[
    {
        "id": 208058,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1977",
        "page_number": 97,
        "title": "RAS-1977",
        "content_text": "TWO ESSAYS ON THE CH'ING ECONOMY OF HSIN-AN\n\n81\n\nbuyers and sellers of commodities and to effect a transaction between them.” By the late 1920's, \"its importance to the Hopei provincial finance was only second to that of the land tax.\" It is difficult to weigh the relative importances of the various taxes in Hsin-An, but we do have figures on the revenue collected on trade between local markets in November 1911, which indicate a relatively low volume of local trade (see Imperial Maritime Customs, 1902-1911, Volume II, p.156). Also, refer to Appendix II, which Lockhart credits as a reliable source. The Tangs of Kam Tin and Lung Kwat Tau (A) were apparently farmed the monopolies of collecting market taxes in Un Long Kau Hui (±##4) and Tai Po Kau Hui (£# #). The Tongs who oversaw the markets in turn \"sub-leased\" the brokerages to traders, merchants, and shop-owners.\n\n4 The CSO files held in the Government Archives of Hong Kong constitute one of the richest stores of first-hand knowledge about local political economy and society in Hsin-An during the period 1890-1910. I am very grateful to Mr. Ian Diamond, Government Archivist, and his staff for their assistance in helping with my research.\n\n5 C. M. Chang, op. cit., pp. 826-828.\n\n6 Lien-sheng Yang, \"Buddhist Monasteries and Four Money-Raising Institutions in Chinese History,\" in his Studies in Chinese Institutional History, pp. 198-199n.\n\n7 Yeh-chien Wang draws heavily on the Ts'ai-cheng Shuo-ming-shu for his research on the land tax in China (Land Taxation in Imperial China, 1750-1911). On the basis of the material presented in this paper, Hsin-An conforms to his general thesis of the declining relative importance of the land tax throughout late Ch'ing.\n\n8 Correspondence Respecting the Extension of the Boundaries of the Colony (hereafter Extension Papers), p. 60.\n\n9 For a fuller discussion of li-chia, see Kung-chuan Hsiao's Rural China, Imperial Control in the Nineteenth Century, pp. 84-143.\n\n10 The annual rotation of these positions (44) constituted the primary mechanism whereby the local magistrate attempted to maintain some measure of centralized power by restricting the excesses of local magnates.\n\n11 Hsiang-kang Teng-ch'u-shui-mau Ts'ung-ch'eng (44¥Æ#*# Z), p. 2: \"All together the cultivated land measured 8 ch'ing 3 mau 6 fen 1 li 9 hau 2 ssu 5 hu (i.e., 803.61925 mau) and was registered under the name of Tang Tin-luk, 6th tu, 7th p'i, 2nd chia. In addition, Tang Chi-cheung and others had purchased from Ho Ch'iu-ping and others plots of land at Wong Nei Chung... having a total area of 1 ch'ing 89 mau registered in Tung-Kuan under the name of Tang Chi-fu of the 2nd tụ, 18th p'i, last chia.\" The formula is often repeated in the land memorials held at the Land Office of the Registrar General in Hong Kong.\n\n12 Kwangchow Fu-chih (1759), ch'uan 4: 43a-b, 46b.\n\n13 Hsin-An Hsien-chih (1819), ch'uan 2.\n\n14 Kwangtung T'u-shuo, Hsin-An Hsien-t'u.\n\n15 Krone, \"A Notice of the Sunon District\", originally published in the Transactions of the China Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, 6:5, 41-105. This quote, as all the others, is from the reprinted copy in the Hong Kong Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society V: p. 119.\n\n16 Tung-Kuan Hsien-chih (1797), 10:10b-11.\n\n17 Lockhart, in the Correspondence Respecting the Affairs in China, writes: \"Small villages and hamlets often place themselves under the protection of large and influential clans to which they refer all complaints and from which they expect assistance in case of attack, robbery, and",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1977.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/np198x23n",
        "rank": 0
    },
    {
        "id": 215672,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-2001",
        "page_number": 449,
        "title": "RAS-2001",
        "content_text": "401\n\nin August 2002.\n\nThe North Koreans quickly crushed South Korean defences at the 38th parallel. The main North Korean attack force next moved down the west side of the peninsula toward Seoul, the South Korean capital, thirty-five miles below the parallel, and entered the city on June 28. Secondary thrusts down the peninsula's centre and down the east coast kept pace with the main drive. The South Koreans withdrew in disorder; those troops driven out of Seoul were forced to abandon most of their equipment because the bridges over the Han River at the south edge of the city were prematurely demolished. The North Koreans halted after capturing Seoul, but only briefly to regroup before crossing the Han.\n\nWhen MacArthur received word to commit ground units, the main North Korean force had already crossed the Han River. By July 3, a westward enemy attack had captured a major airfield at Kimpo and the Yellow Sea port of Inch'ŏn. Troops attacking south repaired a bridge so that tanks could cross the Han and moved into the town of Suwon, twenty-five miles below Seoul, on the 4th.\n\nThe speed of the North Korean drive coupled with the unreadiness of American forces compelled MacArthur to disregard the principle of mass and commit units piecemeal to trade space for time. Where to open a delaying action was clear, for there were few good roads in the profusion of mountains making up the Korean peninsula, and the best of these below Seoul, running on a gentle diagonal through Suwon, Osan, Taejon, and Taegu to the port of Pusan in the southeast, was the obvious main axis of North Korean advance. At MacArthur's order, two rifle companies, an artillery battery, and a few other supporting units of the 24 Division moved into a defensive position astride the main road near Osan, ten miles below Suwon, by dawn on July 5.\n\nComing out of Suwon in a heavy rain, a North Korean division supported by thirty-three tanks reached and, with barely a pause, attacked the Americans around 8:00 a.m. on the 5th. The rain cancelled air support, communications broke down, and the task force was, under any circumstances, too small to prevent North Korean infantry from flowing around both its flanks. By mid-afternoon, the task force was pushed into a disorganised retreat with over 150 casualties and the loss of all equipment save small arms.\n\nThe next three delaying actions, though fought by larger forces, had similar results. In each case, North Korean armour or infantry assaults against the front of the American position were accompanied by an infantry double envelopment.",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-2001.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/zg651950g",
        "rank": 0
    }
]