided. There was indeed constant intervention, notwithstanding all the rules to the contrary and all the thunders of Calcutta and the East India House, '57\n\nHowever, in spite of Thio's and Hall's assertions, the truth of the merchants' complaint is not invalidated, because between 1824 and 1873, British rule in Malaya was indeed ‘inactive,258 as their official policy was still in accordance with Pitt's India Act. In several cases, the actions of the Straits Settlements government implied some form of intervention, or at least limited interference in the affairs of the Malay States, when they violated the policy of non-intervention; but even then, nothing more elaborate was undertaken than the occasional punitive expedition, which was not enough, in 'the interests of British commerce.'60 Insofar as this was concerned, it would appear that the Straits merchants did have a legitimate complaint to the House of Lords, because their statement would appear to have been bona fide and to hold a substantial amount of evidential truth. The influence of Pitt's India Act (that is, EIC non-intervention) remained until 1874, when a new law was passed, and the British took on an active, intervening role in the Malay states.\n\n59\n\nJudicial system!\n\nThe main complaints of the merchants were that the Law was administered by unprofessional persons, that is, the administration of justice was in the hands of local officers of government, civil or military servants of the EIC, and the 'impractical schemes [that] were propounded' (for example, the Currency Act, port dues and stamp duties). LA Mills renders a counter attack to this point; he argues that 'although there were delays in dealing with problems which caused the Straits Settlements to suffer at times, on the whole the results were not serious. Of the problems which arose between 1826 and 1867, very few were of importance, so that injury caused in the delay in settling them was not great. The population was small and generally law-abiding. The Straits Settlements had practically no foreign relations (the main task of the government was to watch Siam and Holland,\n\n63\n\n262", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-2002.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/mp4901278", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 215778, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-2002", "page_number": 77, "title": "RAS-2002", "content_text": "10\n\nreporting to the Government of India if they took unfair trade measures).\n\nHowever, I am more inclined to take the view that the Calcutta government was not efficient in administering the Straits Settlements, in spite of the mitigating factors. Problems were still prevalent, albeit small or insignificant as Mills makes them out to be. In this regard, the Straits Settlements were better off being under the Colonial Office, and concluding thus, the \"problems\" were justified ones.\n\nAt this point, I wish to draw attention to the different systems of law existing simultaneously in the Straits Settlements. There were the Indian laws (passed by Calcutta, modelled on English law) which were either unsuitable to the Straits Settlements or did not cover \"illegality\" in many cases, as we have seen. Then there were the English laws which were more predominant after the transfer but even before 1867 were still the official laws to be applied insofar as the public sphere was concerned. Matters were a little more complicated in the private sphere, as in the case of the local laws under the Sultans, for example, pertaining to Malay customs and religion, discussion of which is beyond the intended scope of this essay.\n\nChinese secret societies—\n\nA wealth of material can be obtained on this issue which has been well-researched by many scholars. However, with regards to the petition and the transfer, all that need be said (despite the topic's complexity) is that the merchants had a legitimate cause for complaint because the Chinese secret societies were dangerous and caused problems; for example 'rivalries of hostile societies and clans gave rise to disturbances and outrages, often of a very grave nature.' This was a real problem, and not a questionable or hazy one, and the Indian government paid little attention to the situation.69\n\nAfter the transfer, measures were undertaken by the Colonial Office to deal with the problem. \"The Straits Settlements government was now empowered to legislate fully for the requirements of the Colony and to adopt a more determined policy towards secret societies,\" for example, Act XX of 1867 legalised the 1863 practice of apprehending headmen of belligerent societies to do duty as special constables during riots;71 1869 Ordinance XIX to provide for 'the suppression of dangerous", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-2002.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/mp4901278", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 215780, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-2002", "page_number": 79, "title": "RAS-2002", "content_text": "them. These ex-convicts married local wives, and some even rose in prominence.82 The European merchants complained mainly about the high cost of keeping the convicts (for example, as early as 1841, they grumbled about the costly body of troops to be maintained in the Straits Settlements mainly because they were penal stations).83\n\nThere were some disturbing facts about the Indian convicts pertaining to the growth of Indian-type secret societies,85 and to the spread of criminal activities among present and ex-convicts. There are no statistics to prove how far these groups were involved in crime, but there were nevertheless a few notorious incidents.87\n\nOn the whole, the convict \"problem\" was not really a problem. The Indian government did make some attempts to improve the situation. However, this only took place after the petition of 1857 to the House of Commons. Thus, even though most defects of the system were remedied by the time of the transfer to the Colonial Office, little credit can be given to the Indian government in this issue. Taking into account the context in which the convict problem was cited in the 1857 petition,88 it is not difficult to sympathise with the European merchants,8991 and hence, this \"problem\" in my opinion, was a bona fide one.\n\n## Conclusion\n\nThe transfer was governed by a series of factors. The overall argument has been broached with a revisionist's method of assessment. However, the conclusion is nonetheless an orthodox one in that having clarified the \"problems,\" most would appear to have been bona fide and convincing enough to necessitate a liberation from the Indian government's rule. In this respect, the transfer was a necessary, and hence, a justified move. The act that was eventually passed by Parliament, to change the government of the Straits Settlements from the India Office to the Colonial Office, was the result of a complex variety of causes, which also explains how legal changes were brought about, not in isolation, but in the context of and in accordance with the Straits society's requirements. The regulations of the Straits Settlements were made subject to London's control, and this is a confirmation of the primacy of the English legal system in which was entrenched the rule of law in the Straits Settlements.", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-2002.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/mp4901278", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 215781, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-2002", "page_number": 80, "title": "RAS-2002", "content_text": "NOTES\n\nAbbreviations:\n\nColonial Office - CO\n\nJIA - Journal of the Indian Archipelago and Eastern Asia\n\nJMBRAS - Journal of the Malayan Branch, Royal Asiatic Society\n\nJSEAH - Journal of Southeast Asian History\n\nSFP - Singapore Free Press\n\nSSR - Straits Settlements Records\n\nThe Government of the Straits Settlement Act, 1866. 29 & 30 Vicc 115 - An Act to provide for the Government of the Straits Settlements.\n\nTurnbull, The Straits Settlements 1826-67 Indian Presidency to Crown Colony. (1972) Oxford University Press, p 379\n\nAmong the various historians on Malayan history, Mary C Turnbull's comments on the Straits Settlements prior to the Transfer in 1867 are, by far, the most balanced and comprehensive, and her views on this area are invaluable. While the following facts were gathered from several historians' works, I have been influenced strongly by Turnbull's analysis. I have attempted to summarize in the following 3 sections Turnbull's views based closely on her Introduction to The Straits Settlements 1826-67 Indian Presidency to Crown Colony.\n\ncf. Treaty of 6 February 1819 (Johore 1819) (Treaties with Native States Part III)\n\nTreaty of Friendship and Alliance between the EIC and the Sultan of Johore in 1824, cf. Treaties with Native States p 16 Part III\n\ncf. Article 10 of the treaty\n\nTurnbull, The Straits Settlements 1826-67 Indian Presidency to Crown Colony, Introduction p 3", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-2002.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/mp4901278", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 215783, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-2002", "page_number": 82, "title": "RAS-2002", "content_text": "15\n\n25 Ibid, Chap 5\n\n26 Ibid, pp 755 - 6; Hansard, 3rd series, vol cxlix, p 989\n\n27 Turnbull, supra p 350\n\n28 Act XVII of 1855, cf. Pridmore, Memoirs of Raffles Museum; Hansard, 3rd series, vol cxlix, pg 988\n\n29 Tan DE, A Portrait of Malaysia and Singapore p 70\n\n**Tumbull, supra, p 207**\n\n31 Tan DE, supra, p 70\n\nBuckley, supra, p 760; Hansard, 3rd series, vol. cxlix, p 990\n\n+\n\n* for example, when an act was passed in 1862 to regulate coinage in India, special provision was made by the Legislative Council for the Straits Settlements, and between 1862 and 1867, copper cents for the first time bore the name 'Straits Settlements' (Turnbull, supra, p 208; Hansard, 3rd series, vol. cxlix, p 990)\n\n34 Ibid. p 760\n\n35 1867 Act to Provide for the Government of the Straits Settlements, para 4\n\n36 Turnbull, supra, p 209\n\n37\n\nBuckley, supra, p 756\n\n38 Mills, supra, p 241\n\n39 Turnbull, supra, p 247\n\n40\n\n41\n\nMills, supra, p 243\n\nCameron J, Our Tropical Possessions in Malayan India pp 251 - 2\n\n42 of Treaty of Tientsin Art. LIII; Prussian Treaty Art. XXXIII; Danish Treaty Art.", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-2002.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/mp4901278", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 215787, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-2002", "page_number": 86, "title": "RAS-2002", "content_text": "19\n\nfrom Pitt's India Act. The EIC accordingly found itself guaranteeing some states protection from attacks, or pledging to uphold boundary settlements. (Thio, supra, p xvi-xvii)\n\nThere were cases of intervention for example, in Kedah, Perak and Selangor, brought about by Robert Fullerton, Burney, Anderson and James Low:\n\nWhen Robert Fullerton was governor of the Straits Settlements in 1824, he completely reversed the earlier British attitude of giving in to the claims of Siam, thus embarking on protection and expansion of British interests in the Malay Peninsula by checking Siamese attempts at extending their influence over the northern Malay states. Thus, when Ligor prepared to invade Perak and Selangor in 1825, he sent a Penang squadron to patrol the river mouths to prevent any attacks. (Mills L A, British Malaya 1824-1867, Chap 8 p 141; other examples of intervention included the following: Burney's Preliminary Treaty with Ligor in 1825. (Mills, Ibid, Chap 8 p 143-146); the Anderson Treaty (involving Selangor and Perak) in 1825. (Mills, Ibid, Chap 8, p 145-146; Purcell, supra, Chap 6, p 70)\n\nThe Burney Treaty of 1826 saw British attempts to secure independence for Selangor and Perak (Newbold, British Settlements in the Straits of Malacca Vol. 2 p 26); and later, the Low Treaty of 1826 promised British assistance in maintaining Perak's independence. These two treaties had more effect on the Malay States than any other treaties, the greatest consequence being a marked ending of Siamese southward ambitions, and thus securing the British position in expanding further into the Malay States at a later stage. However, signing these treaties showed non-compliance with Pitt's India Act. Thus, where Low's Treaty was concerned, the Supreme Government continued for some time to condemn it as unauthorised and never really ratified it. In effect, the intervention in the Malay States was still somewhat restricted by the Government's policy. (Mills, Op Cit. Chap 8 p 162) Other examples include Fullerton's challenge of Ligor's claim to the Kurau District in 1826, and the Burney Treaty of 1826 after which the British ceased to intervene in Kedah. (Mills, Ibid. Chap 8 pp 160-161)\n\nOther examples of intervention included those in Naning and Sungei Ujong: The British fought the Naning War in 1831-2 to establish British right to collection of revenue in Naning. In Sungei Ujong, the British squadron was called in 1857 to destroy the village of Pengkalan Kempas, in order to punish the chiefs who had been extorting British subjects. And again in 1860, Governor Cavenagh", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-2002.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/mp4901278", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 215792, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-2002", "page_number": 91, "title": "RAS-2002", "content_text": "24\n\nTreaty of Holland (Anglo-Dutch Treaty of 1824), (Hertslet's Treaties Vol VIII) Pangkor Engagement of 1874 (Treaties with Native States Part II)\n\nBill:\n\nStraits Transfer Bill (House of Commons), 1866, V (Session 1 Feb - 10 Aug 1866)\n\nStatutes:\n\nAct 24th George III Cap 25 (1784)\n\nIndian Charter Act of 1833\n\nIndian Act No. XVII of 1855\n\nCharters of Justice (1807, 1826, 1855)\n\nThe Colonial Laws Validity Act, 1865, 28 & 29 Vic, Cap 63\n\nThe Government of the Straits Settlements Act, 1866, 29 & 30 Vic, Cap 115\n\nThe Courts (Colonial) Jurisdiction Act, 1874, 37 & 38 Vic, Cap 27\n\nThe Straits Settlements Offences Act, 1874, 37 & 38 Vic, Cap 38\n\nCase:\n\nRegina v Willians Esq (1858) (3 Ky 16)\n\nSecondary Sources:\n\nAllen, Richard H S, 1968, Malaysia, Prospect and Retrospect. The Impact and Aftermath of Colonial Rule, Oxford University Press\n\nAuber, P, 1826, An Analysis of the Constitution of the EIC and the Laws Passed by Parliament for the Government of Their Affairs at Home and Abroad, London\n\nBlythe, W L, 1969, The Impact of Chinese Secret Societies in Malaya, Kuala Lumpur\n\nBraddell, Roland St John, (1915) 1982, The Law of the Straits Settlements. A Commentary, Oxford University Press (Kuala Lumpur)\n\nBraddle, T, (1853) 'Notices of Singapore', JIA, vii, 1328\n\nBuckley, Charles Burton, (1902) 1984, An Anecdotal History of Old Times in Singapore, Oxford University Press", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-2002.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/mp4901278", "rank": 0 } ]