[
    {
        "id": 205783,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1969",
        "page_number": 89,
        "title": "RAS-1969",
        "content_text": "KING MONGKUT AND THE KINGDOM OF SIAM\n\n83\n\nopened the Treaty Ports and a second British conflict with China had proved the superiority of Western arms, the Chinese court refused to reform. The Japanese were quicker to read the signs. Only Siam, unlike her weak neighbours in the tropical south, was able to adapt herself to the new world without war or its threat and without loss of sovereignty.\n\nWhy was this? Was it because Britain and France had agreed to the Thai kingdom being a buffer between their Indian and Indo-Chinese empires? Or was it that the King of Siam who received Sir John Bowring had more vision than most of his Asian contemporaries and was succeeded by an equally gifted son? Whatever the reasons, the Treaty of 1855 was a major factor in determining the future of the Thai kingdom. It provided for the opening of diplomatic relations with Britain and, as a natural consequence, with other western nations. It introduced extra-territorial rights to British subjects living in Siam and allowed them to own or rent property. In commerce the Treaty abolished the strangling system of monopolies owned by the King and 'farmed' to Chinese merchants - replacing it by a free market with low duties on imports and exports. The year after the conclusion of the British treaty the Americans and the French secured similar agreements and these in turn were hastily followed by treaties with various European nations. These treaties marked a turning-point in the modern history of Siam.\n\nIn the century and a half which followed Louis XIV's mission to Ayuthia in 1689 Siam had little or no contact with the West. In the mid-eighteenth century her main preoccupation was the constant war with the Burmese who finally sacked their ancient and splendid capital in 1767. By the time the new house of Chakri had established the capital at Bangkok in 1782 the British East India Company had consolidated its dominion over India. The tea trade with China was growing rapidly and ports of call on the eastern run were obvious advantages. Francis Light obtained Penang island for the Company from the Sultan of Kedah in 1786 for the annual payment of $6,000 and the vague understanding of British protection. Kedah was an acknowledged feudatory of Siam, but at that time King Rama I was far too busy with the building of Bangkok to concern himself with the incident and the British were not then interested in Siam. Raffles had",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1969.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/9g553n20d",
        "rank": 0
    },
    {
        "id": 205784,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1969",
        "page_number": 90,
        "title": "RAS-1969",
        "content_text": "84 \n\nR. BRUCE \n\nlost Java and gained Singapore for a reluctant Company, and Malacca followed. Siam was eventually drawn into the picture not for her trade or her position on the way to China \n\na little \n\noff the route -- but, in fact, because of Kedah and the other northern Malay States. \n\nBy 1818 the Chakri dynasty had gained sufficient strength to instigate her vassal Kedah to attack the neighbouring Malay State of Perak. The Siamese army then entered Kedah itself and the Sultan fled to Penang. British merchants there were indignant and called on the Company to intervene, but the Supreme Council in Calcutta considered that \"a war with Siam would be an evil of very serious magnitude\". Their policy was one of conciliation. \"All extension of our territorial possessions and political relations on the side of the Indo-Chinese nations\" the Company declared, \"... is earnestly to be deprecated and declined as far as the course of events and the force of circumstances permit\". \n\nAs well as the Malay States there was the Burma question. The restive Burmese had extended their power to Arakan, thus making them neighbours of the British in India. By the eighteen-twenties Britain became involved in war with Burma in the southern part of the country. With the extension of the East India Company's interests to Siam's western and southern borders it became desirable that relations between the Company and Bangkok should be regulated on a peaceful basis. At the same time trading relations should be improved. The bad conditions of trade were described by Raffles as \"slavish and humiliating” for English merchants. He gave this account of the trade: \n\n“On arrival in port the most valuable part of the cargo is immediately presented to the King who takes as much as he pleases; the remaining part is chiefly consumed in presents to the courtiers and other great men, while the refuse of the cargo is then permitted to be exposed to sale. The part which is consumed in presents to the great men is entire loss; for that which the King receives he generally returns a present which is seldom adequate to the value of the goods which he has received; but by dint of begging and repeated solicitation this is sometimes increased a little.\" \n\nTo remedy the situation John Crawford was sent to Bangkok by the Governor General of India in 1822. \n\nPage 90\n\nPage 91",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1969.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/9g553n20d",
        "rank": 0
    },
    {
        "id": 215771,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-2002",
        "page_number": 70,
        "title": "RAS-2002",
        "content_text": "3\n\nbecame British territory. Malacca was administered by the Dutch until the signing of the Anglo-Dutch treaty in 1824, whereby it was ceded to the British among other terms. Two years later, Singapore and Malacca came under the Penang Presidency.\n\nAccording to Turnbull, the Straits Settlements were the East India Company's most incongruous offspring….The Straits Settlements formed a scattered unit, which was difficult to administer efficiently.” In legal terms, it included Western laws at constitutional level, and local legal systems under the control of sultans.\n\nPhysical/geographical problems\n\nPenang Island lay opposite Province Wellesley (a strip of land about 30 miles long and three miles wide) which the EIC acquired from the Sultan of Kedah in 1800. Malacca was about 260 miles to the south of Penang. Singapore Island was a further 120 miles south, at the tip of the Malay Peninsula.\n\nThere were problems of communication between these settlements, being only by means of sea. Until 1861, the Straits government possessed only two antiquated sailing gunboats and one steamer, used mainly to ferry the governor, recorders and senior officials between the three stations. Communications with the EIC's headquarters in Calcutta were also poor, and until 1864, a monthly steamer service between Calcutta and the Straits Settlements remained the only link with the seat of government.\"\n\nAdministration problems\n\nAccording to Turnbull, '[d]ivision of interest between the East India Company and its eastern dependencies was even more formidable than the geographical and physical problems of administration. The sole value of the Straits Settlements to the East India Company was to protect and stimulate the China trade. When [the EIC] lost its monopoly of this trade in 1833 Calcutta was left with an unrewarding and expensive burden. She could not abandon the Straits Settlements but constantly begrudged the drain they made upon India's financial resources and upon the time and attention of senior officials over the next thirty years.'",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-2002.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/mp4901278",
        "rank": 0
    },
    {
        "id": 215785,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-2002",
        "page_number": 84,
        "title": "RAS-2002",
        "content_text": "in the Straits, for example in negotiation for the settlement of Penang Island in 1786 where the Supreme Government remained steadfast in refusing to promise military aid to the Sultan of Kedah. Thus, in a Siamese invasion in 1821, the Penang Government did not offer military aid to the Sultan, but only political asylum and mediation. Indeed the whole history of Anglo-Siamese relations in the Malay Peninsular shows evidence that the non-intervention policy was adhered to as much as possible, (cf. Mills, supra, Chap 8 (Anglo-Siamese relations)) For the obvious political and economic reasons the British did not want to antagonise the Siamese (cf. Tarling, Anglo-Dutch Rivalry in the Malay World, 1760-1824) by interfering in the affairs of the Malay States (such as Kedah, Kelantan and Trengganu) which were within the Siamese sphere of influence.\n\nSevere censures were passed upon Captain Low for his treaty with Perak in 1826; and the treaty between James Low and Perak and Selangor in 1826, received strong criticism from the Supreme Government and resulted in Low's being suspended from his duties. (Tan DE, Supra, p 119) The Indian Government only relented when Governor Fullerton managed to convince it of the necessity of protecting British interests, a clear instance of the Indian Government's unwillingness to intervene in any of the Malay States. This was further proven when appeals of Perak and Trengannu for defensive purposes were likewise rejected. In the Naning War of 1831-2, Governor Ibbetson was told that the extension of territory was not desired. (Ibid. p 119)\n\nAn even more striking instance occurred in 1833, when the boundary between the Malacca Territory and the tiny state of Johol was debated over. Between the two lay a debatable piece of land which had formerly been claimed by both states, containing rich mines of tin and gold. Governor Ibbetson regarded the frontier delimitation as an excellent opportunity for showing that accessions of territory and encroachments upon their rights is the furthest from our views and intentions' (Mills, supra, p 177), thus resigning any claims that the British might have to it, and even included it within the area of Johol.\n\nThrough the above examples, I would say that the British were pursuing a policy of non-intervention in the Malay States between 1824-73. They upheld this policy whenever possible, though in some cases intervention was unavoidable. And it is significant that sometimes even in instances where British merchants' interests were threatened (for example in Negri Sembilan), the policy of non-intervention was still observed.",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-2002.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/mp4901278",
        "rank": 0
    }
]