[
    {
        "id": 212497,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1991",
        "page_number": 51,
        "title": "RAS-1991",
        "content_text": "31\n\nLo was suspected to have cheated an amount of 20,000 taels as bad debt from the Bank See Group Archives of the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation, Comprador Files Law Pak Sheung\n\n|| Ibid. Lo Hok Pang was said to be involved in certain bankruptcy cases See Comprador Files Lo Hok Pang\n\n12\n\nFor an important article that explores the studies on early Chinese in Hong Kong, see Carl T Smith (1993), Hong Kong Chinese Wills 1850-1890\n\n13 See HKRS#144-98. Cheang Hoong (December 1856), 245 Wong Kong (August 1867), 254 Kwong A Hang (January 1872), 268 Ng A Cheong (October 1870), 349 Law Pak Sheung (February 1877), 368 Wei A Kwong (October 1866), 457 Law Sai Nam (December 1881), 470 Lau Cheong (June 1880), 661 Au Yeung Shing (December 1886); 733, Wong Shi Lai (June 1888), 734 Sung Chin Tseung (January 1888), 1161 Tong Mow Chee (December 1894), and 1465 Choa Chec Bec (June 1890)\n\nHKRS#134-144; Soong Ke (December 1864)\n\n15 See Zheng Guanying. Da Guangzhou shangwu zonghu yi bingting zhuamban zhangcheng ershisi tiao (To draft the twenty-four opening ordinances of the General Chamber of Commerce of Canton), in Xia Dongyuan (1988a), pp 593-6\n\n16 HKRS#144-273 O Kee Cheong (October 1872)\n\nHKRS#144-1504: Leung Kiu (April 1887)\n\n18 HKRS#144-394 La Hing (January 1879)\n\n19 See Carl T Smith (1993), p 11, 15-6\n\n20 For Western merchants who came with their Cantonese compradors to Shanghai, see Hao (1970), pp 51-3\n\n21 According to Leung Yuen-sang's study, Wu Jianzhang came to power because of the rise of mercantile power in post-1843 local politics when there was an absence of official-gentry leadership during the British invasion and capture of Shanghai in 1842 The vacuum was filled by Cantonese merchants and compradors They were sought because of their foreign language skill and foreign knowledge During Wu's office, nearly all the jobs in the government were filled by Cantonese See Leung (1990), pp. 53-6, 147-50, Toyama Gunji (1994), Shanghai dotai Go kensho (The Shanghai Taotai Wu Jianzhang), pp 45-54. and Zhang Wenqin (1989), Cong fenguan guanshang dao maiban guantiao, Wu Jianzhang shilun (From Feudal Official Merchant to Compradorial Bureaucrat), pp 31-54\n\n21 Leung Yuen-sang (1982), Regional Rivalry in Mid-Nineteenth Century Shanghai: Cantonese vs Ningpo Men, pp 34-6.\n\n21\n\nThough Li Hongzhang was a central bureaucrat, through the guandu shangban enterprises in Shanghai and Tianjin, he had successfully extended his influence in this region discussed through the \"Shanghai-Tianjin Connection\" See Leung Yuen-sang (1986), The Shanghai-Tientsin Connection: Li Hung-chang's Political Control over Shanghai during the Late Ch'ing Period, pp 315-30\n\n24 Ibid, pp. 45-6\n\n24\n\nWang Gungwu (1990). China and the Chinese Overseas, pp 175-6\n\nHKRS#144-1152 Li Chu (December 1896)\n\n27 HKRS#144-1087. Lee Chak (May 1894)\n\n8 HKRS#144-1093 Chan Kin Tong (April 1896)",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1991.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/k356gt84j",
        "rank": 0
    },
    {
        "id": 213875,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1996",
        "page_number": 227,
        "title": "RAS-1996",
        "content_text": "201\n\n\"official-supervision merchant-management\" (A). The formula went like this: the reform-minded officials provided the political patronage - they bargained with Beijing for charter, franchise, monopoly or tax concessions for the enterprises, and the merchants provided the capital and management. Concerning merchants' ability to raise capital, their credibility came not from the enterprises they set up, but from their own reputations, as well as from the political patronage which they managed to establish. Some of the most famous of these merchants in the western affairs movement were such Hong Kong compradors as the Tang Jingxing (Tang King-sing) brothers.\n\nThis kind of business environment made China unique when compared to Europe. Historically, the political fragmentation of Europe, and the frequent wars it led to, had forced the kings and the princes to be bound by their commercial commitments - one refusal to repay their debts meant that the princes would find tremendous difficulty in raising funds for the next war. In China, on the contrary, the Emperor needed not to (and actually had not) surrendered his right to interfere into the market; the government was not bound by legislation it made. Several incidents which occurred in the fifteenth century help to illustrate these divergences. Firstly, while the Ming Emperor abolished the national debt (in the form of salt certificates) overnight in 1667, the King of England was forced to grant his debtors a charter for the formation of a national bank (the Bank of England). Secondly, while the four Atlantic states (Spain, Portugal, France, England) were competing for overseas expansion and experiencing the “Age of Discovery”, the Chinese Emperor issued an edict to stop all his subjects from going overseas in 1667, just three years after the famous Zhenghe fleets (Tr Admiral) arrived at Malaya. Business endeavours in Europe were first protected by privileges granted by the Kings (in the forms of charter or monopoly) as in the case of the East India Company. This practice was later developed into a kind of rights guaranteed by legislation (company laws). In China, with the prohibition of sea-going, overseas trades were restricted in the forms of tribute, smuggling and piracy. No legislations were developed in China to guarantee and to protect commercial endeavors. An easy alternative for the Chinese merchants, therefore, was to rely on personal networks. On this, China and Europe went their separate ways. While the feudal society in Medieval Europe based on the ties of allegiance to a local land-owning aristocracy for protection, in China, authority was nominally resided in the central",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1996.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/3n209j641",
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    },
    {
        "id": 213876,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1996",
        "page_number": 228,
        "title": "RAS-1996",
        "content_text": "202\n\nstate through the mandarinate and extended downward. Dependence on the favour of aristocratic protection found in Europe was represented in China by dependence on the favour of personified officialdom from the central extending all the way down to the localities. Accordingly, the rivalry within central officialdom would extend downward to their protégés in the local regions. The Cantonese experience can illustrate this point.\n\nAs such \"reform-minded\" officials such as Li Hongzhang and Zhang Zhidong were competing for national influence, their protégés recruited in the provinces were also competing among themselves. After the opening of Shanghai and Tianjin, increasing numbers of men from Ningpo and Zhejiang were appointed compradores of western firms or advisors to the reform-minded officials. Even within the Cantonese group, some were more influential than others.\n\nIn terms of national influence, those Cantonese engaged in economic reforms always gained the upper hand from those engaged in legal reforms. As shall be seen, for those Cantonese engaged in economic reform (from Tang Jingxing to his nephew Tang Shaoyi, and through him to Liang Shiyi), they eventually advanced to positions in Beijing and monopolized the influential Board of Communications, which commanded huge economic resources in steamships, railways, mining and telegraph. This group of Cantonese was known as the Communications Clique. Their interests were vested in a China united under the central control of Beijing. This partly explains why Liang Shiyi and his clique were willing to finance Yuan Shikai's government after 1911, as well as his monarchical movement in 1916.\n\nThose Cantonese advisors such as Wu Tingfang and Ho Kai (He Qi) who were engaged in legal and diplomatic reforms, had not established their power base in Beijing and so eventually they based their influence in south China. After all, they were appointed Legislative Councillors in Hong Kong, the highest political posts that the Hong Kong Chinese could expect. They were sympathetic to the revolutionary activities in south China. As shall be seen, they sided with Guangdong in reform, in revolution, and in independence. Remarkably, both the Communications Clique and the \"legal-reform group\" turned out to be political patrons for competing groups of Cantonese merchants in Hong Kong.",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1996.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/3n209j641",
        "rank": 0
    }
]